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ABSTRACT
This thesis contributes to institutional theories about European business systems through the 
analysis of one case study: the French asset management industry in the period 1984-1999. It 
asks how firms in a given business system adapt to changes in their economic and societal 
environment. The thesis declines the usual focus on issues of convergence and divergence, 
and suggests investigating organisational adaptation as a key dynamic process within business 
systems, and it develops a theoretical framework for this purpose. It presents the French 
model of asset management in the mid-1980s and contrasts it with the Anglo-Saxon model. It 
then shows that by 1999 French firms had for the most part adopted the dominant patterns of 
the Anglo-Saxon model. It then explains that if companies can stimulate the constitution of a 
new organisational field operating with different rules and institutional arrangements, they 
can depart from the dominant patterns and behaviours of their national environment. In this 
process, such institutional agents as regulators, professionals, market leaders and consultants, 
and such calculation tools as performance measurement, benchmark, rating and invitations to 
tender play a key part in establishing the new rules. Instead of focusing on convergence or on 
persisting diversities among national business systems, the thesis suggests further 
investigating the constitution of trans-national entities.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
This thesis contributes to the analysis of a general problem: how European business systems 
respond to societal change. It follows a literature, which recognises that economic action 
should be understood as embedded in a societal environment, and that a coherence exists 
between national institutions and the organisational patterns and behaviours of firms. But 
given a changing economic and social environment, the research does not follow the usual 
perspectives that focus either on convergence or on persisting differences between national 
economies. Instead it concentrates on the analysis of one particular phenomenon: 
organisational adaptation. In an integrating Europe, how do firms adapt to changes in their 
surrounding business system? The argument will proceed in four steps.
In the first chapter, we justify this approach and the methodology adopted. The second 
chapter is devoted to the case study design, French asset management over the period 1984- 
1999, and to the definition of four theoretical hypotheses or possible scenarios about how 
French firms would have adapted to changes in their environment, as predicted in the 
literature. Also, we will develop a theoretical framework, in order to have the necessary 
theoretical tools to analyse organisational adaptation processes within the business system 
framework. In a third step, we will categorise the situation in the French asset management 
industry at two historical moments: 1984, and January 1999, when the Euro was launched. 
We will note that most firms have departed from the patterns of the French model to embrace 
those of the Anglo-Saxon model. Finally, we will explain how this rather surprising result was 
possible and develop a novel understanding of organisational adaptation processes. This will 
lead us back to the initial research problem, which is the concern o f the following pages.
1. The research problem
Our research problem is organisational adaptation in an integrating Europe. We will show that 
it emerges from a particular approach, economic embeddedness within business systems as it 
faces societal change. We will then explain why we focus on organisational adaptation and 
why especially in an integrating Europe.
11
1.1. The starting point: embeddedness and business systems
The research belongs to a growing stream, which holds that economic action should be 
analysed with regard to its context. Over the last twenty years, economic sociology and 
political economy have indeed had an impressive renewal, with more and more scholars 
revisiting the postulates of economics and trying to offer better accounts of economic 
phenomena (Nee, 1998; Swedberg, 1997). Here the core concept is ‘embeddedness’, which 
was made popular by Granovetter in a much cited article of 1985. But the notion of 
embeddedness goes back to the writings of Karl Polanyi (1944), who assumed the existence 
of an institutional frame constituting the context in which economic activities took place 
(Callon, 1998: 8). Granovetter rejected the two concepts of Homo Sociologicus and Homo 
Economicus, the latter resting on the hypothesis of a person closed in on himself. As 
Granovetter noted:
A fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the atomisation implicit 
in the theoretical extremes of under- and oversocialized conceptions. Actors do 
not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, not do they adhere 
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social 
categories that they happen to occupy. (1985: 487)
The starting point of the thesis is the recognition of this embeddedness of economic action, 
not only in networks, as stated by Granovetter (1985), but also in the cognitive, regulatory and 
normative institutions that constitute social structure (Giddens, 1984: 31; Scott, 1995: 35).
More precisely, the present research follows a large and growing body of literature that
attempts to categorise capitalist economies in terms of their specific institutional
arrangements (Albert, 1991; Berger and Dore, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall and
Soskice, 2001; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, 1994;
Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1999). Most of these authors express the view (which is also the initial
postulate of this research) that economic behaviour can be understood at the level of a system
which gives coherence to the behaviour of individual agents. For instance, Hollingsworth and
Boyer define what they call a social system of production, which means “the way that a
number of institutions or structures of a country or a region are integrated into a social
configuration” (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998: 2). These institutions are:
the industrial relations system, the system of training of workers and managers, 
the internal structure of corporate firms, the structured relationships among firms, 
the financial markets of a society, the concepts of fairness and justice held by 
capital and labour, the structure of the state and its policies and a society’s 
idiosyncratic customs and traditions as well as norms, moral principles, rules, 
laws and recipes for action.(ibid.)
They claim that these institutions tend to integrate with one another, and that they constitute a 
relatively stable and coherent social configuration. A similar idea is found in the notion of 
models of capitalism, which are used to define institutional typologies affecting the 
functioning and performance of firms (Albert, 1991; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Rhodes and 
Van Apeldoom, 1997; Streeck 1992; Zucker, 1988). Models of capitalism have insisted, in 
particular, on the different configurations in terms of corporate governance between Anglo- 
Saxon and Rhenan capitalisms (Albert, 1991), or between shareholder and stakeholder 
capitalisms (Kelly, Kelly and Gamble, 1997). The thesis will use a third concept, the business 
system (Whitley, 1991), which seems more appropriate for the study of corporate behaviour 
in a context of institutional change, and which explicitly relates business organisations to their 
socio-institutional environment.
Business systems are understood as the sum of the general practices and value orientations
which characterise both the internal organisation of business units and their relations with
their environment. They are “distinctive patterns of economic organisation that vary in their
degree and mode of authoritative co-ordination of economic activities, and in the organisation
of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts and other employees” (Whitley,
1999: 33). It is important to notice that the concept of business system was elaborated for and
has been used for comparative purposes. But it also provides a framework that accounts for
internal consistency, as underlined by Whitley:
While not assuming that national contexts determine all aspects of business 
systems, nor denying the significance of variations between industries in 
heterogeneous cultures, the comparative analysis of enterprise structures does 
claim that dominant social institutions generate distinctive business systems 
which are relatively similar within national states and strong cultural systems, but 
vary considerably between them. (1991: 24)
It is of special interest that these theories recognise some conformity between the micro-level 
of corporate behaviour and a macro-level of analysis. In other words, they offer some 
concrete understanding of the embeddedness of organisations in defining patterns of 
behaviours for firms and economic agents, and in relating them to dominant institutions. This 
is the case in the work of Christel Lane (1992, 1995) on France, Germany and Britain; of 
Jacqueline O’Reilly (1994) on banking in France and Britain; of Peer Kristensen (1995) on 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Denmark; and of Whitley (1991, 1999) on Asian and 
East-European countries, just to mention a few. Such studies should also be related to the Aix 
school, which produced a number of comparative enquiries (Maurice et al., 1988; Maurice, 
Sellier and Silvestre, 1986; Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980; Sorge and Warner, 1986), and 
which undoubtedly influenced the business system approach. Taken together, these studies 
provide a body of literature that categorises national economies by defining the dominant
13
patterns of behaviour of given economic agents, and by relating these to particular sets of 
institutions. They have developed some frameworks to categorise national economies using 
particular lists of key characteristics and using tables that combine them with macro- 
institutional features. This is well illustrated by Whitley (1999), who first identifies eight key 
characteristics of business systems in three categories (ownership co-ordination, non­
ownership co-ordination and employment, and employment relations and work management 
[34]), then classifies them along six business system ideal-types (42), which are then 
combined in a matrix with thirteen institutional features (60). These approaches together with 
those previously quoted therefore provide a framework by which to categorise national 
economies.
Moreover, the business system approach seeks to recognise and identify some dynamic 
elements within the functioning of national economies, and it questions the persistence and 
change of varied forms of economic organisation (Whitley, 1999: 5). Interestingly, one could 
understand the present varieties of capitalism as different versions of what has been defined as 
Fordism, each of these versions following national specificities and bargaining traditions 
(Crouch and Streeck, 1997: 8). Based on the principles of Taylor’s scientific management and 
initiated in the United States in the 1930s, Fordism was a method for the efficient production 
of a single item through mass production and standardisation, and it gradually gained 
universal acceptance as the paradigm of efficient production, at least until the early 1970s 
(Boyer and Durand, 1997: 7). But Fordism was more than a method of production: it 
encompassed an institutional configuration, a mode of regulation associated with particular 
employment relations (Boyer and Durand, 1997: 9; Lipietz, 1992: 8). It was implemented at a 
time when economies were nationally organised and when nation-states acted as watertight 
containers of the production process (Dicken, 1998: 2). Consequently, Fordism could be 
successfully diffused internationally, but because it both implied and required a societal 
compromise and compatible institutions it was integrated into a variety of national practices 
and traditions. Business systems are therefore regarded as the products of certain historical 
developments: they receive their distinctive character at a very early stage of the 
industrialisation process, but develop and adapt over time in response to broader economic 
and technological challenges, as well as to social and political pressures (Lane, 1992: 64). 
And the proponents of the business system approach consider that “societies with different 
institutional arrangements will continue to develop and reproduce varied systems of economic 
organization with different economic and social capabilities in particular industries and 
sectors” (Whitley, 1999: 3). However, given the present situation of societal change and its 
trans-national nature, there arises a problem: why should national business systems remain
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different? To answer this question we decided to focus on one particular phenomenon: 
organisational adaptation.
1.2. A context of economic transformation questions the 
persistence of national distinctiveness
The problem with the institutional analysis of European business systems is that it does not 
explain how national distinctiveness may be preserved despite present societal changes. While 
it is hardly disputable that capitalist economies have experienced accelerated transformation 
over the last twenty years (Dicken, 1998: 3), there is no agreement about the direction they 
are taking. A short phenomenology of the present changes will illustrate how extensive they 
are, and this will lead us to recognise conflicting theories about their impact on national 
economies. Noticing an inescapable dichotomy in the literature, we will explain why a focus 
on organisational adaptation was adopted in the research.
1.2.1. Current changes in the world economy
Four elements are often mentioned to describe the current changes in the world economy: new 
technologies, globalisation, new competitive conditions and re-definition of the role o f the 
state.
First of all, technological progress and the digital revolution radically changed the conditions 
of production and the possibilities of innovation. In what has been described as Flexible 
Specialisation and Neo-Fordism (Piore and Sabel, 1984), or post-Fordism (Boyer and Durand, 
1997; Lipietz, 1992) or lean management (Womack et al., 1990), there is no longer a 
dissociation between the design and the execution of tasks. Workers participate in a constant 
upgrading of the production processes; they are expected to suggest improvements, take 
initiatives and be responsible for their work. Firms can thus achieve both flexibility and high 
quality. The impact of new technologies and especially the rise of the Internet and other 
communications devices such as digital television and mobile phones results in boundaries 
being blurred between industries, and even more between countries. This leads to what some 
call the “eEconomy” (Andersen Consulting, 1999), where the same companies can operate in 
publishing, entertainment and retail at the same time, on a global basis and without closing 
hours. New technologies mark the death of distance (Caimcross, 1997) and the birth of a 24- 
hour-society (Moore-Ede, 1993).
In fact, and this is the second dimension of the present changes, boundaries seem to be 
dissolving between countries, so that time and space are contracting in a globalising world.
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Globalisation refers both to the compression of the world and to the intensification of 
interdependency (Giddens, 1990: 21; Robertson, 1992: 8). International trade and cross- 
border investments are creating economic interdependency. Mass media and 
telecommunications open the world to individuals who then develop a global awareness 
(Giddens, 1991: 187). Interdependency and time-space contraction go with the development 
of trans-national entities. Leslie Sklair, who talks about sociology of the global system, 
expresses the view that these trans-national corporations produce trans-national practices, 
which then become the basis of the global system (1991: 6).
The third phenomenon in today’s changes is the establishment of new competitive conditions. 
In the New Competition, not only price but also innovation, fast design, better products, and 
higher responsiveness to change start to be the decisive criteria (Best, 1990: 254). 
Competitiveness is no longer the outcome of the firm's own efforts and its ability to 
rationalise production so as to lower costs. Competitiveness is the outcome of such 
institutional arrangements as education, research and development capacities, information 
resources, transport and communication networks, leisure and the quality of life, all of which 
contribute to the competitiveness of nations (Porter, 1990: 19). Consequently, and this is the 
last dimension of the phenomenology of the present changes, the role of nation-states is being 
re-defined.
Governments seem to have lost their supremacy in terms of economic governance. This is the
argument of Susan Strange’s The Retreat o f The State (1996), where she writes that:
The impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post-war period more 
by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the co-operative 
decision of governments, are now more powerful than the states. (4)
Everywhere, privatisation and deregulation are on the agenda. In the period 1990 to 1996
alone, more than thirty countries abandoned central planning as the main mode of allocating
scarce resources, while over eighty countries liberalised their inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) policies (Dunning, 1997a: 35). The difficulties experienced by states in coping with the
changing conditions of competition and economic order have led to a retreat by government
from direct economic involvement. They have given back to markets a leading role in the
managing of the economy. In what is called Alliance Capitalism (Dunning, 1997b), states
tend to build a partnership with business and society in order to compete internationally and
to attract FDI. To do so, they behave:
as strategic organise5and institution-builders, as ensurers of the availability of 
high-quality locationally bound inputs, as smoothers of the course of economic 
change and as creators of the right ethos for entrepreneurship innovation, learning 
and high-quality standards. (Dunning, 1997b: 23)
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All these changes, however, severely question the previous framework positing that economic 
action can be described using national business system types. Why should differences persist 
when there are no more boundaries to the global influence of change? Given new 
technologies and international interdependency, how do we understand the transformation 
occurring inside business systems?
1.2.2. Convergence vs. Divergence
Although a major qualitative change is widely acknowledged amongst scholars, there is as yet 
no agreement on the extent and precise nature of that change (Lane, 1995: 1). One dispute is 
between the hypothesis of general convergence towards a single model, and that of persisting 
national differences that will either remain unchanged or even be reinforced by the general 
trends of economic transformation.
The first thesis, sustained by Marxists, by functionalist social science, and by the management 
literature in general, is that in a modernising and globalising world, each national economy is 
likely to converge on a single set of axial principles for its economic and social organisation. 
For Marx and Lenin and their followers, the world is becoming unified because o f the 
domination of a single way of producing commodities: capitalists will use their power to 
impose their system on regions not previously within their orbit (Waters, 1995: 12). For 
functionalists, there is an evolutionary path, with corresponding stages that any society will 
follow to reach the same eventual configuration. For instance, Bell (1976) argues that 
emerging intellectual technologies for the production of services create convergence towards 
a post-industrial future, while scholars interested in macro-social convergence insist on the 
capacity of specific agents to develop a unified global system (Robertson, 1992; Sklair, 1991). 
Most business and management scholars also predict a gradual convergence of national 
economic systems in a borderless and global world. Since the existence of a “best way” for 
business organisation is recognised, global best practices and dominant market structures 
gradually overtake the entire world. For instance, the multi-divisionary organisation 
(Chandler, 1962; Williamson, 1975), the trans-national organisation (Barlett and Ghoshal, 
1982, 1989; Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1991) or lean management (Edquist and Jacobson, 1988; 
Womack et al., 1990) become generalised because of their inherently superior efficiency. In 
general, the convergence thesis therefore goes with evolutionary and rational choice 
perspectives, and with the idea that each individual country will adopt the same patterns of 
economic behaviour, which are judged superior either because of their efficiency or because 
of the power of their advocates.
However, many other authors have supported the thesis of persisting differences and even 
divergence. A common view, advanced by comparative political economists, is that 
convergence is over-stated and that closer examination shows that differences still persist and 
are likely to remain (Kingman, 1996). Some scholars insist that convergence to a single most 
effective type of market economy is no more likely in the twenty-first century than it was in 
the highly internationalised economy of the nineteenth century (Hirst and Thompson, 1996).
Some others focus on persisting differences between national configurations (Boyer, 1996;
Florida and Kenney, 1993; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998; Kristensen and Whitley, 1995,
1997; Lane, 1992; Maurice et al., 1986). In their view, the interdependency between national 
institutions will continue to develop and to reproduce varied systems of economic
organisation that are equally viable. For that reason, the same global processes would still
- ---------------------------------  f j / y * * * -
lead to different versions and different production systems. Finally, some authors have 1 \ ^ \
suggested the development of further divergence, based on the principle of international 
specialisation. Such authors as Dicken (1998), Dunning (1997a), Porter (1990) and Best 
(1990) insist that in a globalising world states are all the more important in developing the 
institutional configurations within which firms can flourish, given the new economic 
conditions of competition. Convergence will not occur, because the specific features of 
business systems will lead firms to specialise in some sectors and to disregard others, which 
in turn could lead to international competitive advantage and division of labour (Porter, 1990;
Sorge, 1991). Globalisation may therefore end up reinforcing patterns of specialisation and 
the distinctiveness of national economies. These arguments seem just as convincing as those 
of the proponents of the convergence thesis, which is why another approach may be desirable.
1.3. Another perspective: a focus on organisational adaptation
It is very difficult to find a way out of this confrontation between the convergence and the 
divergence theses. In fact, there seems to be almost a formal point of no return between the 
two perspectives. The numerous studies produced over the last years start displaying some 
conventional conclusions, and this may have more to do with their disciplinary divides than 
with any convincing evidence. On the one hand, scholars interested in economic efficiency 
and performance seem to be driven towards the convergence thesis. They tend to insist on the 
possibility of agency from actors that break free from their national constraints to build up the 
global best practices and new ways of organising. On the other hand, scholars interested in 
comparative studies of countries and industries seem inclined to agree with the divergence 
thesis. They insist on the importance of institutions in constraining and orientating change. As 
a result, the debate between the convergence and divergence hypotheses is losing its 
fruitfulness (Djelic, 1998). In reality, part of the problem in addressing persisting differences
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in a context of globalisation and European integration is a consequence of the theoretical and 
methodological orientations that have been used so far. The deadlock between the 
convergence and divergence debates results from the subjective stance inside any research 
project in the social sciences. It is not surprising that researchers looking for differences will 
find some, just as it is not surprising that researchers looking at new social practices will find 
some kind of convergent upgrading.
The observer himself creates his object and formats it in a way that suits his research 
enterprise (Popper, 1963: 48). And the convergence and divergence hypotheses are the 
products of particular theories and methodologies. The convergence proposition that a best 
way to organise economic action will be generalised to the whole world is justified by using 
rational choice or evolutionist types of arguments. But rational choice theory fails to 
recognise that preferences, alternatives and outcomes are structured and restructured by 
particular social constructs, which are themselves historically bounded. The focus on agency 
misses a number of macro-social constraints. Evolutionist types of arguments concentrate on 
stages and on generic principles moving societies in one direction (Rostow, 1968). They miss 
the complexity inherent in change and tend to reduce reality to mere theoretical categories. 
The divergence proposition is sustained by those comparative political economists who insist 
on macro-institutional constraints. But their comparative methodology tends to point to 
differences and to overlook similarities. Moreover, the systemic view advanced in these 
approaches insists on the interconnectedness of various institutions and therefore emphasises 
reproduction and inertia at the expense of conflict and change (Lane, 1995: 13). It tends to 
ignore the possibility of agents altering their institutional environment. Another problem 
comes from their lack of a consistent theory about how institutions affect the behaviour of 
economic agents (Hall and Soskice, 2001). To escape the deadlock of the convergence and 
divergence theories, and the limitations of their understanding of reality, it is necessary to 
provide a new approach towards the analysis of change within business systems. In the 
present research, it is suggested that the study of organisational adaptation may offer an 
interesting perspective towards this end.
1.3.1. Firms, an appropriate level of analysis
Comparative political economy has traditionally paid attention to the state and to trade unions 
(Hall and S^ ckjc^ 2 0 0 1 : 2). The business system perspective draws attention to the 
relationships between five broad kinds of economic actors: (a) the providers and users of 
capital, (b) customers and suppliers, (c) competitors, (d) firms in different sectors, and finally 
(e) employers and different kinds of employees (Whitley, 1999: 33). To tackle business 
systems within the perspective of societal change, there could admittedly be several levels of
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analysis: macro, micro or meso, and several types of focus: individuals, the state, firms or 
even intermediary associations (Hage, 2000). Here, it is argued that business organisations, at 
a meso-level, should be the focus of attention, not so much to categorise their relationships 
with other economic actors, but first and foremost to monitor their dynamics.
The first justification for this choice is that firms have become key actors in modern 
capitalism. Firms were often neglected in contemporary Political Economy (Sally, 1994). But 
recent initiatives (Casper, 1997; Hancke, 2000; Mueller and Loveridge, 1997) have shown the 
potential interest of a firm-centred Political Economy. Many writers have acknowledged the 
increased importance of firms within society (Giddens, 1990; Ritzer, 1993; Sainsaulieu, 1990, 
Strange, 1996): they are regarded as centres of innovation and as capable of influencing and 
changing their social surroundings. The second reason for this focus on firms is that they play 
a key role not only in the definition but also in the production and in the re-production of 
business systems themselves. First, the key features used to define business systems are firm- 
centred: they focus on how firms are influenced and relate to a set of institutions (Whitley, 
1992). But more importantly, they are both the repositories and the agents of transformation 
of national business systems. This is because of the properties of systems and in particular 
because of how they are reproduced over time, as explained, in particular, in Giddens’ 
structuration theory.
Giddens conceives systems as “reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, 
organised as regular social practices” (1984: 25). This definition is similar to the concept of 
business systems presented earlier, as grounded in relationships between owners, managers 
experts, employees and institutions. In structuration theory, social systems are reproduced 
over time because agents activate (or constitute) their structural properties. Firms, as 
economic agents, carry internally the structural properties of their surrounding business 
system, the patterns of which they reproduce over time or even alter, in their actions and 
interactions. And they are key players in the maintaining and change of the business system, 
because they have a central role in the definition and re-production of it. Admittedly, they are 
not the only agents capable of changing the properties of the system: the state has without 
doubt this ability. But the factors of change in today’s economy are so much related to firms 
that they are probably the most interesting objects of analysis, in any attempt to monitor how 
national differences remain or disappear. This is the reason why the present research focuses 
on business organisations. More precisely, the choice was made to focus on one particular 
process: organisational adaptation.
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1.3.2. The problem of organisational adaptation
The approach taken in this thesis consists of monitoring how firms in a given business system 
adapt to changes in their environment. We argue that this focus not only helps to uncover 
business systems’ internal dynamics, but also that it is compatible with our initial postulate 
that economic action is embedded within society.
The concept of organisational adaptation refers to the way firms alter their structures, routines 
and organisation to fit better with their market niche. Dynamic in nature, organisational 
adaptation corresponds to the Darwinian concept that living organisms survive because they 
are adapted to their environment (Darwin, 1968). Biological and ecological analogies have 
been considered appropriate to the study of firms within their context, because they are 
purposive and mortal entities (Alchian and Lott, 1997; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
Ultimately, a firm can survive only if it finds customers to buy its products, in other words, if 
it is adapted to the demand in its market niche. But while this is generally accepted, 
adaptation has only recently become a matter of concern for organisation theorists. 
Understanding why this should be will show why it fits with our initial perspective.
As Coase noted in his celebrated 1932 article, the firm had not been clearly defined by 
economists in their theories. And just as the firm remained unquestioned for a long time, the 
relations between firms and their environments were absent from organisational theory until 
recently. In the neo-classical economic model, as defined for instance by Walras in the 1930s, 
the firm is only a part of the price and resource allocation theory: it maximises profit in a 
perfectly rational and transparent market, where every resource and information is known and 
available. In a given technical set-up with perfect information and competitive conditions, the 
firm has therefore no difficulty in reaching an optimum by adjusting output or price 
respectively. As a result, adaptation is straightforward and immediately guaranteed in the neo­
classical concept of the market. And for that reason there is no theoretical question about 
adaptation. The same is true in the idea of firms as closed systems. The scientific management 
literature does not question the environment: it is part of a process, the process of producing 
goods scientifically. The environment provides raw material and resources, which are then 
engineered through bureaucratic rules, following a careful analysis and an attempt to find out 
the one-best-way to organise production. The whole organisation is a machine, there is no 
problem in its relation to the environment, no question of adaptation. In short, for theories 
based on optimisation of resources and unlimited rationality, adaptation was not a theoretical 
problem. However, new perspectives on capitalism and society, which rejected both the over­
socialised nature of sociology and the under-socialised nature of economics, looked at 
adaptation differently.
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In the economic field, Schumpeter undoubtedly had an impact in promoting a concept of 
efficiency and change that criticises economic maximisation as a theoretical perspective. 
Capitalism is, according to him, “by nature a form or method of economic change,” so that a 
process of creative destruction constantly “revolutionises the economic structure from within, 
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one” (1943: 82-83). 
Competition from new technologies and from new types of organisation is more effective 
than simple maximisation of existing resources. Because of constant change, only those 
organisations that best exploit the capacity of their environment can strive and survive. Only 
those adapting themselves to change can avoid being destroyed. Schumpeter contributed 
therefore to a theoretical perspective towards adaptation, as shown from his interest in 
adaptive mechanisms and especially the role of entrepreneurs. This analysis is still very 
influential today, as illustrated in the ‘evolutionary economics’ and Neo-Schumpetarian 
schools (Levinthal, 1994; Nelson and Winter, 1982). We should also mention the influence of 
Parsons, who gave adaptation an important role in his social system theory. For Parsons, 
adaptation is first and foremost related to the economy (1960: 164). Together with Neil 
Smelser he conceives the function of economic production as primarily an adaptive 
mechanism of society in relation to several of its environments (1956: 111). This relates not 
only to the allocation of resources but also to societal values and norms. Focusing on 
organisational adaptation means therefore focusing on the key function of firms within their 
business system. We consider a focus on organisational adaptation a suitable approach to 
tackle the problem of persisting diversities in a context of economic change, and to grasp how 
business systems retain or depart from their dominant patterns in a changing environment.
It is not by chance that the Handbook o f Organisational Design (Nystom and Starbuck, 1981) 
has as a subtitle: “Adapting organisations to their environments.” Adaptation is probably the 
key challenge facing business firms. In modem capitalism, the competitiveness of firms 
reflects their capacity to innovate, which is seen everywhere and is related to a constant 
adaptive process (Lundvall, 1992). Organisations are not self-directed and autonomous. They 
need resources like capital, personnel and supply, which are not always available. This results 
in an interdependency with other companies or individuals possessing these resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). For that reason, from the point of view of the organisation, change is 
driven by the relationship between the organisation and its environment (Cyert and March, 
1963). Adaptation occurs when some attributes, such as business strategy, structure or 
routines, are changed in response to an environmental change, in order to fit some new 
environmental contingency (Levinthal, 1994). But adaptation will not be conceived here as a 
pure feedback response: adaptive adjustment can also include manipulative and political
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behaviour where organisations select and try to alter their environments (Hedberg, 1981: 3; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). By focusing on organisational adaptation, the present research 
attempts to escape the deadlock between the convergence and divergence theses. The process 
of organisational adaptation is a key element in the micro-foundations of business systems. It 
represents a core function of economic and managerial action and it has an impact on both the 
internal maintenance of the system and on its transformation. The research will attempt to 
monitor carefully how firms react to changes in their environment, and whether and how they 
depart from reproducing the dominant patterns of their surrounding business system. To do 
so, it will build upon the studies developed by organisation theories. But there is also another 
justification for an approach based on organisational adaptation, and one that arises out of a 
broader consideration of European integration.
1.4. At stake is also the path followed by European integration
As the European Union grows and intensifies, it has been the subject of more and more 
academic interest. European integration is often described as a catalyst (Merrill Lynch, 1998; 
White, 1998) that enables general trends of economic transformation to penetrate European 
economies; it is also a process of its own, which results in the creation of specific institutions 
and rules. And interestingly, the problem of organisational adaptation in an integrating Europe 
casts doubts on the path chosen towards a closer union.
The European Union is creating a new business environment for firms operating in the 
member-states (Nugent and O’Donnell, 1994: 1). It is also developing an original set of 
institutions, combining supra-national and inter-governmental dimensions (Nugent, 1994: 
430). The scope of European integration is therefore not only about trade liberalisation; it is 
about the creation of a unique form of government, which could integrate nation-states in a 
common system (Hix, 2000). The Monnet method has followed functionalist theories of 
European integration, based on the idea that a ‘spill-over’ will extend the degree of 
integration from narrow economic co-operation towards political and social integration 
(Monnet, 1976: 537). And the evaluation of the Single Market programme, in particular, 
undermines the view that business firms will be an important vector of this integration.
Cecchini, in his analysis of the benefits of the single European market, anticipated “a new and 
pervasive competitive climate” which would stimulate businesses to exploit new opportunities 
and to use available resources better (1988: 73). Behind the evaluation of the benefits of the 
single market is indeed the assumption that European firms would take advantage of the 
Single European Market to restructure their operations, and to reach economies of scale and
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scope (Thompson, 1993; Tsoukalis, 1993). In other words, at the core of the single market
project is the idea that firms will adapt to the new European environment produced by the
dismantling of non-trade barriers. The central idea is therefore a ‘Europeanization’ of
business activity: instead of remaining focused on their home market, firms will
internationalise their activities and reach a European scale, either by themselves or through
take-overs or alliances. The European Commission argues that only an internal market on a
truly European scale can combine the advantages of technical efficiency and economic
efficiency (Gibb & Wise, 1993: 109). The idea behind this concept is therefore not only that
firms will adapt, but also that they will move from their national business system to constitute
a European business system. This perspective is even evoked by Whitley:
If, for example, owners, managers, unions, and other organised groups became 
structured at a European level, together with the emergence of a European state 
that dominated national and regional political systems and established 
standardised labour and financial systems across Europe, we would expect 
nationally distinct business systems to become less significant than the emerging 
European form of economic organisation. (1999: 46)
European integration and organisational adaptation are therefore linked together: 
organisational adaptation is expected to occur in reaction to European integration, and at the 
same time organisational adaptation is expected to foster integration and to create a European 
business system. Both processes are believed to be mutually dependent, which makes the 
study of organisational adaptation in an integrating Europe all the more interesting, not least 
because there are some doubts about the path chosen towards European integration and its 
capacity to forge a distinctive European system.
There is indeed a dualism in the process of European integration, between supranational 
European law and intergovernmental European policy-making. This can be described as the 
contrast between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ integration: “measures increasing market 
integration by eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition, on the 
one hand, and common European policies to shape the conditions under which markets 
operate, on the other hand” (Scharpf, 1996: 36). In the path chosen towards European 
integration, the negative option has dominated so far. The European Court of Justice 
successfully enforced non-interference from European Union (EU) member States (Garrett et 
al., 1998; O’Neill, 1994), while the principle supporting the single market programme was 
mutual recognition and therefore competition among rules (Woolcock, 1994). Moreover, 
positive integration was often blocked in the games of intergovernmental policy and often 
took the form of guidelines, networking and self regulation (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1994: 14; Kohler-Koch, 1996: 371), and directives, which are only binding as 
to the result to be achieved (Nugent, 1994: 210). By focusing on organisational adaptation, we
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may be able to offer interesting insights about whether negative integration is sufficient to 
build up a European business system. Moreover, as was pointed out by Schmitter (1997), it 
may well be that the rising tide of globalisation and interdependency will simply dissolve 
Europe by integrating it anonymously into the world economy. Admittedly, these issues are 
only in the background of the present research; but they are sufficiently important to justify 
our interest in this research question. Our analysis of organisational adaptation will show that 
simply opening borders is not a sufficient element to foster integration. The transformation of 
the French asset management industry was very much influenced by the European context, 
and in particular by European directives. We will show that in this sector, French firms have 
adopted practices that are not typical to their national system any more and that they replicate 
the international (Anglo-Saxon) patterns. But we will also insist that such changes were 
highly debated and that they did result from a positive integration mechanism: the constitution 
of a new organisational field. In other words, even if Europeanisation is only in the 
background of our study, we will notice that negative integration is not sufficient to forge a 
single European business system; a whole series of institutional initiatives is needed to 
constitute and structure anything alike.
1.5. Conclusion
This chapter had two objectives: first, to expose the general issue addressed by the research: 
the analysis of European business systems as they confront societal change; second, to show 
the limitations of the theoretical debate around the convergence and divergence theses, and to 
illustrate how the study of organisational adaptation could offer a more fruitful approach to 
the persistence of national specificities. These two objectives explain the relevance of such an 
issue in a European perspective. The thesis will therefore try to answer the following research 
question:
How do firms in a given business system adapt to changes in their environment?
In doing so, it will investigate whether firms depart from the patterns of their national 
business systems and it will consider if the emergence of a European business system is 
foreseeable. Before summarising the argument of the thesis, we will now outline its main 
methodological options, which are to a large extent the consequence of this research question 
and of our starting point.
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2. Methodological considerations
Now that we have outlined our research question and positioned it in the literature, it is 
important to explain the methodology and to justify some of the choices that were made in the 
thesis. This means in particular justifying a qualitative and interpretative investigation as well 
as the choice of the case study: the French asset management industry over the period 1984- 
1999. One of the claims in the present thesis is indeed that some of the shortcomings in the 
literature dealing with persisting differences in business systems are the consequences o f their 
methodological stances. Because we are interested in organisational adaptation as one of the 
dynamics that reproduce (or not) the dominant patterns of a given business system, we made a 
number of methodological choices and tried to develop specific conceptual tools. Two 
principles guided our investigation: theory as theory in practice, and as grounded theory. 
Theory in practice addresses an empirical case with the ambition of building a model, or 
theoretical framework, and of developing a coherent grammar of relations between clearly 
identified variables and concepts (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 204). This first guideline 
resulted from the observation that our study was confronted with a mass of data that we could 
not process without appropriate theoretical tools and concepts. Chapter III is dedicated to 
producing the framework we required. The second guideline, grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967), is the consequence of our initial remark that.the internal dynamics of business 
systems have not been sufficiently theorised. At the modest level of a doctoral dissertation, 
we aimed to contribute to a better understanding of such dynamics, by generating theory from 
our research. The combination of these two guiding principles and of our research question 
led to two methodological options:
- qualitative research based on a longitudinal case study at a meso-level
- analysis based on hypotheses and conducted through a theoretical framework and through
the construction of ideal-types
In the following pages, we will briefly justify these options. In the next chapter, we will focus 
on case study design and explain why we selected French asset management over the period 
1984-1999 as a critical case study for our research problem, how firms in a given business 
system adapt to changes in their environment.
2.1. Methodological options
Given our research question and our position towards the literature, it soon appeared that we 
had several methodological constraints. First of all, we were interested in a dynamic process, 
organisational adaptation. This led us to opt in favour of qualitative research, using one
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longitudinal case study. Then, given the nature of the evidence required, we chose to conduct 
the investigation on the basis of hypotheses about the case, and to use a theoretical framework 
as well as ideal-types to analyse our findings.
Qualitative research appeared a natural consequence from our focus of attention. Quantitative 
research tends to deal less well than qualitative research with the process aspects of 
organisational reality (Bryman, 1989: 140). It is rarely possible to understand organisational 
change in quantitative studies, as we see in the investigations of the Aston Studies (Pugh and 
Payne, 1977). Such quantitative analysis may have succeeded in showing stable relationships 
between such variables as size and dimension of organisation structure, but they fail to tell us 
much about the dynamics of organisations. Survey methodology, it appears, makes it harder 
to find out what processes lie behind the correlations it may reveal (Hartley, 1994: 212). A 
qualitative approach is more likely to reveal changes and transformations, because it pays 
more attention to the context and to external aspects, and is therefore more appropriate to a 
research focusing on the relationships between the organisation and its environment. It is also 
a good way to analyse the subjects’ own understanding of the situation and to look at their 
reactions without a limited number of explanations. In other words, a qualitative approach 
was more appropriate to the purpose of this research project. More precisely we opted for a 
case study method.
Case studies have been widely used in studies of organisational behaviour, especially in 
understanding organisational innovation and change, as shaped by both internal forces and the 
external environment. Classic analyses include Selznik’s study of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (1946), Gouldner’s study of alternative patterns of organisation (1954), and Bums 
and Stalker’s study comparing ‘mechanistic’ and ‘organismic’ forms of organisation (1961). 
Case studies have been significant in understanding formal and informal processes in 
organisations, as in socio-technical systems research (Trist et al., 1963) or action research. 
The strength of case studies lies especially in their capacity to explore how social processes 
impact on organisations (Hartley, 1994: 212). They allow for a contextual, longitudinal and 
process-based analysis of the various actions and representations inside and around firms. 
Moreover, they have a function in generating hypotheses and building theory, which is one of 
the objectives of this doctoral thesis, following Glaser and Strauss (1967). For all these 
reasons, the case study method was a natural choice for the research project. More precisely, 
we opted for a longitudinal case study at the meso level.
A longitudinal historical and process study (Scott, 1995: 80) was the natural consequence of 
research focusing on transformation and change: it is not possible to observe change without
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examining different historical moments. Moreover, and given the nature of organisational
adaptation as a process, it was natural that the research should concentrate on processes. The
second methodological option was to focus on the meso-level, by studying the adaptation of a
population of firms within an organisational field, rather than one single organisation at the
micro-level or a whole country at the macro-level. Operating at a meso-level makes it easier
to analyse the relations between firms and their environment, since this level presents a
number of actors and situations. It shows the differences between individual cases and
highlights common patterns, which is most useful when analysing processes. Moreover this
level of analysis is usually preferred by a number of scholars who focus on the relations
between firms and their environment, such as organisational ecology and institutional theory.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) insist that:
The appropriate unit of analysis in the study of institutional isomorphism is the 
organisational field (Aldrich and Reiss, 1976; Bourdieu, 1973; Turk 1970;
Warren, 1967; Warren et al., 1974). By organisational field, we mean those
organisations in a population that, in the aggregate, are responsible for a definable 
area of institutional life. In an organisational field, we would include key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, and regulatory agencies, as well as 
other organisations that produce a similar service or product. (10)
For these reasons, our research focused on a population of firms within an organisational 
field. More specifically, when tackling the organisational field, it looked at the 
transformations of firms from the point of view of an internal observer, and tried to relate 
these to the way actors understood changes in their environment. This follows what Parsons 
defined as the subjective approach to the theoretical treatment of institutions (1990), which 
studies them from the point of view of the individual acting in relation to institutions. This 
approach constitutes a mid-way between the micro-level of individual actors and the macro­
level of structures of relations or systems of action (Coleman, 1990), which fits particularly 
well with our attempt to avoid both under-socialised and over-socialised concepts of man. We 
will justify in the next chapter the choice of French asset management over the period 1984- 
1999 as our case study. The second methodological option regarded the analysis of the 
evidence.
First of all, the analysis was supported by the hypotheses which the various approaches found
in the literature might have led us to expect in such a case. In tackling the problem of a
changing environment, such as European integration, we faced a large number of variables 
and elements that are not easy to cope with (Humbert, 1993: 14). Adopting a hermeneutic 
approach, and trying to understand the phenomenon under study as it reveals itself, did not 
seem feasible in front of such a nebulous object. This would have led to the risk of losing 
grasp of the research question and of becoming absorbed in a mass of information, which is
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not always easy to decipher. The chosen method combined the use of generic hypotheses 
drawn from the literature about economic change with a theoretical framework that enabled a 
careful examination of organisational adaptation processes. In conducting the investigation 
and validating the hypotheses, we used a theoretical framework that presented organisational 
adaptation within the business system perspective, along sets of variables. Organisation 
theories were used as analytical tools, in order to provide a grammar and a codification of 
organisational adaptation and to categorise it along precise adaptation processes: change in 
the entrepreneurial synthesis, change in the conception o f control, learning of new routines, 
manipulation of the environment. Chapter III will outline this framework, which was used as 
a toolbox, in order to interpret the dynamics observed in reality. The combination of a 
theoretical premise and of analytical tools proved useful in conducting a precise study while 
not losing focus in the face of such a large phenomenon as European integration. However, 
we made another decision regarding the validation of the hypotheses: to use ideal-types.
The thesis followed Weber’s methodological stance that knowledge of the empirical world is 
not possible without concepts, and that it is necessary to build unified analytical constructs 
and ideal-types and to use them as a means for the analysis of historically unique 
configurations (Weber, 1949: 91). In the following chapters, we will compare the French asset 
management industry at the end of 1998 with the ideal-type corresponding to the situation in 
the mid-1980s, and explain the changes observed by reference to the ideal-type corresponding 
to the situation in Anglo-Saxon countries. Weber defines the ideal-type as a “conceptual 
pattern which brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex 
which is conceived as an internally consistent system” (Weber, 1949: 90). Such types are not 
meant to be a comprehensive representation of reality; they rather represent a construct that 
elucidates and categorises reality. We decided to use such types to conduct our analysis rather 
than opting for a strictly comparative methodology. There are admittedly some comparative1 
dimensions in the study: as will be illustrated in the next chapter, some theories predicted that 
European integration and Anglo-Saxon leadership in the asset management business would 
drive French firms to adopt Anglo-Saxon practices. To grasp this comparative dimension, we 
could also have studied organisational adaptation within the British asset management 
industry, and compared results with the French case. This method, called comparative 
historical analysis, is advocated by Skocpol (1979) and Djelic (1998) because it combines 
detailed analysis and systematic comparison, and allows the tracking of regularities and
1 Here we may remember Durkheim’s methodological rule that sociology is fundamentally comparative 
(1937: 137).
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similarities in the historical processes. Two reasons underpin our choice not to adopt such a 
method.
First of all, the size limit of a thesis would not have permitted two in-depth case studies: it did 
not seem likely that we could have revealed all the subtleties of historical developments if two 
countries or more had had to be tackled. In order to reach empirically valid conclusions, 
however, it was important to have sufficient precision in the observation and a sufficient 
number of companies to study. A comparative historical analysis would have incurred the risk 
of providing only general and unsubstantial evidence, and our basic aim of offering a precise 
account of the adaptation processes would not have been achieved. Secondly, this 
comparative historical method would have conflicted with our guiding principle of theory as 
theory in practice. It would not have been possible to develop any coherent theoretical 
framework, because international comparisons-as explained by societal analysis-require 
placing objects in their context (and not within desocialised variables) and comparing the 
incomparable (Maurice, 1989). Because they are historically and socially contingent, 
processes are not easy to translate. There was the distinct risk of comparing a British apple 
with a French pear while calling them identical in the theoretical framework: comparative 
historical method may lead to using concepts of such generality that they are merely empty, or 
to over-interpreting reality in ready-made categories that are not empirically grounded. Ideal- 
types, on the contrary, were regarded as most appropriate for the research problem, which was 
to measure whether and how firms would depart from the dominant patterns of behaviour in 
their surrounding business system. The purpose of ideal-types, in Weber’s sociology, is 
precisely to analyse and identify deviations in the empirical world, in comparison with such 
types (Weber, 1978: 21). Moreover, the business system approach implicitly aims at 
producing ideal-types to categorise national economies; it is therefore particularly compatible 
with a methodology based on these2. Secondly, ideal-types appeared to be congruent with a 
research focusing on dynamic processes. They help interpret and understand social action, and 
in particular historical shifts, by showing sequences of purposive decisions (Weber, 1949:
101). The combination of hypotheses, a theoretical framework and ideal-types made it 
possible to draw a precise analysis of the case study, the French asset management industry 
over the period 1984-1999. In the next chapter, we will justify more precisely the choice of 
this case, as critical for our research question.
2 Here we may identify one specific difference in orientation between the business system approach and 
societal analysis.
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2.2. Data collection
The central empirical evidence and data collection related to the case study: the French asset 
management industry. The objective was to cover as many companies as possible, in order to 
have a good understanding of the whole population of firms. At the same time, the number of 
firms covered had to remain manageable, given that the investigation was actor-based and 
required direct contact with people in and around asset management companies. For that 
reason, the research material was to a large extent obtained through semi-directive interviews 
with managers and professionals in the industry. As far as possible the interviews were 
recorded and they lasted from 40 to 110 minutes with an average duration of a little less than 
an hour, and they were typed in a word processor before being analysed. Some of them were 
conducted by telephone. Questions were adapted to the interviewee, and were also related to 
the theoretical framework about organisational adaptation processes. It was possible to 
interview some 70 professionals, mainly in Paris but also in London, Brussels and 
Luxembourg. The object of the investigation was to gather evidence about transformation 
processes at the level of the field and at the level of individual companies. Consequently, 
various categories of actors were interviewed in areas related to asset management, notably 
professional associations, professional and consulting firms, financial authorities and other 
financial experts. In order to obtain different points of view regarding organisational 
adaptation processes within individual firms, an attempt was made to interview different 
categories of employees, with about 40 direct contacts. For each company at least one 
executive was interviewed, complemented when possible by someone working in the human 
resource department and someone in charge of the controlling area. Most of the time, it was 
also possible to draw upon direct company information and/or internal documents. For 
reasons that will be explained later, the population of the asset management companies was 
divided in three groups, with the objective of obtaining a good representation of the whole 
industry:
six companies related to retail banking groups (category 1):
five companies related to insurance groups, including the Caisse des Depots (category 2)
five independent companies (category 3)
These companies were all of French origin, although some had been bought by foreign 
players in the very recent past. Together these sixteen companies represented 71% of the 
market, on the basis of the assets they managed at the end of 1998, as shown in the following 
table. To complement direct contacts and increase the total coverage of the industry, 
supplementary material was drawn from internship reports, market studies, professional 
magazines, Internet websites and a database provided by the financial media L ’Agefi. A
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directory bought from the French professional association AFG-Asffi (1999b) was also used; 
it contained information on all French-registered portfolio management companies at the end 
of 1998. Altogether, this material was rather comprehensive, and it allows us to draw 
conclusions for the whole industry by providing a satisfactory representation of the population 
of companies.
Table 1: companies analysed through direct contacts: corresponding market shares in 1998
Name Cate­
gory
Associated 
financial group
Assets under 
management 
(FF Billions)
Market
share
%
Indocam 1 Credit Agricole-lndosuez 846 10%
SGAM 1 SGAM 829 10%
CLAM 1 Credit Lyonnais 638 8%
BNP Gestion 1 BNP 575 7%
Paribas Asset Management 1 Paribas 350 4%
CCF Asset Management Group 1 CCF 332 4%
CDC AME 2 CNP, Poste, Ecureuil 1025 12%
AXAIM 2 AXA 580 7%
AGFAM 2 AGF 324 4%
Finama 2 GAN-Groupama 270 3%
Victoire AM 2 Victoire 210 2%
ODDO AM 3 - 31 0%
Lazard Freres Gestion 3 - 22 0%
Cyril Gestion 3 - 10 0%
Financiere Atlas 3 - 3 0%
Sogip 3 - 1 0%
TOTAL sample 6046 71%
Total market 8500 100%
Sources: AFG-Asffi (1999b), company reports and author’s estimations 
The interviews were semi-directive: they mixed open and closed questions and were tailored
to the position of the interviewees. Typically, they would start with an open question, “From 
your position, which are the major changes in your industry/firm?” and would then proceed 
with more targeted questions, related to the analytical framework. The objective was to record 
the personal understanding and opinions of various actors about changes in the French asset 
management industry, and/or within their firms, as well as to interpret and identify adaptation 
processes. Most interviews were conducted in French, some in English. During the analysis, 
the interesting quotes had to be translated into English, in order to be incorporated in the text.
2.3. Analysis
Interviews played a key part in the data gathering. The analysis was based on the transcripts 
from the interviews recorded. It started with a coding of the various themes in the interviews, 
regardless of the underlying research questions. The different themes were then classified and 
ordered following the relationship between them. The resulting list was then compared with
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the research questions and re-ordered so that the themes would fit the theoretical framework. 
Finally, some patterns were deduced from this comparison and some conclusions were drawn 
about the interviews. Obviously, the rest of the research material was used in this process to 
document and back up the analysis of the interviews and to provide further evidence for the 
identified patterns.
Now that we have clarified our methodology, it is possible to outline briefly the general 
argument of the thesis before tackling, in the next chapter, case study design.
3. Thesis argument and chapter plan
The thesis will proceed in five stages and eight chapters:
1. problematisation and methodology (chapter I)
2. case study design: selection and hypotheses (chapter II) and theoretical framework 
(chapter III)
3. empirical investigation (chapters IV and V)
4. analysis of the adaptation processes (chapters VI and VII)
5. conclusions (chapter VIII)
Two contributions will be made to the analysis of European business systems. The first one is 
of a methodological nature and regards the development of analytical tools to tackle dynamic 
processes of adaptation within the business system framework. We will show how a specific 
definition of the firm using three layers {entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f control and 
organisational routines) enables us to relate the firm coherently to its institutional 
environment. Applying the framework, chapter IV will show that the French model of the 
mid-1980s corresponds to integrated structures, with fund managers at the core of the 
business, with human resource management and industrial relations based on collective 
agreement and on internal mobility, and with customer relationships founded on personal 
contacts. The Anglo-Saxon model, in contrast, displays an autonomous industry, with an 
organisation based on an investment process where fund managers have to comply with 
company rules and monitoring, where human resource management is based on the external 
labour market and the personnel has a higher and performance-related pay, and where 
customer relationships are founded on careful selection and professional scrutiny.
The second and core argument of the thesis, which will result from a careful examination of 
the case study, is that existing frameworks fail to understand the dynamics of national 
business systems, because they do not pay sufficient attention to the constitution o f new
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organisational fields in sectors and across borders. We will show that it was possible for firms 
in the French asset management industry to adopt patterns of organisation and behaviour that 
differed substantially from their national business system, and that such a development cannot 
be explained without referring to the emergence of a new organisational field operating with 
different rules. In chapter II, we will show that French asset management is a critical case 
because on the one hand it faced radical change and European integration, and on the other it 
was intrinsically linked to national institutional configurations. Given the domination of 
Anglo-Saxon players, the peculiarities of the business, and the nature of the changes within it, 
existing theories about adaptation will lead to four hypotheses:
1. French firms adopt the dominant patterns of the Anglo-Saxon asset management industry
2. the patterns of the French model remain unaltered
3. a hybrid situation
4. France’s asset management is moved to an Anglo-Saxon business system, such as London
While the business system perspective would have suggested the persistence of differences 
between French asset management and Anglo-Saxon patterns, we will show in chapter V that 
the situation of the French industry in 1999 was very similar to the Anglo-Saxon model of 
asset management. Chapter V will also identify two puzzling elements: first, a portion of 
small French companies that focus on private clients have kept the French model of the mid- 
1980s; and second, change did not occur when market pressures were released: it occurred 
only later, with a series of developments at the regulatory and professional level. The case 
study will therefore show that none of the theoretical hypotheses can characterise the 
transformation of this industry. They miss a key element, the importance of the emergence 
and constitution of a new organisational field, where new rules can apply which may differ 
from the rules in the over-arching business system. Chapter VI and VII will examine in detail 
how asset management was constituted as a new organisational field, and how one particular 
coalition of elite asset managers was able to gain government support in 1996 and enable the 
asset management business to achieve autonomy from banking. The subsequent processes of 
structuration of the new organisational field will then be analysed, and in particular the role of 
institutional agents and calculation tools. The conclusion in chapter VIII will allow us to draw 
up a possible research agenda.
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CHAPTER II. CASE STUDY DESIGN 
AND HYPOTHESES
In the previous chapter, we outlined the general problem, the argument of the thesis and the 
methodology. This chapter tackles the design of the case study as a critical case and defines 
four competing hypotheses about the case: how, looking at the changes in their business 
environment, would we expect French asset management companies to have adapted? 
Consequently, we give here an overview of the asset management business and of the generic 
changes in the French environment; and we look at the main theories about adaptation, to 
recognise three generic approaches, which emphasise different adaptation drivers and 
processes. We then examine in more detail the properties of the French asset management 
industry, using secondary literature and newspaper articles as well as some interviews, 
conducted mainly outside France, with investment professionals and members of the 
European Commission. The examination of the case will show, however, that the 
convergence/divergence debate re-surfaces when organisational adaptation in the French asset 
management industry is addressed. The nature of the changes in their environment and the 
Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the business suggest that the adaptation of French firms may 
indeed mean only adopting the practices of American and British players. This leads to four 
possible hypotheses about the expected adaptation of the industry.
1. The generic perspectives about organisational adaptation
In our attempt to establish theoretical hypotheses about the case study, it seems natural to start 
with the various theoretical accounts of organisational adaptation. However, organisation 
theory is ^ v e r y  heterogeneous in the different approaches it displays, probably because 
organisations are incredibly complex and offer a wide range of levels of analysis.3 Despite 
this variety, one can identity three families of theories, each of which has a particular 
understanding of organisational adaptation. The objective here is not to undertake a critical
3 For instance, Stogdill identified eighteen different premises and orientations in theories of 
organisation (quoted by Champion, 1975: 26) while Reed reviewed ten theory groups and research 
programmes about organisations (Reed, 1992).
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review of these theories, but simply to present their generic perspectives and identify what 
they may tell us about our research question.
1.1. Three families of theory
In the literature, one can identify three families of theory about organisational adaptation. One 
fundamental difference can be noticed. The first and most widespread approach, elaborated in 
economics and managerial literature, regards adaptation as the capacity to fit with an 
environment, whereas the other two approaches, the evolutionary and sociological 
perspectives, consider it as a capacity of the environment. Here again therefore we find the 
usual debate within organisation theory between purposive-action and environmentalist 
approaches, each of which provides a framework for the analysis of organisations (Child and 
Kieser, 1981: 29). When we consider briefly the three perspectives, we will notice that they 
each insist on different drivers of adaptation.
The first family of theories regards adaptation as a problem-solving operation, where the 
optimal organisational form is elaborated to best fit with the constraints and opportunities in 
the environment and to achieve the highest degree of efficiency. This is probably the most 
widespread concept of adaptation, to be found in textbook economics as well as in most of the 
management literature. It considers that the economic agents in the firm have the capacity to 
act upon the organisation or its environment so that the former becomes adapted to the latter. 
The neo-classical economic model conceives firms as systems for managing production. 
Rational optimisation through price mechanisms makes the firm perfectly adapted to its 
environment (Baumol and Blinder, 1991: 541; Begg, Fischer and Dombusch, 1997: 91). The 
transaction-cost model is more refined because it integrates the institutional environment of 
firms and issues of governance, by saying that the capitalist firm is the culmination of efforts 
to economise on the transaction costs that arise from universal features of the institutional 
environment (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1985). But the same idea applies: the efficient 
organisational form will result from the evaluation of transaction costs and their minimisation 
by rational actors, given the constraints in their institutional environment. In other words, 
within these perspectives economic agency will lead to efficient adaptation under competitive 
pressures. The same idea can be found in the management literature.
Scientific management, in the tradition of Taylor (1911), considers adaptation as a technical 
problem, where the organisation is designed and adjusted in the best possible way to respond 
to the demands of customers. Contingency and strategic choice theories recognise that the 
organisations that more closely fit or match the requirements of their environment will be
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more effective than those that do not (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Child, 1972; Emery and Trist, 
1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Consequently, a reduced performance will trigger 
managers and their advisors in the field of Organisation Development and Change 
Management to analyse their environment and implement new strategies and new policies that 
fit better with the environment (Donaldson, 1987: 2; Galbraith, 1973: 2; Miles and Snow, 
1978: 21). Adaptation is therefore a positive response to a performance problem: the firm 
needs to engage in a continuous search for ways to maintain and adapt the capabilities that are 
the basis of its competitive advantage. This may also lead firms to try to alter their constraints, 
as claimed by the resource-dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1979), through 
mergers, alliances, political lobbying etc. Some scholars even consider the capacity o f firms 
to choose the business system where they want to operate, in order to benefit from a societal 
fit. For a series of reasons, some national economies or regional districts provide the firms in 
their area with a competitive advantage in certain businesses (Porter, 1990: 74; Sorge, 1991; 
Soskice, 1991). They would then adapt their environment to their business by choosing the 
right location and possibly moving to a suitable one. In all cases, in the economic or 
managerial approaches, the driving mechanism for adaptation appears therefore to be 
voluntary efforts to optimise economic efficiency. There is however another perspective to be 
found in the literature, which tend to focus more on environmental pressures than on the 
purposive-action of firms.
The second theoretical stance towards adaptation relates to evolutionary perspectives. A 
number of theories consider adaptation not as a rational agency of economic actors or 
managers, but rather as the ex-post indication of a successful adaptation. This idea is the most 
closely related to the principle of social Darwinism, where the forces of competition and 
selection will lead to a survival of the fittest (Spencer, 1996). Only those firms that are 
adapted to their environment will survive, while the others will go bankrupt or voluntarily go 
out of business (Aldrich, 1979; Campbell, 1965; Carroll, 1984; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
Within this perspective, adaptation is a rather blind prospect, since it is only after some have 
won and some lost that the appropriate organisational form can be recognised. Given this, 
such a perspective is not very useful for the present research. Moreover, different authors 
have privileged different drivers to explain change and adaptation. The most general view, 
found in the population ecology school within management, defines selection as a market- 
and competition-based mechanism. Schumpeter and his followers focus mainly on 
technological innovation; this is also the perspective of economic growth theories (Galbraith, 
1971; Kuznets, 1966). But other authors have also mentioned cognitive elements, such as the 
production of new routines as in evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982), or 
organisational learning (Dosi and Malerba, 1998; Levitt and March, 1988). Interestingly,
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some authors also integrate the constraining role of institutions in the selection process 
(Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Dobin, 1994), an element which offers a bridge to the third 
perspective on adaptation. The second driving mechanism for adaptation appears therefore to 
be evolutionary upgrading, through selection and through the diffusion and institutionalisation 
of new technology and knowledge.
The third theoretical consideration about economic change relates to political and institutional 
arguments that change and adaptation are imposed by the firm’s environment. This is for 
instance the argument of Marxist writers when they claim that the capitalist class and its 
managerial allies imposes on the workers particular organisational structures, which are not 
market-efficient but rather aimed at maximising control and profits (Braverman, 1974; 
Burawoy, 1982). Without referring to class struggle, a similar concept could be that the actors 
having more economic resources, like trans-national corporations (Korten 1995), or more 
political power, like gender groups (Acker, 1990), large states, lobby groups, or professions 
(Burawoy, 1985; Sabel, 1982), may impose new rules on organisations. A not so distant 
version can be found in the neo-institutionalism in organisational analysis, where it is argued 
that organisations strive to maintain legitimacy by conforming to institutionalized beliefs 
about how they ought rationally to be constructed (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and 
Zucker, 1989). Power is replaced by or rather included in considerations of legitimacy, and 
therefore the analysis is more complex, because not only politics but also various cognitive 
elements and institutional dimensions can be taken into account, following Berger and 
Luckmann (1967). Ultimately, the idea is that social and institutional conditions will define 
the rational organisational structure and literally make the organisation adapted. This may 
occur through various mechanisms and confrontations before a solution is reached that is then 
institutionalised and diffused to the whole organisational field. Powell and DiMaggio (1983) 
identify three means by which a common organisation structure becomes generalised: 
coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. Here again, the core theoretical argument is 
that the driving mechanism for adaptation is the pressure to conform to the dominant and 
legitimate social dogma.
This short overview is only a brief, and admittedly superficial, review of the prominent 
approaches towards adaptation4. But it should already have given a clear picture of the 
confrontation between several theoretical perspectives. In particular, we showed that 
competition, innovation and institutional constraints had been identified respectively as the 
main drivers of adaptation. One element, however, is worth mentioning, since it relates the
4 A closer examination o f the actual processes o f adaptation will be presented in the next chapter.
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present concern to the starting point of the thesis. It appears that these perspectives about 
adaptation can be related to the convergence/divergence debate. Such a remark is important at 
this stage of the thesis, in order to avoid confusion about the object of the research, and to 
stress it focuses on adaptation: as we will see in the following pages, the Anglo-Saxon 
supremacy slightly mixes the two angles.
1.2. Adaptation and the convergence/divergence debate
Not surprisingly, there are some parallels between our research question and the three 
perspectives on adaptation we have identified. In particular, our starting point in the thesis 
goes together with the perspective that diversities will remain between national states, and not 
converge. This corresponds to the theory expressed for instance by Whitley (1999: 3), that 
“societies with different institutional arrangements will continue to develop and reproduce 
varied systems of economic organization with different economic and social capabilities in 
particular industries and sectors”. Adaptation is therefore linked to the 
convergence/divergence debate.
Adaptation in most of the theories we mentioned will lead to convergence: convergence 
towards the most efficient organisational form, the one best way, because of competitive 
pressure and selection; or convergence towards the most legitimate one, the one that the most 
powerful agents will impose. But some theories about adaptation also recognise the 
importance of national institutional constraints. The sociological and political understanding 
of adaptation, that it is driven by the social environment, opens the possibility of persisting 
differences between nation-states, provided the dominant institutions exert different pressures. 
Selection may be influenced by institutional elements, which would discourage firms in 
different environments from adapting in the same way. Parallel adaptation and transition in 
which countries evolve along diverse trajectories would leave them distinct (Zysman, 1995a: 
442).
Moreover, contingency theory, despite its insistence on efficiency as a driver of adaptation, is 
opposed to the idea of a one best way (Galbraith, 1973: 2). Combined with the notion that 
national economies display specific institutional properties, contingency theory leads in fact 
to a divergence theory. Because some societies, given their institutional configurations, favour 
particular types of activities, it would be more efficient for companies to try to locate their 
activities in these societies (Porter, 1990: 19; Sorge, 1991). This creates increased 
international specialisation and hence divergence.
39
All these elements show that organisational adaptation and the problem of persisting 
differences among national business systems are related. It also shows that the same drivers of 
adaptation may lead to different expectations in terms of convergence, depending upon the 
institutional properties of the environment. In other words, in order to design the case study, 
and to make the best use of the theories we mentioned, it is necessary to look at several 
dimensions: competition, innovation and institutional constraints, and to choose an industry 
accordingly. It is now possible to explain why we selected the French asset management 
industiy 1984-1999 as a critical case.
2. The choice of the case study
The present research is based on one case study: the French asset management industry over 
the period 1984-1999. Here we show how both theoretical considerations and pragmatic 
elements regarding access and familiarity with the field were taken into account in the attempt 
to design a critical case. First it may be useful to recall the purpose of the case study. Our 
theoretical concerns regard European business systems and how they deal with societal 
change, through the analysis of organisational adaptation. We therefore want to test whether 
firms, in a context of European integration, depart from the dominant practices of their 
surrounding business system. Because we start from a clear theoretical proposition a research 
design based on a single-case study is appropriate, provided it represents a critical case (Yin, 
1994: 38). We will show the steps that lead to the selection of the case.
2.1. Designing a critical case
To find that critical case, we proceeded iteratively, and tried to combine theoretical 
considerations with pragmatic feasibility. We started from Roche’s advice to begin by 
examining theoretical concerns and to move from there to elaborating a case selection (1997:
102). In the last paragraph we identified market competition, innovation, and institutional 
constraints as factors driving organisational adaptation. Our research question focuses on the 
problem of internationalisation. Consequently, and given the tensions between the three 
families of theories and their links with the convergence/divergence debate, we should design 
our case study along two dimensions:
the degree of internationalisation, innovation and competition in the European business 
environment, which is expected to stimulate firms to adapt by departing from the 
dominant patterns of their national business system
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the degree o f  interdependency o f  firms with their national business system, which is 
expected to prevent them from departing from the dominant patterns 
In other words, if  we want to have a critical case that addresses our research question, we 
should find one industry in the upper right com er o f  the following matrix, high on both 
dimensions:
Degree of high
international is at 
-ion, innovation 
and competition 
in the European 
business
environment o^ w
If we start with the first dimension, we need to find a sector where organisational adaptation 
is expected, where it is related to internationalisation, where competition and innovation have 
increased, hence where borders have opened. Because o f  the single European market, there 
are several possible sectors: for instance telecommunications and new technologies, 
publishing and media, chemicals or financial services. At this stage, financial services already 
appeared a valid candidate. It is probably the sector where European integration is the most 
advanced, with free movement o f  capital achieved inside the European Union (Commission  
o f  the European Communities, 1997) and a single European currency. A lso, in continental 
Europe, it represents a critical example for the study o f  organisational adaptation, given the 
scope and the speed o f  transformation. In Latin countries, and to a lesser extent in Germany 
and Northern Europe, financial services moved within twenty years from a state-controlled 
industry with no freedom o f  movement and heavy national regulation to a fast-moving fast- 
changing business operating on an international basis and deregulated. France seemed one o f  
the best countries in which to investigate the impact o f  such elements, because it is probably 
the country in Europe that changed most, with a strong development o f  financial markets as 
opposed to credit-banking. And as France is the ideal-type o f  a state-centred econom y, the 
nature o f  the changes in the European environment (deregulation, retreat o f  the state and 
internationalisation) represent a direct attack on its institutional foundations. Moreover, 
having m yself studied finance in a French business school and worked in a French insurance
low high
Degree of interdependency of firms 
with the national business system
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company, I had some knowledge of French asset management and 1 knew it had experienced 
accelerated change over recent years.
But the final selection resulted mostly from the conclusion that French asset management was 
undoubtedly one of the best case studies available for the research question, given its 
remarkable interdependency with the national business system. If we follow Whitley (1999: 
48) there are four key institutional features structuring business systems:
1. the state
2. financial system
3. skill development and control system
4. trust and authority relations
Given French asset management's clear interdependency with each of these dimensions and a 
high degree of change in its environment, we will show in the following pages that it 
represents a critical case for our research question.
2.2. Asset management: definition
It is not easy to present a clear picture of the asset management business. In fact, as we will 
see later, the very existence of asset management and the recognition of its specificity as 
opposed to other financial services were critical issues in the story of its transformation in 
France. It is possible, however, to provide a relatively simple definition of this business, 
especially in a European perspective.
Historically, the first asset managers were in charge of managing the wealth of rich families 
and kingdoms. For instance, Colbert, the famous French statesman who developed principles 
known as mercantilism, was a sort of asset manager. He was first hired, in 1651, by Cardinal 
Jules Mazarin, chief minister of King Louis XIV, to handle his personal finances. After the 
French revolution and the recognition of private property as a fundamental of society in 
Napoleon’s Code Civil, asset management in its modem understanding began to develop, as 
some Jewish or Protestant banks, such as Rothschild, Mallet, Worms and Hottinguer, set up 
their investment banking activities, especially wealth management, in Paris around 1812 
(Bergeron, 1991: 36). Initially a service supplied only to the richest of France’s families and 
entrepreneurs, asset management was progressively extended, in particular after World War 
II, to a whole range of clients, thanks to the creation of mutual funds in 1960 and to the 
growth of retail banks and their portfolio management services. As a result, Credit Lyonnais, 
one of the largest French banks, managed in 1987 more than 1.1 billion portfolios of 
securities and the accounts of more than 34,000 wealthy individuals. However it is important
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to understand that asset management is a complex activity that requires a particular expertise 
in terms o f  monitoring one’s clients’ needs.
European law, as expressed in the legislation leading to the Single market, distinguishes three 
generic types o f  financial services: insurance, credit and services related to bank accounts and 
investment services. Asset management is part o f  investment services, as shown in the 
Council Directive 93/22/EEC o f  10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field. It 
corresponds to the number 3 in the section A and 6 in section C o f  the Annex o f  the Directive: 
ANNEX Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field
SECTION A: Services
3. (a) Reception and transmission, on behalf o f  investors, o f  orders in relation to one or more 
o f  the instruments listed in Section B
(b) Execution o f  such orders other than for own account
4. Dealing in any o f  the instruments listed in Section B for own account
5. Managing portfolios o f  investments in accordance with mandates given by investors on a
discriminatory, client-by-client basis where such portfolios include one or more o f  the 
instruments listed in Section B.
6. Underwriting in respect o f  issues o f  any o f  the instruments listed in respect o f  issues o f  
any o f  the instruments listed in Section B and/or the placing o f  such issues.
SECTION B: Instruments
1. (a) Transferable securities
(b) Units in collective investment undertakings
2. Money-market instruments
3. Financial-futures contracts, including equivalent cash-settled instruments
4. Forward interest-rate agreements (FRAs)
5. Interest-rate, currency and equity swaps
6. Options to acquire or dispose o f  any instruments falling within this section o f  the Annex,
including equivalent cash-settled instruments.
SECTION C: Non-core services
1. Safekeeping and administration in relation to one or more o f  the instruments listed in 
Section B
2. Safe custody services
3. Granting credits or loans to an investor to allow him to carry out a transaction in one or 
more o f  the instruments listed in Section B, where the firm granting the credit or loans is 
involved in the transaction
4. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related matters and 
advice and service relating to mergers and the purchase o f  undertakings
5. Services related to underwriting
6. Investment advice concerning one or more o f  the instruments listed in Section B
7. Foreign-exchange service where these are connected with the provision o f  investment 
services
But this legal definition o f  asset managemenl as one among other financial services remains 
rather abstract. The nature o f the relationships between the asset manager and his client help 
clarify further the nature o f  this business.
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Any economic agent can potentially use an asset management service, provided it has some 
free cash: individuals who have savings, corporations, state agencies or charities with positive 
cash flow, or institutions that are intermediaries between savers and users of capital. 
Fundamentally, an Asset Manager invests funds on behalf o f his clients. “His primary task is 
to invest the flow of cash from pension contributions, insurance premiums, and personal 
savers in a portfolio of financial assets that will best meet clients’ needs” (British Invisibles,
1997). Asset management companies provide a pure service, which is their expertise in 
investing cash properly to best satisfy the wishes of their client. Instead of managing their 
funds themselves, individuals and corporations will pay the asset management firm to do it on 
their behalf. Admittedly, there is a wide choice of securities. In the case of wealth 
management, which is the side of the asset management business dedicated to wealthy 
individuals and which almost always include tax advising, some portfolios might be invested 
in real estate, fine art, armouries or even diamonds. In some case, funds may be invested in 
non-public companies, such as high-tech start-ups or very profitable small businesses. But in 
the vast majority of cases, the portfolios are invested in the Stock Exchange, in equities, 
bonds, money markets, options, futures, swaps etc. A large part of the industry is also covered 
by mutual funds5, which are called in France Societe d ’Investissement a Capital Variable 
(SICAV) if they are open-ended, and Fond Commun de Placement (FCP) if  they are close- 
ended. The talent of asset management professionals is to select determined securities at the 
right moment and for the right period, in order to achieve specific objectives in terms of a 
combination of return and risk. This requires a particular expertise and it is a difficult 
exercise, given the nature of financial markets and their inherent unpredictability. But asset 
management presents some other peculiarities, which make it dependent upon national 
institutional constraints and illustrate its interdependency in the French business system, as 
we will underline later. For our case design it is first important to recognise the extent of the 
changes in the business environment of French investment firms.
2.3. French asset management is critical in terms of change
We explained earlier that the choice of a critical case study for the purpose of our research 
question required us to find an industry whose business environment had changed 
dramatically, and in particular -to fit with the perspectives on adaptation- where competition 
and internationalisation had increased substantially. French asset management appears a very
5 A mutual fund is operated by a portfolio management company that raises money from shareholders 
to pool them in the fund and invest the money in a variety o f  securities.
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valid choice on this dimension: the French financial regulatory framework evolved 
considerably during the 1980s. It went from a statist system where financial markets were 
heavily controlled by the government to an open and liberalised one, with little state 
involvement and a single European currency. France’s decision to come into line with 
European economic integration led it to foster a new financial system, a new business 
environment for asset management activities. The following pages aim at presenting this 
process of change, which also represents the general context of the case study.
2.3.1. France’s statist financial system
Everywhere in the world the financial system comes under close government scrutiny: 
prudential ratios and regulatory control aim at preventing systemic risks in a sector vital to the 
whole economy (Harris, 1997; Loriaux, 1997). In France, the state had built a particularly 
strong constraint on the banking system, and used it as an instrument of its economic, 
industrial and even external policy (Dressen and Roux-Rossi, 1996: 21). In fact, until the mid- 
1980s, France had one of the most regulated financial systems in the industrialised world, 
with a high degree of government involvement in almost every aspect of the financial markets 
(Swary and Topf, 1992: 99). In the late 1970s, credits represented two-thirds of the financing 
of the French economy and more than 80% of banks’ assets. In such a context, stock 
exchanges played a marginal role, as opposed to the situation in Anglo-Saxon countries: for 
instance, in 1988, stock market capitalisation was equivalent to barely 24% of France’s GDP 
against 85% in Britain.
The first aspect of this state involvement was that in 1984 the state actually owned most large 
banks and insurance companies: state-owned banks controlled 87% of deposits and provided 
76% of credits in 1984 (Plihon, 1998: 32). Apart from this institutional presence, the state 
used an array of controls on interest rates and capital flows, and had a strong control of stock 
exchange operations. France’s capital market was dominated by government debt; price 
movements were controlled and commissions were fixed. Until 1988 ‘agents de change’ (the 
French equivalent of stockbrokers) had the monopoly of transactions on the stock exchange. 
Interestingly, they were not profit-driven financiers, but ministry officials (and hence public 
servants) nominated by the Finance Ministry. In addition to a series of rules and controls, the 
number of agents de change was fixed by the ministry of finance and was a numerus clausus,6 
which means a restricted profession. Such an environment was not likely to give many 
investment possibilities to portfolio managers, whose activity was also tightly controlled. 
Secondly, the regulation of the asset management business was very state-centred. Legislation
6 For a long period the number o f  these stockbrokers was limited to 60.
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distinguished between collective and individualised asset management. The first dimension of 
asset management regulation regarded individualised portfolio management. The 21 
December 1972 law governed the activity of ‘remisiers’ and portfolio managers, who had the 
right to manage portfolios of securities for their clients. These professionals had to have a 
card, the auxiliary to the stock exchange profession card, which was issued by the 
stockbrokers’ (agents de change) union. These individuals, together with financial institutions 
such as banks and insurance companies could take mandates from their clients, often wealthy 
individuals, to manage their portfolios. The other segment of the business, collective asset 
management, was achieved through setting up mutual funds. Investment companies were 
created in the early 1960s, for the purpose of investing into portfolios of securities: FCP, 
which are closed-end funds,7 and SICAV, which are open-ended funds.8 However, the rules 
governing asset management were restrictive and yet again characterised by state control. The 
creation of a new SICAV had to obtain the agreement of the Finance minister, after the 
‘Commission des Operations de Bourse’ (COB), the regulatory authority of the French stock 
exchange, had issued an opinion. There was a legal limit on the size of mutual funds, and the 
Treasury director had the right to limit the capital issue of open-ended funds, on an individual 
basis. The capital structure of mutual funds was also controlled by the state. For instance, they 
could not hold more than 20% in cash, they were restricted in their investment in futures and 
options and they were banned from swap operations. All these aspects of French asset 
management explain why a report by OECD in 1987 could say “market mechanisms played a 
fairly minor role in the way the financing of the French economy functioned” (quoted by 
Swary and Topf, 1992: 100).
2.3.2 The choice of Europe: from state to market
In 1984 however a new banking act brought in substantial modernisation. French policy under 
Mitterrand in 1982-83 had taken a dogmatic approach with nationalisation, increases in wages 
and social benefits, and state aid which however led to falling reserves, a rising trade deficit 
and inflation. The decision made in March 1983 to leave the franc in the Exchange Rate
7 “Type o f  fund that has a fixed number o f  shares usually listed on a major stock exchange. Unlike 
open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds do not stand ready to issue and redeem shares on a 
continuous basis. They tend to have specialized portfolios o f  stocks, bonds, convertibles, or 
combinations thereof.” (Downes and Goodman, 1998)
8 SICAVs are registered companies and they sell mutual funds to the public; they can issue new shares 
on demand. Mutual funds shareholders buy the shares at net asset value and can redeem them at any 
time at the market price. The funds are invested in stocks, bonds, or money market instruments.
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Mechanism (ERM) meant a period of necessary austerity, a re-alignment of monetary policy 
towards stability and a close link to the Deutschmark. Mitterrand’s economic U-turn was 
indeed, as he explained it later in his Lettre a tons les Frangais9 the choice of Europe. It 
ultimately provided the thrust for the completion of the European single market and the 
creation of the single currency (Moss, 1998: 58). Choosing to integrate France into Europe 
resulted in the economy transforming itself from a statist one to a market-driven one 
(Schmidt, 1996). This also meant major changes in the business environment of asset 
management companies. The transformations in the environment of the asset management 
business over the period 1984-1999 are characterised by three of the properties we are looking 
for in a critical case: deregulation, innovation and internationalisation, and the strong 
influence of European integration.
From 1984 to 1988, in a very brief period called “le petit bang”, the Paris stock exchange had 
its revolution and in 1989 it was the second most open financial market in Europe. Ten years 
later, on the first of January 1999, France embraced the single European currency, which was 
another step towards European integration. The 1984 banking act was the starting point of a 
deregulation process in France. It set up a single regulatory framework for every credit 
institution and relaxed a number of state controls. Credit control and savings control was 
abolished. Soon after, and progressively, in 1984, 1986 and 1989, foreign-exchange controls 
were also relaxed. The market in government bonds was re-organised in 1985 and in the same 
year, the French-franc Eurobond market, which had closed in 1981, was re-opened. This 
meant new opportunities in terms of investment. The transpositions, in 1988, of the European 
directives of 20 December 1985 on European UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment 
in Transferable Securities) and, in 1996, of the 1993 directive on Investment Services 
provided new and more liberal rules. Deregulation meant that the government was deprived of 
direct control of investment companies, the supervision of which was given entirely to the 
stock exchange authority, the COB. Brokers’ fixed commissions were abolished (Dixon, 
1991:9).
Moreover, the agents de change, who had the monopoly of transactions on the stock 
exchange, were dismantled in 1988. These individuals were replaced by the stock exchange 
companies, which were given the trading monopoly on the stock exchange. The 2 August 
1989 law completed these changes, modified certain investment rules and modified the
9 Letter written by the French president in all major newspapers on the eve o f  his re-election campaign.
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professional landscape of asset management. It abolished the profession of ‘remisier’™ and 
created a unique framework for portfolio management: only registered companies could 
manage portfolios and they had to be agreed by the COB, the stock exchange authority. 
Specific portfolio management companies could be created, with a minimum capital 
equivalent to FF 500,000, or 0.5% of assets under management (Storck, 1990). However, 
stock exchange companies and banks were still allowed to manage portfolios, under the 
banking or investment services regulations. The 1989 law also created a disciplinary council 
for mutual funds. Made up of two government officials, a COB representative and seven 
professionals, this council was given the tasks of ensuring that investment companies 
maintained professional standards, and of protecting their shareholders. This supervision was 
to be achieved through stricter agreement procedures rather than by state control (Boeglin, 
1989). This was complemented by a code of ethics for mutual funds, which was inspired by a 
working group of investment professionals and then published, in 1988, by the COB.
All these elements show that the environment of French asset management companies went 
from a statist regulation system to a liberal one with some professional self-regulation. This 
was further amplified by the Modernisation of Financial Activities Law of 1996, which was 
the transposition of the European 1993 directive on Investment Services. This law clarified 
the scope of investment services as well as their regulatory supervision. It provided an 
integrated framework for asset management, by covering collective investment as well as 
mandates; it also reinforced the importance of agreement procedures and rules of conduct, and 
specified the competencies of the regulatory authorities. Interestingly, the law went further 
than the European directive in clearly identifying asset management as a specific business 
distinct from banking. We will show later that some events surrounding this development had 
a critical importance in radically transforming the industry. In addition to deregulation, the 
evolution in the environment of French asset management industry was characterised by 
innovations in the financial market, the playing field of investment managers.
2.3.3. Innovation
Over the 1980s, a process of innovation was initiated that substantially increased the volume 
of direct financing through the financial market. The 1981 decision to dematerial ise securities 
came into force in November 1984: ‘paper’ securities were replaced by a paperless securities
10 The remisier were intermediate brokers who had their own privileged clients, whom they advised on 
their investments. They would get a discount (or remise) o ff  the broker’s commission, in exchange for 
bringing their clients’ orders to him. (Pilverdier-Latreyte, 1991: 115)
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circulation system. Shortly before, in 1983, the Second Marche, a second stock exchange for 
smaller companies, had opened. New financial instruments were introduced, such as the 
Commercial Paper Market in December 1985, Treasury bills and the Financial Futures 
Market (MATIF) in 1986, and the Options Market (MONEP) in 1987. In 1986, a continuous 
electronic trading system (CAC) was introduced. This was complemented by the 
computerisation of the Paris stock exchange in 1989 and 1991, a signal that France was at the 
forefront of financial innovation. In 1986, when the right came back to power and Jacques 
Chirac became Prime Minister, a number of privatisations -including those of such banking 
groups as Indosuez, Paribas and Societe Generate- helped double the turnover of the stock 
exchange. All these elements resulted in a boom in the asset management business: collective 
investment vehicles reached 1.4 FF trillion in assets in 1988, or 50% of the European market. 
This shows that by the middle and late 1980s France had an established asset management 
industry, and that the first movements of liberalisation and innovation had their impact early 
on. Later we will show that despite this French firms were slow to adapt and only did so, 
eventually, after 1996 and through a series of specific agencies.
2.3.4. Internationalisation
Finally, the French business environment of asset management in the period 1984-1999 is 
characterised by an increased internationalisation. This resulted primarily from the European 
directives we have already mentioned. The UCITS directive of 1985 created a European 
passport for mutual funds, which meant that once authorised by a national authority they 
could be distributed all over the European Union (EU). The 1993 directive on investment 
services, which was transposed in 1996, provided a European passport for these services -and 
therefore for portfolio management- throughout the EU, based on the mutual recognition of 
agreements authorised by any member State. In line with the single market programme, 
capital movements were freed in 1990, which allowed both unrestricted investment abroad 
and competition to attract foreign investments. The internationalisation of the asset 
management environment culminated with the introduction o f the single European currency, 
which made it possible to invest on a continental basis: previously many regulatory rules, 
especially concerning compliance, had prevented institutional investors from investing in a 
foreign currency and therefore in a foreign country. With the euro, these restrictions were 
lifted and investing in pan-European portfolios of securities became much easier. In France 
the internationalisation process was impressive: foreign investors now own more than 40% of 
the Paris stock exchange, as against 11% in 1987 and 23% in 1993 (Baudru and Kedichi,
1998).
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Clearly, the transformation in the environment of French asset management companies has 
been huge over the period 1984-1999. But more importantly, this industry has displayed the 
properties we were looking for as regards environmental change: increased competition, 
innovation and internationalisation. To that extent, it represents a critical case for our research 
question, about how firms in a given business system adapt to changes in their environment. 
On the second dimension-institutional dependency-we can see that French asset management 
is again a critical case.
2.4. Interdependency with the national business system
From Whitley (1999) we noted that four dimensions in particular had a structuring role in 
business systems: the state, the financial system, the skill development and control system, 
and trust and authority relations. This means that we can expect these four dimensions to have 
an impact on adaptation processes, and in particular in constraining firms to retain the 
national specificities of the system. French asset management appears critical in its 
interdependency with national institutions, and a very valid choice for our study.
2.4.1. The state
It is no surprise that in France state influence was important, since the country is in many 
respects the ideal-type of state-centred capitalism. In the case of the asset management 
business, this interdependency with the state is particularly acute, as both regulation and the 
pension system illustrate.
Regulation deals with questions of licensing and registration, with reviewing prospectuses and 
information statements, with monitoring disclosure documents and trade reporting 
requirements, and with supervising professional duties and obligations. All these institutional 
mechanisms have a strong impact in restricting the freedom of market players and in 
constraining their behaviour. In particular, access to the asset management business is 
restricted to those companies that successfully pass the test of licensing or accreditation. To 
obtain such access applicants need to have their programme of activities approved by the 
Stock Exchange Commission, or Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB), which 
assesses the resources and competencies of the firm and the integrity of its senior 
executives.11 The COB is also in charge of controlling misbehaviour and breaches of 
professional duties: it can suspend or withdraw the agreement, impose sanctions and even ban
11 We will see later that this procedure was actually instrumental in enforcing organisational change in 
1996-1997.
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delinquents from offering portfolio management services (decree 96-880, October 8, 1996: 
art.71). The professional duties of asset managers include a number of guarantees regarding 
both clients and the business partners of the firm, as well as transparency, quality of service 
and fair treatment. Moreover, regulation has an impact on the very possibility of investing. 
Some funds may not be authorised for distribution, because they are considered too risky. 
There may also be restrictions on the amount of equity, the currencies which may be chosen, 
the freedom to use derivatives and exotic financial instruments, and the possibility of 
borrowing money to increase the leverage of the fund. Some particular legal frameworks may 
also be banned in the structures of the fund.12 Finally, regulation operates mainly through 
national channels. Even if there are international rules, and in particular a common framework 
developed by the European institutions, the principle of the European passport gives pre­
eminence to the national level. In the European Union, it is the French regulator who has 
authority to register and to control all financial players in France. Conversely, firms are very 
much related to their country of origin, in terms of constraints and regulation.
Interdependency with the state is also striking in the pension system. Pensions represent a 
non-negligible part of a country's GDP: more than 12% in France (Deroy, 1994). They reflect 
the degree of advancement of a nation and contribute to social cohesion by providing 
sufficient income to a growing segment of the population. However, they are very much 
nationally organised. In particular, there are two generic systems of pension funding, both of 
which have a substantial impact on the asset management industry. The first is the 
contributory pension scheme: active workers pay contributions, which go directly to 
pensioners. This is France's present situation. In this case, the money invested in financial 
markets is limited: most of the in-flows from workers are transformed directly into pensions. 
The other generic pension system is radically different: it is based on individual capital 
planning, where individuals contribute to a pension fund during their working life and are 
given back their investments’ yields when they retire. This has important consequences for 
asset management: within contributory pension schemes, the amount of money is a lot larger 
and it is invested over a longer period, with more possibilities of combining various assets 
over different durations. Any country’s asset management industry will therefore reflect some 
of its core institutional features: the pension system, the importance and function of financial
12 For instance, the master/feeder fund structure was authorised in the USA in the early 1990s and only 
authorised in 1997 in France. This structure involves a single master fund or hub, invested in a 
portfolio o f assets and various feeder funds or spokes each with a single investment, representing a 
share of the master fund. The feeder funds pool their investments so that the master fund is larger and 
has more possibilities of investments and they can be marketed towards various audiences.
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markets, the circulation of money within the economy, and even its savings habits. And 
France is a very good example in Europe, because of the national dimension of its system: our 
research question addresses the persistence of national patterns. Consequently, France was 
preferred to Germany, which combines local, regional and national levels of pension and 
investment structures, through its famous ‘Landbank’ and ‘Sparkasse’ (Dore, 2000: 171-181).
State influence is massive in the French asset management business: we mentioned regulation 
and the pension system, and we could also have discussed direct state involvement through 
nationalisation, and as a user and provider of asset management services. For that reason we 
can say that in respect of interdependency with the state, French asset management represents 
a critical case.
2.4.2. The financial system
But French asset management is also critical in terms of interdependency with the national 
financial system. This is obvious from its position within financial services and in relation to 
investment habits.
Asset management is at the very core of the national distinctiveness of business systems. 
Many authors have used the role of financial markets -and therefore asset management- as a 
key element in defining various models of capitalism, contrasting the arm-length relationships 
of Anglo-Saxon countries with the credit-based configurations of Rhenan and Latin countries 
(Albert, 1991; Cemy, 1993; Franks and Mayer, 1997). We have already underlined the 
importance of the national pension system: the existence of pension funds will drain a large 
amount of savings into the stock exchange and it will sustain the investment industry. In 
France, the lack of pension funds limits the size of the demand for investment services. 
Furthermore, the importance of banks rather than the stock exchange as financial 
intermediaries will have an impact on the asset management industry. Credit and securities 
are competing modes of financing and since they compete for the same clients, a credit-based 
economy will go with a weak stock exchange and limited possibilities for the asset 
management industry. This shows how intimately this industry overlaps with its national 
stock exchange.
Moreover, the state of the asset management industry will reflect the saving habits of the 
nation's citizens. The level of financial savings constitutes the stock of possible investment of 
the national economy. The asset management market is therefore dependent upon the savings 
and reserves of individuals and companies in the national economy, and more specifically on 
the part of those savings they are willing to invest in the stock exchange. These elements are
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very much influenced by national habits. The French population shows a degree of risk 
aversion from equities but buys a lot of life insurance (Artuis, 1997). The Italians and the 
Japanese are known for their high level of private savings, over 15% of income being saved 
compared with less than 3% in the United States. Germans traditionally use their local house 
banks -17 Land banks, over 600 municipal banks and nearly 3000 co-operative banks- where 
they put their savings into deposits or fixed-interest bonds and forget about them. 
Consequently, the average German household’s holding of equity was less than 20% in 1999 
as against 145% in the United States (Dore, 2000: 176). A director in the European 
Commission, himself French, comments on these societal differences by way of the following 
anecdote:
There are many national differences regarding monetary habits. An example: the 
other day, I was in Frankfurt and I was very surprised to notice that most 
Germans would pay their hotel bill in cash. In France, you would be suspected of 
having criminal activities if you did that! But the credit card is well spread in 
France unlike in Germany, where the Eurocheque is dominant; and Eurocheque 
scarcely used in France!
All these elements, relating to the stock exchange and to the societal particulars of the 
national environment, represent clear institutional constraints on the French asset 
management industry and make it a critical case.
2.43. Skill development and control system
In terms of skill development and control system, asset management is also a very valid 
choice, because it belongs to the financial services area, which in France has clear national 
peculiarities. This is largely due to state ownership, which was widespread after a. series of 
nationalisations in 1945 and 1981.
In 1984, virtually all leading financial institutions were state-owned; nationalised banks 
accounted for almost 90% of deposits in the country. As will be explained in more detail in 
chapter IV, French financial institutions are subject to national collective agreements, which 
set very precise guidelines in terms of human resource management. Careers are modelled on 
the public service and take into account seniority and training. The national influence can also 
be felt in the employment practices and other restrictions on labour market flexibility in the 
financial sector (White, 1998: 15). State ownership resulted in banks and insurance companies 
implementing very scrupulously collective agreements and the Auroux laws, voted in 1982 by 
the socialist government and extending employee involvement. Consequently, the sector 
portrays very well the typical features of the French model, which is seen by Barsoux and 
Lawrence (1990), Lane (1989, 1995), and Maurice et al. (1986) as having constraining labour
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laws, high hierarchy, low flexibility and difficulty in adjusting to change. Within the French 
economy, this once again makes asset management, as included in financial services (and 
primarily in the mid-1980s, as we will explain later) a critical example in which the usual 
characteristics of the French model of industrial relations can be observed. This is to a large 
extent also the analysis of O’Reilly (1994) in her study of human resources in the banking 
sector.
2.4.4. Trust and authority relations
Finally, the relationship with the client is of a particular nature in the asset management 
business, with trust and authority relations particularly embedded in the national business 
system. The difficulty of measuring performance and the uncertainty about future returns 
make these relations very important.
First, asset management is a pure service with no results guaranteed. When setting out the
responsibility of banks regarding asset management, Bouteiller and Credot underlined as
follows {La Revue Banque 484, 1988:618):
Unless to pretend that the banker has a gift for divination, it is undeniable that 
the bank is not liable for any obligation of results, i.e. the one of obtaining for its 
client an automatic appreciation o f assets or revenues of a high percentage. 
Nevertheless, it has an obligation of means and must give its management all the 
care and rigour of a salaried mandatory that is an expert in financial matters, 
which means the one of a well-informed professional.
Financial markets are extremely unpredictable and risky. Despite such Wall Street legends as 
Michael Steinhardt, Julian Roberson and George Soros, who made fortunes out of their 
investment skills, few people can claim that they will secure financial gains whatever 
happens. In fact, the list of investment disasters, from Black Thursday to Black Monday to the 
Asian crisis, from KreditAnstalt to Barings to LTCM, is almost endless. It means that there is 
no certainty regarding the quality of the service provided to the client, and also that the 
evaluation of it is problematic. In this context, it is very difficult to appreciate the value of an 
asset manager. This is the opinion of many asset management professionals, as expressed by 
D:
What a good asset manager is, is very difficult to define. To me, a good manager 
is someone who is capable to do better than its competitor with exactly the same 
tools and the same very clearly defined objective. It is not possible to evaluate 
90% of fund managers, because you don’t know either their objectives -eithcr-their 
tools. Thereafter, it is all about marketing.
Is 10% a good return? Who knows? It all depends on how well the market performed, on what 
the risk level was etc. It was probably not good if the market index increased by more than
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200% over the same period, but even then it might be a good performance if the objective 
was, for instance, to limit volatility. It is very hard to measure the performances of a fund 
manager, for the simple reason that it is necessary to find a proper measurement, a suitable 
scale that will allow us to say whether a 10% return, taking into account some other ratios 
measuring the associated risk, is a satisfactory result or not. Hence the necessary use of 
benchmarks and ratios against which to measure asset managers’ performances. Moreover, 
not only is it difficult to evaluate a good asset manager today, but the choice of an asset 
manager means trying to choose one who will be good for years to come. The mandate is 
indeed not about past performance, but about the prospect of future gains, which makes the 
choice even harder. How do you know that because the fund manager you chose has 
performed poorly for one year, he or she will continue to do so for the next two years you 
have contracted with him or her? Because of all these problems of measurement and because 
of the uncertainties inherent in financial markets, the client really has to trust his or her asset 
manager.
As the director of an Anglo-Saxon investment consultant in Paris said to us: “It is an act of
faith to give your money to someone during thirty years, especially when you need this
money to live for thirty years after retirement”. Sometimes the issues at stake are very
important, regarding as they do one’s life, one’s earnings and one's means of subsistence. As
soon as asset management does not deal only with expert investors, who are capable of
discerning the dangers of certain investments, then the sense of responsibility and the ethical
sense of asset management professionals become extremely important. Therefore, it is not
enough to have access to distribution networks and to have the adequate resources to lead in
the asset management business. Another competitive driving force is related to the capacity to
build relationships of trust with the client through effective marketing and sales relationships.
Hence, marketing is a key to success in the business of managing assets for Europeans and for
others who wish to invest in Europe (Walter and Smith, 1989: 152). This also includes
promoting a positive image in the client's eyes, and building relationships of trust, as G. a
finance professional, explains:
To be a good asset manager, you mustn’t be suspected of any collusion; your 
responsibility must be unquestionable. It is a matter of trust. When you make a 
deposit in a bank, you make’an act of faith: you believe that the bank will give 
you your money back. But apart from that, the money does not move. When you 
give an asset management a mandate, you say ‘you can play with my money, at 
the end, I will take back what remains of it.’ It is an act of faith, a belief in the 
professional competence of someone you trust.
Trust is crucial in convincing investors, be they professionals or private, to give their money 
to an asset management firm. And competition between asset managers depends on their
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capacity to gain the confidence of potential clients. But trust is very much influenced by 
social surroundings, and in particular by the institutional arrangements between economic 
actors. Lane and Bachmann (1996) provide a useful analysis of the concept of trust in a cross­
national perspective. They criticise the idea that trust is based on moral and altruistic values, 
and reconcile Luhman’s treatise on trust (1979) and Zucker’s New Institutionalist perspective 
(1986) with Coleman’s work on Rational Choice theory (1990) to say that social structures 
constitute trust. In the latter perspective, institutions provide the framework for rational 
calculations; in the former, they channel social actions and mutual expectations. 
Consequently, Lane and Bachmann show that trust needs to be rooted in the existence of 
stable societal institutions. For our purpose, this means that French clients will tend to put 
their trust in the institutional practices of their long-term business partners, in other words in 
French asset managers, rather than venturing into partnership with foreign and not-so-well- 
known competitors.
In other words, French players are unlikely to be willing to undermine relationships of trust 
by changing their patterns of behaviour towards clients in order to secure or enhance their 
market share. They are thus likely to be very much attached to the dominant practices o f their 
business system. This shows once again that French asset management displays some critical 
interdependency with its national institutions.
2.5. Conclusion
French asset management represents a critical case for the purpose of our study: it has been 
confronted to accelerated change and displays strong interdependency with national 
institutions. Two supplementary elements are worth mentioning regarding our research 
question. First, since France is famous for its resistance to change (Crozier, 1971, 1979) we 
would expect French asset management companies not to have departed from the national 
patterns of organisation and behaviour, which is another reason why it represents a critical 
case for our research problem. Secondly, and again to support our choice, we should remind 
that France has been a leader in continental Europe’s asset management business over the last 
20 years, in particular for mutual funds. In 1987 the French market represented 50% of the 
assets in the mutual funds of the 15 European states of today,13 and it remained the leader in 
1998, with 23% of the total. With 512bn euros by the end of 1998, France reached second
13 Interestingly, these funds were channelled through retail banks and not through financial markets 
intermediaries, which re-inforced the structure o f  the financial system around credit institutions.
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place worldwide in ownerhsip o f  mutual funds, after the United States, by far the largest 
player with mutual funds o f  more than 4,000bn euros (AFG-Asffi, 1999b). If one takes into 
account private and institutional mandates as well as insurance technical reserves, France still 
holds fourth position in the world asset management market, and leads continental Europe.
Figure 1: the world largest asset management markets
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Source: AFG-Asffi, 1999b
Consequently, in selecting French asset management as a critical case we also select the 
continental European leader, and we may hope to achieve analytical generalisation, defined as 
a method “in which a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to 
compare the empirical results o f  the case study” (Yin, 1994: 32). The reasons for choosing the 
period 1984-1999 were straightforward. 1984 was the starting date for the deregulation o f  the 
French banking system, with the new banking law on 24 January 1984. This corresponds to a
f
decrease in government control (Plihon, 1998: 9). 1984 is therefore a good starting date for 
the study o f  organisational adaptation. The end date, 1999, saw the launch o f  the euro. Firms 
had to anticipate the arrival o f  the single European currency and react accordingly, which 
means potentially interesting adaptation processes. Moreover, with a clear finishing date, it 
was possible to have precise data and more open commentaries from the actors in the field 
about what had happened.
All these elements should have convincingly justified the choice o f  the French asset 
management industry over the period 1984-1999, as a critical case study for the investigation 
o f  organisational adaptation in an integrating Europe. It is now possible to formulate more 
precisely some theoretical hypotheses about the case.
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3. The return of the convergence hypothesis
It appears from close investigation of the asset management industry that the French situation 
cannot be accounted for without referring to the Anglo-Saxon model of the financial system. 
The changes that we have described appear to have been heavily influenced by the 
confrontation with the American and British systems. Moreover, the whole industiy is largely 
dominated by these countries, which have not only world-leading companies but also a 
business system that gives these companies some societal competitive advantage. Both in 
terms of efficiency and legitimacy, it appears therefore that the Anglo-Saxons are leading the 
way, and this has some implications for the theoretical accounts of organisational adaptation: 
adaptation in the French asset management industry may be nothing but the adoption of the 
Anglo-Saxon organisation and practices.
3.1. Anglo-Saxon influences in the new French financial 
environment
We will now show that Anglo-Saxon influence was critical in transforming the French 
financial system, and therefore the environment of French asset management companies. This 
influence was particularly noticeable in three areas: the deregulation agenda, the definition of 
new rules of the game, and the development of a financial market economy. This may well 
suggest that adaptation to the new French environment did mean becoming more like Anglo- 
Saxon firms.
3.1.1. The deregulation agenda
Moves towards deregulation in the financial sector started in the United States and were soon 
followed in the United Kingdom. Liberalisation of interest rates in the United States began in 
1972, when the savings banks in Massachusetts were authorised to establish new financial 
instruments without restrictions on interest rates, and when money-market funds were 
approved (Canals, 1993: 11). The introduction of the Cash Management Account by Merrill 
Lynch in 1977 gave investors simultaneous access to financial instruments and a deposit 
account, and its rapid success increased the pressure towards liberalisation in a context of 
high inflation. By the beginning of the 1980s, the control of banking activities in the United 
States had been largely relaxed and competition increased greatly. The United Kingdom 
followed the lead with an impressive deregulation programme: exchange and capital controls 
were dismantled in 1979, and the financial landscape was transformed by a new financial act, 
the Big Bang, in 1986. London capital markets were opened to foreign firms and fixed 
commissions on stock market transactions were abolished. These fixed commissions had
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supported a distinction between traders and dealers; this distinction became untenable and 
jobbers were replaced by market-makers. “Prompted by Britain’s fear that it was losing big 
business to America, Big Bang in turn instilled the fear that the continent would lose the same 
sort of business to London”, commented The Economist (26 March 1988, p.65). And indeed 
France’s swift deregulation programme was regarded by many as a reaction to international 
competitive pressures (Albert, 1991: 270). Furthermore, it is particularly interesting that 
French and European financial regulation actually borrowed from the American and British 
example.
3.1.2. New rules inspired by Anglo-Saxon countries
First, the general spirit of the French deregulation was clearly liberal: it corresponded to a 
retreat of the state and the adoption of a free-market agenda (Walter and Smith, 1989: 109). 
This is the traditional stance of Anglo-Saxon regulators. Second, the new regulation that was 
described earlier shows a shift in the nature of the control on asset management companies. 
Licensing and direct state control were the main instruments of French financial regulation 
until 1984, when supervision took the form of procedures of agreement associated with 
prudential ratios and some professional self-regulation. These practices corresponded to the 
ones traditionally used by British regulators (ECU Institute, 1995: 73). Finally, the design of 
the European regulation was actually inspired by Anglo-Saxon regulation. For instance, the 
1988 Investment Services Directive, covering securities business, closely followed the 
Financial Services Act, 1986, in the United Kingdom (Gardener & Molyneux, 1990).
The adoption of the single European currency aimed explicitly at creating a financial market 
that could approach the size and fluidity of the American one. Converting government debt 
into euros created a $2 trillion market, in which product innovation, increased competition 
and financial efficiency could be expected (Merrill Lynch, 1998). In fact, the euro is likely to 
be beneficial to American companies, which are used to operating in a large and fluid market, 
such as the one that should emerge from the linking of the eleven European currencies. A 
survey of 100 European pension funds and managers, published by Goldman Sachs and 
Watson Wyatt in June 1998, showed that 64% of them were planning to manage their 
investment portfolios on a sectoral basis, and to consider the euro-zone as a single entity 
(Financial Times, 10 November 1998). The perspective of an integrated European financial 
market would produce an environment having many characteristics in common with its 
American counterpart. This is the opinion of a director in a leading American investment 
bank:
The new model with Euro might be appropriate for Europe. But if it is based on
free market, it is likely to become similar to the US. The outcome should be
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similar because the single European market has the same values. Financial 
models are not political, but models are driven by politics. The US model is 
innovative and responsive; this is more interesting because it is producing good 
results for the financial world as well as for society. The more innovative your 
financial market, the more efficient your economy.
But the Anglo-Saxon influence was present not only in the concept of the deregulation 
programme in France and in Europe and in the definition of the rules of the game; it also had 
some important consequences for the structures of the financial market. This produced an 
even greater change in the environment of French asset management companies.
3.13. A new financial system
We underlined earlier a major feature of American and British types of capitalism: financial 
structures in which capital markets and not banks play the central role. The path followed by 
France seems to have brought this country closer to such a type.
Rybczynski (1997) has suggested that thd'Tinancial systems evolve in three phases. First is the 
bank-oriented phase, in which banks are responsible for almost every financial service and 
there are no other financial markets of any significance. Second is the market-oriented phase, 
in which financial markets grow and become more important for providing funds and for 
investment purposes. Third is the securitised phase, in which the share of banks in collecting 
savings and allocating them declines, and non-financial agents go directly to financial markets 
to find funds and to invest savings. Evolution towards this later stage tends to result from 
changes in the regulatory framework, from technological advances and from an increase in 
general wealth.
In line with this argument, France seems to have adopted more Anglo-Saxon arrangements, 
with a dominant role of the financial markets. Plihon (1998) shows that in terms of assets, 
French major banks held 84.2% of credits in 1980 but only 50.9% in 1996. At the same time, 
the share of their assets invested in securities rose from 4.8% in 1980 to 34.6% in 1996. 
Moreover, their share of financial intermediary business fell from more than 70% in 1980 to 
20% in 1997 (CNCT, 1998). Consequently, the weight of financial securities increased 
greatly in France, as illustrated in the following diagram, which shows the value of financial 
securities (stocks, bonds and negotiable debt) as a percentage of France’s GDP:
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Figure 2: stock o f  financial securities as a percentage o f  France’s GDP
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This means that the French financial environment has become centred on the stock exchange 
and has hence become more similar to the position in Anglo-Saxon countries. This central 
role o f  the financial markets is even reflected in the internal structure o f  French shareholding. 
France was characterised by a system o f  cross-shareholdings, especially after 1986 and the 
withdrawal o f  state influence from control o f  economic activities. But recent analyses show  
that the country is moving away from interlocking and concentrated ownership structures and 
moving “towards less complex, market-oriented structures, closer to the US and British 
models” (Morin, 2000: 39). This change is illustrated by the attitude o f  the AX A -U A P group, 
which is managing its huge stock o f  French equities in line with profitability targets and not to 
foster strategic control. For example, while it could have used its cross-shareholdings or its 
own assets o f  3,500 billion francs to raise 60 billion francs and block the 1998 take-over o f  
the French insurer AGF by its rival Allianz, AXA-UAP did not intervene and let a foreign 
player break the cross-shareholding network. The change in French capitalism is also 
illustrated in the high percentage o f  foreign ownership in France, which represented 35% o f  
the capitalisation o f  the Paris stock market in 1997, according to a Bank o f  France study o f  60 
per cent o f  listed companies. Furthermore, the shift towards an Anglo-Saxon style economy, 
centred on the financial markets, is confirmed in the profile o f  supervisory control.
In summary, it appears that French asset management companies have come to operate in an 
environment that is becoming more similar to that o f  their Anglo-Saxon competitors. This can 
be observed from the regulation and the shape and the structures o f  the financial markets. 
From our evolutionary perspective on adaptation and even from an institutional econom ics 
point o f  view, this may suggest that French firms would adapt by becoming more similar to 
Anglo-Saxon ones, especially since Britain and America dominate the asset management 
business.
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3.2. Competitive conditions and legitimacy: Anglo-Saxon pre­
eminence
We now analyse the case study further in order to show the elements which may be driving 
organisational adaptation, and how this may occur. This means, in the first place, looking at 
competitive conditions in the industry. We will notice that the asset management industry is 
marked by the clear supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon players. In other words, adaptation 
through the definition of the best practices in the business, or through the dominant social 
dogma, are highly likely to go in only one direction: the adoption of Anglo-Saxon practices.
3.2.1. Competing in the asset management industry: key success factors
The new market environment created by the single European market makes it necessary for 
companies in the asset management industry to secure quality and effectiveness (Walter and 
Smith, 1989: 151). When asked about the key success factors in their industry, investment 
professionals insist on a number of issues, which reveal the competitive dynamics of the 
sector. In order to produce superior performance, two elements are critical: people and 
technology. But this is not enough: asset management also requires some more general 
strategic thinking regarding size and distribution.
As £>., fund manager in a leading global investment bank, explains, the industry is structured 
around two general problems, collecting the clients’ money and then managing it in the best 
possible way:
When banks look at asset management, they first look at how they can gather 
funds, and then how they actually manage them. I think the first is a bigger 
challenge than the second is. There is a lot of competition; customers are not 
always easy to access.
The asset management firm does not have many sources of revenue. It is paid almost entirely 
by a management fee, typically between 0.5% and 2% of assets managed per year (Downes & 
Goodman, 1998). Since management fees are expressed as a percentage, then the higher the 
volume of assets under management, the higher the revenue. In other words, to make profits 
in this industry it is not enough to excel in fund management: it is also very important to have 
as many customers as possible. Market analysts therefore regard distribution as a key element 
(Ernst & Young, 1999). It is an entry barrier, and a pre-condition to being able to compete in 
the asset management business, which is why foreign competitors have had such difficulties 
in entering the market, as will be outlined in a subsequent chapter. Distribution networks, and 
in particular those of the retail banks, represent the largest market share. The first condition
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for success in the industry is to have access to these networks, in order to reach as many 
customers as possible.
Another important factor is the capacity to limit costs, in order to generate profits. This is the
focus, for instance, of the PricewaterhouseCoopers 1998 survey of the UK investment
management business, which tried to identify the conditions improving the profit margins of
the industry. The main findings are that size is a key success factor:
We are now seeing the largest businesses establishing something of a lead in 
profit terms as medium-sized and smaller scale operations come under increasing 
pressure. (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998: 1)
This conclusion was reached by many investment professionals, who recognised that only two 
strategies are possible: either going global and reaching a critical mass, or being specialised. 
Nick Lopardo, chief executive of State Street Global Advisors, explains that size is necessary 
to reach economies of scale and scope and to respond to the challenge of the global economy, 
which requires following the financial markets twenty-four hours a day {Investment and f 
Pensions Europe, February 1998: 18). Didier Miqueu, chief executive of Sinopia, a European 
niche player, reckons targeting small market niches is also a good strategy {Investment and 
Pensions Europe, September 1999: 43). On the other hand, it is not easy to control costs, 
because of the rarity and expensiveness of the key resources in the asset management 
business: people and technology. This quote from P., the chief executive of a leading British 
asset manager, is particularly revealing:
Question: Which are the key factors of success in the asset management business?
Answer: It is a people business. So at the end of the day you must employ, that is 
attract and then retain key professionals in all the disciplines of fund 
management. Not only fund managers.[..] That means individuals who can 
interface with clients, service the clients, those who can process the IT, 
technology environment and the human resource management to properly run the 
business.
To succeed in the asset management industry, it is therefore critical to have the best 
professionals available. The capacity to hire such individuals and to retain them, which means 
the human resource management, is then very important. Obviously, this is true for any 
business, but in the case of asset management it is especially critical because only a few fund 
managers manage to beat the market, an ability which makes them uniquely valuable to the 
company. The conditions of employment, and in particular pay, are therefore veiy important 
in enabling companies to hire such individuals. That said, technology and innovation also 
appear to be key factors in success.
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Banking has traditionally made great use of technology, but the information technology 
revolution is proving an incredible driver towards of (Canals, 1993: 37). Investment 
professionals emphasise the importance of technology: computers, databases, pricing 
software, and performance analysis modules were cited as important tools in improving the 
quality of asset management offered to clients. It is not surprising, then, to notice that 
Fidelity, the world’s leading asset management firm, had in 1997 an Information Technology 
budget of more than $500 Million. But this also has implications for the way firms compete 
against each other, and try to design new types of funds {International Tax Review, May 
2000). In fact, the evolution of the financial system can be viewed as an innovation spiral, 
where companies compete not only in a static but also in a dynamic sense, in their capacity to 
innovate and to develop new products (Merton and Bodie, 1995: 20). The capacity of firms to 
react and to adjust quickly therefore appears critical in this industry. In summary, we have 
listed a series of competitive drivers in the asset management business: distribution, size, 
people and technology. However, given these competitive conditions, it appears that Anglo- 
Saxon players are particularly dominant.
3.2.2. Anglo-Saxon leadership
It is important to notice that American and to a lesser extent British players dominate the 
world of asset management. Not only do these countries have the largest market and the 
world’s market-leading companies, but they are also the leading professionals in the field.
The asset management business has strong links to stock exchanges. In fact, asset 
management is barely imaginable without a stock exchange: the whole business is about 
buying and selling securities to pool them together in portfolios in order to achieve certain 
objectives of return and risk. There is a strong interdependency between the national stock 
exchange and the national asset management industry. This is true in terms of factors of 
production: finance professionals, financial products and infrastructures are common to the 
two. A small and non-competitive stock exchange will therefore limit the possibilities for 
development of the asset management industry. It is also the case that asset managers cannot 
work without a number of intermediaries: brokers, analysts, dealers and investment bankers, 
who issue new securities. The performance of the dealers depends on the performance of the 
others. This corresponds to what Porter described as the national diamond, the determinants 
of national advantage (1990: 72). Nations succeed in clusters of industries connected through 
vertical and horizontal relationships (Porter, 1990: 73). Consequently, nations are more likely 
to succeed in the asset management business if they can count on a powerful stock exchange 
and on a wide arrays of investment bankers, analysts, brokers and so on. Reciprocally, 
because the diamond is a mutually reinforcing system, a strong asset management industry
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will support leadership in other related financial industries. Is it therefore so surprising to
notice that the world leaders are to be found in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the largest
financial markets are located? When questioning investment professionals in London, the
perception o f  an Anglo-Saxon leadership is clearly recognised, and it is related to the
geographical location o f  a strong stock exchange:
Interviewer: Talking about investment management would you say that such an 
expertise is more developed in America and Britain?
D: Yes. There are different traditions, also because o f  different pension systems.
Asset Management is located in financial centres (New York, Tokyo and London) 
because they have the competencies and skills e tc ...
Interviewer: Do you think that asset management is more developed in Anglo- 
Saxon countries?
P: I think... what you find, in general, is a larger and more efficient market. The 
state o f  fund management is more developed in more developed markets. Where 
you have a less efficient market it is relatively easier to extract value. 
Technology, terminus o f  flows, transparency make markets like the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia very challenging markets. They have an equity 
culture. There, you have a regime where information is available. Where you 
have less well-defined equity culture, the efficiency is not there as much. When 
you have that kind o f  transparency and efficiency, you become more disciplined  
in the way to consistently extract value out o f  the market. So, in that sense the 
Anglo-Saxon markets are probably ahead o f  the pack.
Anglo-Saxon leadership benefits from a huge market, because o f  pension funds, which collect 
a large part o f  these countries’ GDP and use asset managers to invest it. As a result, the 
American market represents almost 40% o f  the world asset management market. Not 
surprisingly, this is translated into the domination o f  the Anglo-Saxon asset managers, who 
manage the largest volumes in the world. According to Pensions & Investments!Watson Wyatt 
W orld 500, asset managers based in the US had 44.2% o f  the total world market at the end o f  
1997, as shown in the following chart:
Figure 3: Asset management firms’ market shares in 1997 by country o f  origin
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Anglo-Saxon leadership is therefore not only leadership amongst individual companies 
operating in the asset management market, but the societal leadership o f  the Anglo-Saxon  
system in this area. Not only are American and British companies the leading asset managers, 
but the whole professional scene is dominated by Anglo-Saxon players. The most established 
lawyers, the leading investment consultants (Frank Russell, Watson Wyatt, Mercer), the 
prominent rating agencies (Standard & Poor's, Moodies), the leading accounting and audit 
firms (the Big Five) are all American or British. They reinforce the leadership o f  the Anglo- 
Saxon business system, by providing resources and support to the asset management 
companies they work with. They contribute to establishing and improving common practices, 
and thus sustain an institutional competitive advantage in the field. This corresponds to what 
Soskice (1992) defined as the National Frameworks o f  Incentives and Constraints. The 
Anglo-Saxon business system, through its finance, labour market, product market rules and 
inter-company relations helps companies operating in the asset management business. It is 
widely accepted that Anglo-Saxon countries have a more responsive and flexible labour 
market than continental European countries, and in particular France (Lane, 1989; O ’Reilly, 
1994). More generally, in a sector such as asset management, where human resource 
management and innovation are critical, it is likely that institutions o f  the Anglo-Saxon type 
will be beneficial (Casper, Lehrer, Soskice, 1999). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
comparative studies o f  national institutional competitiveness conclude that countries like the 
United States and the United Kingdom provide a competitive advantage for money 
management (Porter, 1990: 255; Vitols et al., 1997: 22). All these arguments have a strong 
implication: competitiveness in the asset management business goes in tandem with the 
Anglo-Saxon business model. We will show later how this suggestion was both recognised 
and debated by the actors in the field, and how the Anglo-Saxon model could eventually 
prevail.
In conclusion, our review o f  Anglo-Saxon leadership in the asset management industry leaves / j 
us with the idea that if a company wants to be competitive it shoulfd look Tike an Anglo-Saxon  
one. Two generic drivers were identified for adaptation: pressures towards higher efficiency  
(economic or evolutionary), and pressures towards legitimacy. In both cases adaptation is 
expected to lead to business practices that look like those o f  British and American companies. 
Even if  this is a rather odd conclusion for the purpose o f  the research, it appears that in the 
case study adaptation may well be nothing but adopting the practices and routines o f  Anglo- 
Saxon players. Such a conclusion complicates slightly the perspective o f  the research, because 
it makes it necessary to look at adaptation processes by paying attention to the Anglo-Saxon
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model. In other words, while our study is longitudinal and studies the French case, it has to be
analysed in relation to the American and British patterns o f  organisation. The problem is 
however that we chose French asset management precisely for its critical interpendency with ' 
the national business system. The case study mixes therefore the problem o f  adaptation with 
the ' 1 . • jt pQggjbjg to a(j0pt Anglo-Saxon practices in the French
asset management industry, tnereoy contradicting the principle o f  interdependency with the 
national business system? This leads us to formulate competing hypotheses about the case 
study: different theoretical perspectives w ill predict that the French industry would go in
4. Four competing hypotheses
N ow  that the case study has been assessed in more depth, it is possible to go back to the 
theories about organisational adaptation to try to predict what might have been expected from 
the adaptation o f  French asset management companies to their new environment. As w e will 
see, contradictory arguments can be advanced about the case study, which leaves a puzzie 
about what <actua% happened in reality. Four hypotheses can be advanced, which put to the 
test the theoretical proposition that business systems will preserve their originality.
4.1. Organisational adaptation: hypothesis 1
There are many elements in the case study that favours a first hypothesis, which is a version 
o f  the convergence theory. The hypothesis is that French asset management companies will 
depart from reproducing the routines corresponding to the original French business system  
and will adopt the routines o f  the companies operating in Anglo-Saxon business systems. 
Several theoretical justifications can be advanced.
The analysis thus far has shown clearly that the asset management business is marked by the 
dominance o f  Anglo-Saxon players, and by the Anglo-Saxon financial system model more 
generally. We may therefore expect that the world leaders in the asset management business 
will be the most efficient firms. The organisation model o f  American ancLffrjtish companies 
would therefore represent the best way to organise asset managemenu-fn a new French 
environment where competition is free, w e would expect market forces to put pressure on 
firms to improve their structures and organisation. Ultimately, the argument is that adaptation, 
driven by economic efficiency, would lead French firms to eliminate their previous practices 
that were not optimal and to adopt those o f  their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Other theoretical 
arguments can also be advanced that support the idea o f  French firms adopting the practices
different directions.
of their American and British competitors. Recalling the argument of Rybczynski (1997) that 
Anglo-Saxon countries are at the forefront of historical trends in the development of financial 
markets, this first hypothesis would also be justified by evolutionary approaches. French 
companies would only catch up with those companies that lead the scene and master the 
newest technology and knowledge. A further justification would come from the neo- 
institutional argument that the most legitimate form of organisation will be imposed upon 
companies. Because they represent the world leaders and because their supremacy ranges 
from asset management to pension funds to consultants and professionals, American and 
British players would have the legitimacy and the political power to assert their organisational 
structures. French companies would therefore comply with the dominant dogma, which in the 
asset management business happens to be the Anglo-Saxon one. We would therefore expect 
firms in the French asset management organisational field to integrate and to imitate the 
leading practices from the Anglo-Saxon business system. Hence the formulation of the first 
hypothesis for the case study:
*=> HI: French asset management companies will adopt a large number o f routines from  the
Anglo-Saxon business system and transform their patterns o f economic organisation
accordingly
4.2. Organisational adaptation: hypotheses 2 and 3
In the preceding hypothesis, the institutional constraints were not regarded as very 
problematic: the focus was rather on the intrinsic superiority of Anglo-Saxon practices and 
their subsequent adoption by French players. However, we have underlined that there were 
several aspects in the case study that made this perspective more complex. For instance, the 
distribution and client relationships were shown to be influenced by historical and 
institutional practices. If foreign companies cannot have effective access to the French 
market, because they do not have a suitable distribution network, it is unlikely that market 
competition will operate properly. French players will not compete against their Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts so much as against their French counterparts. In this case, it is not so obvious 
that they will be prone to change their practices. Moreover, the properties of the asset 
management business make it vital to establish relationships of trust. Change and the adoption 
of new business practices would undermine the system of trust, and this would be undesirable 
for companies. Finally, we have shown that there were still some national institutional 
peculiarities, in terms of regulation, financial habits and more generally in terms of the 
economic organisation of the country. All these elements represent serious constraints that
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may prevent adaptation proceeding in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon system. The case 
study is therefore testing the capacity of the French business system to evolve.
French asset management companies are faced with a changing environment, one which is 
becoming more similar to that in Anglo-Saxon countries. But at the same time, the dominant 
institutions of the French business system have remained in place and continue to have a 
national dimension. Given these elements in terms of regulation and conduct of business, and 
given the nature of asset management, one would therefore expect the national dimension of 
the business system to continue to dominate. Because of system interdependency, one could 
advance the hypothesis that French asset management companies will not change radically: 
they are already adapted to their environment, and even if the French financial system may 
have different rules, the components of the system have not changed and remain inter­
dependent. Given a new environment, asset management companies may change some of 
their practices, but their distinctive patterns of economic organisation will remain, and they 
will continue to reproduce the structures of the French business system. One would even 
expect societal effects (Maurice and Sellier, 1986) to appear, showing the specifically national 
response to transformations in the environment. Hence the second hypothesis:
H2: French asset management companies will continue to reproduce the patterns o f the
French business system; change will only reinforce their specificities and produce
societal effects
Another hypothesis, closely linked to H2, would be that of an intermediary or hybrid stage. 
French asset management companies would adapt to the changes in their environment by 
adopting some American or British patterns, but because of institutional constraints this 
would lead to something rather different from the Anglo-Saxon business system. The 
theoretical justification for this would be the fact that the French financial system is only half­
way towards the Anglo-Saxon model, and therefore a successful adaptation would also be 
half-way in this direction. Firms would adopt hybrid patterns of organisation, with for 
instance their distribution and customer relations still carried out in the French way, but other 
areas, such as portfolio-building, taking advantage of global investment and operating as in 
American or British companies. This hypothesis is probably the most inconclusive one, but 
given the situation disclosed by the case study, it may be a possible outcome. Hence the third 
hypothesis:
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■=> H3: French asset management companies will develop original patterns o f organisation, 
that will correspond to an hybrid model, between the original French model and the 
Anglo-Saxon one
4.3. Organisational adaptation: hypothesis 4
But given the recognition that national environment is relevant, there may be another possible 
way for firms to adapt to their environment. This relates to the theory of societal contingency, 
which is once again an intermediary outcome between HI and H2, but this time in relation to 
geographical stratification.
An important outcome in European integration is the freedom of movement, which makes it
possible not only to distribute investment products and services across borders, but also to
locate asset management companies anywhere in the EU. We underlined that Anglo-Saxon
pre-eminence in the asset management field was a matter not only of firms but also of a whole
business system. In order to compete not only in France, but internationally, it is therefore
possible that firms might try to seize the opportunities offered by such a business system. As
explained by Sorge (1991):
Performance in an industry or sector is due to a correspondence between an 
industry, sector or company profile and the societal profile, rather than 
correspondence between a supposedly ideal profile and the societal profile.
Asset management companies will monitor reflexively the new requirements of the new
European environment. In this perspective, they will admit the relevance of national
dimensions. More precisely, they will recognise the intrinsic superiority of Anglo-Saxon
societal characteristics for the purpose of asset management services. As a result, they will try
to place their activities in a business system displaying Anglo-Saxon patterns of organisation.
This is in particular the case of London, as this director of a leading investment bank explains:
N: London has the infrastructure and the people and so-on to be the pre-eminent 
financial centre. So, if you chose a place to concentrate your activities, of course 
it would be London, because it is the best place to be in business.
Hence the fourth hypothesis for the case study, which would take into account both 
institutional constraints and competition drivers:
■=> H4: French asset management companies will exploit the competitive contingency related 
to the patterns o f Anglo-Saxon business systems, by leaving France and moving their 
capacities to such systems (for instance: London)
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As a result of this investigation of the French asset management industry we have therefore 
come up with four competing hypotheses, or four possible outcomes of the adaptation 
processes in this industry. Starting from some theoretical understanding o f organisational 
adaptation, the hypotheses take into account the specific nature of this business, the specific 
nature of the changes in the French environment and the specific constraints o f its 
surrounding institutions. The next chapters will attempt to evaluate which of the four options 
corresponds best to reality. As a starting point, the following chapter builds a theoretical 
framework to address the empirical evidence, and starts to analyse the case in more depth by 
showing how the organisational field is internally structured.
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CHAPTER III: ANALYTICAL TOOLS
In the previous chapters, we elaborated on the research problem, namely the investigation of 
how firms in a given business system adapt to changes in their environment, and on the 
methodological options for tackling it. This led to the choice of a case study, the French asset 
management industry over the period 1984-1999, and to a first evaluation of the case, from a 
theoretical and a priori perspective. Four competing hypotheses were formulated which were 
grounded on generic theories of economic change and adaptation, and which represent four 
possible outcomes of the organisational adaptation processes. In this chapter we develop a 
theoretical framework to provide the analytical tools necessary to conceptualise and analyse 
organisational adaptation within the national business system perspective. It is necessary to be 
equipped with theoretical tools and concepts before approaching the data, so that the evidence 
can be framed properly. Our ambition, and a possible contribution of the present thesis, was 
therefore to develop a coherent grammar of relations between clearly identified variables and 
concepts (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 204), all the more so as we planned to interpret the 
empirical material accordingly, following the principle of “grounded theory” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).
However, such a coherent grammar of relations was not easy to achieve. The main problem 
was to accommodate theories about organisational adaptation within the business system 
perspective, which is the starting point of the research. We were faced with two difficulties. 
First, we had to relate a static framework (business system) to a dynamic process (adaptation). 
Then, we had to relate structure and agency, because organisation theoiy presented conflicting 
views about the drivers and modalities of adaptation. The solution we provide in the 
following pages relates to a definition of the firm along three layers {entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception o f control and organisational routines) which are in essence dynamic 
and analytically relate the firm to its environment. Together, the three layers consistently 
combine and cover the main elements of the firm’s organisational life. They link the internal 
properties of the firm to the patterns of the business system. Separately, they highlight 
different dimensions of the firm and make it possible to use theories and concepts, which 
would not otherwise relate to each other. After introducing the problems we had to solve in 
designing the theoretical framework, we will outline our multi-layered definition of the firm 
and apply it to the case study.
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1. Designing the theoretical framework: problems to solve
Our objective in this chapter is to provide conceptual tools to investigate organisational 
adaptation within the business system perspective. Unfortunately, we have to face two 
problems. First we need to accommodate a framework that is mainly static (business system) 
and dynamic processes (adaptation). Secondly, the organisational theories we need to use to 
deal with adaptation are divided between those focusing on agency and those focusing on 
structure. We will show that Giddens’ structuration theory helped us solve these difficulties.
1.1. It is necessary to complement the business system framework
We started the thesis from the perspective that economic action has to be understood within 
its context, and we recognised in the business system a useful framework to categorise 
national economies. The argument developed by the business system approach, and in 
particular by Whitley (1991,1999), is the idea of interdependency between institutions on the 
one hand and patterns of economic organisation and behaviour on the other. This is best 
expressed in the format of a matrix, in which certain institutional features are correlated with 
certain characteristics of firms (Whitley, 1999: 79). In other words, once the institutional 
features of the system have been identified, we will be able to characterise the patterns of 
organisation and behaviours of the firms in the business system. The approach is particularly 
useful because it gives a list of variables, which are the result of empirical investigations and 
can be used to categorise national economies. They represent a useful tool to portray the 
patterns of organisation and behaviours of firms in a given context. There are however some 
difficulties if we want to apply the framework while focusing on organisational adaptation 
processes.
The problems with Whitley’s framework are that it operates at a high level of abstraction and 
deals mainly with ideal-types (1999: 60, 75, 84), and that it explicitly aims at comparative 
studies. These two elements result in a static and descriptive framework, which gives a good 
comparative picture of national economies but does not account for dynamic processes. In 
other words, the scheme works well for categorising national systems but not for showing 
how they change, which is the aim of our research. Consequently, to tackle organisational 
adaptation, we have to look for other theories to supplement the business-system framework. 
Looking at organisation theory, it appears that many different organisation theories have 
tackled adaptation, even though most of the time it was not their primary focus of analysis. To 
build our theoretical framework we must select properly the various concepts and theories 
that fit with the business-system perspective. However, this is not an easy task, given the
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width of the organisation literature: attempting any critical review would be like opening 
Pandora’s box. The strategy we adopted was to identify .potential candidates and to present 
the key elements in these theories that are useful to our argument. We limited our review to 
the perspectives that pay attention to the social context of economic action, by recognising 
some limitations to the perfect rationality of actors. We found they all share some underlying 
assumptions about the cognitive capacities o f  economic agents, as being limited and 
constructed in relation to a social context. In the following table, theories A1 and A2 follow 
Simon (1960) on the limited rationality of managers. A3 and A4 largely follow the position of 
Weick (1979) that actors make sense and enact their environment. S3 is largely linked to 
Berger and Luckmann's concept that reality is socially constructed, whereas authors within SI 
have drawn on all three of the approaches just outlined. Even so there are differences in 
perspective which correspond to differences in the focus of investigation. This in turn leads to 
the use of different concepts and processes to analyse adaptation. From this rapid overview of 
the literature it is clear that the theories are consistent on these three aspects (perspective, 
focus and processes), although they differ one from another. We know now that we ought to 
use organisation theories to complement the business-system framework, if we want to build 
the theoretical tools we need for the empirical investigation. The theories in the table provide 
a series of theoretical tools that we could potentially use. The problem now is to know which 
tools to select and how to use them. And here, another difficulty surfaces: there is a strong 
dichotomy between those theories that consider adaptation as a managerial agency (A1-A4), 
and those that consider it a property of the firm’s environment (SI-S3).
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Table 2: Review o f the organisational literature in its treatment o f adaptation
Perspective Treatment of 
adaptation
Focus of 
investigation
Processes
A1 Transaction costs 
economics
Williamson (1975, 
1985, 1986)
Adaptation is a 
managerial agency: a 
rational optimisation 
under institutional 
constraints
institutional
setting
transaction costs
governance
structure
analysis o f the 
environment 
optimisation of the 
transaction costs
A2 Contingency 
theory
Bums and Stalker 
(1961), Donaldson 
(1987), Galbraith 
(1973), Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967)
Adaptation is a 
managerial agency: a 
problem-solving 
ability
organisational
structure
technology
analysis of the 
environment 
diagnosis and 
design of the ideal 
structure 
implementation
A3 Resource- 
dependence
Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978)
Adaptation is a 
managerial agency: 
managers can adapt 
their environment to 
the organisation
resources 
coalitions both 
internal and 
external to the 
firm
enactment of the 
environment 
political struggle 
and replacement of 
the ruling coalition
A4 Strategic choice
Chandler (1962,
1977), Child (1972), - 
Miles and Snow 
(1978)
Adaptation is a 
managerial agency: a 
political and problem­
solving ability
competitive 
environment 
formal structure 
coalitions
enactment of the 
environment 
political struggle 
between rival 
coalitions 
strategic decisions 
by the ruling 
coalition
SI Organisational 
learning
Argyris (1985, 1999), 
Argyris and Schon 
(1978), Cyert and 
March (1963), 
Levinthal (1998), 
Nelson and Winter 
(1982)
Adaptation is the 
result of appropriate 
learning. Learning 
does not always lead 
to adaptation. It may 
be intentional and be 
driven by managers, 
or it may be 
unintentional and 
driven by stochastic 
events and random 
improvements.
Organisational 
routines (programs 
and memory that 
enable the firm to 
perform tasks)
Experimentation 
through stimulus- 
reaction learning 
Searching and 
noticing of new 
routines
Diffusion from the 
environment
S2 Population 
ecology
Aldrich (1979), 
Hannan and Freeman 
(1977, 1989),
Adaptation is the 
result of a selection 
by the environment: 
adapted organisations 
will survive, while the 
others perish
Organisational
forms:
goals
boundaries
activities
Variation
Selection
Retention
S3 New 
Institutionalism 
Berger and 
Luckmann (1967), 
Meyer and Rowan 
(1979), Powell and 
DiMaggio (1983, 
1991), Scott (1995)
Adaptation is imposed 
by the institutional 
environment, through 
pressures towards the 
legitimate
organisational forms
Institutions, as 
expressed in 
rules, norms and 
cognitive 
frameworks 
institutionalised 
myths and 
rationalities
Institutionalisation 
of business recipes 
in the environment 
Isomorphism: 
coercive, mimetic 
and normative
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1.2. Combining agency and structure
We need to select those theories may be best combined with the business-system perspective, 
and we are confronted with the recurrent problem in social sciences of agency and structure. It 
is not easy to decide which theory may suit best, especially because we insisted that in this 
research we wanted to avoid both the over-socialised and the under-socialised view of the 
individual. Whitley (2000), even while underlining the constraining role of institutions, 
recognises the possibility of change and innovation. In other words, to fit into the perspective 
of the present thesis, and to relate the business system perspective with the theoretical 
accounts of organisational adaptation, it is necessaiy to redefine and integrate both the 
possibilities of agencies and the constraining properties of the environment. Only in this way 
is it possible to insert such dynamic elements as adaptation and change into a configuration 
interested in interdependency -such as the business system approach.
The attempt to achieve an integrative framework of organisational adaptation is not only 
desirable; it is indeed possible, from a closer examination of the underlying assumptions that 
guided the previous presentation of the literature. Such an attempt, moreover, is not an 
isolated one: a number of social scientists have tried to overcome the division between actors 
and structure. Conscious of the limitations of one single approach, a number of theorists have 
come to crossing over boundaries and to combining theoretical perspectives. For instance, 
Institutionalists recognised the inability of their theories to explain fully organisational 
behaviour and realised the relevance of efficiency perspectives (Scott, 1987). Organisational 
ecology and institutional theory witness increasing convergence (Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Dacin, 1997), in particular because organisational ecologists have 
realised that institutional pressures supplement competitive or market ones. Other analysts 
combined ecology perspectives with learning models (Ingram and Baum, 1997) or transaction 
cost economics (Silverman et al., 1997). On the other hand, organisational learning has 
attracted the attention of institutional theorists, since it offers an alternative to rationalistic 
models and to the aggregate models of population ecology (Aldrich, 1999: 60). Learning is 
also connecting individual agency and environmental influence through its cognitive 
perspective: the notion of the learning organisation has become a management classic, 
although it recognises the limits of managerial agency. Other attempts to bridge perspectives 
should also include authors such as Fligstein (1990), who draws on the politics of resource 
dependence theory to complement Institutionalism. The possibility of bridging perspectives 
and o f crossing boundaries is more than a war of influence to establish pre-eminence over
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competing theories; it appears to be a real option for the analysis of organisational 
adaptation.14 And the paradigm provided by Anthony Giddens offers such an opportunity.15
In a book devoted to the critical appreciation of his structuration theory, Giddens affirms 
(Bryant and Jaiy, 1990) that his concern is to develop an ontological framework for the study 
of human social activities, where ontology means a conceptual investigation of the nature of 
human action, of social institutions, and of the interrelations between action and institutions 
(Giddens 1990: 201). Giddens’ structuration theory wishes to escape from the dualism 
associated with objectivism and subjectivism (1979: 49). Using the notion of practical 
consciousness, he argues that actors can reflect upon their intentions (if not their unconscious 
motivations) and routinely build a theoretical understanding of their activity (1984: 5). 
Because of the duality of structure, as a constraint and a possibility, agents are not determined 
by the social system but participate in its structuration: they are at the same time products and 
producers of structure (1984: 25). In adopting these insights we place the research in a new 
paradigm, where agency and structure are not opposed but combined together in a theory of 
practice. Doing this, we follow other authors who use such a new paradigm for their 
investigation o f organisational life. For instance, structuration theory gained considerable 
influence within management studies (Pettigrew, 1985; Whittington, 1989, 1992). It was used 
because of its concept of agency, that recognises both the influence of the environment and 
the possibility o f initiative and choice. This allows for a re-conception of institutional 
environments that provides a way out of the Institutionalists’ self-confessed tendency to 
determinism (DiMaggio, 1988), since it opens space for management agency in social 
structure. Maurice and the societal effect school adopted the same perspective, but are more 
influenced by Bourdieu (Maurice et al., 1986: 233). In summary, using Giddens’ theory of 
practice, we have solved part of our problems with the literature dealing with adaptation; we 
can use an integrative perspective that pays attention both to the environment and to the 
possibility of agency. It can be translated into an analytical framework, thanks to an enhanced 
definition of the firm, as shown in the following paragraph.
14 Durand (2001) sustains a similar argument about selection .
15 We could alternatively have used the work o f  Pierre Bourdieu who also attempted to combine 
structure and agency, but we preferred Giddens for the purpose o f this research because his writings 
consider systems, while Bourdieu explicitly rejects this concept (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97, 
104).
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2. A multi-layered definition of the firm
The conditions of possibility for our theoretical framework concerned the need to supplement 
the business system perspective with dynamic processes and to combine agency with 
structure. We have shown that we could satisfy these requirements by using structuration 
theory. We can now proceed with the design of the framework, and make good use of the 
organisation theories we identified earlier. Instead of focusing on just one theory or building a 
new one from scratch, we propose a more modest option which represents a middle way: it 
integrates several theories, by recognising the possibility of aggregating adaptation processes 
in a multi-layered definition of the firm. This means developing a generic classification, 
where theoretical propositions can fit and where they can be tested. It means using theories as 
tools and not as prescriptions to describe reality (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
The theories we mentioned above all address organisational life, despite having different
focuses of analysis. By re-configuring their object, it is possible to make them fit together.
Such an attempt may sound arbitrary and even inconsistent, and it could be argued that by
combining perspectives that are sometimes in opposition to each other, the true substance of
each individual theory would be lost. There are however two justifications for combining
these perspectives. First of all, the idea here is not to merge theories, but rather to use some of
the concepts developed by one theory to tackle one particular dimension of organisational life,
and some other concepts, developed by another theory, to analyse another dimension of it.
Moreover, this happens within a new paradigm, taken from structuration theory, which allows
us to overcome dialectic oppositions. The claim is twofold: first that no one theoiy has
addressed properly all organisational dimensions, and second that each theory we use has
convincingly analysed at least one organisational dimension. The claim is therefore that by
recognising the limits of the theories and their link to particular empirical problems, it is
possible to develop a better understanding of these theories (Hall, 1999: 292). The second
justification is that the idea of a stratified model, combining theoretical perspectives, has
already been developed by several influential scholars.
As Richard Scott explains:
Noting the selectivity of the perspectives, a number of theorists have attempted to 
develop more encompassing formulations, combining selected portions of the 
earlier traditions. (1998: 102)
Scott himself suggests a layered model with three levels: social psychological, structural and 
ecological (1998: 107); he claims that because of their historical origin existing frameworks
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are applicable to differing levels o f  analysis (119). The same idea is developed here, in order 
to build a theoretical framework for the analysis o f  organisational adaptation processes.
We can start from a very basic and general understanding o f  what a firm is and what it does,
and then try to categorise these ejjemeat^ in relation to each other and to the firm’ 
environment. As explained by Hall (1 9 9 9 :3 0 )^ 7 ^
An organization is a doflectivityfwith a relatively identifiable boundary, a 
normative order (rules), ranks o f  authority (hierarchy), communication systems, 
and membership coordinating systems (procedures); this collectivity exists on a 
relatively continuous basis, in an environment and engages in activities that are 
usually related to a set o f  goals; the activities have outcomes for organizational 
members, for the organization itself and for society.
To put it simply, an organisation therefore relates to its environment in two ways: through its 
goals (its function, its strategy, and its purpose), and through the way it works (its structure, 
hierarchy, rules and values, its resources and specific capabilities). We decided to divide the 
latter element further, to allow the recognition that the structural and hierarchical dimensions 
o f  the firm are o f  a different nature from its performance tasks and practices, because they 
involve some political configuration. Therefore in order to grasp the dynamics involved in 
each layer, we propose the following definition o f  the firm, based on three dimensions that 
relate to each other:
entrepreneurial synthesis
structure and coalitions: the conception o f  control 
organisational routines
These three elements represent what the firm does and how it works. They are interrelated in 
the sense that the entrepreneurial synthesis is the very reason for the firm's existence, and that 
it defines a social space where a group o f  individuals can organise follow ing a conception of 
control and perform tasks according to specific organisational routines. Such a definition 
seems very simple, but it integrates various perspectives concerning the firm by combining 
three elements that used to be studied separately. By developing these three layers, we can 
solve our initial problem and relate dynamic processes o f  adaptation to static pictures o f  
business systems.
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2.1. Entrepreneurial synthesis
The first layer in our definition of the firm is the entrepreneurial synthesis; it is the reason for 
the firm to exist, its purpose and its value proposition.
In his famous article about the nature of the firm Coase (1932) asked why a firm emerges at 
all. Why are there organisations in the first place? Why are they created? The answer given by 
Coase and extended by Williamson (1975) is found in the cost of using the market: a firm is 
created because it is cheaper to use hierarchy than market. But it remains the case that the 
founding of an organisation is not the automatic result of a given economic and institutional 
setting: for a firm to exist, there is a need for an entrepreneur, who will exploit the 
possibilities in the environment to start an enterprise. This is the message delivered by 
Schumpeter:
The function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionise the pattern of 
production by exploiting an invention or, more generally, an untried technological 
possibility for producing a new commodity or producing an old one in a new 
way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for 
products, by reorganising an industry and so on. (1943: 133)
The entrepreneur is the one who notices the opportunities contained in the market and 
develops the idea that in the given situation hierarchy will work better than market. He is 
continuously involved in sense-making processes, in which he develops an understanding of 
his environment in a cognitive map (Weick, 1979, 1995; Weick and Bougon, 1986). His 
initiative in starting an enterprise is the result of a synthesis between a particular 
environmental setting, the technological, market, competitive and institutional conditions, and 
a particular governance structure, an organisation, in order to produce some goods or services 
in a way that is thought to be adapted to the environment. For that reason, we call 
entrepreneurial synthesis the very reason for the firm to exist. The entrepreneurial synthesis 
is best conceived as the solution to a problem; it provides an adapted response to an 
imperfection in the market. It is the essence of the capitalist enterprise, the shape of 
opportunism: the entrepreneur is the one who seizes the opportunities in the environment and 
provides an appropriate organisational response, in order to bring some kind of benefit 
eventually. Moreover, the entrepreneurial synthesis gives a purpose to the firm: it drives the 
organisation to perform a task and makes employees share some common objective. Through 
the entrepreneurial synthesis, the firm is conceived and its purpose is defined in relation to an 
environment. But it is only an idea of the firm; it does not yet correspond to anything tangible. 
Other elements have to be added to it, in order to define the firm properly.
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2.2. The conception of control
The second element constituting the firm corresponds to the actual governance structure and 
hierarchy that makes the firm a collective entity. ,
As explained by Mintzberg (1979):
Every organised human activity gives rise to two fundamental and opposing 
requirements: the division of labour into various tasks to be performed and the 
co-ordination of these tasks to accomplish the activity. The structure of an 
organisation can be defined simply as the sum total of the ways in which it 
divides its labour into distinct tasks and then achieves co-ordination among them.
(2)
But these two elements, division of labour and co-ordination of tasks, can be further defined 
by noticing that the formal structure is exposed to political games and conflicts. The structure 
is not a formal organisation chart that works by itself; it corresponds to a confrontation 
between conflicting interests, which can only be fitted together thanks to a hierarchy of 
authority. The political dimension within the firm was outlined several times in the earlier 
literature review, as in the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963), the 
resource-dependence and strategic-choice perspectives. Not only is the firm the creation of an 
entrepreneur, who seizes in an entrepreneurial synthesis the opportunities offered in the 
environment, it is also a social arena, where coalitions fight against each other, where 
individuals seek to increase their power. The formal structure of the organisation has therefore 
to be coupled with a political configuration. This is the description Mintzberg gives of the 
firm: he shows that the structure is reflected in power games and rival coalitions, which aim 
to dominate the firm and establish a hierarchy in their favour. He defines some categories 
which constitute the firm (strategic apex, middle line, operating core, technostructure, support 
staff), and thus illustrates the two inter-linked dimension of organisational structure: formal 
hierarchy and authority.
Political tensions and bureaucratic division of labour and co-ordination can combine because
o f the underlying mechanisms of domination, as was explained by Weber:
Indeed, the continued exercise of every domination (in our technical sense of the 
word) always has the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the 
principles o f its legitimisation. (1978: 954)
The link between authority and legitimacy gives coherence to the collective entity that makes 
up the organisation. In bureaucratic organisations, which represent the most common form in 
our modem industrialised societies, rationally-regulated domination is the pre-eminent
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principle of legitimisation. “In that case, every single bearer of powers of command is 
legitimated by that system of rational norms, and his power is legitimate insofar as it 
corresponds with the norm” (954). Rational legitimation is critical in the sense that it relates 
political struggle and cognitive rhetoric:16 it is only through justification that the dominant 
coalition can continue to rule (Boltanski and Thevenot, 1991). The dominant coalition 
therefore has to be the incarnation of the legitimate rationality. Domination and hierarchy, in 
return, are the product of a struggle to establish the legitimate rationality.
The functions of groups of individuals, as explained for instance by Mintzberg (1983), have
an impact on their goals and on their perceptions of the organisation. The position of the
agents in the organisation, which is, by definition, a structured social space, influences their
sense of their place (Giddens, 1979: 117). It is a basis for a plurality of worldviews, which
initiates a symbolic struggle for power and for the definition of the legitimate worldview
(Bourdieu, 1987: 159). Political struggle between rival coalitions and formal bureaucratic
division of labour and co-ordination can be combined, because the bureaucratic structure and
the power configuration are two dimensions of the same reality. This reality is the accepted
rationality about how to organise and control the firm. The ruling coalition maintains its
authority and the corresponding power configuration only because it is legitimate, and this
legitimacy derives from the fact that the ruling coalition is the incarnation of the accepted
rationality about how to organise. This is another way to express the Weberian concept of
authority in a bureaucratic system, which however adds to it the idea that the legitimacy based
on rational rules is socially constructed. To make this aspect explicit, we use the term
conception o f control, borrowed from Fligstein (1990) who defines it as follows:
Conceptions of control are world views that define one firm’s relationship with 
others, what appropriate behavior is for firms of that type and how those kinds of 
organisations ought to work. (295)
This gives the idea of a coherent principle, a concept about how the firm ought to be 
organised, a concept that is considered rational. The conception o f  control is an expression of 
the institutionalised rationality about what ought to be done to perform in a given 
organisational situation. In Fligstein's use there are very few conceptions of control, probably 
because of the very general formulation he gives of it. But here, the term conception o f 
control is used in a narrower way, at the level of an individual firm: the conception o f control 
is the script about how the firm is to be structured and organised. It lists the resources, the 
division of labour, the mode of co-ordination and the hierarchy within the firm. It is also, and
16 Strangely enough, these two dimensions have traditionally been kept separate in most organisation 
theories.
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this is important, the basis upon which the legitimacy of the bureaucratic domination is 
established. As a generic principle, the conception o f control contains the accepted best way 
to organise the firm, as regards its division of labour and authority, which means as regards 
the relative authority of rival coalitions. The dominant coalition is the promoter of the 
conception o f control and its authority relies upon it.
An example can be provided to illustrate such a perspective. Let us assume there is a 
company A, with three coalitions: sales people, accountants and information technology (IT) 
specialists, and which is faced with a problem of profitability. Accountants promote 
conception o f control 1, saying that costs must be under control and that employees must be 
constantly evaluated, in order to measure precisely where value is created and to limit 
expenses accordingly. Sales people promote conception o f control 2, saying that management 
should be as simple as possible and avoid bureaucratic rules and that money should be 
invested in advertising to boost revenues. IT specialists promote conception o f control 3, 
saying that the company should modernise its infrastructure and buy up-to-date software. Any 
argument may seem acceptable. However, conception o f control 1 becomes institutionalised. 
From that moment, accountants develop a control system: they limit the resources of the other 
coalitions, determine the legitimate bureaucratic rules and end up dominating the other 
groups. The means by which institutionalisation occurs can be multiple, but they are always 
related to the environment. In the example, company A is actually copying what other 
companies in the industry are doing. Such an example illustrates how the conception o f 
control formulates and holds together domination and legitimacy.
2.3. Organisational routines
The third and last dimension in the definition of the firm corresponds to the routines that 
enable it to perform specific tasks and display specific cultural features. Once the 
entrepreneurial synthesis has been defined and a social space is created where a conception o f  
control holds together division of labour and bureaucratic co-ordination, it remains for the 
firm to operate. What the firm does is the result of organisational routines.
The concept of routines here is similar to that found in evolutionary economics (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) and organisational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Levinthal, 1998). Routines are the deposit of the firm’s know-how; they represent the way of 
doing things within an organisation. They contain the necessary programmes and the 
combinations of roles and resources that enable the firm to perform tasks. However, we 
extend slightly their properties, in order to recognise how routines also carry societal features.
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This corresponds to the idea that the firm is not only an organisation, but also an institution 
(Coriat and Weinstein, 1995: 4). The reality of everyday life, which also contains cultural 
schemes and representations, maintains itself by being embodied in routines (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1968: 169). Routines and rules are reproduced over time by the members of the 
organisation, who thus activate organisational memory. But these routines contain more than 
a programmatic nature: meanings arise in interaction and they are preserved and included 
within the routines of organisational life (Scott, 1995: 41). This creates some kind of 
corporate culture, some rituals and collective images that are specific to the members of the 
organisation. Moreover, this practical experience does not operate in a vacuum: it is 
embedded in a social context because organisational members are also members of a society.
While they activate the routines of the firm, individuals also recall some societal elements of 
their environment. This is due to the duality of the social structure. “Analysing the 
structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in 
the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the 
diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction” (Giddens, 1984: 25). 
In other words, social systems are reproduced over time because agents activate (or 
constitute) their structural properties. But because of the duality of structure, this activation is 
routinised, integrated by agents as they carry internally the structural properties of the system. 
As included in a business system, firms display in their organisational routines some o f these 
structural properties. Combined with an entrepreneurial synthesis and a conception o f control 
organisational routines make it possible for the firm to perform the tasks it is assigned and to 
subsist over time.
3. Resolving the initial problems
In this paragraph, we will establish that the layered definition of the firm fulfils the criteria 
that were identified earlier in the chapter and that it provides a useful framework for our 
fieldwork investigation.
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3.1. Dynamic properties, agency and structure
As anticipated, our definition of the firm as made up of three dimensions (entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception o f control and organisational routines) offers the possibility of 
resolving the initial difficulties in our framework: the definition is dynamic and it overcomes 
the duality between structure and agency.
First of all, the three dimensions are intrinsically dynamic, as they represent temporary 
moments of political confrontations and cognitive developments. The entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception o f control and organisational routines are constantly re-asserted and 
reproduced; they represent solutions to problems that are constantly arising. They are by 
nature temporary and undergo perpetual modification, because they arise in changing settings. 
This representation enables us to grasp the movement inherent in organisational life and to 
apprehend change and adaptation as constitutive of the firm. Secondly, this representation of 
the firm offers a solution to the apparent dichotomy between a perspective focusing on 
managers and one focusing on the environment, as we can illustrate by looking more closely 
l«Sfc at the three dimensions identified.
By examining how the entrepreneurial synthesis is obtained, it is possible to take into account 
the environment of the firm and the agency of its creator when seizing opportunities. The 
entrepreneurial synthesis contains a worldview and therefore has the environment inside it; it 
is not a pure abstraction, but rather the solution of the equation defined by the entrepreneur 
when he apprehends some market failure in his environment. This agency is not deconnected 
from environmental influence, because the synthesis is affected by institutional components 
and by the cognitive maps of the entrepreneur, which are influenced by many structural 
elements (Fiol and Sigismund, 1992; Weick & Bougon, 1986). As such, it recognises the 
influence of environmental properties. But the formulation of the entrepreneurial synthesis is 
also an agency; it corresponds to a positive act of creation by the entrepreneur. The 
entrepreneurial synthesis integrates therefore environmental influence and agency. This is 
also the case with the conception o f control.
The conception o f control relates to institutionalised rationalities that come from the 
environment. The legitimate way to organise is not disconnected from pressures in the 
environment of the firm, as was examined earlier in the review of institutionalist theories. The 
conception o f control corresponds to some equilibrium between internal politics and 
institutional legitimisation. It integrates agency by showing the rival interests of the various 
coalitions and of the environment, by showing the legitimate and institutionally rationalised
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best way of organising. Here again, the conception o f control resolves, by its dynamic nature, 
the apparent opposition between agency and structure within the organisation. Finally, 
routines also show the same property. Routines go through boundaries; they are learned and 
transmitted inside the firm and in the environment. The invention of new routines occurs both 
through agency and through the process of socialisation. Routinisation incorporates some 
agency, because agents are conscious of their actions, which they monitor reflexively 
(Giddens, 1984: 64). Facing specific problems, agents may depart from habitual behaviour 
and alter the organisational routines or invent new ones. At the same time, routines are also 
influenced by environmental components, and they continuously integrate reality from 
external spheres. The environment therefore permeates the organisation, and is incorporated 
into the routines. This explains why, here again, there can be a connection between 
managerial agency and environmental pressures.
In summary, the proposed description of the firm presents a concept of adaptation that meets 
our initial requirements: it is dynamic, and it overcomes the structure-agency divide. But we 
can also show that thanks to these properties it fits within the business-system framework.
3.2. The layered model fits within the business system perspective
We built our definition of the firm based on the three layers {entrepreneurial synthesis, 
conception o f control and organisational routines) so as to provide dynamic processes of 
adaptation to be integrated within the business system framework. We can briefly establish 
that this is the case, by recognising how each layer is the expression of some variables 
identified by scholars using either business-system or societal approaches.
Lane (1989, 1995), Sorge (1995) and Whitley (1992, 1999) provide clear insights about the 
variables that can be used to categorise the diversity in actors and systems. Sorge (1995: 73) 
lists five categories: 
organisation of work
human resources, training and socialisation
industrial and sectoral structures and relations between such industries and sectors
labour markets
technology
Whitley (1999) identifies four key institutional features (state, financial system, skill 
development and control, and the norms governing trust and authority relationships) and 
relates them to two key characteristics of firms (governance, and organisational capabilities 
and strategies) (79). If we add to these variables such complementary elements as group
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coalitions and what Whitley (1992) calls “business recipes”, which represent the 
institutionalised rationality about how best to organise, we can relate our three layers to the 
series of variables that characterise business systems. Because of the definition of the 
entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f control and organisational routines, we can identify 
which variables apply to each layer and make their empirical meaning more explicit. We can 
also distinguish between those variables relating to the internal dimensions of the firm and 
those relating to its environment. The following table shows how these variables are 
combined in the three layers of analysis:
Table 3 : the layered model of the firm in relation to the business system framework
Layer of analysis Key characteristics of firms 
in the business system
Environmental features 
In the business system
Entrepreneurial
synthesis:
Integrates an 
understanding of the 
environment and a 
response to it in terms of 
business proposition
Business proposition 
governance structure 
strategy
Understanding of the 
environment by the 
entrepreneur:
institutional environment, 
and in particular the State 
and financial system 
market structures and 
competitive drivers 
associations and 
professional bodies
Conception of control:
Expression of the 
institutionalised 
rationality about how to 
best organise work
group coalitions internal 
to the firm
division of labour and 
employment structures 
human resource 
management (pay, 
promotion, training)
business recipes 
inter-firm relations 
industrial relations and 
labour market
Organisational
Routines:
Programmes, 
combinations of roles and 
resources that enable the 
firm to perform tasks
task definition and 
information fiows 
organisational 
capabilities and use of 
technology 
corporate rules and 
socialisation
training and education 
norms governing trust and 
authority relationships 
technology and resources
In the table we set out the links between the key variables used to categorise business systems 
and our three analytic layers. In the following chapters, we will use these variables to 
characterise each layer, and build ideal-types such as the French model of the mid-1980s and 
the Anglo-Saxon model. This will show how applicable our framework actually is.
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3.3. The layered model provides the necessary tools to analyse 
organisational adaptation
The final requirement is that the framework must allow the analysis of the processes of 
organisational adaptation which means identifying and interpreting organisational dynamics. 
To do this, we introduce four processes that relate to the layered definition of the firm and 
which should encompass the firm’s dynamics.
The design of the three layers of analysis followed the idea that individual organisation 
theories have tackled adequately only some aspects of organisational life. For that reason, and 
even if we may not have insisted much upon it, each of our three layers borrows from distinct 
theoretical concepts. For instance, organisational routines art related to the organisational 
learning perspective, while entrepreneurial synthesis is more related to strategic choice and 
institutional economics. At the same time, however, all three layers have some links to 
Institutionalism, for the simple reason that the business system perspective is part of this 
approach. To describe the processes of adaptation therefore, it makes sense to consider the 
concepts developed by some organisation theories, and to use them appropriately for one 
specific layer of analysis. We identified four processes, which should cover the whole 
dynamics of adaptation.
The first three processes correspond to the adaptation of the firm to its environment, whereas 
the last one corresponds to the attempts of the firm to alter its own environment. There is no 
need to defend our choice of these four processes, because they result from the layered model 
of the firm. Admittedly, these changes happen through complex mechanisms that can hardly 
be described in linear terms. We will show here that each process can be tackled by using 
particular organisation theories applying to the appropriate layer of analysis. The four 
processes are the following:
change in the entrepreneurial synthesis 
change in the conception of control 
learning of new organisational routines 
manipulation of the environment 
Each represents a specific way for the firm to adapt to its environment, and each proceeds 
from the definition of the three layers identified earlier. By reconstituting the firm around 
different levels, it is possible to use the theories as instruments to describe reality. For 
instance, to describe a process of ‘learning of new organisational routines' we will use the 
concepts and insights provided by the organisational learning and population ecology streams.
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The following table illustrates which theories are available to tackle which process:
Table 4: Adaptation processes and corresponding analytical tools
Processes of 
adaptation
Available theories Analytical concepts
Change in the
entrepreneurial
synthesis
institutional 
economics 
strategic choice 
new
Institutionalism
contingency
theory
change in the entrepreneur’s worldview 
about the opportunities and constraints in 
the environment and within the 
organisation
diagnosis and decision-making about 
strategic changes (e.g., divestment, re­
positioning, change of core-business) 
implementation of a new entrepreneurial 
synthesis
Change in the 
conception of control
new
Institutionalism
organisational
learning
resource-
dependence
strategic choice
production of new conceptions of control 
(internally through innovation or 
externally by professionals, competitors, 
advisors)
confrontation between rival coalitions 
institutionalisation of a new conception 
of control
Change in the 
organisational routines
organisational
learning
population
ecology
new
Institutionalism
experimentation, stimulus-response 
learning cycle
searching and noticing (recruitment of 
new staff, acquisition of companies, 
consulting fees, investment in 
information technology) 
diffusion (passive learning through 
contacts with the environment)
Manipulation of the 
environment
resource
dependence
new
Institutionalism
merger and acquisition of rival 
companies
lobbying towards the State, the 
professions and other authorities 
legal action or influence towards 
competitors and stakeholders
It may seem that the above table contains too many theories and concepts to provide a 
coherent appraisal of the adaptation processes. But to take this view would be to miss the very 
nature of the framework that we are trying to design. The underlying methodology is indeed 
interpretative, which means that theoretical tools are meant to provide the basis for an 
evaluation of reality. When dealing with any particular case, we will have to recognise which 
of the processes listed above apply and which do not. And our list of organisational adaptation 
processes offers the ppssibility of identifying and categorising what we observe, and of 
relating it to other variables and theoretical concepts. The framework is now almost complete, 
and we can briefly outline the general method that can be used for the analysis, before 
applying it to the case study:
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1. Setting up the analysis: defining the organisational field, the time frame
2. Categorising firms’ patterns and behaviours, using the layered model, at different 
historical moments (possibly through ideal-types)
3. Evaluating the changes in the organisation
4. Looking for organisational adaptation processes
5. Interpreting the transformation
Once again, little justification is necessary for such an approach: it stems from our 
framework. This generic method was used in our case to analyse the transformation of the 
French asset management industry over the period 1984-1999, but we believe it could be used 
in other case studies.
In summary, we have now built a theoretical framework that should allow us to tackle 
. . OY
organisational adaptation within the business-system perspective. As we explained Mength, it
was not an easy attempt; but we hope it was worth the effort, because of the theoretical
concepts we have now gathered. They will enable us to structure and organise better the
collection of data, and to analyse and interpret the evidence. However, in a preliminary step, it
is important to show how we can define our three layers in the French asset management case,
given the structural properties of that industry.
4. Applying the framework: key variables in the French 
asset management industry over the period 1984-1999
Our analytical framework should allow us to investigate organisational adaptation within the 
business-system perspective. We saw that the framework has two dimensions:
an analytical one, which attempts to categorise the patterns of organisation and behaviour 
of the firms at a given historical moment
an interpretative one, which attempts to identify and conceptualise adaptation processes 
between two distinct moments 
Admittedly this means that there are several variables included in the framework. Following 
the method just outlined, we will now try to simplify the scope of our investigation, by 
concentrating on the critical variables, those that result from the structure and properties of 
the asset management business. In this way we will show how we can apply our framework 
and anticipate the analysis of the following chapters. Two elements are critical in the French 
asset management business: first it is operated by a variety of players, which also operate in 
other financial services; second, it presents a duality in the demand, between private and 
institutional investors. Because of that, the entrepreneurial synthesis of the firms in the field
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resolves the problem of combining a means of distribution with a particular positioning (client 
target and product offer). An analysis of work organisation will then help us clarify the 
variables relating to the conception o f control and organisational routines.
4.1. Defining the entrepreneurial synthesis
There are two key elements in the asset management business: the diversity of players and the 
duality in the demand. This will lead us to understand the entrepreneurial synthesis as a 
solution to the problem of combining distribution and positioning.
4.1.1. The demand side: a duality in the market
It is not possible to understand the French asset management market without noticing that 
demand is extremely diversified. Depending upon their assets and liabilities, and their risk 
sensitivity, clients express very distinctive preferences about their investments. But behind 
this apparent diversity, it is possible to distinguish between two segments:
institutional investors: pension funds, insurance companies, banks, associations and 
any medium or large company
private investors: households, families, any individual with some free cash 
As one director of an asset management firm told us: “between the institutional clients and the 
retail networks’ clients, the market has two logics”. What is striking in the asset management 
industry is the relative difference between institutional and individual investors, in their 
degree of sophistication. This difference is then articulated around the distribution of asset 
management services.
Institutional investors have sophisticated requirements that they can express precisely because 
of their capacity to analyse their assets and liabilities; they can formulate what they want, and 
how they want their money to be invested. For instance, business firms tend to require short­
term money management services, especially because French law prohibits the payment of 
interest on deposits in bank accounts. Firms also have some specific needs for company 
savings scheme and other reserves. Banks and insurance companies probably make up the 
largest share of the institutional demand for asset management; they have large amounts of 
reserves and liabilities from deposits, insurance policies and future claims, and they 
sometimes prefer out-sourcing the management of these funds. Finally, an important group is 
represented by French pension funds, called Caisse de Retraite Complementaire. The French 
pension system is based on a contributory scheme, where active workers pay contributions 
that go directly to pensioners. But in addition to that there are some complementary 
retirement schemes that add to the standard pension. They are funded by individual
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contributions from workers and are organised by various occupations or corporations; they are 
often led by former trade unionists or by delegates o f  the relevant corporation. The following  
diagram gives a presentation o f  this system. It is important to notice that these pension funds 
are part o f  institutional networks. Some occupations, for historical reasons, have particular 
links with particular banks or insurers, especially in the mutual sector. The most notorious 
example is the case o f  Credit Agricole, which used to fund France’s rural sector. For that 
reason, such corporate networks particularly influence customer relationships in the French 
market.
Figure 4: French supplementary pension system
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Private investors are not as sophisticated in their asset management requirements. They tend 
to choose an investment vehicle, instead o f  defining a precise mandate for their asset 
manager, and in most cases they choose mutual funds. Mutual funds are regarded as 
commodities:17 anyone can buy a share o f  a S1CAV or FCP, without having to have any 
personal relation to the asset manager in charge. Moreover, these funds can be sold by a 
variety o f  distributors and promoters: banks, insurance companies (through life insurance
17 One CEO o f  an asset^jmayagement company even told us the distribution and selling o f  mutual funds 
was very similar to the. one o f yoghurts, to signify that he treated mutual funds as commodities.
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policies), financial advisors, retailers or even through direct selling and Internet. 
Consequently, and to make an analogy, the asset management industry is similar in its 
polarity between mandates and mutual funds, to the fashion industry, where “Haute Couture” 
is opposed to “Pret-a-Porter” What is particularly interesting in the asset management 
industry is the fact that segmentation among clients is articulated along different distribution 
strategies. But before that, we should mention the variety among market players, in the offer 
side o f  the market.
4.1.2. T hree categories of players
When considering the offer o f  asset management services, it is important to notice that not 
just any company is authorised to provide asset management services. This business has a 
restricted access to those companies that successfully passed the test o f  licensing or
| o
accreditation. Two types o f  organisation are allowed operating in this business: credit 
institutions and investment firms. In the follow ing diagram, the supervision authorities 
impacting on the asset management industry are represented. As can be seen, both banking 
and financial market authorities play a role.
Figure 5: French asset management supervisory authorities
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18 Before 1988, individuals or limited partnership were entitled to offer portfolio management services, 
but after the 1988 law -which, by the way, was a transposition o f  the European directive- this 
possibility was restricted to companies.
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There is a particular difficulty in trying to define the organisational field of French asset 
management: the players in this business may have different origins and different affiliations 
to particular types of financial services or professional bodies. By looking in more detail at 
the French market, it is possible to identify three groups of players, each with distinct 
properties.19
The first category is the independent players: independent because not related to a retail bank 
or insurance company. Given their market shares, they look like residual actors; but they are 
the most numerous and they tend to target specific niches. The AFG-Asffi, the association of 
the asset management companies, has labelled them ‘entrepreneurial’ players (AFG annual 
report, 1999), because they do not have many employees, usually less than thirty. These 
players are the heirs of the historical development of France’s capital markets and they are 
made up of three categories: portfolio management companies coming ffom investment 
banks, those coming ffom stock exchange companies, and those created after 1988. 
Investment banks, like Hottinguer, Stem, Neuflize-Schlumberger-Mallet, Lazard, Louis- 
Dreyfus and Rothschild, have a long tradition of wealth management, which was extended 
over time to other institutional and private clients. Stock exchange companies have also had 
some asset management capacities, historically through some of their employees called 
remisiers, who gave advice and administered clients’ portfolios; and later, when remisiers and 
agents de change were abolished, by using their own resources and portfolio management 
subsidiaries. Finally, after the 1988 law that created portfolio management companies, some 
new firms were founded by investment experts who had left larger structures. These three 
types can be grouped together, because all of them have the same entrepreneurial synthesis. 
They target individuals with a medium to high capital as well as institutional investors, and 
they operate through direct contacts and direct sales forces; they use external providers to 
cover the whole value chain and to sell a particular expertise with a limited number of 
products. Their competitive strength lies in their capacity to develop personal relationships 
with their clients and to offer tailor-made services. All these independent companies
19 In the thesis we may use alternative names to qualify fund management companies, those firms that 
sell asset management services: we may use asset management firm or portfolio management company 
to qualify them. There is no significant difference between the three designations, all the more so as the 
equivalent French word, which was used during the fieldwork, is “soci6t6 de gestion” (management 
company), which is an abbreviation of either portfolio, fund or asset management company. But this 
slight fuzziness is interesting because it goes with some diversity between market players, and with the 
difficulty of defining asset management without referring to other established financial services.
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constitute the largest number of players in the industry, even though their market share is 
fairly limited. Two other categories, because of their relation to large distribution networks, 
represent the most prominent part of the business.
The second category of players in the asset management market is that linked to large retail 
banks. Their entrepreneurial synthesis is to use the distribution network of the bank to 
distribute mutual funds or life insurance, and to pinpoint the accounts of companies or 
wealthy individuals who may be interested in asset management mandates. This may involve 
some private banking capacities. The funds thus collected are then managed centrally by the 
fund managers of the bank. We will see later how their internal organisation evolved over the 
period 1984-1999 and how autonomous subsidiaries emerged. Because of the size o f their 
networks and the number of their clients, they have the largest market share in the industry.
Insurance companies are the last category of players. Historically they have developed strong 
asset management capabilities, because they have always had to manage their mathematical 
reserves in order to secure the payments of future claims. Life insurance, even if it covers a 
risk (the risk o f death), is very close to portfolio management. But the largest insurers have 
also tended to manage the funds of some pension funds, or Of some of the smaller insurance 
companies which lacked the capacity to manage their own accounts. In the early 1990s some 
insurance companies used the possibility, offered by the new law on portfolio management, to 
create portfolio management companies which then grew to become some of the market 
leaders in terms of assets under management. Their entrepreneurial synthesis is to exploit 
some of their traditional competencies in asset management for their own account, and to 
extend it to third parties by exploiting the resources of their distribution network. It is 
therefore very close to that of retail banks.20 The Caisse des Depots et Consignations (CDC) 
is the state-owned financial institution in charge of managing the assets collected by the 
Caisses d'Epargne, by La Poste, the French public postal service, and by CNP, the largest life 
insurance company in France. Despite its particular characteristics we put CDC together with 
insurers, because it also uses its own account capacities to offer asset management services to 
external clients, and because it uses a large retail distribution network.
We have identified three different categories of players in the asset management field, but 
they do not have similar market shares. This is shown in particular by looking at the segment
20 It should be noted that retail banks also offer life insurance products, and that the presence of insurers 
in the asset management business reflects the trend among financial institutions to offer a whole range 
of financial products.
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of the market devoted to mutual funds. Europerformance estimated that at the end of 1998 the 
ten market leaders had 62% of the market in SICAV (open ended mutual funds). The leading 
players were the large retail banks and the CDC, which itself had more than 10% of the 
market. Comparable statistics show that in 1985 the ten largest market players had 64% of the 
mutual funds market and the largest thirteen more than 70%. These high concentration levels 
in mutual funds can also be observed, if to a lesser extent, in the institutional segment. Here it 
is first and foremost the insurers that dominate the market, because they tend to give the 
management of their reserves to their own asset management subsidiaries. As a result, the 
leading French insurance company AXA had around 9% of the institutional segment in 1997 
and AGF more than 6% in 1998.21 The French asset management market is therefore 
concentrated and dominated by a few players. This did not prevent the industry consisting of 
more than 300 portfolio management companies at the end of 1998 (AFG-Asffi annual report 
1999).
And interestingly, asset management companies also confront one another in the professional 
field, through a large number of associations: the French regulator makes it compulsory for 
credit and investment firms to join a professional body. Until 1997 and the creation of AFG- 
Asffi as a single professional entity for the asset management business, there was no clear 
domination by any one association in the field, as can be seen in the next table and the graph 
following it. But to adapt Bourdieu’s analysis of the literary field at the end of the nineteenth 
century (1992: 205): the role of the French State has been very important in the financial 
sector. Because of that, it was considered important to arrange the various categories of 
players in line with their links to the State, which has closer ties to players which are either 
state-owned (CDC, CNP), formerly state-owned (Credit Lyonnais), or mutually-owned than 
to independent players operating on the stock exchange. The opposition between state and 
market is thus relevant in the asset management business, and we used it to position the 
different players in the field.
21 According to their annual reports for 1998, AXA managed FF 452 billion (mutual funds excluded) 
and AGF FF 283 billion, in a total market of FF 4775 billion (AFG-Asffi, 1999).
Table 5: Professional associations in the French financial sector
Representative body Financial institutions Members 
(in 1998)
I. Entitled to operate a credit activity and to receive 
short term deposits from clients
Association Fran^aise des 
Banques (AFB)
All non-mutual retail banks, investment banks and 
foreign banks established in France.
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Federation Nationale du 
Credit Agricole (FNCA)
Mutual banks historically specialised in funding the 
agriculture sector and united in a national federation. 
It is organised as a single group comprising one 
national unit and some regional and local branches, 
as well as financial companies.
53
Chambre Syndicate des 
Banques Populaires 
(CSBP)
Mutual banks comprising a national and some 
regional branches.
30
Confederation Nationale 
du Credit Mutuel 
(CNCM)
Mutual banks, established in the main regions of 
France and having substantial large autonomy.
18
Caisse Centrale de Credit 
Cooperatif (CCCC)
Mutual banks devoted mainly to associations, small 
and medium businesses and cooperatives.
36
Centre National des 
Caisses d ’Epargne et de 
Prevoyance (CENCEP)
Organised at a regional level and benefiting from 
privileged products (livret A); they are linked to the 
French state.
35
Conference permanente 
des Caisses de Credit 
Municipal
Similar to building societies, they are locally based. 20
II. Companies offering investment services
Association Fran£aise des 
Entreprises
d ’lnvestissement (AFEI)
Created in 1996, this association represents French 
investment companies. Its members may also be part 
of other associations.
80
Association fran^aise de 
la gestion financiere 
(AFG-Asffi)
Created in January 1997 from a merger of the 
association for portfolio management companies 
(AFG) and that for investment funds (Asffi).
326
III. Insurance companies
Federation Fran^aise des 
Societes d ’Assurance 
(FFSA)
Main representative body of the insurance companies 
(96% of all companies).
326
Source: AFB 1998, Apec 1997 and associations’ websites
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Figure 6: The asset management field in 1998
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Where:
♦ Type o f  pressure group
Type o f  state authority
As the diagram shows, the French asset management organisational field is at the intersection 
between three areas: the banking, insurance and stock exchange/investment fields. This 
follow s directly from the typology o f  the players in the asset management business and their 
professional affiliation. The different fields confront each other when shaping the asset 
management business, because each o f  them has its own professional and possibly legal 
bodies. We will see later that the key element in the transformation o f  asset management was 
its constitution as an autonomous business, as a new organisational field in which Anglo- 
Saxon practices could be implemented. We should also mention that trade unions still have 
some influence, especially in the banking and insurance sector, and that they should be taken 
into account when looking at the internal dynamics o f  the field. Now that we have identified 
the players, we can discuss further how the entrepreneurial synthesis may be defined.
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4.1.3 Defining the entrepreneurial synthesis
From our analysis, it appears that the entrepreneurial synthesis is the solution to the problem 
of combining products, distribution channels and customer focus. There is indeed some 
correspondence in French asset management between the duality in demand and the means of 
distribution.
Because they have less sophisticated needs, private investors tend to use mutual funds rather 
than mandates when they hire an asset manager. Mutual funds are distributed through mass 
retail networks, and as a result private individuals have few direct contacts with their fund 
management company. They find their products through retail banks, through insurance 
agents and through retailers, or through such new distribution networks as financial advisors, 
direct selling and the Internet. Institutional investors, on the other hand, normally have direct 
relations with the sales forces of investment companies. This is because they may not wish a 
standard service, as in mutual funds, but one specific to their needs. Such is also the case with 
wealthy clients, who normally receive a very personalised service, either through the private 
banking department of the retail bank, or through direct contact with the investment company. 
Consequently, the segmentation in the demand has a structuring impact on the industry’s 
organisation: different segments are treated in different ways and with different types of 
services. While a private investor may simply buy a share in a mutual fund, a pension fund or 
a company saving scheme trust may choose to open a whole account to be managed entirely 
by the portfolio management company. The following table briefly summarises these 
elements:
Table 6: Demand segmentation
Segment Clients typology Products Distribution
Institutional
segment
pension funds
insurance companies
401K, company saving scheme
charities
governments
firms
tailor-made 
solutions 
mutual funds 
dedicated funds 
bank accounts
direct contact with 
sales force 
through bank retail 
networks or new 
distribution 
networks (Internet)
Private clients 
segment
wealthy individuals
combination of 
instruments 
bank accounts
direct contact with 
an adviser
private investors 
retail clients
mutual funds 
(following risk 
category)
retail network 
(bank, insurance) 
other distributors 
(supermarket, 
department stores) 
financial advisors 
direct marketing 
(mail orders, phone) 
Internet
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The polarity in the asset management industry is therefore combined with a particular 
complexity in terms o f  market players and product variety. This has an impact when defining 
the entrepreneurial synthesis o f  the firms in the field: it has to combine a particular 
distribution network with a customer target and associated product offer. The follow ing  
diagram represents how the French asset management field is structured:
Figure 7: Links between distribution channels and cusomers’ types
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The diagram shows that the asset management business is structured along distribution 
channels which correspond to customer segments. These elements, together with the earlier 
analyses o f  the organisational field, help us select the relevant variables to consider in the 
empirical investigation. These variables will be at the core o f  our design o f  distinct ideal- 
types in the follow ing chapters. We will show that the French asset management model 
focuses on private clients, through large integrated retail networks, while the Anglo-Saxon  
model tries to target a variety o f  customers through several distribution channels.
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4.2. Defining the conception of control and the organisational 
routines
We have managed to identify the key elements that contribute to the definition of the 
entrepreneurial synthesis of firms in the asset management business. We can now briefly 
focus on the two remaining layers of the framework: the conception o f control and the 
organisational routines. Here we will provide some insights into the elements that contribute 
to define them, in order to introduce the evidence of the next chapters. In particular, to present 
the organisational routines and the conception o f  control in the French asset management 
business, we can use two analytical tools: the value chain, and a description of the various 
coalitions inside the firm.
To categorise the different tasks that constitute asset management, and thereby define the 
conception o f control and organisational routines, it is useful to refer to what Michael Porter 
(1986) calls a value chain. The value chain distinguishes between the basic tasks which must 
be combined to obtain the desired outcome and create added value. These tasks represent the 
major organisational routines in the company: the organisation members remember them 
when they perform their duties. In the asset management business, the core activity is 
obviously fund management, which is the activity of managing portfolios to satisfy as well as 
possible the expectations of one’s clients. But this activity has to be supplemented by three 
functions. First of all, there is a need for support staff, as in any organisation, and this 
involves information technology, human resource management and administration. Another 
function in this area is control, which involves accounting administration, the economic 
valuation of portfolios and performance measurement. Then, fund management requires a 
specific support in terms of calculation and accounting, to register all the operations on the 
portfolios and to relate to the other business partners, stockbrokers and custodians. This 
corresponds to the traditional function of back-office. Finally there is a need to relate to 
clients, either directly or through a distribution network, and these tasks involve marketing 
and sales. This concept of a value chain is illustrated by PricewaterhouseCoopers, which 
every year carries out a study of the fund management industry in the United Kingdom and 
gives the following description of the business (figure 8). The value chain shows two main 
dimensions in the organisational routines. Firstly, the treatment of information appears as a 
core activity: the gathering, processing and analysis of data support the decision to invest. We 
will show in the following chapters that in this area French firms tended to rely on individual 
talent and external networks, while Anglo-Saxon firms relied on company rules. Secondly, 
the relationship with customers underpins a large part of the activities, starting with marketing 
and sales. We will also show differences between a French model relying on mass distribution
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and networks and an Anglo-Saxon model based on market rules and selection. But the value 
chain also provides interesting insights about the conception o f  control.
Figure 8: Asset management value chain
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This value chain reveals some internal tensions within any asset management organisation, 
because o f  differences in the roles and functions o f  the organisation members. To define the 
conception o f  control, w e will analyse the division o f  labour within firms, in order to 
understand which perceived best way to organise it reflects. This will be related to the human 
resource management. At the same time, we will relate the division o f  labour to the coalitions 
present in the firm. As explained earlier, coalitions in the organisation formulate competing  
conceptions o f  control, which promote their own perspectives. These view s are influenced by 
the positions o f  the coalitions in the organisation and by their functions. Applying 
Mintzberg’s (1979, 1983) terminology, and using the job design provided in the precedent 
value-chain, we can therefore identify the following coalitions inside any asset management 
business:
strategic apex: the top management o f  the company
technostructure: the controllers in charge o f  the accounting administration and reporting 
support staff: information technology, human resource management and administration 
people
the core workers: fund managers, marketing and salespersons and back-office
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All these coalitions can be represented in the follow ing diagram, which shows the various 
groups in the organisation along these four categories. The diagram does not give any idea o f  
the interactions between the groups, and only provides their position in the internal structure 
o f  the organisation. But it shows clearly how the internal organisation is structured around 
particular groups and coalitions.
Figure 9: Coalitions inside asset management firms
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The diagram offers a clear presentation o f  the various groups within asset management 
companies and how their positions in the organisation drive them to favour particular 
conception of controls. We will see in a subsequent chapter how in the French model o f  the 
mid-1980s fund managers were the dominant coalition, and how they lost this position when a 
new conception of control, based on an investment process, was established, very much on 
the Anglo-Saxon model. N ow  that we have detailed the functioning o f  the business, it is 
possible to conclude, and to determine the variables most relevant for the examination o f  
adaptation processes in our analytical framework.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, w e managed to develop a theoretical framework analysing organisational 
adaptation within the business-system perspective. This was possible after overcom ing a 
number o f  difficulties, and in particular by using Giddens’ theory o f  structuration to link 
agency and structure. We produced a layered model o f  the firm based on entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception of control and organisational routines and considered how they 
operated in the French asset management case. This led us to recognise some further
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peculiarities in this business, to design some complementary analytical tools and to establish 
the key variables to be tackled. These key variables, applied to our case study, can be 
presented in the following table.
Table 7: key variables to be used for the investigation
Empirical problem for 
each layer of analysis
Variables to examine inside 
the firm .
Variables to examine outside 
the firm
Entrepreneurial
synthesis:
How does the individual 
firm in the organisational 
field combine 
distribution, customer 
target and product offer?
Formal structure 
Relationship to 
distribution networks 
Customer target
Regulatory and institutional 
constraints regarding 
licensing and supervision 
international competition 
distribution channels, size 
and evolution of the 
segments in the demand 
professional associations 
competing around the asset 
management business
Conception of control:
How to best manage 
people and technology?
Division of labour 
Group coalitions and 
control system 
Human Resource 
Management (pay, 
promotion, training)
Inter-firm relations 
Business recipes 
Industrial relations and 
labour market
Organisational routines:
Which are the basic tasks 
performed in the firm and 
which type of information 
is produced?
Information flows and 
company rules 
Client relationships
Norms governing trust and 
authority relationships 
Technology 
Training and education
With these analytical tools, it is now possible to represent systematically how the French asset 
management industry was organised in the mid-1980s and how it contrasted with its Anglo- 
Saxon counterpart.
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CHAPTER IV: THE FRENCH MODEL 
OF THE MID-1980S AND 
THE ANGLO-SAXON MODEL
Now that we are equipped with the necessary theoretical tools to understand the case study, it 
is possible to present the results of our investigation. This chapter introduces the two ideal- 
types sustaining the analysis of the transformation of French asset management industry: the 
French model of the middle and late 1980s and the Anglo-Saxon model. As outlined in the 
last chapter, we will look at a number of variables, and point out the typical patterns that 
qualify our three layers (<entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f control and organisational 
routines). We will find a radical contrast in the mid-1980s between the French model and the 
situation in the United States and Britain. While French asset management was integrated 
within banking and insurance structures, and was therefore prevented from attaining any 
visible identity, in Britain and America the distinctiveness of this business was recognised and 
it was independent and organised separately. While in France it was organised around fund 
managers in the manner of a craft, in Anglo-Saxon countries it was organised in the manner 
of an industry, around a precise division of labour and bureaucratic rules. Human resource 
management in the French model was based on restrictive rules similar to those in the public 
service, whereas in the United States and Britain there was much flexibility and use of the 
external labour market. Finally, the relationship between business and customers also 
differed, with personal trust and historical networks in France, and largely impersonal and 
contract-based selection procedures in the Anglo-Saxon model. In illustrating how these 
elements combine and give coherence to the ideal-types, we will show that our theoretical 
framework represents a first contribution by the thesis, to fieldwork-based research of 
embedded economic action.
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1. The French model of asset management in the mid-1980s
The French asset management industry, in the mid-1980s and, as we will explain later, until 
around the mid-1990s, was remarkable in so far as the asset management business was not 
identified or recognised as a distinct financial service. The French model was one of vertical 
integration of asset management within banking and insurance structures, in the typical 
fashion of universal banking. Moreover, it displayed a remarkable coherence between 
structures, hierarchy and work relationships, and echoed) what many authors wrote about 
French management and labour. To use our layered model, the French asset management 
model can be summarised as follows:
Table 8: the French asset management model of the mid-1980s
Layer of analysis Key characteristics of firms
Entrepreneurial synthesis Exploit the capacities of a large distribution network to sell 
mostly mutual funds to private investors 
Sell customised products to captive clients
Conception of control Let talented fund managers provide good financial 
performances
Craft-like work organisation 
- Human resource management identical to the rest of the 
company and close to the public service sector 
limited corporate control; domination of the fund managers
Routines fund managers use their personal knowledge and 
competencies; no systematic rules, ad hoc use of information 
technology; focus on financial analysis more than on 
computer models
information exchange within networks of brokers and other 
stock exchange professionals but individualistic decision­
making
customer relationships embedded in corporate and personal 
networks
Building on the analytical framework outlined in the last chapter, we will use the information 
provided from five areas of investigation (formal structure, organisation and division of 
labour, human resource management, hierarchy and control, use of financial information and 
information technology, relationships with customers and business partners) to illustrate the 
internal consistency of the French model of asset management.
1.1. Entrepreneurial synthesis: French asset management is not 
formally distinguished from banking or insurance
A striking feature of the French asset management industry of the mid-1980s was that the 
business was not separate from other financial services and that it formed part of the corporate 
structures of retail banks and insurance groups. This could be observed both at the
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professional and the corporate level. As a result, the entrepreneurial synthesis consisted in 
exploiting the retail distribution network to sell mutual funds to private clients, while 
exploiting privileged relationships with captive clients. Such a strategy was consistent with 
the institutional structures o f  the investment industry and with the nature o f  French business 
networks.
1.1.1. Industry  structure: not an autonom ous business
If we refer back to the diagram representing the professional arena, w e can say that in the 
mid-1980s the asset management field did not really exist: there was no recognition that asset 
management could be an independent business. The three professional fields o f  banking, 
insurance and investment were able to offer asset management services and they did not treat 
asset management as fundamentally different from their core business.
Figure 10: asset management is not recognised as a separate business in the French model
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It could be argued that in the mid- and late-1980s asset management had a non-negligible 
economic weight within financial services. Earlier we pointed out that France was among the 
world leaders in this market. There were more than 3600 French mutual funds at the end o f  
1987 worth a total o f  FF 1,134 billions, a figure equivalent to 25% o f  France’s GNP (AFG- 
A sffi, 1998; Faugere and Voisin, 1989: 136, 153). Moreover, on a very rough estimate more 
than 4000 people were directly involved with asset management in 1987: around 500 in the 
state-owned CDC, CNP, Poste, Tresor and mutual banks, around 1000 in independent 
companies, around 1500 in retail banks and around 1000 in insurance companies (AFB 1991;
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Bonin, 1989: 177-186; Dressen and Roux-Rossi, 1996; Lehman, 1998: 82; Paris-Europlace, 
1996). To these figures should be added the people working indirectly for the asset 
management business, in the support staff of banks and insurance companies. But even 
though a substantial number of people worked in fund management, little attention was paid 
to their business and they were not identified as an organised profession, as can be shown 
briefly.
As //., vice-president of a portfolio management company linked to a retail bank, explains: 
“In the whole [banking] profession, asset management was something nobody was interested 
in; it was left to the fund managers”. A ., CEO of an asset management firm, continues: “There 
were people who did asset management but no clearly identified asset managers”. Admittedly, 
there were two professional bodies that covered the industry: Asffi (Association des Societes 
Financieres et des Fonds dTnvestissement) for investment funds, and AFSGP (Association 
Fran9aise des Societes de Gestion de Portefeuille) for portfolio management companies. 
However, their resources were not substantial and their role was more representative than 
activist. For instance, as a member of AFG-Asffi explained: “the general secretary of Asffi in 
the mid-1980s was working part-time and there were only four permanent employees for the 
whole association”. Moreover, the private comments of some interviewees described the 
AFGSP as “gritty” and not at all dynamic. This situation echoes the writings of scholars 
interested in the study of professions and in particular Abbott (1988: 20), who claims that an 
occupational group, despite mastering a certain technique and knowledge, can only become a 
profession if it manages to take control of a certain competency area, what he calls a 
jurisdiction, by struggling against other occupational groups. In the French model of the mid- 
1980s, asset management was not a profession; it had no jurisdiction, was operated by many 
different companies and was integrated within banking and insurance structures.
Fund managers were employed by a variety of financial associations, banks, insurance 
companies and securities firms, all of which had their well-established professional bodies. 
Just as the asset management business had no visibility inside financial services, asset 
management specialists were not in a position to rival banking, insurance or securities firms’ 
associations in order to gain autonomy. However, the fund managers, those who had the core 
competency in the business, did have a certain professional identity, through the Societe 
Fran9aise des Analystes Financiers (SFAF), the French Society of Financial Analysts. But 
even if the SFAF was successful in promoting the technical skills of its members, it had not 
established asset management as a distinct business within French financial services. It is 
therefore important to realise that in the mid-1980s asset management was in a sense 
invisible, because it had no professional existence; it was not recognised as a business
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separated from retail banking, insurance or investment banking. This can be seen concretely 
in the structures of French companies at the time.
1.1.2. Distribution: the focus is on the retail network
The French asset management model was integrated into banking and insurance structures.
The entrepreneurial synthesis consisted in exploiting distribution capacities (insurance agents
or retail banking networks) to sell mass-customised products (mutual funds). This
entrepreneurial synthesis was a direct consequence of the concept of universal banking,
where one financial institution covers the whole range of financial services. As H., who took
control of an asset management department in a large bank in 1991, explains:
In the late 1980s, beginning 1990s, products were distributed by the large 
networks, bank or insurance with a perspective that was very much collective 
asset management. One would manage products, one would think in terms of 
distribution, in a marketing way. The fund manager would scarcely see a client.
He would see his computer screen and would not much leave his office.
Both insurers and bankers treated asset management as a support function to their distribution 
networks. Inside insurance companies, asset management was almost exclusively devoted to 
mathematical reserves, which cover future payments to clients. The risk covered, as explained 
by a manager in an insurance company, “used to be a casualty risk: the risk that one dies 
without leaving enough to one’s family”. Life insurance was not used as an investment 
vehicle, as it is today. For that reason, the relation was between a client and his or her 
insurance agent, in almost the same way as for car insurance, and there was very little 
discussion about asset management. The same applied to banking. A former CEO of a large 
retail bank explained that, in his bank, asset management in the 1980s was centralised in 
Paris. The client, typically a private saver, would only be in touch with the bank’s counter or 
agency, where his advisor would tell him about the portfolio he owned or about specific 
requirements he had. The idea was that local bank managers would spot those of their clients 
who had substantial free cash on their accounts and suggest some mutual funds to them. Here 
again, the client did not recognise asset management as a specific service, because he was 
only in touch with the bank. In the mid-1980s, there was therefore vertical integration: asset 
managers were in fact a sort of back-office of the distribution networks. A., CEO of an asset 
management firm, says it explicitly: “As long as there was vertical integration and an 
exclusive client relationship with the network, there was no client-supplier relationship”. 
Asset management, in the French model, was entirely devoted to the retail network; it served 
the objectives of universal banking by offering another type of financial service.
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1.1.3. Structure: a department integrated in the bank or insurance company
In the French model, asset management was integrated into the structures of the bank or the
insurance company. The chief investment officer of an asset management firm expresses the
view that “asset management functions were considered as being support functions, like
logistics or maintenance”. In other words, fund managers and their departments were treated
only as cost centres. They had to deliver financial performances, just like controllers had to
deliver budgets, or Information Technology services to write programs. In the concept of the
business, in the entrepreneurial synthesis, there was no recognition of any specific
requirements in terms of client servicing for fund management activities. Consequently asset
management was operated inside banks or insurance companies, in small departments with a
maximum of 200 employees in the largest market players, as illustrated here:
Asset management was a department in the bank, in general a very small one, 
with the objective of managing mutual funds for a large audience. In 1985, they 
were probably 20 fund managers. When you have 6 or 7 mutual funds, you don’t 
need very many people. (Marketing director in a subsidiary of a bank)
Insurance companies had asset management departments with teams who bought 
bonds and treasury bonds and did investments. Banks had their asset management 
activities, which were largely mixed with primary activities and issuing, because 
they had to manage portfolios for their own balance sheet and issuing operations. 
(Director of an insurance company)
The concept of fund managers as technicians and not as professionals was typical of the 
French model: just as asset management was considered as a product, and confused with 
mutual funds, asset managers were not recognised as having a distinct identity in the 
company. As a consequence, asset management departments were totally integrated into the 
structures of the parent company. Strikingly enough, this meant that on occasion the 
management of funds for third parties was almost mixed with that of the institution's own 
accounts.
Even in 1996, when Societe Generale was the largest manager of mutual funds and was about 
to create an asset management subsidiary (December 1996), its organisation chart was a good 
illustration of what we have just said. Asset management was positioned inside the general 
directorate in charge of resources and services, as shown in the following diagram. It was 
hence regarded in the same way as human resources or information technology, as a resource 
and not a business, as a cost and not a profit centre. The organisation chart of Indosuez in 
1984 showed that asset management activities were not identified as a distinct service and that 
they were totally subservient to distribution issues.
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Figure 11: Societe Generale’s organisation chart in 1996
Source: Societe Generate, 1996 annual report
Figure 12: Indosuez’ organisation chart in 1984
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1.1.4. A situation consistent w ith the institutional configuration of the time
We showed in the last chapter that institutional investors in France consisted o f  pension 
funds, insurance companies, company saving schemes, charities, governments and firms. In 
the m id-1980s, there were no company saving schemes in France, nor any relevant demand 
from charities. Insurance companies would manage their funds themselves, as would state
bodies, through the Caisse des Depots et Consignations. Firms would buy the same products 
as private investors and manage their cash flow themselves. In some limited cases, France’s 
largest companies would use their bank to manage a specific portfolio, as part of their on­
going banking relationships. Consequently, the institutional segment was veiy limited and 
rather small in terms of revenues, compared to the retail network. It was made up for the most 
part of the complementary pension funds, which amounted to FF 80 billions in 1982 (Bonin, 
1989: 130). What is interesting in the French model was the lack of competition for these 
institutional clients.
Each occupational group would have a favoured banking or insurance partner, because of 
other corporate or historical relationships, and would assign exclusive management of its 
portfolio to this partner. As/f., investment consultant, explains, “Some companies had created 
a strong position [among complementary pension funds], thanks to the relational dimension”. 
For instance, farmers would use only Credit Agricole as their asset manager; because of the 
traditional and historical role of this bank as credit-provider to the farming industry. Some of 
the largest pension funds were also related to insurers: for instance ANEP, which at the end of 
1998 represented almost nine hundred thousand subscribers, had its funds managed in 1988 
exclusively by GAN, the state-owned insurer (Bonin, 1989: 130). Other mutual banks would 
manage the funds of craftsmen and so on. Institutional investors would be dealt with through 
established corporate networks and not through a mechanism of supply and demand. This 
peculiar way of doing business was once again very consistent with the pattern of the French 
model of capitalism, in which corporate networks prevent competition and substitute 
themselves for other market-based co-operation mechanisms (Morin, 1974 ; Scott, 1997: 156- 
162). Here we should add something about wealthy individuals, who in the mid-1980s were a 
non-negligible share of the market (Bergeron, 1990: 97). They were mainly serviced by 
prestigious independent houses, such as Rothschild, Lazard or NSM, or through the private 
banking divisions of the large retail banks, in particular Indosuez and Paribas. We will explain 
later how personal relationships played a key role in the routines of the French asset 
management model, both for institutional clients and wealthy individuals. So far, it is 
important to notice that these market segments were not dealt with through competitive 
market pressures, but were left to established corporate and personal networks.
To conclude, we should say that this entrepreneurial synthesis was very favourable to retail 
banks and insurance, in the institutional environment of the time. The lack of strong 
competition, and the fact that private clients and institutional investors were essentially 
captive and could not switch asset managers, made it possible for companies to charge 
relatively high fees. Moreover, asset management earned money from brokers’
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* • 22commissions, and had the opportunity to “turn the portfolios” if revenues were not good 
enough. This was especially so because vertical integration enabled banking or insurance 
groups to mask the fact that some components of the fees, such as brokerage or distribution, 
would actually be paid to the bank itself. However, the profitability of the French asset 
management of the mid-1980s was also grounded in an ethical dilemma.
The ethical dilemma arose out of the temptation for banks, and for the State, to put their own
financial interests before those of their clients, and to play with their clients’ portfolios of
securities. The bad example actually came from the French government itself, which in the
mid-1980s had a large debt burden and needed constantly to issue government or Treasury
bonds to support itself. At times it was difficult to sell these bonds, because the stock
exchange market players would not buy the whole issue. J., former CEO of a state-owned
financial institution, explained what would happen then:
Before, when the Treasury issued state bonds, state-owned financial groups had 
to take a share of it. Sometimes, when the issuing did not work well, Credit 
Lyonnais, GAN, the CDC were told to take some more than their usual quota.
These investments were not so bad, but not necessarily ones we would have done 
spontaneously.
The problem with these practices was that they could potentially damage the interests of 
clients, by not providing them with the best possible investment. From an ethical point of 
view, it was therefore very dubious. And strangely enough, in the French model this was 
initiated by the State. But the same kind of practices could be found when large retail banks, 
such as Societe Generate or BNP, put into the portfolios of their clients the equities their 
investment banking department had been unable to sell on the stock exchange. Again, this 
was ethically questionable. And we have already mentioned the practice of “turning the 
portfolios” to generate artificial revenues. In the French model, one could say that small 
investors were often abused by the large groups that managed their funds, and that they had to 
pay high fees without being able to control the quality of the investments. This being said, the 
1987 crash apart the market situation was very largely favourable and the actual results of 
French mutual funds were very decent, normally superior to 10% a year (Asffi annual report 
1991), so that the bad practices were not felt unduly by the clients. Nevertheless, asset 
management activities were very lucrative for the financial groups, which devoted limited
22 This corresponds to the “retrocession commission” that stockbrokers would pay to the asset 
managers that gave them large amount of orders. In some case, they would artificially generate 
portfolio movements only to receive these commission. This unethical practice has since been banned,, 
but it could be observed in the mid-1980s.
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resources to them and yet earned large profits by taking advantage of their clients. The 
examination of the conception o f control will show more precisely how work was organised 
in the French model of the mid-1980s.
1.2. Conception of control: a distinguished craft of fund managers
The French model of asset management in the mid-1980s was characterised by the dominant 
role of the fund managers, who had a very large responsibility and control over their work. 
Asset management departments, in their organisation, can be compared to Piore and Sabel’s 
craft model (1984: 115) and their values related to the aristocratic concept of honour 
(DTribame, 1989: 58). But the management of human resources, because of its integration in 
banking or insurance structures, was largely constrained by old and protective national 
collective agreements and was close to the public service. This implied a particular 
conception o f control, one positing that giving extensive freedom to fund managers would 
result in the best possible performances.
1.2.1. Organisation and division of labour
In the French model of asset management, one group of employees appeared to dominate the 
organisation: fund managers. As distinguished craftsmen with a superior knowledge of 
financial analysis, they supervised the totality of the value chain and followed their own 
judgement without being bothered by any stringent corporate control.
First, we consider the organisation of the asset management department. This department, 
integrated within support functions or within the corporate finance headquarters, would be in 
charge of managing two types of portfolios: mutual funds (SICAV and FCP) and individual 
client accounts. The division of labour in the department would follow product lines rather 
than technical ones: in other words, one mutual fund or one account would be allocated 
personally to one fund manager. At the same time, because asset management was treated as a 
support function, the department had no specific autonomy in terms of dedicated resources, 
and had to rely on the administration o f the financial group it belonged to. Fund managers 
supervised individually all aspects of their work. This had key implications for the day-to-day 
work, because each individual fund manager would be in charge of the totality of the value 
chain and have responsibility for every aspect of the management o f the portfolio. To help 
fund managers, the department had a back-office, made up of accountants who kept records 
and followed the liquidation values of the funds, and therefore supervised the administrative 
and accounting side of the job. Most of the time, there were also some marketing people, in 
charge of the relation with the retail network. But all other aspects of the business, such as
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human resources, information technology or econom ic research, were carried out for the bank 
or insurance company as a whole, with no acknowledgement o f  the specific requirements o f  
asset management. In the French model, brokers also had a particular importance, because not 
only did they take orders in terms o f brokerage, but they also supplied financial analysis and 
research about potential investments. What is however critical is the central role o f  the fund 
managers, who operated in a very individual and independent manner. The following diagram 
gives some impression o f  this work organisation:
Figure 13: work organisation in the French model o f  the mid-1980s
Institutional clientsbrokersFirms/potential investments
Back-olfice:
- accountants
- marketing
Rest o f the company
General administration: Retail network:
• Information Technology • marketing
• Personnel management • product development
• Economic forecasts • distribution
Departments in charge o f  asset management were rather small and fund managers did
practically all the work, as this director o f  an asset management firm explains:
The fund manager did absolutely everything at X XX  asset management: 
accounting o f  the portfolio since the accountant was reporting to the manager, 
relationships with investors and institutional clients etc.
As a result, both responsibility and the organisation o f  the department were very
individualistic: each individual fund manager would care about his own funds without
commenting any further on the work o f  his colleagues. There was very little teamwork, and
each fund manager was the master o f  his or her funds. Consequently, their work was very
individual: they fought for themselves and tried to beat the market with their own ideas. As
this marketing director in a portfolio management company explains:
20 years ago, when the oldest generation o f  fund managers started, there were as 
many processes as individuals, and individuals were working more or less on
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their own. (..) They did analyses, read information, but it was a series of one- 
man-shows. They were craftsmen, loners who knew each other well. They were 
all equals and independents; there was a strong community, especially because 
they were not numerous. They were not as controlled as today.
This internal organisation was therefore similar to a workshop where craftsmen or artists
would work independently of each other and supervise every step of the manufacturing
process. The corresponding conception o f control meant therefore that talented financial
professionals, provided they were given the appropriate facilities and freedom, would use
their personal knowledge and resources responsibly and obtain the best returns from their
funds. As //., fund manager, explains it:
Before, asset management was a craft. [...] It was enough to say that you had a 
good fund manager who would make the best securities yield a profit.
In other words, the conception o f control was simply to let fund managers deliver the best 
they could. One should also remember that at this time finance was still in its infancy, as 
underlined by a few interviewees who noticed that in the middle and late 1980s, Modem 
Portfolio Theory was little known among French financiers.23 Because France was a credit- 
based economy, where the stock exchange developed only after 1984, financial markets were 
a new topic. In the mid-1980s stock exchange professionals, and especially fund managers, 
were pioneers venturing into a new topic, experimenting with new types of financial products 
and playing with such new tools as computers and terminals. “Most of them were young, 
competent, passionate about their work” (Belley, 1987: 191). Some would be called the 
“Mozarts of finance”, because financial matters were largely regarded as esoteric, complex 
and difficult. It should be remembered that in the middle and late 1980s, financial markets in 
France were in a peculiar situation. Although inflation was kept to a reasonable level after 
1985, following the decision of the government to track German monetary policy, the State 
had to finance a large debt of more than 3% of GDP, and it did so mainly by issuing Treasury 
and government bonds (Commissariat General du Plan, 1992: 46-55). There was a favourable 
differential between bond rates (more than 10%) and inflation rates (around 4%), so that the 
net return on government bonds was over 6% in the mid-1980s (Faugere and Voisin, 1989: 
98). This made life relatively easy for fund managers, because they had at least one 
investment that would guarantee positive returns at low risk. With funds that would normally 
be ‘diversified’, which means incorporating different types of securities (typically money 
market securities, bonds and equities), it was possible to experiment and to take some risks
23 The Modem Portfolio Theory was developed by Markowitz (1990 economics Nobel price); it 
suggests building a model portfolio from the efficiency frontier to exploit the principle o f  
diversification and obtain the best returns from the stock exchange.
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without jeopardising overall performance too much. Also, the French market, in contrast to 
those in America and Britain, did not offer many investment combinations, because of its 
limited size (Bailey, 1987: 196). This favourable context was consistent with an 
entrepreneurial synthesis focusing on distribution issues, in which asset management 
departments were treated as mere support functions, akin to accounting and logistics, as 
shown in the organisational structures. Even so it is striking how little hierarchy and control 
was imposed on fund managers in the French model.
1.2.2. Hierarchy and control
Given that the conception o f control was to let fund managers do the best they could, we 
would expect them to be monitored. It appears however that they enjoyed an extensive degree 
of freedom and that it was almost impossible for anyone to tell them what to do, so that 
people in the field described the fiind managers of the time as “divas”, to indicate how 
difficult it was to manage them. Interestingly, this situation recalls one particular ethos in the 
French model, what DTribame (1989) calls "the logic of honour".
Admittedly there would be a director in the asset management department, but the
organisation was very flat, in the sense that all fund managers would be put on the same level.
Each manager had his own funds and would respond individually to his superior, who
allowed a degree of large autonomy and would only intervene when a real problem was
noticed. A divide existed, however, between fund managers and their support staff, who were
very much in a subordinate position, and moreover had almost no chance of becoming fund
managers. This hierarchical divide is characteristic of what many authors have pointed out in
the French model, the dualism that exists between those with a superior education (“cadres”)
and those without (Lane, 1989: 149; Littler, 1982: 193; Maurice et al., 1986). The
sociological profile of the fund managers is also very interesting. Most of them were from
privileged backgrounds, and very often from the nobility, as can be seen from their names: in
France, names with a “particle” generally indicate an aristocratic origin. In a list of fund
managers, there will be a large proportion of such names as Le Reboulet, de Demandols, de
La Porte Du Theil, Brae de la Perriere, etc. There were two main reasons for this: first, until
1979 fund management services were used mostly by privileged families, and therefore
people from such families would consider a career in this sector. Second, even though fund
management was regarded as only a support function within financial groups, it had a high
social status in France because of its level of abstraction, as explained by Boltanski:
The highest positions are those in which one needs not being aware of labour, 
labourers, or production but only of such abstractions as commodity and cash 
flows, high technology processes, and investments. (Boltanski, 1987: 249; quoted 
by Barsoux and Lawrence, 1997: 69)
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The important point was that in this structure the fund manager was not closely monitored: he
or she was in charge of the investment decision-making, almost without having to justify any
of his or her choices. Fund managers were simply trusted; their day-to-day work was not
supervised, as D., director of an asset management firm, explains:
15 years ago, there was no way of knowing whether a fund manager was good 
or not; there was no measure. (..) Micropal, Europerformance did not exist 10 
years ago. I remember 10 years ago, I looked for some Europerformance tables, 
printed more than published, and done by Europerformance, subsidiary of 
Paribas, and therefore maybe not so objective. Very few people would look at it.
Fund managers were not controlled ten years ago. They had experience. Like 
other support functions, it is not because they were not controlled that they were 
doing many errors, but they were not controlled on a day-to-day basis.
The control was in fact a posteriori, in terms of performance, in comparison to the rest of the 
fund managers. Financial performance was the only indicator that was really looked at in the 
mid-1980s, but it was measured in absolute terms, as total financial return and not against a 
benchmark nor in terms of risk. Every year, some newspapers published their rankings for the 
best performing funds and this fuelled competition among fund managers to win the trophies. 
Admittedly, if  someone had under-performed Systematically in comparison with his 
colleagues, a crisis meeting would take place with his boss, and sanctions might result. But 
the ethos of the business was that fund managers, because they were “cadres” and had a 
special status, would put their honour in the balance, take their risks, make their choices and 
secure good returns for the company that employed them. This situation recalls the analysis of 
D’Iribame, who recognised in the “logic of honour” the foundation of French management 
style. In his understanding, French managers fulfil their duties and do their work properly, 
because they want to maintain their rank, because they are proud of their social function and 
are afraid of damaging their reputation (DTribame, 1989: 59). In our case, this reading is all 
the more convincing because the social origins of the fund managers would incline them to 
lean towards aristocratic values, especially given the limited size of the investment 
community. However, the logic of honour in the specific case of the French asset 
management industry also had a consequence for the structure of power within the conception 
o f control.
The lack of precise performance measurement meant that fund managers had a large degree of 
autonomy in their day-to-day work. But the persons we interviewed commented that it was 
more than just autonomy, and that at the time fund managers had a tendency to resist any 
corporate control. More than ten people used the word “diva” to portray them. By that, they 
meant that fund managers had an almost emotional relation to their job, and could not take
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any criticism. It was matter of pride that no-one could tell them whether they had made the
right investment or not. They resented any disagreement, because it undermined a blind trust
in their capacities, and sometimes they reacted violently to any query from their superiors
about the justifications they had given. In fact, the fund managers were not in the habit of
offering justifications, as we will see later. Being highly individualistic, proud and convinced
that they were right about market trends, they would fight for their convictions. Final
performance by their funds and rankings in the finance media were trophies for their own
glory. As an information technology consultant explained to us, fund managers evolved in a
macho world where they had to prove themselves against colleagues and competitors.
Corporate control had little impact on their decision-making and they would resist any
intrusion in their work. The power configuration can therefore be best presented as one in
which fund managers dominate, because of this lack of corporate control, as illustrated in the
next diagram. And according to some professionals, this way of doing things was rather
pleasant and enjoyable, as this director in an asset management firms comments:
There was no benchmark, no performance measurement. For a fimd manager, it is 
the best possible world. You have plenty of information, you buy, you sell, you 
meet presidents of companies, you are invited all the time by people from the 
financial market. Nothing to complain about!
Here we can see how the internal coherence of the French model is well expressed in the 
conception o f control: the perceived best way to organise gives a primacy to fund managers 
who end up being a dominant coalition. Even though they may have dominated their 
department, in the French model of the mid-1980s the fund managers, in terms of human 
resource management, had no special treatment, no personalised pay. They were simply 
employees of banks or insurance companies, as we can see now.
1.2.3. Human resource management
Human resource management in the French asset management model of the mid-1980s was 
the direct consequence of the vertical integration of this business within banking and 
insurance groups. Fund managers and their support staff had conditions similar to those of 
other bank or insurance employees.
Asset management departments, because they were vertically integrated in bank or insurance 
structures, had to follow the rules of their collective agreements. For instance, bank 
employees were managed according to a national collective agreement of August 20, 1952, 
which remained almost unchanged until it was challenged in 1999 by bank employers. It is 
currently under re-negotiation. In these agreements the rules look like those of a public 
service, as this member of AFB, the French Banking Association, explains:
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Banks' counters often gave the impression to be like national bureaucracy. Work 
organisation illustrates this similarity. For instance, the collective agreement 
looks as if it had been copied from the public service. Employees who were
hired in the 70s had the feeling they went into public administration, with a job
for the rest of their life, and similar fringe benefits.
As a result, the management of human resources is characterised by constraining rules, by 
limited flexibility, by the primacy of the internal labour market and by a rather favourable 
treatment of the employees. These aspects are extensively documented in the literature on the 
French labour market and industrial relations (Crouch, 1992; Crozier, 1963; Lane, 1989, 
1995; Lawrence and Barsoux, 1997; Maurice et al., 1982, 1986; O’Reilly, 1994, 1998; 
^ z m a n , 1983) but it is important to notice that the French asset management industry was 
particularly in line with them, as we now briefly outline. We base our analysis here on the
banking collective agreement, which is the most representative, but the same patterns are to
be found in the insurance companies.
The first crucial element in the collective agreement is that jobs are very precisely classified, 
and that this classification is expressed using a particular coefficient called the ‘basis point’ 
(point de base). Each job is allocated a certain number of points, for instance a position of 
simple clerk has 300 points (AFB, 1994: 35) while a management position has 1000 points 
(44). For that reason, the career of the employees in the banking sector is a process by which 
they acquire points to get promotion. Furthermore, the basis point is also used to determine 
levels of pay: in 1994, the basis point was valued at FF 13,777 after tax per month for normal 
working hours of 39 hours per week. It should already be clear how constraining the whole 
framework can be, even though it is probably very egalitarian: no matter how well they 
perform, all individuals with the same number of points will receive exactly the same salary. 
This is all the more so because any bonuses and premiums are not individual, but paid to all 
employees (art 53a). The only individualised additional pay may come from overtime. In 
terms of pay, however, two further elements play a key role.
The first is a diploma: a diploma recognised by the State gives a right to extra basis points. 
For instance a Baccalaureat (the equivalent of A-levels) gives 30 points, while a Doctorate or 
a diploma from one of France’s Grande Ecoles gives 40 points. In this system, the banking 
sector has created its own training courses, provided by the Banking Technical Institute and 
the Centre for Higher Banking Studies, the diploma of which is valued at 45 points. These 
specific institutes are also used to promote bank employees, who have the opportunity in their 
career to follow supplementary training. Pay, career and training are therefore intimately 
linked in the French model. The second element in pay considerations is seniority: one year in 
the bank gives 1% more pay up to a limit of 35% (AFB, 1994: 44). In addition to these two
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elements, diploma and seniority, some amusing benefits also exist, such as a shoe premium of 
FF 416 for cashiers or an underground floor premium of FF 1634.
In summary, it must be admitted that the whole structure is very rigid and impersonal. But 
there were notable advantages for employees in the asset management business. Working 
conditions were very protective, with a good pension, congenial working hours and holidays, 
and more importantly job security. Job changes required the agreement of the employee. It 
was very difficult and costly for the bank to impose redundancies, which made them almost 
impossible, apart from collective redundancies.24 Asset management employees, just like any 
other employees, were included in these career structures in the French model of the mid- 
1980s, and they had their careers managed along with their basis points. This meant that they 
would spend whole career in the same institution: moving from one financial institution to 
another was extremely rare, because it would mean losing part of one’s benefits in the career 
progression. With the collective agreement being national, the same positions would receive 
the same pay whatever the company, and switching financial institutions could only damage 
one’s career. All in all, human resource management in asset management institutions was 
therefore very rigid and codified, with little scope for hire-and-fire policies or individual 
bonuses.
In our description of the French model so far, we have made little mention of the third 
category of players: independent asset managers. Admittedly, they were not integrated in 
banking or insurance groups, because of their independence. However, the organisation of 
their work was very similar to that already outlined, with fund managers at the core of the 
value chain and supervising most operations. In terms of human resource management, the 
independents were rather small entities, with less than one hundred employees for all their 
operations, which included stock-broking and private advisory banking as well as fund 
management. Their focus on wealthy individuals meant that they took extra care in terms of 
public relations and service, and also that family connections were a pre-requisite for being 
recruited. Human resource management was very influenced by the legal structure of these 
companies, which were often partnerships. A limited number of employees were groomed and 
could eventually achieve partnership, after a number of years. But there was a large divide 
between the partners, who enjoyed large revenues, and the employees, who had salaries only
24 It had to prove the insufficient physical, intellectual or professional abilities o f  the employee, which 
could even be contested with the support o f  trade unions, and had to notify it to a legal authority 
(Commission Regionale Paritaire). Moreover, it had to pay substantial compensation, equivalent to 18 
months salary (art.58).
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marginally higher than those of their counterparts in the retail banks. Admittedly, some 
interviewees explained that the variable part of remuneration was in general higher among 
independent players. But this was to help small companies adjust to variations in their 
revenues, not to attract people from the labour market. The conception o f control was 
therefore very paternalistic, with the company being almost a family or a clan where members 
would be devoted to the glory of their chiefs’ banking dynasty (Bergeron, 1991: 189). In 
terms of career perspectives, employees often had no choice but to wait until they could be 
promoted. Because of the limited number of companies, their only alternative career path was 
to join a banking group: leaving Rothschild to join Worms or NSM was not well regarded, 
since it meant treason (Lottman, 1995: 125) and therefore social disgrace.
Now that we have specified the conception o f  control in the French model of asset 
management of the mid-1980s, it remains to tackle its organisational routines.
1.3. Organisational routines
In this last part of the analysis of the French model of asset management in the mid-1980s, we 
will focus on the organisational routines that characterised the industry at the time. We will 
see that they were consistent with the other dimensions just described and that they were 
appropriate to a situation in which fund managers, as craftsmen, were the depository of 
knowledge and did not rely on any organisational memory. Routines were based on personal 
skills as well as on relations within the stock exchange community. This went together with 
customer relationships based on personal trust and social protocols.
1.3.1. Use of financial information and information technology
In the French model, organisational routines were not very codified and they relied 
exclusively on the personal skills and capacities of the fund managers, and on the circulation 
of information through the stock exchange community.
The central role of fund managers in the organisation just described had an important 
consequence for the organisational routines. The typical day of the fund manager was hectic. 
On his desk, there were one or two computer terminals, displaying news from around the 
globe and several hundred listed companies, plus one or two telephones that would ring very 
often because stockbrokers would phone to suggest buying or selling opportunities. As each 
fund manager was individually in charge of one fund or portfolio, and as there was not much 
direct supervision, the actual tasks performed by the fund managers were not codified by their 
organisation, as A. underlines:
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The way people worked had no importance. One would care about performances 
but not at all about the way it was achieved.
In other words, organisational routines were not made explicit but were kept in the hands of
the fund managers, who would perform their tasks according to their own expertise and not in
line with some established corporate practices. Fund managers worked therefore very much in
the way Piore and Sabel defined the craft model, as “a community of equals able to perform
an endless variety of tasks by the application of common principles mastered through long
experience” (1982: 115). The skilled fund manager was the one able to solve investment
problems by making the right choice of securities at the right time. However, this did not
imply any need to refer to mathematical models, or to any particular finance algorithm of the
sort found in academic papers. This is the criticism expressed by A, when he continues and
describe the practice of the ftind managers at the time:
I publicly said several times that asset management was operated in a romantic 
fashion. It is true that there was no serious doctrine to manage the work of the 
fund managers. Asset management was dominated by people from the SFAF 
financial analysts and from stock exchange people who had done some financial 
analysis. They had a feeling, an affection for some securities; you would like or 
dislike a security; you would sell or buy a share because you were fond of it.
This “romantic” approach, based on intuition and personal expertise more than on systematic 
and quasi-scientific argumentation, was at the core of the organisational routines in the 
French model. “They [fund managers] always had a relevant explanation about what was 
happening in the stock exchange, without noticing that they were only theorising ex post, the 
effects of their own policies. Their doxa resulted from their praxis” (Bailey, 1987: 194). To 
perform their job, fund managers used a mix of techniques, which mostly derived from 
fundamental economic analysis and from corporate finance. Fundamental analysis, also called 
the top-down approach, consists in using macro-economic indices and a review of the 
political and economic situation to forecast general trends in sectors of activities and in 
countries. This then leads to the allocation of the funds in the portfolio to preferred blocks of 
securities. The other practice, which was less widespread in France, was the bottom-up 
approach. This time, financial analysis of individual companies was the first step. After a 
number of analyses, those equities regarded as undervalued by the market were selected and 
put in the portfolio. Because there was no uniform corporate doctrine, each individual had his 
preferred methods. But in any case, the basic knowledge was always financial analysis, which 
explains why the role of the SFAF (French Society of Financial Analysts) was so prominent. 
It provided the fundamental skills that the fund managers would apply individually, following
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their personal experience and expertise.25 In the French model, these financial skills were the 
foundations of the routines used by fund managers. But they would use them in the manner of 
craftsmen, because asset management companies had not developed systematic procedures.
The second element in the model is the prominent role of the stock exchange community, as a 
repository of knowledge and as a source of inspiration. Information was constantly circulating 
between fund managers, stockbrokers and the community of stock exchange experts at large. 
To stand up to the constant pressure imposed on them individually, and to deal with the mass
manager would create and exploit a network of informers (Bailey, 1987: 194). This was 
meant to exchange tips and news, to test different ideas and intuitions and to support 
colleagues, so that Bailey qualifies the resulting networks as a Freemasonry of fund managers 
(1987: 194). In the French model, fund managers constituted a strong community; they got to 
know each other around the Paris stock exchange and at company presentations and brokers’ 
lunches, for instance. A former employee of Europerformance notes that “they were 
craftsmen, solitary people who knew each other well. They were all equals and independents; 
there was a strong community, especially because they were not numerous.” Organisational 
routines were therefore paradoxically not inside organisations, but largely outside, in these 
informal networks where fund managers, stockbrokers and analysts would rely more on their 
intuitions than on mathematical regressions and predict the moves of the stock exchange to try 
and obtain good returns. And despite this lack of systematic procedures, their overall 
performance shows that the fund managers were not doing such a bad job. A study in 1988 by 
Asffi of the performances of the Monory-Sicav, the mutual funds that had most assets under 
management in the mid-1980s, showed that their performances over the period 1980-1987 
were between +168% and +249%, and over the period 1985-1987 between +30% and +56%. 
While the CAC40 Paris Stock Exchange Index lost 29.4% in 1987, these Sicav lost on 
average only 16.7% {La Revue Banque 489: 1187). This leads us to consider another aspect of 
organisational routines, customer relationships.
25 Created in 1961, the SFAF supports the improvement o f financial analysis techniques and the 
development o f quality economic and financial information. SFAF members are all investment 
specialists. The association is also in charge o f a training programme, which leads to a diploma, the 
CFAF (Centre Fransais d’Analyse financtere). This diploma is the only one in France about financial 
analysis and it is exclusively aimed at employees o f financial institutions, who are selected before they
of information coming from analysts, economic research and news
join.
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1.3.2. Relationships with customers and business partners
The presentation of the French model would not be complete without looking at the 
relationships between fund managers and their clients and suppliers. And what we find in 
these routines is a pre-eminence of personal ties and connections.
In our previous analyses we underlined the importance of networks: corporate networks 
between financial groups and institutional clients, and professional networks among fund 
managers. These networks had a particular consequence for the conduct of business in the 
French asset management model of the mid-1980s: customer relationships were based on 
personal trust, in a rather blind manner and without tight control mechanisms. The first aspect 
o f the commercial relation is that fund managers were not given precise instructions regarding 
how they should manage portfolios. In fact, clients would simply trust their fund manager. 
The only requirement expressed in legal jurisprudence and generally mentioned by clients 
was to follow a prudent-man-rule. This principle implicitly recognises that one has to trust the 
finance professional, who is the most likely to know what to do. But such a principle is vague. 
It leaves a great deal of autonomy to the fund manager. Many observers confirm the lack of a 
precise investment strategy on the part of clients. For instance, these two directors explain that 
demand was rather primitive. Clients did not use precisely defined mandates, with pre­
requisites in terms of benchmark, risk management or securities allocation; they would just 
give their money to a person they trusted, without asking supplementary questions about how 
he or she would manage their funds. This is how this CEO describes the situation at the time:
When I arrived at XXX in 1991, people did not have a clue about the weighting 
of their portfolios, and were not worried about some securities having a very high 
weighting.26 They would not care about the differential [to the benchmark]. There 
was no reference. In the contract made with the client, the notion of benchmark 
was unknown: the contract was ‘do whatever is best’. [They would say] You are 
nice, the wine you chose was fine, you took me to a nice restaurant, it seems 
therefore justified that I give you 500 billions francs to manage.
What is noticeable in the French model, apart from the culinaiy experience, which we will 
tackle soon, is the relatively blind trust that characterises customer relationships. Two 
considerations explain this. First, clients had in general little expertise in financial markets. 
French pension funds have often been run by former trade unionists or by retired managers, 
who lacked the expertise to assess their fund managers. Private investors had no strong 
finance background either, and finally even expert investors had not developed strong Asset 
and Liability Management (ALM) competencies, which meant they could not precisely define
26 A very high weighting would contradict the diversification rule and therefore indicate a higher risk 
level.
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their requirements. Secondly, customer relationships were embedded in personal networks. 
Institutional investors had some corporate links with their asset manager, which was often 
their bank or insurer. Wealthy individuals would be served by some fund managers or private 
bankers who they would know either personally or indirectly through family connections. 
Moreover, the whole investment community was fairly small; altogether barely several 
thousand people, which meant that trust could be institutionalised within personal networks. 
This resulted in these peculiar routines, where asset management companies would take the 
money of their clients without stringent demands.
On the other hand, business relationships were also very much based on personal knowledge. 
In particular, there was a strong connection between fund managers and stockbrokers. We 
have already underlined the fact that brokers would supply information to fund managers. 
Traditionally, in exchange for good advice, the fund manager would give his orders to the 
broker who had given him the tip. And reciprocally, as we already said, the fund manager 
would receive a commission for a large amount of such orders. Is it surprising then to see that 
in the mid-1980s brokers and fund managers had developed personal friendships? In fact, 
fund managers used a limited number of brokers, whom they would contact systematically. In 
return, brokers would be keen on developing “friendly” relationships with fund managers, by 
way of invitations to lunch, travel or other entertainment. The investment profession being a 
small world, where people could socialise easily, the game of building friendly relationship 
was extremely important in securing revenues for the company. And this is where the food 
dimension took on a particular importance in the French model.
Brokers spent most of their time phoning fund managers trying to sell them securities or
giving them advice and recommendations. Fund managers tried to make connections with
institutional investors to secure future contracts. All this was achieved to a large extent
through invitations to good meals, social events, cocktail parties or short holiday breaks. And
the ability to reserve a table at Taillevant or make the appropriate choice from a wine list were
real competitive advantages in this context. This is how M., now marketing director,
remembers the good old days:
In the past, people had a career through lunches and holidays. There was a person 
on the financial market known as SICAV-glutton (‘Sicav-bouffe’), because he 
would earn new clients by systematically taking them to nice restaurants.
This illustrates how the rules of the game and the corresponding organisational routines were 
not so much a rational measurement of the asset management service as a more complex 
relationship that mixed trust with personal contacts and friendship.
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In conclusion, we can say that the French model of asset management in the mid-1980s 
presented a coherent picture. Integrated within banking and insurance structures, and left to 
the fund managers, it was based on personal networks and craft-like abilities. In other words, 
the patterns characterising our three analytical layers (entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f  
control and organisational routines) fit together remarkably well, and make clear the internal 
coherence of the model. Moreover, we have shown that on each level, the behaviour and 
organisation of asset management firms were closely tied to their societal and institutional 
context, including among other things: the pension system and the national investment 
structures, state debt and state involvement in the financial sector, national collective 
agreements and the logic of honour, the distribution of financial expertise, and corporate and 
personal networks. Each layer not only goes together with the other two but also sheds some 
light on the dynamic processes by which firms and their environment constituted one another 
in reproduction. Our framework, by creating some functional stratification inside the firm, has 
revealed the duality of structure (Giddens, 1979: 128) and grasped some elements in the 
structuration of organisational practices. The fact that we could produce a consistent model 
portraying in such detail French asset management in the mid-1980s is a positive outcome 
from the use of our theoretical framework. It may confirm that it is a valid analytical tool for 
the purpose of fieldwork-based research. The analysis of the Anglo-Saxon asset management 
model will be the occasion to establish whether this holds true. We will see that the situation 
in Anglo-Saxon countries offers a radically different picture.
2. The Anglo-Saxon model
Having analysed the French model of the mid-1980s, we now contrast it with its Anglo-Saxon 
counterpart, which, as we underlined in the second chapter, might have been expected to 
influence the transformation of the French asset management industry. We will start by a 
clarification of what we intend by Anglo-Saxon model, in relation to particular developments 
in the financial markets in the United States of America and in Great Britain. This will lead to 
a closer examination of the structures and organisation of companies in the Anglo-Saxon 
model. We will notice a clear contrast with the French situation. To study the Anglo-Saxon 
model, we will once again use our theoretical framework, which produces the following 
summary:
127
Table 9: the Anglo-Saxon asset management model
Layer of analysis Key characteristics of firms
Entrepreneurial synthesis asset management is a true business and should be treated as 
an industry where products are developed for targeted 
segments
align a marketing positioning with an investment philosophy 
and an organisation structure
Conception of control a rigorous investment process is the key to regularly good 
performances
fund managers should be controlled through risk management 
and performance measurement
human resource management is flexible and performance- 
related; it uses the external labour market
Routines corporate rules and financial models prevail over individual 
decisions
the logic of contract dominates client-relationship, so that 
selection procedures are prominent
2.1. About the Anglo-Saxon model
The expression “Anglo-Saxon model” has become a catch-phrase in continental Europe - 
especially in France- in particular since it was given widespread circulation by Michel Albert, 
a former chief executive of the insurance group AGF, in his book Capitalism against 
Capitalism. In the asset management field, it is possible to categorise an Anglo-Saxon model, 
a way of organising that corresponds to the practices of American and British (and to a lesser 
extent Canadian and Australian) firms. Our aim is here to present one ideal-type that is 
characteristic of these countries and fits the understanding French players have of it. In other 
words, we do not claim to portray here all types of firms in Britain or America, but rather the 
most typical ones: those that best reflect the institutional patterns of the Anglo-Saxon business 
systems. However, to give more depth to our analysis, it may be useful to present the Anglo- 
Saxon model within some historical context.
2.1.1. Common institutional features
Even if differences exist between British and American companies, their asset management 
industries show similar features in terms of institutional and organisational configurations. 
The purpose of the following lines is to provide some justification for the use of the term 
‘Anglo-Saxon model’. The term is based on the commonalities between the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, in terms of the financial system. But it also follows from the fact that the same 
typical patterns were adopted by asset management firms in America and later in the UK, in 
relation to specific historical developments.
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Anglo-Saxon countries, from the start, shared a number of patterns, in particular in the way 
their financial markets and stock exchange professions have been organised. First o f all, in 
contrast to the French model of the mid-1980s, the Stock Exchange has been the largest 
source of financing for Anglo-American companies. “Financial markets were invented by the 
Anglo-Saxons,” the CEO of a French asset management firm reminds us. The origins of the 
London Stock Exchange go back to the coffee-houses of 17th century London, where people 
wishing to invest or raise money bought and sold shares in joint-stock companies. The 
Muscovy Company, the world’s first joint-stock company, was founded in London in 1553. 
Large and deep securities markets are the first key characteristic of the Anglo-American 
model: they support a vast asset management industry, and give it important investment 
possibilities.
A second important dimension in the model is the role of what can be called ‘finance capital’: 
disorganised networks of institutional investors. This corresponds to numerous large financial 
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds, which hold powerful 
positions within the business world but do not exercise direct control over particular 
dependent enterprises (Scott, 1997: 139). This category o f actors represents vital customers 
for asset management companies, because of the important volumes of cash they have to 
invest. This is related to the pension system in these countries, individual capital planning, 
which generates huge amounts of investment and requires specific asset management 
services. Apart from these critical institutional similarities, some historical events have led 
asset management in the US and in Britain to develop along similar lines.
2.1.2. Historical developments
The second justification for the use of the term ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ results from the 
historical events that made it possible for both Wall Street and London to develop the same 
particular ways of organising their asset management industry, even before the mid-1980s. 
The origins of the Anglo-Saxon model are indeed to be found in the US, with the crisis of 
1974 and in the introduction of a new law for pension funding, the ERISA law. However, 
they can also be traced to Great Britain, with Big Bang and the surrounding transformation of 
the London financial system.
In 1974, the US fund management industry experienced considerable difficulties: while stocks 
had been booming for over two decades on the back of economic growth and of the Bretton
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Woods exchange rates system, market indexes suddenly reversed and provoked substantial 
losses in portfolios. This required practitioners to change their ways and to develop new 
techniques to control risks better. This also triggered a reaction among trade unions and 
politicians, who realised the danger of such a situation for pensioners, who relied on private 
pension funds that lacked capitalisation and might have become unable to pay the rent. The 
result was the voting of a new law on pension funding, the ERISA law. It had a decisive 
impact on the structure of the asset management industry of the time and catalysed some of 
the key properties of the Anglo-Saxon model (Montagne, 2000). The law specified that 
pension funds had as a unique objective the payment of a return to their members, and it 
stipulated that any investment by a pension fund should be selected on the basis o f its specific 
return, with an objective of risk diversification, and that it should be in line with market 
practices. In other words, the law oriented asset management towards conformity with a 
benchmark, established by the fund managers community, through the notion of the ‘prudent 
expert’, which superseded the ‘prudent man rule’ (the one observed for instance in the French 
model). Moreover ERISA gave some individual rights to the members of the pension funds: 
they were authorised to sue the fund, in the event that they believed their interests not well 
served. The act therefore increased the judicial resolution of disputes (litigation), at the 
expense of procedures based on collective agreement (Clark, 1993). For these reasons, and as 
shown for instance by Montagne (2000), ERISA had an important impact on the structure of 
the US asset management industry, which ended up displaying the properties we describe here 
as the Anglo-Saxon model. In other words, and even if this consideration is not at the core of 
the present study, it is important to notice that this model too has an origin that can be related 
to specific historical events. This is all the more important as the Anglo-Saxon model as we 
define it was then adopted in the United Kingdom, at the beginning of the 1980s, in 
connection with the transformations involved in Big Bang.
As explained for instance by Augar (2000), the market players in the City of London changed 
their ways of doing business fairly swiftly and adopted the organisational practices of their 
American competitors. Between the years 1980 and 1986, the British gentlemanly capital of 
the City was replaced by new corporate rules and by a new ethos (Augar, 2000: 18-52), which 
corresponds to what we call here the Anglo-Saxon model. But before looking more carefully 
at these corporate structures, it is worth noticing that this model is based on certain 
hypotheses in financial theory.
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2.1.3. Academic finance is at the core of the model
When we look closely at American asset management, we see that almost 25% of the market 
consists of quantitative asset management, a technique that uses mathematical models to build 
efficient portfolios that duplicate the evolution of financial markets. Quantitative asset 
management is also called passive management, because it does not try to outperform the 
designated benchmarks: it uses Markowitz and CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) theories 
in order to build portfolios that are linked to model portfolios, with a level of risk defined for 
the client. “Passive managers generally act as if the security markets are relatively efficient” 
(Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey, 1999). And this hypothesis, that markets are relatively 
efficient, is in fact fundamental in any attempt to understand the Anglo-Saxon model. The 
improbable origins of modem Wall Street, as told by Peter Bernstein (1992), concern the 
message brought to fund managers by a tiny contingent of scholars such as Markowitz, Tobin, 
Merton, Sharpe, Black and Scholes: the message that there can be no reward without risk, and 
the story of how they developed a number of abstract methods to manage capital. The 
coherence of the Anglo-Saxon ideal-type is indeed to be found in the reference to certain 
theories of finance. Two elements, in particular, give it some of its distinctive techniques and 
organisational peculiarities.
The first element is the recognition that it is difficult to beat the market, and that it is therefore
not credible to promise high returns. The efficiency hypothesis results from Kendall's
demonstration of 1953, that there is no correlation between yesterday’s prices and today’s.
Market efficiency is a theory claiming that market prices reflect the knowledge and
expectations of all investors. Those who adhere to the efficiency theory say that it is
impossible to beat the market. The CEO of a French asset management firm summarises:
In the US, people largely know that financial markets are hard to beat. 
Therefore, to avoid poor performances, it is necessary to develop a series of 
tools that enable measurement of how far the portfolio is from its reference 
benchmark, and how, with which kind of processes, performance will be 
managed. The American client, who knows that performance is random, is 
interested in the asset managers who can explain their investment process and 
what they do.
In other words, and as opposed to the French model, asset management's objective in the 
Anglo-Saxon model is not to reach high returns: it is to limit poor results in comparison with 
the market. This is a fundamental stance, because it gives different perspectives to investors, 
who in the Anglo-American system do not try to attain unreasonable rates of return, if the risk 
premium is not bearable.
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Apart from market efficiency, the second important financial theory to influence the Anglo- 
Saxon model was that of diversification. Diversification means the spreading of risk by 
putting assets in several categories of investment. Its advantage is to reduce risk for a given 
level of return, or reciprocally to improve return for a given level of risk (Vemimmen, 1989: 
37). This principle is at the core of investors’ decision-making, and in particular in their 
demands for explanations and information concerning how and why their money is invested. 
As an Anglo-Saxon consultant told us: “We have learned that diversification is the governing 
idea of regularity and future performances”. This explains why institutional investors in the 
US look for generalised diversification: between companies, between sectors, between 
countries and between asset managers.
We should have provided enough justification for the use of the term ‘Anglo-Saxon model’, 
as well as enough background information to enable us to understand its coherence. It is now 
possible to tackle more precisely its key characteristics, using once again our theoretical 
framework. . "
2.2. Entrepreneurial synthesis: an industry
In our analysis of the French model, we showed that the asset management business was 
totally unnoticed in the mid-1980s. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the situation was very 
different: this business had been recognised and clearly identified for a long time. Not only 
were customers more precisely targeted, but so also were the strategies of the firms related to 
generic investment styles. This resulted in corporate structures that were independent of retail 
banking groups, and in an entrepreneurial synthesis that aligned any given positioning with 
an investment philosophy and an organisational structure.
2.2.1. Corporate structures: an autonomous profession
Asset management has a long tradition in Anglo-Saxon countries. The firm of Schroders, still 
market leader in Great Britain, launched its first investment trust in 1922. And this early 
development was linked to a concept of asset management different from that in the French 
industry.
In 1924 the American Henry S. Sturgis wrote a book called Investment: A New Profession, in 
which he outlined a set of techniques designed to improve the quality of investment activities. 
He called for the development of autonomous professionals devoted entirely to this business. 
Unlike the French model, in which asset management was not visible, in which it was
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integrated into the structures of banking or insurance, this business had a real identity in the 
Anglo-Saxon model. An excerpt from the Englishman Hargreaves Parkinson’s book of 1932, 
Scientific Investment, shows a concept of asset management as distinct from other services:
It is high time that investment assumed an independent existence, and began to
build up its own system of general principles, based on scientific analysis.
But it was not only among commentators that this autonomy of the asset management 
business could be observed in Anglo-Saxon countries. Asset management also developed 
early as a profession, with its specific business techniques and code of conduct. The 
Investment Bankers Association of America was founded in New York City in 1912, and 
soon had a division dealing with asset management. The Association of Unit Trusts and 
Investment Funds, the trade body representing the UK unit trust and mutual funds industry, 
was formed in 1959. Obviously, the autonomy of asset management from retail banking and 
insurance in the US owes much to the Glass-Steagall act o f 1933, which separated credit and 
investment activities. In consequence, asset management was created as a specific profession, 
as one of the investment services with its defined professional space, distinct from banking 
and insurance. This happened gradually after World War II, at a time when financial markets 
were growing and thus helped the investment industry to become more relevant to the 
economy. In the US, the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) was established in 1947 as a 
service organisation for investment professionals. In 1959 the Institute of Chartered Financial 
Analysts (ICFA) was founded to examine candidates for the qualification o f Chartered 
Financial Analyst. These associations, which merged in 1990 to create the Association of 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR), develop not only training programmes, but 
also sets of standards for the investment professions, such as performance measurement 
standards, ethical rules and accounting methods. This explains why investment companies 
emerged in Anglo-Saxon countries as independent entities, as A., CEO of a French asset 
management firm with stakes in the UK, told us: “In the mid 80s, there was not any asset 
management firm in the UK that was controlled by a bank. Almost all companies were 
independent.” This ability of asset management companies to structure their professional 
space makes the Anglo-Saxon model coherent, with a set of standards and professional 
conduct that are well codified. As we will see later, this goes together with customer 
relationships that are very formalised and with normalised organisational routines. 
Consequently, it is not surprising to find that in the Anglo-Saxon model asset management 
companies are independent and very often publicly listed, and that some of them are indeed 
large multinationals. For instance, AMVESCAP, “one of the world’s largest independent fund 
management companies”, is a listed company, “has operations in 25 countries and serves 
clients in over 100 countries worldwide” (1999 Amvescap PLC Annual Report). Both this
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autonomy and the size of the market in Anglo-Saxon countries have important consequences 
for the entrepreneurial synthesis in the model.
2.2.2. An industry in which positioning, investment philosophy and process are 
combined
Anglo-Saxon countries together represent more than 50% of the world’s investment 
management market. Their asset management business is organised as an industry: both the 
offer and the demand are clearly identified. Under the influence of intermediaries, such as 
investment consultants or financial advisors, the offer is structured and very precisely 
segmented.
A precise terminology is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon model, in which asset managers 
have to position themselves in respect to the asset category, the sector. They also have to 
define the investment style they specialise in: each product or service is adapted to identified 
client requirements. Consequently, the market is highly structured and the products precisely 
defined, as can be seen from the American classification of Mutual Funds, which are 
categorised in terms of each of the following considerations:
the investment philosophy: passive, active, guaranteed or alternative (i.e. through 
hedging, options...)
the type of investment strategy: growth (invest in equities with growth perspectives) 
or value (invest in equities with recurrent profits or undervalued by the market) 
the type of securities: equities, fixed income or cash
the type of companies: small cap (small capitalisation), medium cap or large cap
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The following table illustrates how these elements combine to classify US mutual funds: 
Table 10: US mutual funds classification in 1997
Type of fund Number of funds % of total
Common stock
Maximum capital gain 180 2.1
Small company growth 491 3.4
International equity 995 8.0
Long-term growth 1153 15.8
Growth and current income 618 12.9
Equity income 189 2.3
Bond funds
Flexible income 90 2.2
Corporate bond 685 4.3
Corporate high yield 190 2.5
Government mortgage-backed 165 1.4
Government securities 540 2.7
Municipal bonds 502 3.4
Municipal high yield 67 1.0
Municipal single state 1302 3.5
International bond 264 0.8
Specialised 0.2
Energy/natural resources 42 0.2
Financial services 21 0.2
Gold and precious metals 50 0.2
Health care 28 0.2
Other 56 0.2
Technology 53 0.5
Utilities 101 0.8
Money market
Taxable
Tax-free
736
396
23.7
4.3
Mixed asset classes
Balanced 
Asset allocation
320
178
2.1
1.2
Total 9412 100
Source: Investment Companies 1997. CDA Weisenberg Investment Companies
The table above illustrates the degree of complexity in the product market; but it should also 
be related to the degree of elaboration in demand. An important aspect in the Anglo-Saxon 
model is the fact that many advisors and consultants play a role in helping clients define their 
needs and express their requirements. Institutional clients typically give mandates not only to 
one asset manager, but rather to several, depending on the areas in which they judge them
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most competent. For instance, if a pension fund wanted to invest $500 billion it would not be 
unusual for it to place say $100 billion with Invesco and $100 billion with Merrill Lynch for 
growth funds, $200 billion in a Fidelity value fund, and the remainder with two niche players 
for alternative fund management in small caps or options. Such refinement in demand has a 
consequence for the entrepreneurial synthesis of the Anglo-Saxon model: any company has to 
show a particular coherence between its customer focus, its investment philosophy and the 
corresponding organisation structure.
In the Anglo-Saxon model each investment house tends to choose a generic investment 
philosophy, which then underlies the whole investment process and gives it coherence. For 
instance, Fidelity Investments Ltd presents itself as having a value style, as set out in its 
advertising brochure: “Fidelity’s philosophy (...) is the identification of the fundamental 
value”. Delaware, another American fund management company, has on the contrary a 
growth philosophy. As Molly Baker describes it, after spending one year with Delaware 
managers, mutual funds in America have become just one more commodity consumer 
product, like toilet tissue, breakfast cereals or toothpaste (2000: 104). Marketing professionals 
are essential to promote the products and attract and retain investors (Marcus and Wallace, 
1997); they help refine positioning, publish brochures and advertising, and more generally 
they publicise the work of the fund managers in layman’s terms: “why Delaware?” “why 
Small Cap?” “why Growth versus Value? ” (Baker, 2000: 104-106). The investment process 
in the Anglo-Saxon model is conceived as a technology that stems from an investment 
philosophy which operates through precisely devised procedures that result in the selection of 
securities that fulfil clients’ requirements. The coherence is further sustained through the 
choice of particular technology tools, such as computer models and databases. The following 
diagram summarises the entrepreneurial synthesis in the Anglo-Saxon model, as a 
combination of technology and resources to respond to a particular customer target:
Figure 14: Entrepreneurial synthesis in the Anglo-Saxon model
Customer Generic investment Generic investment
target/ philosophy : strategy:
positioning i— s active 1----- \ growth
V passive 1----- \ / value
alternative
&
Investment
process
Types of securities
Degree of information
technology use
i Type of invesment1 process (top-down,
bottom u p )
The Anglo-Saxon model thus offers far more structure and conceptualisation than the French 
model, in which established networks were at the basis of the response to clients’ 
requirements. It is also worth noticing that both the investment philosophy and the investment 
strategy have an impact on the investment process, which is at the core of the conception o f 
control.
2.3. Conception of control: Taylorist work organisation
In terms of work organisation, the Anglo-Saxon model is fundamentally different from the 
French one. It tends to consider investment as a true industry, and to establish a strict division 
of labour in order to replace intuition with a set of procedures that can be analysed and 
eventually improved later, as in a factory.
2.3.1. Division of labour and task definition
In the work organisation of American or British companies we notice a strong division of 
labour between various types of experts. Unlike the French model, in which the fund manager 
was at the core, portfolio management in the Anglo-Saxon model is best described as an 
investment process.
The term ‘investment process’ refers to the understanding of asset management companies as
factories and their work as something engineered. “Instead of science, the term which seems
more appropriate to investment work is technology” (Taylor, 1969). The Anglo-Saxon model
embodies the claim that it is possible to beat financial markets through a rigorous mastery of
financial techniques and risk management. This image has been noticed by French managers,
as is shown by this marketing director of a French asset management firm:
In my opinion, the model applies well to the companies targeting pension funds.
The myth is to be organised in order to have recurrently good performances, with 
buy-side analysts, equity tables, and collective decision-making processes.
The claim is confirmed by American consulting firms, which sometimes play the role of
organisation consultant and advise asset managers how to organise to perform well. A
consultant in such a firm told us that:
If there is an overall investment philosophy, a real organisation, a management 
with strong convictions, which motivate the employees, we notice that 
performances are regularly good. And with regularly good performances, after 3 
to 5 years, you are among the best.
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The Anglo-Saxon model is based on the conception o f  control that it is possible to have
regularly good performances, thanks to clear procedures and appropriate risk management.
This concept is widespread amongst all categories of fund managers. For instance, Schroders,
the leading British asset manager, says it pursues “a disciplined and structured approach to
portfolio construction which aims to add value incrementally based on lead differences
relative to indices”; and “can consistently add value over a market cycle by making
considered investment decision without taking high levels of risk” (Schroders, 1998).
Goldman Sachs, the leading American investment bank, explains that it wants “to leverage
the tremendous capacities of the bank in providing high-quality products and services that are
delivered consistently year in and year out” (1998). To sustain this claim, the bank develops
precise work organisation, which stems from an investment philosophy and is articulated
through an investment process and risk management:
The foundations of our strategy are fundamental research, risk control and an 
integrated global process. Our philosophy is based on three key beliefs:
- Active investment management, focused on effective stock selection, adds 
significant value by exploiting inefficiencies in equity markets
- Stock price performance is predominantly a function of corporate 
fundamentals and management competence
- Systematic risk management is an essential part of successful active
investment management.
(...) Our investment process is focused on competitive stock selection, utilising a 
disciplined, bottom-up research-intensive approach. The asset allocation process 
combines the quantitative input from the quantitative research team based in New 
York together with the qualitative input from our regional research teams. (...) 
Regular risk monitoring is used to ensure that deviations from the benchmark are 
justifiable and intentional. (Goldman Sachs, 1998)
This organisational aspect relates to what is called the “traditional” investment management 
organisation, which means a particular investment structure that can transform investment 
into a technical process, with a clear division of labour and precisely defined tasks. In fact, in 
many respects, the Anglo-Saxon model is a form of Taylorism applied to investment decision­
making. Investment is presented almost mechanically as the result of a three-step process: 
research and analysis, decisions about an approved list of securities, and portfolio 
management. The following diagram illustrates this organisation structure.
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Figure 15: The investment process in the Anglo-Saxon model
Approved list
Buy/sell orders
Model portfolio
3. Portfolio management
2. Investment committee
Performance evaluation, portfolio revision
Investment philosophy, strategy and policy
1. Analysis and research
• economists
• buy-side analysts
• technicians and market experts
Source: Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey (1999: 792-794) and author
The first stage in the investment process is analysis and research. Economists, buy-side 
analysts27 and market experts are in charge of studying the general economic environment as 
well as particular securities. Their predictions and conclusions may be summarised thanks to 
specific coding, such as a buy/hold/sell designation. This research and analysis is the basis for 
further investment decisions, since it provides all possible purchasing opportunities as well as 
recommendations to buy, hold or sell. The list is then transmitted to an investment committee, 
which typically includes senior fund managers, strategists and the top management of the 
organisation. The investment committee then examines all the reports and analyses resulting 
from the first stage, and discusses appropriate investment decisions. This can lead to lively 
discussions, and is normally team work: the idea here is to determine an approved list, 
consisting of the securities deemed worthy of accumulation in a given portfolio. The rules of 
the organisation normally specify that any security on the list may be bought, whereas those 
not on the list should either be held or sold. The second stage is hence a real production of 
decision-making, since it manages through discussions, synthesis and argumentation, to write 
a series of securities on or off the list. The second task of the investment committee regards
27 Financial analysts who work for fund management companies (hence those who buy securities), as 
opposed to sell-side who work for stock exchange companies.
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the determination of the ‘model portfolio’, which sets guidelines in terms of asset allocation. 
The model portfolio gives the appropriate ratios not only between asset classes (stocks, bonds, 
money markets) but also between sectors and countries (Leonard Capital Management, 2000). 
It therefore determines the general profile that the fund managers should take into account 
when they define the shape of the individual portfolios. As a result, asset management is 
coherent across the company in the Anglo-Saxon model, unlike in the French model, where it 
was dependent upon single fund managers.
The third stage in the investment process is portfolio management. Like the worker in the 
Taylorist factory, the fund manager in the Anglo-Saxon model is constrained by the 
investment process. First, he can buy only securities which are on the approved list. He then 
decides between the securities in the portfolio, which to sell and which to hold, following the 
precise indications about the investment objectives as expressed in the investment philosophy. 
In so doing, he also has to pay attention to the model portfolio, in order to avoid inappropriate 
asset allocations that would be contrary to the company’s current policy. Moreover, in the 
choice of securities to be put in the portfolio, the fund manager is limited by certain risk- 
management considerations. In the Anglo-Saxon model, in order to be able to measure 
performance properly, each individual fund is linked to a benchmark, a stock market index. 
The gains and losses of the index are carefully monitored, and compared to those of the fund. 
Moreover, a number of ratios are used to measure the risk; they show the differences in the 
variations between the index and the fund and enable fund managers to identify how much the 
portfolio is fluctuating in comparison to the index. In the Anglo-Saxon model, risk 
management is set in a permitted range, such as 2% or 5%, which indicates that the fund 
manager is not allowed to have more than 2% (or 5%) difference from his benchmark.
All these parameters go together with a careful monitoring of the fund manager’s 
performances. Evaluation is a constant parameter in the Anglo-Saxon model. While the 
French model was based on blind trust, the industrial approach in the previously described 
investment process goes with a constant evaluation of risk and return. Every step in the 
process is closely monitored, and inadequate performance is identified in order to improve it. 
Once again, this is similar to a factory where errors are detected and corrected. Since the 
investment process is separated into precise steps, it is possible at each stage to identify what 
went well and what did not, by looking at the performance of portfolios. When this has been 
done, corrections may be made to the selection process. This is why evaluation and portfolio 
revision are an integral part of the model. The conception o f control in the Anglo-Saxon 
model is therefore very different from that in the French model: whereas in France gifted fund 
managers would be trusted to do their best, in America and Britain fund managers have to
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follow  precisely designed procedures. It is not the individual but the corporation that is meant 
to produce added value, through team work, division o f  labour, quasi-scientific planning and 
modelling, and careful control, evaluation and improvement. Consequently, the leading 
coalition is made up not o f  fund managers, but rather o f  those such as sales and marketing 
managers who control the commercial side o f  the business, and the C hief Investment Officers 
and the CEO who control the investment process. These individuals are the members o f  the 
Investment Committee; they supervise the division o f  labour between all em ployees and 
review individual performances. They are normally former fund managers or analysts and not 
very young. Their control over corporate organisation and corporate routines vests them with 
power. However, as the Morgan Grenfell case o f  1998 illustrates,28 their position depends 
upon the performance o f  the investment process they have designed. The conception o f  
control in the Anglo-Saxon model, with its clear roles and process, goes together with a 
particular kind o f  Human Resource Management, in which performance is a key criterion.
2.3.2 H um an Resource M anagem ent
The last dimension in the conception o f  control has to do with Human Resource Management. 
Here again, w e can notice some differences from the French asset management model o f  the 
mid-1980s. Three elements characterise the patterns and behaviours o f  com panies in the 
Anglo-Saxon business system: flexibility, performance-related pay within a m oney culture, 
and a focus on the external labour market.
First o f  all, one should notice a great degree o f  flexibility in the Anglo-Saxon model: 
employers have “considerable capacity to introduce flexibility initiatives to meet changing 
requirements” (O ’Reilly, 1994: 257). This corresponds first o f  all to the ease with which 
companies can hire and fire employees. As P., a British human resource manager, tells us: “if  
you talk about getting rid o f  people, it is fairly easy”. As a consequence, it is not unusual 
•within Anglo-Saxon investment banks to get rid o f  considerable numbers o f  people at once, 
and very quickly (Auger, 2000: 149). While the Labour Code and the national collective  
agreements were norwtegotiable boundaries to companies' action in the French model, asset 
management companies have more scope for action in the Anglo-Saxon model and they tend 
to use it. For instance, it is notorious that British and American asset managers operating in 
London had their employees sign a particular document, by which they declared that they 
agreed to work more than 48 hours in a week if  need be, thereby by-passing the limit
28 In 1998, Morgan Grenfell decided to restructure its investment process and fired one Chief 
Investment Officer; the main change was to separate business and fund management activities to 
rationalise their investment process. This was advised by the management consultant Me Kinsey.
stipulated in the European directive on working hours. Flexibility in the Anglo-Saxon model 
regards not only hiring and firing but also the general working conditions, which are 
company-specific and not sectoral or national, and sometimes even specific to each individual 
employee (Lane,1995: 126). Individuals have to negotiate their pay and benefits individually, 
and the resulting bargaining is not influenced by national collective agreements, unlike in the 
French model. Industrial relations are therefore very limited in the asset management 
business. As P notices: “there is a trade union somewhere, but it does not have many 
members”. The financial culture in Britain and America is very individualistic and pro­
market. This has an impact on both pay and careers.
Pay is the most important element for human resources in the Anglo-Saxon model. “Cash is 
king”, and money and bonuses are the ultimate preoccupation of investment professionals: not 
only because they are nice to have in your pocket but also because they are the ultimate 
success signal in the business (Baker, 2000: 235-238), especially because pay is highly related 
to performance in Anglo-Saxon portfolio management firms. This goes together with what 
DTribame identifies as the dominant logic in American companies: the logic of contract, 
where work and performance are fairly compensated (DTribame, 1989: 138). In the Anglo- 
Saxon model market mechanisms apply within the firm as well as outside it, and each 
employee is perceived as selling his or her work for a price that refers to a market value. This 
has important implications. First of all, pay is related to performance. As explained by B., a 
recruitment consultant in London, “bonuses vary enormously: depending upon individual 
performance it can be 100%, but it can also be 10% or even zero”. To determine bonuses, 
companies develop complex appraisal systems: personal goals are set up and reviewed, along 
with a number of performance indicators. For instance, performance relative to the benchmark 
combined with risk management ratios would typically be taken into account to evaluate a 
fund manager. The amount of new money generated by a sales manager would also contribute 
to determining his or her bonus. The availability of rankings and performance measurement 
ratios that cover the whole asset management industry is therefore a crucial element in the 
good functioning of the model. “For Jerry’s group and for much of Wall Street, the numbers 
that appear on the scorecard that summarises the performance of all funds have a direct impact 
on their annual bonus checks” (Baker, 2000: 24).
Secondly, the level of pay is influenced by the market price of a given individual. There are 
compensation surveys in Anglo-Saxon countries which give information about how much 
investment professionals get for certain positions. These surveys are used to determine 
starting salaries for new recruits and also to adjust the salaries of existing employees. 
Moreover, the connection between pay in the firm and market prices is sustained through the
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constant temptation for employees to leave in order to get more money. Because money is the 
ultimate reward and also the ultimate recognition for success, individuals in the Anglo-Saxon 
model are constantly looking for salary increases. When they are contacted by head-hunters 
offering them more money they may leave, or they may use this information as a bargaining 
tool to get more from their current employer. This goes together with the third key element of 
Human Resource Management in the Anglo-Saxon model: the role of the external labour 
market.
The labour market for investment professionals in Anglo-Saxon countries is very developed 
and very institutionalised. We have mentioned compensation surveys. But the role of head­
hunters is even more widespread. One human resource manager explained that he did not try 
to recruit directly but would always use head-hunters to find investment professionals. In 
London or New York, the labour market for these investment specialists is a fierce place, 
where recruitment agencies compete for talents. Practices can be very aggressive, with head­
hunters phoning people directly and trying to take well-regarded individuals away from their 
current employers. What is specific to the asset management business however, especially in 
comparison to traders, is that not only individual fund managers but also whole teams can be 
bought away from competitors. Because work is organised along a process, it is not 
uncommon to hire the whole team rather than just one individual. The career of Nicola . 
Horlick, a famous personality of London’s investment scene, because of among other things 
her five children and her nickname “supermum”, is a good illustration:
Graduated from Oxford she joined SG Warburg & Co in 1983, where she became 
hooked on money management. She then moved to Mercury Asset Management 
unit, a spin-off from Warburg. In 1991, however, she bolted for Morgan Grenfell, 
together with her team. For the five years ended in 1996, Morgan Grenfell's 
pooled pension fund rose 17.4 percent a year, ranking Horlick's group in the top 
10 percent of pension managers tracked by Leeds-based Combined Actuarial 
Performance Services. But in January 1997 Morgan Grenfell suspended her for 
negotiating a new job with Dutch rival ABN Amro Bank. (Horlick later 
acknowledged the talks.) She stormed off to the Frankfurt headquarters of 
Deutsche Bank, Morgan Grenfell's parent - with 30 reporters she invited in tow - 
where she demanded a meeting to discuss her reinstatement. Bank officials heard 
her out, then refused her request. But the visit, recounted in every major UK 
newspaper, made her a household name. Horlick then opted to join former MAM 
colleague John Richards, 37, who was starting up a UK pension fund manager for 
Societe Generale.29
A typical career in the Anglo-Saxon model is not spent in one asset management company: it 
is based upon a good use of the external labour market to signal opportunities and to offer pay
29 Summary based on the article “The Spice Girl on SocG en’s pirate ship” from Institutional Investor, 
N ew York, August 1998.
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raises. In contrast with the French model, where there was a primacy of the internal labour 
market, the Anglo-Saxon model gives the primacy to the external one. This completes the 
analysis of Human Resource Management, which has shown the consistency between 
flexibility, performance-related pay, and careers based on market mechanisms and external 
moves. We can now look at organisational routines.
2.4. Organisational routines
The last dimension in the analysis of the Anglo-Saxon model is its organisational routines. 
Once again, the contrast with the patterns in the French model of the mid-1980s is noticeable. 
First of all, routines are located not in individuals but in companies; they are inscribed in the 
investment process and expressed in the use of particular tools, not in the informal networks 
which were the repository of knowledge in the French model. Then, the ‘logic of contract’ is 
the basis for customer relationships; it aims at identifying objectively the best partners 
available and goes together with specific procedures and intermediaries to help the selection 
process.
2.4.1. The pre-eminence of formal procedures
The Anglo-Saxon model performs according to rules and procedures that are continuously 
developed and re-developed, not according to the sole talent of one particular individual. 
These rules are developed at the company level and at the institutional level too.
Rules and procedures are developed in each individual asset management firm. For instance, 
the investment firm Greathawk developed its own “Greathawk’s Maxims”, a list of 18 
principles meant to guide the actions of its fund managers (Stutchbury, 1964: 197). Such 
formal procedures are produced and codified at the same time as the process is evaluated and 
improved. They are also supported by particular information technologies:
- to develop financial models and perform simulations on portfolios, using for instance the 
Black and Scholes formula for option pricing or the CAPM theory for optimum 
diversification etc...
- to monitor and assess the performance of the portfolios
Organisational routines in the Anglo-Saxon model are therefore expressed in a tangible way, 
through certain rules, codes and programmes. It is also worthy of note that they are sustained 
at the institutional level of the business.
We should mention the role of the American Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR), which has developed particular standards for the calculation and
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presentation of performance information. AIMR standards require particular accounting 
rules30 and are continually updated. Widely accepted by the investment community, these 
standards define the playing field for asset management companies, which have to adopt them 
if they want clients to take them seriously. This production of standards relates not only to 
technical considerations, but also to code of ethics and standards of professional conduct. For 
instance, the International Council of Investment Association has developed a code of ethics 
and standards of professional conduct. The Code of Ethics specifies that:
Investment Professionals shall:
• observe high standards of honesty, integrity and fairness,
• act in an ethical manner, with reasonable care and diligence, and with 
respect for the individual in dealings with the public, clients, prospective 
clients, employers, employees and fellow investment professionals; and
• continually strive to maintain and improve their professional competence.
Anglo-Saxon players -therefore operate in an institutionalised environment in which the 
appropriate behaviour has been precisely defined at the professional level. To show once 
again the importance of formal codes and procedures, we need only mention the role o f one 
particular figure in any British or American asset management firm: the compliance officer. 
The compliance officer is normally a legal expert, who is in charge of verifying that his or her 
employer is behaving appropriately, with regard to legal prescriptions and to professional 
standards, in all of its investment management operations. He or she will make sure that the 
firm fulfils its mandatory duties in relation to its depository and its contractual obligations, in 
particular when the client has specific requirements in terms of risk level or portfolio 
weighting.
Consequently, formal procedures influence organisational routines at two levels: in the daily 
work of employees, who apply corporate rules and policies, and at the level of the whole 
profession, through standards and codes of practices.
2.4.2. The logic of contract
Rules and procedures not only have an impact on the work of investment managers, by 
codifying their behaviour. They also show that the legal dimension takes first place, in a 
system where contracts and litigation are the foundations of customer relationships. Whereas 
in the French model corporate or personal networks sustained customer relationships, the
30 For instance, portfolio returns must be calculated using a weighting formula eliminating the effects 
o f  external cash flows; they also require investment values to be determined on a full accrual basis.
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Anglo-Saxon model is based on market mechanisms and operates through contracts 
stipulating the rights and duties of each contractor.
First, we see in the Anglo-Saxon model what D’Iribame has called a “logic of contract” 
(1989: 146): individuals relate to each other in the light of their explicit and reciprocal 
obligations, and with a keen respect for the fairness of their agreements. This legalistic 
approach is critical for customer relationships. For instance, the constitution of a Unit Trust 
for the Royal Wessex Bank Limited, to be managed by Greathawk Securities Management, 
contained no less than 45 clauses, which covered all possible aspects of the business 
relationship between the Trustees of the fund and its manager (Stutchbury, 1964: 199-224). 
Pension funds in the UK operate under trust law and are thus bound by the trust deeds of the 
fund. Trustees have a fiduciary responsibility under the 1961 act to behave in the ‘best 
interests’ of the current and future beneficiaries of the fund (Blake, 1995: 319). The ERISA 
law in the United States also gave pension funds a fiduciary responsibility to their members. 
This legal responsibility has a very concrete consequence in the Anglo-Saxon model which 
takes the form of litigation, with members taking their pension funds to court, when they 
believe their interests have not been properly looked after. US investor militancy is even 
backed by an array of such support mechanisms as consultants to arrange the proxy fights and 
lawsuits, and such advisors as the Council of Institutional Investors {Investors Chronicle, 
February 15, 1991; March 8, 1991).
The famous Megarry judgment of 1984 is another illustration of the legalistic approach to 
customer relationships in the Anglo-Saxon model. The National Coal Board (NCB) took the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) to court in 1982, after the NUM had refused to 
endorse that year’s investment proposal and had proposed the prohibition of investment in 
energy companies competing directly with coal. Both the NCB and the NUM were trustees in 
the mineworkers’ pension fund. Mr Justice Megarry decided in favour of the NCB and 
declared that the purpose of the trust was to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries. 
He argued that the pensioners had no particular financial interest in the success of the coal 
industry, and that the trustees should use the full range of investments authorised in the terms 
of the trust to enhance the fund’s returns or reduce its risk (Blake, 1995: 319-320). This shows 
how legal considerations impact on customer relationships in the Anglo-Saxon model: 
investment choices may be contested and lawsuits pursued if clients are not happy with their 
asset manager. Another consequence of this logic of contract is the important role played by 
advisors and intermediaries.
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In the Anglo-Saxon model, it is common practice to use the services of investment advisors 
and consultants. Institutional investors generally use external fund managers to manage 
pension funds or parts of their balance sheets on their behalf. This is also a way for 
institutional investors to protect themselves against possible claims or accusations by their 
stakeholders, by delegating the responsibility for at least some o f the investments, as a 
consultant told us. As a result, less than 10% of investment trusts in the UK employ their own 
investment management staff (Draper, 1989: 143). Then, the selection of such professional 
asset managers is normally done with the help of an advisor, the investment consultant, who 
helps the trustees to choose the right manager (.Investors Chronicle, February 8, 1991: 30). 
The investment consultant has normally three tasks to perform. First, it analyses the client’s 
assets and liabilities and designs its investment needs. Then, it provides information about 
possible investment vehicles and management services. Finally, and maybe most notoriously, 
it carries out a selection process to find the most appropriate asset manager for its client. This 
normally means writing an invitation to tender and analysing the replies from the various 
asset management companies, and eventually organising interviews and presentations to 
enable the client to make his final decision. According to Eurostaf (1998), 80% of invitations 
to tenders in the US are mediated through an advisor. Investment consultants, such as Frank 
Russell, Watson Wyatt or Mercer are therefore powerful companies which perform numerous 
analyses and investigations of asset management companies. Their role is critical in the 
Anglo-Saxon model, in rendering the business efficient and in supporting the logic of 
contract. To complete the picture of this environment, we should also notice the role played 
by such other professionals as rating agencies, specialised lawyers and other management 
consultants, which all have an influence in the definition of standards and in the selection and 
ranking of asset management companies. They complement the financial data compiled by 
news groups such as Momingstar Mutual Funds, which gives information on mutual funds’ 
prices and performance (Cornett and Saunders, 1999: 135).
The Anglo-Saxon model is thus a true market, where a demand meets an offer, where 
competition operates through the mediation of professional advisors and through particular 
measurement tools, which taken together allow investors to compare, rank and judge the 
performances of asset management companies. Personal or corporate networks have little 
relevance in this system which selects whatever best fulfils precise criteria. We will see in a 
subsequent chapter how these institutional agents and these measurements tools played a key 
role in sustaining the newly established organisational field that developed in France around 
1996.
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3. Conclusion
The Anglo-Saxon model again shows remarkable consistency. Its entrepreneurial synthesis 
brings together resources and investment philosophy in order to target precise customer 
segments. The investment philosophy is then translated into an investment process, 
corresponding to a conception o f control which emphasises the division of labour and close 
control over individual workers. Finally organisational routines make the process work 
through formalised rules and procedures, and through calculation tools and selection 
mechanisms. As well as ensuring consistency and complementarity between the three layers, 
the pattern reveals dynamic links between firms and their social and institutional 
environment. In looking at the three layers of our framework, we discovered essential links 
with, among other things, the pension system, the regulatory framework, the labour market 
and the logic of contract, as well as with professional structures and financial expertise. As in 
the French model, our analysis has therefore revealed the duality of structure in the patterns of 
organisation and behaviour of asset management firms, by showing the dynamic links 
between internal organisation and surrounding environment. This chapter has thus illustrated 
the applicability of our framework, and consequently a contribution by the thesis to the 
analysis of situated economic action.
The framework proved successful in categorising the various patterns of organisation and 
behaviour in the asset management business. It enabled us to build a coherent framework 
because the three layers of analysis (entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f control and 
organisational routines) are intimately linked. Thanks to its stratified design, it also enabled 
us to examine carefully each layer and to show how the patterns we identified integrated the 
institutional and societal environments of the firm. The second conclusion is more mundane 
and regards the strong contrast between the two models. In France we saw an asset 
management industry subservient to universal banking, in Britain and America one proudly 
existing on its own. The French model relies on gifted individuals, the Anglo-Saxon model on 
processes and procedures. In one case there is a pre-eminence of networks, in the other 
selection through market rules. Given such radical differences, it is therefore particularly 
surprising that by January 1999, the French asset management industry had to a large extent 
become similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, as we explain in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V. THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FRENCH ASSET 
MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY
In the last chapter, we presented the French asset management model of the mid-1980s and 
the Anglo-Saxon model. But from 1984, the French asset management industry was faced 
with important changes in its business environment: deregulation, increased competition and 
internationalisation. It is now time to analyse the situation in January 1999, at the launch of 
the euro, and to examine whether any of the competing hypotheses we designed in the second 
chapter can be verified. In other words, now that we know the specific patterns of the French 
and Anglo-Saxon models, and have identified the predictable trajectories that could have 
resulted from a new business environment, we must ask: how did French asset management 
companies adapt? Using once again our analytical framework, we will test in this chapter 
which of our competing hypotheses is verified. The earlier analysis used secondary sources 
and archives as well as interviews with some of the individuals who worked in the asset 
management industry in the mid-1980s. In the present chapter, the material is mostly drawn 
from direct investigation of companies through interviews and company data. In an attempt to 
draw conclusions about the totality of the French asset management industry, we studied 16 
companies through direct contacts:
six companies related to retail banking groups (category 1)
five companies related to insurance groups, including the Caisse des Depots (category 2) 
five independent companies (category 3)
Together these 16 companies represented 71% of the market, on the basis of assets managed. 
To clarify our investigation, it may be useful to recall the hypotheses we formulated about the 
organisational adaptation of the French asset management industry:
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Figure 16: summary o f  the hypotheses
Four competing hypotheses
1984
1999
H2: 
unchanged 
French model
French model of 
the mid-1980s
H3:
Hybrid
model
HI
Anglo-Saxon
model
H4: 
French A.M. 
is operated 
from London
We will see that reality is not as clear-cut as these four possible outcomes, and that none 
grasps fully the transformation in the French asset management industry over the period 
1984-1999. Starting from the business system framework and from the idea that economic 
action is embedded in its social and institutional context, we expected to find some resistance 
to change and that, as Whitley for instance expressed it, “societies with different institutional 
arrangements will continue to develop and reproduce varied systems of economic 
organisation with different economic and social capabilities in particular industries and 
sectors” (1999: 3). The evidence shows, however, that French asset management firms have 
adopted the Anglo-Saxon model: we will show that the new patterns of the French asset 
management industry in January 1999 are consistently similar to those of the Anglo-Saxon 
model. In other words, the evidence seems to contradict Whitley’s claim. This result is 
surprising because we were very careful in designing a framework that took account of the 
institutions surrounding firms, and should not therefore have overlooked the claims of 
persisting differences among national economies (Boyer, 1996; Florida and Kenney, 1993; 
Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998; Lane, 1992; Maurice et al., 1986; Whitley and Kristensen, 
1995, 1997). We believe our conclusions are convincing because of the depth and consistency 
of our analysis: we cannot be accused of superficiality, especially since we also pointed out 
some differences in detail between French asset management at the end of 1998 and the 
Anglo-Saxon model, which shows that we do not overstate the similarities.
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We will notice some shifts towards the Anglo-Saxon model, in the degree of independence of 
companies, in the degree of flexibility of human resource management, in the implementation 
of selection procedures, and in the fact that some French asset management companies have 
developed international operations in London. But these do not allow us to argue 
convincingly for either the hybrid model H3 or the displacement to London, hypothesis H4. 
They may indicate that the institutionalisation of the new model is not complete, or that the 
surrounding French business system is preventing a thoroughgoing implementation of the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Moreover, we will notice two puzzles in the transformation of the 
French asset management industry. It appears that one section of the industry, those 
companies dealing mostly with elderly private investors, has hardly changed at all since the 
mid-1980s. Also surprising is the timing of the transformation: French companies adopted the 
Anglo-Saxon model mostly after 1996, almost overnight, and not progressively over the 
period of our study. These considerations will lead us to a new interpretation of organisational 
adaptation, which will then be developed in the following chapters.
1. Entrepreneurial synthesis: asset management has become 
an autonomous business
At the level of entrepreneurial synthesis, the French asset management industry in January 
1999 appeared to follow the Anglo-Saxon model. In 1984 the French model was based on 
vertical integration with no recognition of the specific character of the asset management 
business. By the launch of the euro, French asset management had achieved autonomy both at 
the level of the profession and at the level of individual companies. In the new 
entrepreneurial synthesis, portfolio management companies had their own strategic decision­
making, their own resources and marketing and sales capabilities. As in the Anglo-Saxon 
model, they aligned products, distribution and customer targeting.
1.1. A new professional identi
The picture of the French asset management industry at the launch of the euro is radically 
different from the situation in the mid-1980s, and looks very much like the structures of the
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Anglo-Saxon model. ’1 Alain Leclair, president o f  the French Asset Management Association,
the AFG-Asffi, had this very revealing comment when starting his review o f  the 1997 year:
A big new business has appeared in France, just like the one existing in Anglo- 
Saxon countries. (AFG-Asffi 1997 annual report)
First, the asset management field has gained professional autonomy from banking and 
insurance. If we use the same graphic to represent the relationships between the fields o f  
banking, insurance and stock exchange/investment, we can say that by 1999 asset 
management did exist in France as an autonomous business. Asset management's competency 
area, or jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988:20), was guaranteed through the role o f  the COB as a 
single supervisory body for the industry's activities, and through the professional association 
AFG-Asffi as an effective representation within financial services.
Figure 17: asset management has gained autonomy in 1999
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Since 1996 and the Modernisation o f  Financial Activities Law o f  July 2, 1996 (the MAF law), 
the COB alone has had control and supervision authority over all portfolio management 
companies,32 even if  they originate from credit institutions. This means that asset management 
has its own regulatory framework, distinct from the one o f  banks and insurance companies.
31 We will go back to the importance o f  the 1996-1997 period in the next chapter and show how it was 
a turning point in the case study.
32 Legal entities created in 1988 to manage mutual funds, after the abolition o f the “agents de change”, 
stock exchange brokers.
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But the recognition of asset management as a new business in its own right was also achieved 
through the particular role of AFG-Asffi. Earlier we pointed out how weak the various 
associations representing asset management in France were in the mid-1980s, in comparison 
with those representing banking and insurance. By the end of 1998 the situation had clearly 
changed. This was in the main the result of the merger between AFSGP, the French Portfolio 
Management Companies Association, and ASFFI, the French Funds and Investment and 
Asset Management Companies Association, which created AFG-Asffi in Januaiy 1997. This 
association grouped together all those companies operating in the asset management business 
and using the legal denomination of portfolio management company. With around 300 
members, in a profitable and growing business in which the French industry is number one in 
Europe and number four in the world, the association was able to assert its influence. After 
the nomination o f a new president and a new general secretary, respectively Alain Leclair 
from Paribas and Pierre Bollon, formerly general secretary of the French Insurance 
Companies Association (FFSA), an important restructuring took place in the association. In 
1997 the association was able to develop new methods of operating, based on a new 
organisation chart, rationalised activities and better budgetary control and management. It 
also developed and intensified its lobbying of other professions and public authorities (AFG- 
Asffi, 1998: 5). With as many as fourteen working groups, each headed by an established 
professional and lobbying on particular topics, it declared its ambitions and described itself as 
the “asset management home” (AFG-Asffi, 2000). This dynamism and influence could be 
seen during the preparation of a new European directive about European portfolio 
management companies, when AFG-Asffi lobbied the European Commission extensively. 
The association's effectiveness was acknowledged by many observers and professionals. J., a 
consultant, suggested for instance: “You will see the difference between AFG-Asffi and the 
AFB [French Banking Association], just the presentation of their headquarters is revealing”. 
In fact, the AFG-Asffi headquarters, in an 18th centuiy townhouse in rue de Miromesnil, are 
newly renovated and stylish, while the AFB’s headquarters in rue Lafayette have an old- 
fashioned air, with old carpets and decor dating from the 1970s.
In summary, we can say that the structures of the French asset management industry have 
changed dramatically and that by January 1999 they resembled those in the Anglo-Saxon 
model: independent from other services and with their own professional identity. These 
similarities could also be observed at the level of individual companies.
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1.2. New corporate structures: autonom ous subsidiaries
In 1999, the recognition o f  asset management in France as a business separate from retail 
banking or insurance could be seen not only at the professional level, but also in the corporate 
structures o f  individual companies’ -corporate structu-res. Virtually all retail banks and 
insurance companies had created subsidiaries devoted to asset management.
By the launch o f  the euro, French financial groups treated asset management separately, as a 
distinct activity with autonomous resources. For instance, the insurance group AX A 1998 
annual report stated that, “today we think that our businesses are insurance, reinsurance and 
asset management” (3). Indosuez and Societe Generale, the two examples we used in the last 
chapter, exhibited similar changes: Indosuez, which merged with Credit Agricole in 1996, had 
a dedicated asset management subsidiary (Indocam), and Societe Generale had created 
SGAM in December 1996. These newly created subsidiaries also relocated to buildings 
clearly separate from their mother company’s headquarters. This de-merger o f  asset 
management became general among financial institutions. The organisation charts o f  AGF 
asset management, the subsidiary o f  the insurer, and o f  BNP Gestion, subsidiary o f  the retail 
bank, are examples o f  the new corporate structures:
Figure 18: AG F’s organisation chart in 1997
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Source: AGF, L ’Agefi June 17, 1997
Figure 19: BNP’s Gestion organisation chart in 1997
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These organisation charts show that by January 1999, in both banking and insurance groups, 
asset management was operated through autonomous companies with their own resources. 
There was therefore a very different pattern from the French model o f  the m id-1980s. As the 
vice-president o f  an asset management firm summarised: “we went from a business in a bank 
to a subsidiary in the real sense: independent, with the means o f  our independence.” The 
number o f  employees is an indicator o f  this new autonomy in terms o f  resources. SGAM , for 
instance, more than doubled from 407 to 927 em ployees in only two years:
Figure 20: increase in the number o f  em ployees at SGAM
N u m b er of e m p lo y e e s  a t  SGAM
1 9 9 6  1 9 9 7  1 9 9 8
■  abroad  
□  F rance
Source: SGAM annual reports 
The new situation was thus very close to the Anglo-Saxon model in which, as we noticed, 
asset management was operated through independent companies with autonomous resources 
and important means o f action. Furthermore, as in the Anglo-Saxon model, this independence 
resulted in the formulation o f a new entrepreneurial synthesis, no longer devoted to the retail 
network but emphasising strategic positioning.
1.3. New distribution agreem ents
In 1999, the entrepreneurial synthesis in French asset management firms disclosed a situation 
in which, as in the Anglo-Saxon model, products were defined in order to target precise 
segments o f  customers, and firms tried to align products, investment philosophy and 
distribution channels.
By the launch o f  the euro, the situation o f  asset management within financial institutions had 
changed radically: it was no longer a type o f  technical support serving only the purpose o f  
universal banking. It had an autonomous existence, its own corporate structures and resources 
and, importantly, its own separate marketing and sales capacities, distinct from those o f  the 
retail bank or insurance network; and a separate strategy, as M  .former administrative 
manager, explains it:
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Creating a marketing & sales division meant that there was a client. The top 
management then decided to systematise it all: business plans were written, an 
international department was opened, new targets were identified, like for 
instance treasurers, institutional investors. This meant taking part in invitations to 
tender, in competition with AXA, Paribas AM, etc. This meant moving from a 
department involved in fund management to a company that has to respond to its 
clients.
The development of new marketing and sales structures and capabilities meant that French 
asset management firms targeted an array of external customers, and did not serve only the in- 
house customers of the bank’s retail network. With de-merger, the reason for these firms to 
exist changed and now embodies the new entrepreneurial synthesis. While asset management 
firms in the French model had an exclusive relation with the distribution network of the bank 
or insurance company, they now distribute their mutual funds via several channels and 
partnerships. For example J., the CEO of an independent player, explained that his company 
has developed a partnership with a network of Independent Financial Advisors.33 Another 
vice-president explained that his company had a subsidiary which claimed to be a 
supermarket for mutual funds: it sold via the Internet, by post and by telephone. By 1999 asset 
management had adopted the idea that segments and distribution had to be combined to target 
certain customers precisely, with the right products through the right channel. This 
corresponds precisely to the entrepreneurial synthesis in the Anglo-Saxon model: develop 
products to target particular segments of customer, and distribute them through the 
appropriate channel.
By January 1999 the French market had adopted an industrial logic: asset management 
companies portrayed themselves as “factories” producing specific products for particular 
segments. They did not just support their parents’ distribution networks. They looked for 
clients on their own initiative and developed various strategies and partnerships to best sell 
their own products. The use of new marketing recipes illustrates the change: companies 
supplied so-called “blank” products,34 instead of the old “diversified” funds prevalent in the 
1980s. There were also “profiled” funds, which targeted the levels of risk appropriate to 
different marketing niches. The final novelty in 1998 was the development of so-called “funds 
of funds”.35 As M., market development manager, explains: “In the asset management market,
33 Self-employed financial experts who give advice to private investors and who also sell some mutual 
funds.
34 Mutual funds without any reference to the company managing them, so that various distributors can 
put their own brand on it, just like distributor brands in the retail industry.
35 Mutual funds that bundle several other mutual funds, from different companies.
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market structures correspond to segments in the demand. On each segment, revenue, sales 
packaging and distribution strategies differ”. Reflecting on the changes in the asset 
management market, and about the new entrepreneurial synthesis in his bank J-C, strategy 
director, concludes: “The way it works, the way to go about things with institutions is now  
American”. French asset management companies have indeed changed their entrepreneurial 
synthesis, and their business has become an industry, where marketing and distribution 
strategies are in line with particular resources and technologies. As we will see, this goes 
together with dedicated investment processes, in a new conception o f  control.
1.4. Conclusion
The entrepreneurial synthesis o f  the French asset management companies at the launch o f  the 
euro had changed greatly since the mid-1980s. Admittedly, the new situation o f  independence 
did not affect the third category o f  players, who were already by definition independent. But 
the proposition that the patterns and behaviour o f  the French system have remained unaltered 
cannot be sustained: the evidence provided here contradicts Hypothesis H2. The asset 
management industry did not migrate entirely to an Anglo-Saxon business system, contrary to 
Hypothesis H4. Decision centres are still primarily located in France, even though most 
leading companies have some subsidiaries or shared resources in London or N ew  York, as 
well as in other countries. The hypothesis that the new picture is a hybrid o f  the French and 
Anglo-Saxon models is not very convincing either: there cannot really be a middle way 
between being recognised as a true business and not being so recognised, between vertical 
integration and autonomy. The most appropriate assessment o f  the situation at the end o f  1998 • u
is that companies had adopted the entrepreneurial synthesis dominant in the Anglo-Saxon  
model. At the same time, the evidence shows that the model had not been adopted in its pure\jlA/ 
form, but in a milder version influenced by the French historical context. ''
\ P
It appears that the links between French retail banks or insurers and their asset management 
subsidiaries remained strong in 1999. Several interviewees told us that they did not think that 
the strategy o f  the subsidiary could realistically go completely against that o f  the group. Even 
if  they had other distribution channels, French asset management companies still made most 
o f  their profits by selling through their parent companies’ retail networks, which still had the 
largest market shares. Historical contingencies had some impact here. Moreover, some ch ief  
executives recognised that, even if their asset management firm was independent and had its 
own identity, they themselves still felt a certain attachment to the financial group’s corporate 
culture. A director o f  an asset management firm, a subsidiary o f  a retail bank, explains:
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Question: Do you still consider yourself as part of the bank?
P.: Yes, of course. Maybe some others would tell you something else. But I was 
formerly in the bank X Y  and I might have a stronger culture than a young 
graduate who arrived less than 3 years ago. But we are very much XY, we have 
the brand.
With the heavy recruitment of new professionals 'who have not spent much time in the parent 
company, this situation will probably evolve further towards one in which asset management 
companies have a truly separate corporate identity. P .’s comment is not very surprising, given 
that the changes are fairly recent and that many employees of asset management companies 
previously worked as bank or insurance managers. The CEO of one company pointed out that 
most of the leading French asset management brands were large banks or insurers, whereas in 
America the leaders were such independent asset management companies as Fidelity, 
Vanguard and Invesco. Here again, historic links have left a trace.
We should therefore conclude from our analysis of the new entrepreneurial synthesis of 
French asset management companies that by January 1999 a radical transformation had taken 
place. New professional and corporate structures had emerged which looked very much like 
the Anglo-Saxon model, albeit with some differences of detail related to the French historical 
context. Examination of the conception o f control will produce further evidence pointing in 
the same direction.
2. Conception of control: investment processes have taken 
over
By 1999 the conception o f control in French asset management had changed radically from 
what it had been in the mid-1980s, in a way consistent with what we had to say about the new 
entrepreneurial synthesis. Instead of simply trusting their expert fund managers and leaving 
them to perform as best they could, companies had by the launch of the euro developed 
investment processes, as in the Anglo-Saxon model. The implementation of this new work 
organisation which emphasised the division of labour and teamwork went together with a new 
and more flexible human resource management and a new distribution of power in the 
company.
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2.1. Organisation and division of labour
The French model o f asset management in the mid-1980s was centred on the fund manager, 
who was in charge o f  the whole value chain, while support functions and marketing and sales 
were integrated in the structures o f  the bank or insurance company. By January 1999, the new  
entrepreneurial synthesis meant that French asset management companies were autonomous 
and had developed true organisational capacities. In terms o f  the conception o f  control, the 
role o f  the fund manager had been sidelined within a new division o f  labour in which an 
investment process was in charge. In other words, these companies had adopted the Anglo- 
Saxon model.
As a starting point, we could refer to the organisation charts o f  BNP and AGF reproduced 
above. These show how work was organised along different functional lines: fund 
management, marketing and sales, support staff and risk-management and control. The 
example o f  CDC Asset Management Europe (CDC AME), subsidiaiy o f  CDC, the state- 
owned financial conglomerate, can be used to supplement this observation.
Figure 21: CDC AM organisation chart in 2000
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risk control
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— investment performance
Source: CDC Asset Management, 2000
Immediately noticeable is the greater divide between fund management and a number o f  other 
functions, such as marketing and sales and support staff. This division o f  labour is an 
indication that fund managers were no longer at the core o f  the organisation, and that they had 
been integrated into an authority structure with various divisions and responsibilities. And the 
new structure was not a natural consequence o f  any growth in the size o f  the company, which 
had only 400 employees altogether, the bulk o f  whom were still fund managers and their
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accountants, just as they had been in the mid-1980s. CDC AM E’s organisation and strategy
show that its conception o f  control matched exactly what w e identified as the key elements in
the Anglo-Saxon model, a focus on regularity and risk management within a mechanical and
quasi-scientific process:
CDC Asset Management's main concern is to achieve consistent performance 
figures. To this end, it has developed structured investment processes, a highly 
disciplined investment approach and strict risk control at each stage o f  
implementation. (CDC AME, 1999 annual report: 10)
This focus went together with an organisation based on an investment process centred around 
a committee, which was one o f  the main features o f  the Anglo-Saxon model, in opposition to 
the central role o f  the fund manager in the French model in the mid-1980s:
In the case o f  the CDC therefore the perceived best way to organise, as claimed by the 
company in its corporate documentation, gave pre-eminence to the investment process, and to 
collective decision-making rather than the individual performance o f  a talented individual.
The change in the conception o f  control is to be found not only in company documents, but 
also in the testimonies o f  the field professionals. It is captured well in this comment by // .,  a 
fund manager:
Asset Management has not fundamentally changed its core-business: one still 
tries to have a high return from savings. But while saying that you had a good  
fund manager that could make value o f  the best securities would have been 
sufficient some years ago, it is now necessary to have a process in place and to 
constantly follow  a panel o f securities. You have to show that it is a team work, 
that the decision goes from the econom ists’ indications to stock-picking.
Figure 22: CDC investment process
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TEAM_vrO ^
In v e st m e n t  S trategy  
C o m m ittee
BALANCED
INVESTMENT
PROCESS
Source: CDC AME annual report 1999 p.l 1
160
Many more examples and testimonies could be found to show that by the launch of the euro
French portfolio management companies believed that the best way to organise was through a
structured process, not through the use of gifted fund managers. Indocam explained that its
process operated in three steps: screening of the investment universe, stock evaluation and
inscription on an approved list, and portfolio construction (Indocam, 2000). This sequence is
identical to the description we gave in the last chapter o f the Anglo-Saxon model. The overall
picture in the industry shows therefore that the business has been divided between more
people with a strict division of labour; and, as we will explain later, with a pre-eminence of
organisational routines over individual talent. By 1999, a majority of companies in the
industry had formally designed some investment processes, with several steps, as in the
Anglo-Saxon model. As A ., vice-president of an asset management firm, explains:
We developed rigorous methods, in the American way. The whole asset 
management process becomes standardised: there is a norm for the investment 
policy, for the implementation of a value by the investment committee, market 
tables are introduced, currency and interest rates tables, sometimes with complex 
analytical techniques. The whole chain is pervaded with quantitative methods and 
with financial analysis. It becomes a systematic work organisation; it is 
Taylorism, industrialisation. It is a production process. Quantitative methods have 
not evolved so much: it is about managing in efficient markets, which means 
supposing that no analyst is stronger than another; you try to follow and to 
anticipate the formation of a new consensus.
While the fund manager in the French asset management industry of the 1980s was doing 
almost everything, by 1999 he had become part of an organisation, in which a strict division 
of labour determined his role and responsibilities. French asset management companies had 
become factories, which produced investment decisions through a series of standardised 
operations (economic research, buy-side analysis, committee, portfolio management, 
performance review and adjustment), as described by the people interviewed:
PROCESS
Economic Buy-side Investment Portfolio produces
Investment
decisions
Im proves process Performance
review
Clearly this diagram shows something very similar to the Anglo-Saxon model, which 
suggests that hypothesis HI applies here. Moreover, an important change by 1999 was the 
appearance in the business of new types of professionals: sales people and buy-side analysts.
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Along with dedicated economists, these analysts processed information, which was then 
analysed by the investment committee. These new functions and the new organisation 
undermined the supremacy of the former “divas”, the fund managers.
2.2. Hierarchy and control
This new conception of control went along with a new hierarchy. Fund managers had lost 
their privileged position, to the benefit of top managers, sales people and controllers.
The first important change in terms of hierarchy and control concerned the CEOs of the newly 
created asset management subsidiaries. When investment companies became subsidiaries, and 
began to recruit people and develop their own resources and gain strategic independence, it is 
unquestionable that the bosses of these companies increased their power. From simple 
managers of a department in a bank or insurance company, and a department that was 
relatively small in terms of both resources and overall turnover, they became chief executives 
in a new and growing industry, with the chance to put their strategic ambitions into practice. 
Moreover, the introduction of an investment process, with clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities, established them firmly in command. We will see in the next chapter how 
they managed to conquer this leadership both at the level of their company and at the 
professional level. The second change concerns the arrival of new employees, who took a 
series of activities away from the fund managers.
When asset management subsidiaries were created, around 1996, some people were hired to
develop institutional sales, a logical implication of the new entrepreneurial synthesis. These
sales people took over contacts with customers; fund managers therefore lost this role and
consequently some organisational power. This change could be seen in the hierarchy, as B.,
former marketing support manager, explains:
There was a new equilibrium, which was not the same as before, where the sales 
and marketing people had a more asserted role. For instance, in the board of 
directors, there was the president and two other members: the chief of asset 
management, and the chief of marketing and sales.
The new importance of the sales dimension was the first blow to the position of the fund 
managers. But the establishing of an investment process was a further attack on their arrogant 
independence. At the same time as these new processes were being established, it became 
clear that the new marketing focus also required the development of the capacity to offer 
client-support. More precisely, people started to realise that the business was not only about 
managing funds but also, like any business, about finding new clients, developing new
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products, providing services for pre-sales (e.g. advertising brochures, tenders) and for after­
sales (reporting, performance measurement). The new conception o f control required the 
business to hire other staff who could supply such information and provide client-reporting 
and marketing brochures. This is how B. relates the decision to create the unit he was to run, 
which was in charge of gathering information to publish leaflets and reports for the sales 
people:
In my opinion, the decision was pushed by the marketing and sales people. (..)
The marketing [department] did a survey of institutional investors. Performance 
ranked first, but just behind was client information.
Here we see how deeply political and cognitive the change of conception o f control was.
Creating these new functions of sales and support staff was not only a response to the
perceived best way to organise, but also a progressive take-over by a new coalition.
Furthermore, once this take-over became established, the ranks of sales and support staff and
technocrats made it possible to control the work of the fund managers and to make sure that
they respected the instructions and guidelines set out in the investment process. Support staff
started compiling data and files about fund managers’ performances and investment choices,
and comparing them to the recommendations of the investment committee. J-F explains how
the rationalisation process trapped fund managers:
We created a function for economic analysis in each sector. We do performance 
attribution; we may notice that the selection of securities in a sector was regularly 
poor over the last two years. We may notice that this is related to one particular 
fund manager. Every month, there is a performance committee, with the top 
management of XX Asset Management, the fund managers and the chiefs of the 
asset management, and we analyse performances. There may be some tension; it 
is a serious issue. Things are really controlled. Before, fund managers used to be 
freer... The first performance committee went wrong. The fund managers refused 
to discuss and said something like “who are you to put your fingers in my own 
business?”. P [the CEO] is present; it is rather solemn, even if we try to make 
things easy and even if I give the information beforehand to the fund managers so 
that they can prepare themselves.
As should be obvious, this new organisation of the work did not leave fund managers in the
most comfortable of positions: on the one hand they were limited by the restrictions imposed
in the investment process, and on the other they were controlled through committees and
performance measurement ratios. With the new conception o f control, managerial power was
taken away from fund managers. This confirms our theoretical expectation that political and
cognitive dimensions are related and that a coalition can only dominate when it embodies the
legitimate conception o f control. The new situation was not accepted easily by the fund
managers, as this director explains:
The oldest fund managers do not feel at ease in the organisation. They are not 
divas, but they have to change their perception of work; when you have 20 or 30
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years’ experience, that is difficult. They are still here, but an important effort was 
made to transform their practices.
The change in the conception o f  control brought a new hierarchy and control, as illustrated in 
the following diagram. We can see that the fund managers were now constrained in many 
ways, through the investment process and through the actions of the controllers. Top 
management was more assertive, as were marketing and sales people. Support staff still had a 
subordinate position.
Figure 23: Hierarchy and control in French asset management firms in 1998
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Here we can see how the methods of calculation and of accounting not only supported the 
new conception o f control but also helped make it operable (Miller and O’Leary, 1990, 1994: 
41). Calculating devices, such as performance measurement and benchmarks, had an 
influence at a distance (Latour, 1987; Robson, 1994), and made possible effective control and 
supervision of fund managers. They also made any questioning of the new organisation 
structures impossible (Miller, 1994: 3-4). The former core-coalition of fund managers was 
now in competition with financial analysts and with marketing and sales, and under the grip 
o f the controllers. Another dimension of this new corporate hierarchy relates to a radical 
change in the management of human resources, which by 1999 had become very different 
from the French model.
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2.3. Human resource management
Human resource management in the French model was very constrained and followed the 
rules of the banking or insurance collective agreement, but by 1998 French portfolio 
management companies had adopted practices similar to those of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Even though interviewees did not recognise it as the first motive for de-merger, for which 
they quoted ethical or strategic reasons, human resource management was also undoubtedly 
part o f the equation. Three elements can be observed: increased flexibility, performance- 
related pay and the use of the external labour market. The patterns of the Anglo-Saxon model 
can be seen here, but once again we will point out differences of detail within an overall 
resemblance.
2.3.1. Flexibility
The first element was increased flexibility. This is what J, human resource director in an asset
management firm, explains:
The bank was trying to escape the juridical framework of the banking collective 
agreement, a very heavy framework. (...) By simplifying, by increasing 
flexibility, one reduces labour costs. We also kept vested benefits. (...) We took 
rules similar to those of the banking collective agreement for allowances, 
maternity leave, part-time. The statute is close but different from the banking 
collective agreement. We adapted the banking system to make it simpler. Small 
differences exist for the calculation of holidays. Also, we are paid in Francs and 
not in “bank points".
Detailed examination of the conditions of employment in the newly created subsidiaries 
shows that the changes were far-reaching. The first important element was the adoption of a 
new statute for personnel. When subsidiaries devoted to asset management were created, their 
employees could be given a new statute, different from the banking or insurance national 
collective agreements. Company-specific agreements were hence designed for personnel 
matters; these were more flexible and more to the advantage of the employer.36 This meant 
more flexibility in hiring and firing, in general working conditions, and in pay and bonuses. It 
also meant a reduced role for employee representatives, and in particular trade unions, whose 
role had been important in the collective agreements. We will see in the next chapter how 
unions tried to resist the move through various legal challenges. Some companies were more 
radical than others in this process of transferring employees from a banking/insurance
36 One interviewee even said that in 2000, some employees had tried to involve trade unions, after a 
few sackings had taken place in a subsidiary of a retail bank and revealed the lack of protection in the 
new statute.
165
collective agreement to a new and more flexible personnel statute. Some decided to transfer
all their employees to the new statute, while others transferred only those whom they regarded
as the core employees of the asset management business, as A. and J. explain:
We proposed to the employees that they resign from the bank and get a new 
contract from the asset management firm. Today, 100% of them are employees of 
the asset management subsidiary. A. (CEO of an asset management firm)
360 persons were transferred to XXXX. Two groups of people: on the one hand, 
the core-business people (asset managers, negotiators, top management, actuaries, 
sales people) were obliged to take up the new statute. This represents 130 
persons, mostly managers (“cadres”). The other employees, who had horizontal 
jobs that can be found in eveiy company (information technology, accounting, 
human resources etc...) and who are rather non-managers, were told they had a 
choice. They could leave for the asset management subsidiary and not come back 
to the old status, or they could be transferred to XXXX  and keep the old stature.
170 persons chose to keep the old statute. (J, HRM director)
In other words, through the creation of new subsidiaries, French asset management was able 
to get away from the restrictions of the national collective agreements and adopt more flexible 
human resource management. The fact that not all employees agreed shows that the new 
statute was not more favourable to employees. In fact, it now looks closer to the practices of 
Anglo-Saxon countries, even though French labour law still prevents a perfect duplication. 
The new statute also opened up the chance of higher pay, as a trade union representative told 
us. In the French asset management industry of 1999, pay is no longer decided by basis 
points; it is related to performance.
2.3.2. Performance-related pay
We explained earlier that in the French model of the mid-1980s pay was based more on 
education and seniority than on performance, and that salaries tended to be lower than in the 
Anglo-Saxon model. By January 1999 the situation had changed.
After de-merger, pay in the asset management subsidiaries was higher than in the bank or
insurance group, as this human resource manager explains: “In general, basic salaries are
higher than in the mother company”. Apart from basic salaries, the structure of pay was also
different and the use of bonuses was widespread. The two categories of employees which
received the highest bonuses were fund managers and sales people. But most employees in
the asset management firm had some bonuses too. And it is particularly noticeable that pay
was now based on performance, as these professionals explain:
There is an important portion of variable remuneration, up to 50% depending on 
corporations, with an average of 25%. What has justified higher remuneration is 
that one is measured against a benchmark and against competitors. (..) Pay is 
higher in the finance sector, compared with maintenance functions; that's because
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w e are measured against a number. There are two communities who in theory can 
earn more money than others: finance and sales people. In both cases, 
performance is measurable; it is a source o f  risk and o f  profit. (Director o f  a 
subsidiary o f  an insurance company)
What is completely different is that there are bonuses, and variable remuneration, 
which is largely superior to what is given in the bank. (..) We have encouraged 
the development o f  variable remuneration, like in the Anglo-Saxon system. 
Variable remuneration can represent 100% o f  the salary. This is now almost taken 
for granted. Bonuses are discretionary, uncertain and based on performance. We 
will take into account the rankings, like Europerformance. The one who is placed 
higher in the ranking will have better pay. We also look at the development o f  
new contracts from sales people. ( . . . )
These changes are particularly important, in the light o f  the situation in the m id-1980s. By 
1999 French companies had radically altered their human resource policies; performance- 
related pay had become the norm. It is all the more interesting, in that this trend was not to be 
observed on anything like the same scale in retail banks or in the rest o f  the economy. O., 
working in the human resource department o f  a retail bank, told us that the asset management 
subsidiary and the retail bank had started to represent two distinct worlds in terms o f  human 
resource. On the one hand, the retail bank was still based on the collective agreement and 
seniority and resembled closely the public sector, all o f  which elements categorise the French 
model. On the other hand, the investment bank had higher salaries and high labour turnover 
and made use o f  the external labour market. O. quoted some data from a market survey 
carried out by Towers Perrin, an American Human Resource consulting firm, o f  salaries paid 
in the French financial sector in the year 1998. The results from this survey give a picture o f  
the average salaries by functions. We chose four comparable categories, requiring similar 
technical skills and at a comparable level o f  seniority: two in retail banking (financial
accounting and asset-liability manager), one in aiock exchange company (trader), and one in 
asset management (portfolio manager). To this we added an estimate o f  the market value o f  a 
similar position in London.
Figure 24: Comparative average salaries in 1998 between selected financial jobs
Average 1998 yearly salary (000 FF)
A sset-Liability m a n a g e r  
Portfolio m a n a g e r  
UK portfolio m a n a g e r
Financial acco u n tan t
T ra d e r  (bonds)
□Yearly pay 
□  Bonus
0 5 0 0 1000 1 5 0 0
Source: interviews and author estimations
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Clearly there were great disparities both in absolute terms and in terms of the pay structure. 
While French retail banking remained tied to the French model of the mid-1980s, asset 
management had moved towards the Anglo-Saxon model, even though pay in it had not 
reached the same levels. It should also be kept in mind that 1998 was a peculiar year on the 
financial markets, with exceptional returns and therefore high bonuses for stockbrokers. This 
explains how it was possible for French brokers to earn so much, more even than fund 
managers in London. The situation was be to very different in 2000, a year in which financial 
markets were very depressed: fund managers in London had approximately the same pay 
level as in 1998 whereas French stockbrokers had almost no bonus, and hence possibly lower 
total pay.
2.3.3. Use of the external labour market
The last striking change in the human resource management of French portfolio management 
companies is the pre-eminence of the external labour market over internal careers.
Asset management companies' autonomy from the rest of financial services resulted in the
development of a specific labour market dedicated to asset management professionals. As this
CEO of an asset management firm explains:
We recruit senior and junior managers. Their career is to be done in the asset 
management business [only]. We try to retain employees as much as possible.
There is a larger turnover between portfolio management companies than 
between portfolio management companies and banks.
Several interviewees recognised that asset management had become appealing to young 
graduates, who now apply directly for fund management or marketing positions. These asset 
management professionals tend to develop specific skills, because their career is to be spent in 
the sector. Consequently, the SFAF (the French Society for Financial Analyst) is heavily used 
to train them as financial analysts, as this marketing director in an asset management firm 
explains:
SFAF is almost a pre-requisite. Young staffs always go to the SFAF, even though 
-because of buffers in their in-takes- they cannot do it straight away. You cannot 
hope to remain fund manager durably without having been to SFAF.
Similarly, sales people who specialise in institutional investors are highly sought after. There 
is competition among companies to recruit good professionals and to equip their teams. Asset 
management professionals spend their career in this area and switch from one company to 
another, in an attempt to take advantage of the shortage of competent professionals. There are 
many cases in the market of professionals who have moved from company to company. For
168
instance, Marc Sinsheimer, who represents the American Investment Management Research 
association in France, worked for CLAM, then BNP Gestion, then Paribas and finally 
returned to CLAM, all within eight years; even in the Anglo-Saxon business system this 
would seem hectic. External mobility is a real option, all the more so as head-hunters in 
France have developed new approaches specifically to recruit asset management professionals 
(Spencer Stuart, Egon Zehnder, Korn Ferry in particular). One fund manager also pointed out 
that asset management professionals were highly “visible” because their names appeared in 
various professional yearbooks. Therefore, competition is high between companies in order to 
attract the best resources; and this leads to rule by the market, which means that certain prices 
must be paid to hire certain profiles. We have already mentioned the salary surveys which are 
used to clarify the market value of certain jobs; but the trend is general and French companies 
realise they must pay the market price if they don't want to lose their employees. As this 
director of an asset management firm explains:
You have to offer fund managers the same conditions as other companies.
Otherwise, they will not come!
Some companies even use stock options, in order to motivate their employees and to increase 
their attachment to the asset management firm.
2.3.4. Conclusion
In summary, we can say that the French asset management industry has developed new 
patterns regarding human resources, in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. Flexibility, higher 
pay, performance-related pay, and the use of head-hunters and the external labour market are 
all to be found, resulting in a situation very similar to that in Anglo-Saxon markets. Such a 
result is remarkable, because it shows a radical departure from the dominant patterns of the 
French business system and confirms our conclusion that French asset management has 
adopted the Anglo-Saxon model. But to be precise, we should still recognise that the model 
has not been adopted in its entirety.
Admittedly flexibility has increased, but as some professionals pointed out, French labour law 
still applies, and in the extent of its protection of labour and the associated constraints on 
employers it is still very different from the practice in America or Britain. Generally speaking, 
pay is still lower in Paris than in London or New York and the asset management labour 
market in France still lacks the size and density of the Anglo-American ones. From our 
hypotheses, we would therefore suggest that French asset management has become similar to 
the Anglo-Saxon model, but in its own milder version. We can now conclude the analysis by 
looking at organisational routines.
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3. Organisational Routines: similar with some nuances to the 
Anglo-Saxon model
At the third layer of our analytical framework, the organisational routines, French asset 
management companies have been radically transformed. Whereas the French model of the 
mid-1980s was based upon informal networks and personal capabilities, by January 1999 
companies had well-defined bureaucratic rules, which specified how fund managers should 
make their investment decisions within the investment process. These new practices went 
together with new instruments, using information technologies, performance measurement 
norms and risk-management ratios. Customer relationships had also been transformed. In 
place of personal trust and contacts, companies applied rigorous selection methods and used 
investment advisors and invitations to tender. Even though this cannot be said of the entire 
market, it is another indication of how consistent the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model has 
been.
3.1. The development of procedures and Information Systems
Organisational routines in the French model were located in individuals’ expertise, or in the 
informal networks formed to collect information about attractive investment opportunities. By 
January 1999, the situation had altered radically, and once again had become similar to the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Individual fund managers were no longer at the core. The process and its 
various procedures had imported organisational routines into the organisation. A set of norms 
and standards had become the frame of action.
3.1.1. Routines are now located in the organisation
First, routines in French asset management firms had moved from gifted individuals to the 
organisation. While the French model was based on the individual talent of the fund manager, 
the new structure, in which an investment process dominates, is based on collective decision­
making:
Today, decisions are collegial, there are committees. (..) A fund manager might 
not agree with the committee’s decisions, but he still applies them. (Director of an 
asset management firm)
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This process consists of a series of rules that the fund manager must apply. He is under
control, and follows tight prescriptions regarding the securities he puts into the portfolio. M , a
junior fund manager, explains:
The process means that they don’t want star fund managers... because if the star 
leaves, you are in trouble. Therefore, it is necessary to have the value added 
coming from the company rather than from individuals. They try to structure the 
decision-making so that anyone is a mere pawn that can be moved around.
M  then describes how in his company the process starts with a strategic committee, made up 
of economists and senior fund managers, who analyse the current economic situation and 
make allocations by countries. For instance it may be decided to invest less in Japan and more 
in Germany. Then, an investment committee, on which M. may sit, decides which sectors 
should receive higher or lower weightings. The committee may decide to invest more in 
automotive and less in chemicals. Finally, within every sector, the internal (buy-side) 
financial analysts have recommended some securities and set up an approved list. For 
instance, VW may be rated ‘buy’ and BMW ‘sell’, meaning they should pick VW in the 
German automotive industry. Consequently, given these indications produced by the process, 
“you only need to apply [them] and you have a portfolio”, says M. The individual fund 
manager activates organisational routines when performing his tasks; he does not rely so 
much on his personal talent. Moreover, the investment process is combined with new tools to 
support decision-making and to give it some scientific credibility.
Two new elements can be found in French asset management companies in 1999, as regards 
fund management techniques. First of all, the use of financial mathematical models can be 
observed. These models are based upon New Portfolio Management Theory in particular, and 
they aim at forming so-called efficient portfolios, with the best possible diversification. By 
January 1999, a large numbers of French firms used such tools to support the work o f their 
fund managers. The second type of new instalments relates to databases, which contain much 
information about securities and can simulate price variations, using what is often called 
‘technical analysis’. These techniques are fundamentally different from the practices of fund 
managers in the mid-1980s. The latter focused exclusively on fundamental analysis (i.e. 
company accounts) or macro-economic analysis, which remain the dominant techniques used 
but are by no means the only ones. New infonnation systems have changed the organisational 
routines with the result that machines and programs have taken on considerable importance in 
the investment process itself. The role of the organisation is more important than the role of 
the individual fund manager and fund management finds its fundamentals in academic 
finance, as in the Anglo-Saxon model. But there are more than procedures in the new work 
organisation of French asset management in January 1999.
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3.1.2. Measurement and calculation tools
A second element in the new configuration of 1999 is the extensive use of measurement and 
calculation tools. This means in the first place a series of performance measurement and risk 
management tools, and secondly international standards and norms.
The French model was thoroughly transformed by the introduction and widespread use of the 
benchmark as an instrument to measure fund management performances. Whereas clients 
used to give mandates based on the prudent-man rule, by 1998 asset managers were given 
precise targets, based on benchmarks. A benchmark is a stock index made up of specifically 
chosen securities and intended to show market trends. For instance the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 
index contains 325 securities, including some of the largest European firms in selected 
sectors, and fund managers working in the Euro-zone will typically be given this index as a 
target to beat. Instead of being judged by pure returns or by rankings against competitors, 
fund managers are judged from the position of their funds in relation to the benchmark, in 
terms o f value creation and of risk. A series of ratios is used to monitor their performances. 
The following table is an extract from a client report, made by the French company SGAM, 
and it shows the ratios relating to performance analysis:
Table 11: Performance analysis
Information ratio -0.65
Tracking error 4.27%
Correlation 0.97
Beta Bull 0.92
Beta Bear 1.01
Sharpe ratio for the fund 1.29
Sharpe ratio for the benchmark 1.41
As a result, and thanks to new software, it is possible to measure the overall performance of
the fund continuously. As M  explains:
Everyday at 6:30pm, there is a file coming up with the names of all fund 
managers, and their performances for the day, month, year. (..) If you are too far, 
after one week, someone comes and see you.
Here again we can see what we said earlier about the conception o f  control, and how 
calculation tools made it possible for top management to dominate the coalition of fund 
managers. The importance of performance and risk measurement tools was one pattern in the 
Anglo-Saxon model. It appears that French companies have embraced it too. The move
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towards more rules and procedures culminates with the adoption of American norms for 
performance measurement.
3.1.3. Norms and standards
The final stage in the process of adopting Anglo-Saxon norms and practices is the 
implementation of AIMR (or GIPS) methods of performance measurement.
These norms come from the United States and their objectives are to give a clearer
comparison of performances, by setting-up composites by asset category. As this manager in
charge of reporting explains:
The ultimate stage is the norm imposed from outside, like AIMR. (..) Advanced 
norms allow clients making comparisons. The main characteristic of AIMR is to 
create pure composite funds by asset category. (..) The objective of AIMR was to 
take part in international invitation to tenders, in order to be recognised as a 
player that could attract investors. It was a^obligatory move in terms of marketing 
to get access to international invitations to tenders.
It is striking however that such a norm is imported from Anglo-Saxon countries. In fact the 
GIPS norms (Global Investment Performance Standards) were developed in a collaboration 
between the American association AIMR and some European and Asian investment 
professionals. In short, these GIPS norms adapt the American standards to international funds. 
As a consequence, a number of portfolio management companies now strive to be AIMR 
certified, which means that they have composites complying with AIMR standards. We 
should also mention, to complete the analysis, that the French asset management association 
(AFG-Asffi) developed new codes of conduct in 1997 and 1999. And these codes, strangely 
enough, embody many of the recommendations of the Anglo-Saxon professions, especially in 
terms of independence and resources. In summary, we saw in the examination of French 
organisational routines in January 1999 that they have been radically transformed and look 
very much like those of the Anglo-Saxon model. This is also true, with some differences and 
reservations, of the routines relating to customer relationships.
3.2. Customer relationships
The final element of organisational routines relates to the management of customer 
relationships. The French model was based on personal ties within established social 
networks, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model, which was based on market mechanisms and 
selection procedures. When we look at the situation in the French asset management business 
in January 1999, we notice a clear transformation. Selection procedures and consultants had
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become the norm, and the Anglo-Saxon model had been largely adopted, except by specific 
niche players.
3.2.1. From personal trust to selection procedures and contracts
The people interviewed for this research all agreed in saying that the conditions of 
competition had changed between the mid-1980s and 1999, and that clients had become more 
demanding. Not only do clients use new selection procedures to select their asset managers, 
but the nature of trust is also different. It is institutionalised in selection procedures and 
contracts and no longer based on personal contacts.
As we were told, in the French asset management industry of 1998 it was no longer possible 
to win contracts over a good dinner. Whereas clients used to trust their fund manager on the 
basis of personal acquaintance, they now require information about what fund managers do 
and why. “[Clients] start to ask for explanations, they don’t want romanticism”. Clients, 
especially large institutional investors and wealthy individuals, use selection procedures and 
in particular invitations to tender in order to choose their asset managers. An invitation to 
tenders|consists in a series of questions sent to a sample of investment companies. These 
companies have to supply lots of details about their performance and organisation, and on this 
basis the client may decide which company is the most appropriate to manage its funds. The 
manager o f a French pension fund told us that he had asked for the following elements in his 
invitation to tender:
Table 12: Example of an invitation to tenders
General information on the company:
assets under management 
number of employees 
details about employees 
key figures
Details about strategic asset management
strategic asset allocation
supervision and modifications of asset allocation
asset allocation committee
Details about the investment process
number of economists, analysts, actuaries 
investment committee 
portfolio managers’ degree of autonomy 
periodicity of the meetings
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Information technology
resources
software used by the company
Past performances
details about performances by category 
rankings and comparisons with benchmark
Reporting and control
structures of the reporting
controls
deontology
internal audit
What is the proposal of the asset manager?
F ees............................................................  ............................................................
management fees 
custodian and brokerage fees 
banking conditions 
Source: interviews
In general, asset management firms are given a few weeks to provide this information. After
they have done so, some of them (normally between five and ten) are selected for an oral
examination, in which they have to present their company and explain how they would
manage the portfolio of assets. Invitations to tender are very often arranged through
investment advisers, or so-called consultants. These consultants, often from Anglo-Saxon
countries, have a particular expertise in drawing up questionnaires, analysing the answers and
making the selection. The whole procedure is very strict and involves a lot of rules and
formats and leaves little space for amateurism. Any company that does not comply with the
requirements set up by the clients and its advisors has no chance of being selected. As this
marketing director explains:
The task of consultants, which is very developed in the US, is to analyse the asset 
management firm, in order to measure the durability of its performances. The 4 P 
(process, people, products, and price) is their motto. It is necessary to present a 
process to them and not individuals.
The consequence of these new procedures, based more on objective measurement and 
selection than on inter-personal trust, was a substantial change in the organisational routines
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dealing with client relationships in French asset management companies. The logic of honour
we identified in the French model had largely disappeared in the French industry of 1999.
Instead, companies had developed new capabilities, new organisational routines, to deal with
customer relationships. The nature of trust had evolved towards the Anglo-Saxon contractual
idea, as asset management director P.H. explains:
Everything was written and we pledged to do what we say we do. This is a proof 
of trust, because the institutional investor makes a choice by looking at past 
performances but also by looking at the investment process.
From trust based on personal contacts and logic of honour, French asset management has 
adopted the Anglo-Saxon model of trust institutionalised in selection procedures and 
contracts. The consequence for firms’ organisational routines is however the need to have all 
the required information available.
3.2.2 New information systems
Information systems have been developed not only for fund management, but also for 
customer relations. In French asset management firms new organisational routines have been 
developed to carry out selection procedures and contractual requirements.
In order to be able to reply efficiently to invitation to tenders, (the larger) asset management
companies have set up dedicated teams, whose role is to collect information from various parts
of the company and use it to give the best possible answers to the numerous questions posed in
the tender document. With new technology and the development of specific software,
databases and other computer tools, firms have developed a systematic approach and new
information systems which monitor closely the results of the company. As P.H. explains:
To position ourselves towards institutional investors, we adopted a highly 
structured organisation, with sales teams dedicated to institutional clients, 
marketing teams that take care of invitation to tenders, o f reporting and of all the 
information logistics upon which sales people base their selling proposals. There 
are teams only devoted to the development of new products.
In other words, because of the need to respond to invitations to tender, investment companies 
have been required to think about themselves as an information system. New routines have 
been established which deal only with customer relationships and which have the support of 
new technological tools. It is no longer personal trust, but a market mechanism of selection on 
the basis of systematic measurements. This shows how different the situation has become 
from the model of the mid-1980s. Interestingly, however, some interviewees also pointed to a 
few remaining French peculiarities, which go beyond the norms and the objective 
measurement.
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3.2.3. Some nuances
A few interviewees gave a more subtle description of customer relationships in French asset 
management in 1999. It seems that for a certain category of market players, and especially 
small pension funds, corporate ties and personal relationships still matter.
There was a perception among interviewees that some clients, especially small pension funds, 
use selection procedures in a way that leaves some room for the old networks; some 
invitations to tenders may in fact be bogus and purely formal, in order to justify the choice 
and preferences of the clients. This is the comment of a director in a subsidiary of an 
insurance group:
Some invitations to tenders are slightly “fake”; there is politics involved. I went 
to an invitation to tender made by a [French] Pension Fund for independent 
practitioners. They sent an invitation to tender to the whole market but they said 
to me “in any case, we would not have given it to insurers; it was just to see how 
they are positioned”.
These elements do not prevent Anglo-Saxon practices from being firmly established in the
French asset management industry of 1999. But they do reflect the historical contingencies of
the French model. The old logic of personal trust may have been replaced by trust
institutionalised in selection and control instruments, but the enforcement of the new
contractual logic may still be subject to partisan interpretation. Even consultants recognise
that the implementation of the Anglo-Saxon model of invitations to tender may include a
subjective element and reflect historical contingencies:
I worked on an invitation to tender with a pension fund; they did suggest some 
names I would not have thought of. In fact, one of the portfolio management 
companies was linked to a retail bank that had been financing the industry of the 
pension fund. There were links between the pension fund and the bank. (President 
of an investment consulting firm)
In other words, even if organisational routines in the French asset management industry 
replicate the Anglo-Saxon model, they do so in a peculiar way, which is not unrelated to 
historical habits.
To conclude our analysis of the French asset management industry at the launch of the euro, 
we can say that we have produced a consistent picture of the new situation. Change is radical 
in comparison to the French model. Asset management is operated in autonomous 
subsidiaries, along an investment process, and on the basis of procedures and norms in a logic 
of contract. The three layers (entrepreneurial synthesis, conception of control and
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organisational routines) are once again intimately related and reinforce one another in 
producing a picture that is very similar to the Anglo-Saxon model. The result is surprising, we 
insisted, because it contradicts the idea that national distinctiveness would persist through 
institutional interdependency. That said, we have also shown some minor differences and 
variations, indicating that the French asset management industry is yet not identical to the 
Anglo-Saxon model. Moreover, we can now set out two puzzles, which call for a new 
understanding of the adaptation process.
4. Two puzzles to complete the analysis: differentiation and 
timing
Our analysis has revealed that the patterns of organisation and behaviour of French firms in 
the asset management sector at the launch of the euro contrasted strongly with the French 
model of the mid-1980s, and had become very similar to those of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Given our starting point, embeddedness, and the design of our theoretical framework, using 
the business system concept, this result is rather surprising. It seems to contradict the 
proposition that systemic interdependencies would prevent French firms from departing from 
the dominant patterns of the French model. We now move one step forward and start 
examining the processes that led to this result. This will lead us, in the next two chapters, to a 
novel understanding of organisational adaptation, as embedded in the constitution of a new 
organisational field. In this paragraph, we identify the first clues. We will briefly show that 
France as a whole is still distinct from Anglo-Saxon countries, and specify the two puzzles in 
the transformation of the French asset management industry: its timing, and the fact that some 
firms have indeed not changed.
4.1. France is still a distinctive business system
One possible interpretation of our findings concerning the asset management sector might be 
that the French business system as a whole had changed radically and become similar to the 
one in Britain or the US. But this is an untenable interpretation. In the French economy as a 
whole there remain patterns of employment, corporate governance and work organisation 
very different from those in Anglo-Saxon countries.
Barsoux and Lawrence, in the preface to the second edition of their book on French 
management, point out that over their ten-year familiarity with business and management in 
France, French management has seemed remarkably stable, despite having had to face up to
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dynamic change (1997: x). Even if the French model of capitalism may have evolved 
somewhat, it would be misleading to declare an end to French exceptionalism, if only because 
of the persisting role of the state (Schmidt, 1997: 137). In financial services, recent events 
have shown that Anglo-Saxon corporate governance was still not the predominant way of 
doing things in France. For instance, when BNP and Societe Generate launched a competing 
take-over bid for Paribas, in March 2000, many international observers were astonished to see 
how the Bank of France tried to mediate between the three parties (Le Monde, June 23, 1999). 
When ING attempted to acquire CCF in 2000, the move was blocked by the French 
authorities, who seemed unwilling to let any foreign player enter the French financial system.
In terms of organisation too, analyses show that French retail banks exhibit distinctly different 
patterns (O’Reilly, 1994). Recent surveys illustrate how labour law, representation and 
employment structures differ between the French and Anglo-Saxon business systems. Careers 
in French retail banks and insurance are still based on internal mobility: the average seniority 
in French insurance groups was 13.7 years in 1999 (Observatoire des metiers de / ’ assurance, 
1999 report). A study by CEGOS shows that performance-related pay accounted for only 
some 5% of total pay in the French business system in 1999, only 1% more than in 1991 (Le 
Monde, December 12, 2000). To measure the gaps between French and Anglo-Saxon 
capitalisms, we need only recall that in 2000 France introduced in a 35-hour working week 
regulation, something unique in the globalising economy! Furthermore, it appears that some 
asset management firms still operate according to the French model of the mid-1980s.
4.2. Differentiation: some companies have hardly changed
So far our analysis of the French asset management industry in 1999 has led us to the 
conclusion that companies had adapted to change by reproducing the Anglo-Saxon model, 
albeit with variations in the detail. But the real picture is more complex: a fraction of the 
industry has actually Changed very little from the French model. The reality of the industry is 
one of a differentiation between firms operating like Anglo-Saxon companies and those which 
have retained the French patterns of the mid-1980s.
The latter belong to the group of independent asset managers. They may be related to former 
brokers (agents de change) or families. Their entrepreneurial synthesis has not changed since 
the mid-1980s: they sell their products mostly to private investors and to small institutional 
investors. In terms of distribution, they rely on direct sales forces or independent financial 
advisors. Judging from our sample, and from the AFG-Asffi database, their staff varies from
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10 to 70, which means that they represent niche players in the French asset management
market, and therefore not the dominant practices in the industry. In terms of conception o f
control, they still operate as in the French model: without investment processes or tight
control, and with autonomous fund managers pre-eminent. While L. recognises that fund
managers have considerable autonomy in their decision-making and are not constrained by
tight procedures, B. describes as follows the work of the fund managers in his firm:
There are weekly meetings, to validate common positions and choices of stocks. 
However, there is a strong autonomy among fund managers. When they have 
heard every one’s opinion and a consensus has been reached, it does not mean 
that a fund manager, who has his own theory, will not apply his ideas to his 
clients’ portfolios.
There is no strong division of labour, even if they probably have larger sales forces than in the 
mid-1980s and more people working in terms of controlling. But in general their practices are 
surprisingly in line with the French model, to the extent that B. underlines: “There are in our 
asset management a large part of methods that have not evolved since 20, 30 years”. And on 
the other layers of analysis, the same conclusion can be reached: this segment of the French 
asset management industry has not fundamentally changed and still follows the French model 
of the mid-1980s.
In terms of routines, the companies admit to making little use of quantitative methodologies.
The work of their fund managers is based on fundamental analysis, not on databases or
computer models. But all these companies emphasise that the results are “just as good” as
those of firms using investment processes. The last element, customer relationships, is even
more interesting. It appears that these companies rely on a faithful customer basis, consisting
mainly of elderly private individuals. And, according to L., the personal relationships of the
top executives, and especially their address books (carnet d ’adresse), have a key role, as in
the French model. But they also rely on small institutional investors, both small and medium
companies and small pension funds. Most of them acknowledge that they seldom reply to
invitations to tender, which results in a differentiation in the market. As M. explains:
Our firm, like small firms, has a strong human dimension. It is different for the 
large companies, which work around an investment process. (..) To describe the 
offer, we would say that it is organised around two poles: 
on the one hand the industrial offer, with large companies having internal 
processes and targeting a large customer basis
on the other hand the craft offer, with customised services for targeted clients.
Another interviewee recognises some kind of systemic interdependency, by saying that small 
clients go with smaller asset managers. This differentiation within the French market is 
particularly interesting, because it suggests that the French model of asset management is still
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alive in 1999. It confirms our suggestion that the French business system is still different from 
the Anglo-Saxon one.
In conclusion, we have found a first puzzle in the French asset management industry of 
January 1999, that some companies have adopted the Anglo-Saxon model while others 
continue to present the French model. Firms behaving in the Anglo-Saxon way are thus 
deviant from the French business system, even though they represent the dominant group in 
the asset management sector. The proposition we will develop in the remaining part o f the 
thesis is that such a result is possible because the French asset management industry has been 
constituted as a sub-system. With a series of rules and behaviours, inscribed in trans-national 
networks and sustained through new institutional arrangements, it is possible for French asset 
management companies to behave differently from the dominant patterns o f the French 
business system. In other words, our result would not contradict the importance of national 
institutions; it would rather point at some discontinuity within business systems and illustrate 
some of the mechanisms through which organisational fields embrace new practices and 
become structured. A second puzzle will give further evidence to this interpretation: it appears 
that change came suddenly in the French asset management industry.
4.3. The timing of the transformation
Another surprising element in the case of French asset management is the timing of the 
changes. In fact, when we look at exactly when autonomous asset management companies 
were created, a point which indicates the adoption of a new entrepreneurial synthesis, we see 
that in most companies changes occurred after 1996, and not from 1984 when the 
environment started to change, as we might have expected.
The creation of autonomous asset management subsidiaries is very illustrative. Paribas was 
the first company to create one, in 1988. Then followed CCF in 1992, and AXA, CDC and 
UAP in 1993-94. But these were the only companies to do so at this time. After 1996, in 
contrast, there was a massive creation of asset management subsidiaries, in all retail banks 
and insurance companies. Such a time delay can be observed in the following diagram, which 
shows the year of creation of the 297 portfolio management companies in business in January 
1999, and measures it against the total assets managed in French mutual funds, which gives a 
fair indication of the market size trends. The creation of companies was fairly steady and 
followed the trend of the market except in 1996-1997, when more than 150 portfolio 
management companies were created, with no comparable trend in the market size. And most 
of these new companies appear to have been related to a banking or insurance group:
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according to Eurostaf (1998), only 15% o f  market players had de-merged their asset 
management activities in 1996, against the quasi-totality today.
Figure 25: 1997 marks a sharp increase in the number o f  portfolio management companies
number of portfolio management companies* 
vs. total assets in French mutual funds
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Sources: AFG-Asffi 1999b, AFG-Asffi annual report 1999, COB and author.
Nor can the effective establishment o f  an external labour market dedicated to asset
management professionals be traced back beyond 1997, when these autonomous subsidiaries
were given the freedom to recruit and no longer had to rely on the internal market o f  their
banking or insurance group. The delay between the moment o f  legislative liberalisation,
which occurred in 1984-1987, and the actual organisational change is therefore noticeable, as
M , CEO o f  an asset management firm, remarks:
Honestly, changes have been less important than I expected. In 1987, we thought 
that everything would explode, that consultants would come very quickly, that 
asset management companies would get their autonomy. Today, it seems to be the 
case.
Even if  French companies did eventually adopt Anglo-Saxon practices, it is important to 
know why they did not adopt them earlier  than 1996. According to the professionals in the 
field, two events played a key role in the transformation o f  the industry. And both, strangely 
enough, happened in 1996. The first was the transposition into French law o f  the European 
directive on investment services (the MAF law), which gave autonomy to asset management, 
by creating the portfolio management company with extended object, and by giving asset 
management a supervisory body distinct from that o f  banking: the COB. Interestingly, this 
impulse towards the autonomy o f  asset management was not in the original directive, but was 
added by French regulators. The second element was the publication o f  a report, the Paris- 
Europlace (La Martiniere) report on the asset management industry, which analysed its 
characteristics within financial services and argued for reforms in order to secure the 
international competitiveness o f  French asset management. Both these events took place in
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1996, and only then did change become dramatic. This second puzzle is very interesting, 
because it supports the proposition that system interdependencies would prevent French firms 
from moving away from the dominant patterns o f  their business system (North, 1990; 
W hitley, 1999). Instead o f  contradicting this proposition, the evidence refines the 
implications: interdependencies do apply, but system s are not automatically watertight. They 
require some political pressure to secure their borders, and there can emerge new  social 
spaces which promote practices different from the dominant national patterns. Until 1996, as 
w e will show in the next chapter, it was not possible for firms to becom e too deviant from the 
French business system. However, after the opening o f  a fresh social space, o f  a new
organisational field called asset management which was distinct from banking, insurance and 
stock-broking, it was possible to institute new rules and to develop new patterns o f  
organisation and behaviour, in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. The follow ing chapters w ill 
illustrate how adaptation processes were embedded in the constitution o f  a new organisational
In conclusion, w e have found in this chapter that none o f  the hypotheses designed in our 
second chapter matched perfectly the changes that occurred in the French asset management 
industry. The closest hypothesis was actually, and in a way surprisingly, the one that French 
firms would have adopted the patterns o f  the Anglo-Saxon model. They did so with some
reservations and differences o f  detail, admittedly, but still convincingly enough to allow  us to
 7 ; ZaT 1
reject the hypothesis o f  an hybrid model. But the two puzzles w e have identified -the fact that
som e firms still reproduce the French model, and the delay between the beginning o f  the %__
changes in the French environment and the actual timing o f  the transformation- question the 
path o f  the adaptation processes. Once again the problem is to understand how such a result 
was possible.
field
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CHAPTER VI: THE CONSTITUTION OF A 
NEW ORGANISATIONAL FIELD: UNTIL 
1996, EXPERIMENTATION AND LEARNING
In the previous chapters we analysed the transformation of the French asset management 
industry. The major conclusion was that French firms have embraced the Anglo-Saxon model 
albeit with some slight differences, even if a fraction of the industry has retained the patterns 
of the French model. In the following chapters, we will focus more precisely on the 
adaptation processes that made possible such a result. The argument we develop is that 
organisational adaptation processes were embedded in the constitution of a new 
organisational field, which allowed firms to adopt practices at odds with the French business 
system. Before the recognition of asset management as a new business distinct from banking 
and insurance, which took place only in 1996, it was possible for only a fraction of firms to 
adapt and evolve, through various processes of learning or manipulation of their environment. 
For the great majority of firms, institutional constraints and interdependencies prevented any 
departure from the patterns of the French model. In other words, for the period to 1996 our 
research supports the claim by institutionalist scholars that organisations are constrained by 
surrounding institutions (Nee and Ingram, 1998: 40; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
1995: 112). But we will explain how firms were driven to adopt isomorphic patterns of 
1 organisation and behaviour after asset management became a distinct organisation field, with 
new rules copied from the Anglo-Saxon business system. In other words, in this chapter we 
will support the argument that “to understand the institutionalization of organizational forms, 
we must first understand the institutionalization and structuring of organizational fields” 
(DiMaggio, 1991: 267). The constitution, the structuration (Giddens, 1979, 1984) of the 
organisational field is a crucial step, and a step that is historically and logically prior to the 
processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
Until 1996 asset management was not recognised as an autonomous business in France. Most 
firms in the field followed the routines of the French model of the mid-1980s. However, this 
does not mean that no adaptation processes were taking place. In fact, even in the mid-1980s 
Anglo-Saxon practices were being learned, through dealings with British and American
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companies or acquisition of them. And some market players had already adopted these 
practices from abroad. Asset management professionals started to notice the changes in their 
environment, and they perceived tensions in the French model (Weick, 1995) which they 
were able to resolve by formulating solutions inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model. However, 
because of institutional constraints, adaptation processes were restricted to some limited 
learning, and did not bring any substantial change in the industry.
1. Confronting the Anglo-Saxon model
In order to understand the transformation of the French asset management industry and its 
conversion to the Anglo-Saxon model, it is necessary to trace the initial steps in the 
confrontation between the two models. Either because of their international operations and/or 
acquisitions, or because foreign players had entered the French market, French firms were 
able to see in action the practices of Anglo-American companies. They realised how different 
the Anglo-Saxon model was, and that it was more advanced and represented the international 
reference point. This resulted in an adaptive process of learning; and even, in some few cases, 
in an early adoption of the new practices.
1.1. Abroad: manipulation of the environment through foreign 
acquisitions and new subsidiaries
It may be useful to recall that in our theoretical framework we identified four adaptation 
processes: change of entrepreneurial synthesis, change in the conception of control, learning 
of new routines and manipulation of the environment (86). The last process refers to all 
attempts by firms to alter their environment, through mergers, acquisitions, lobbying and 
influence. And French firms did engage in such a process when they ventured abroad and 
developed important international capacities, even in the 1970s and 1980s.
The track record of French financial institutions regarding acquisitions o f British or American 
companies is not as impressive as the German one, but it is still not negligible. In 1978, for 
instance, four of the world’s ten largest banks were French: Credit Lyonnais, Paribas, BNP 
and Societe Generate (The Banker, June 1978). At this time they had developed strong 
capabilities in project finance and international lending, parallel to the international expansion 
of French multinationals. Financial globalisation extended their attempt to establish 
themselves in international markets, either through acquisitions or through the opening of 
foreign subsidiaries. This process of ‘manipulation of their environment’ was not primarily
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targeted towards asset management, but it created opportunities for this business too, which 
came into contact with the Anglo-Saxon model and was able to learn from it. This not the 
place for a thorough review of French involvement in Britain or America, but we will mention 
the most relevant points, especially given the historical connections between certain events 
and certain individuals.
Most large leading French banks had some kind of involvement in Britain or in America. For
instance, Societe Generate bought the British bank Touche Remlands in 1986 only to close it
four years later, and in 1998 it acquired Hambros. In 1993 BNP launched a joint venture with
Neuberger and Bauman, an American institutional asset manager. In 1991, CCF took a 51%
participation in the British asset manager Framlington. In 1987 Indosuez bought a large
British asset manager, Gartmore, and sold it at a very good profit in 1995. These encounters
with Anglo-Saxon companies had an impact in terms of ‘learning new routines’: French
companies drew some inspiration from the structures and organisation of the Anglo-Saxon
model. A manager at Indocam comments on the involvement with Gartmore as follows:
In terms of structure they were more advanced in comparison with us. We 
looked at what they were doing, and since they had partnerships with American 
companies, we looked at how American companies were organised.
The cases of Paribas and AXA deserve closer attention, because of the depth of the learning 
process and the extent of Anglo-Saxon influence. Paribas’ saga in the United States is 
remarkable in that it resulted in Paribas adopting the Anglo-Saxon model (see next page). In 
1991 the AXA group bought, with the support of Paribas, the US life insurer Equitable, which 
itself had a majority participation in Alliance Capital, a large asset manager in the US. As its 
website says, “Alliance Capital is America^ largest publicly-traded asset manager and one of 
the most experienced investment managers in the world” (Alliance Capital, 1999). Alliance’s 
example had a radical effect on the strategic orientation of AXA, which changed its 
entrepreneurial synthesis and recognised that it was not just an insurance company, but also 
operated another business which it was now able to identify: asset management. In 1994 AXA 
created AXA Asset Management, which later became AXA Investment Managers, and it used 
its American experience very much as a point of reference in creating new structures. As one 
of AXA’s managers explains: “We are a veiy American group. Our presence in the US made 
us sensitive earlier than others”. Thus, acquisitions by AXA and other leading firms gave 
them the opportunity to learn from Anglo-Saxon practices, and eventually to upgrade the 
organisation of the French structures. In the events which followed both AXA and one of its 
General Directors, Gerard de La Martiniere, were to play a key role in the transformation of 
the French industry as a whole.
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The inside story o f Paribas and AG Becker
Paribas, from its very origins - i t  was jointly established in Paris, Brussels and
Amsterdam- has had an international path. It founded the first French investment bank
■ ..................
subsidiary in N ew  York in 1970 and at the same time had som e involvem ent in
London. In the 1970s, Jacques de Fouchier, Paribas CEO, entered into a partnership
. .  . ■.  . . . . . . . .  .
with Sir Siegmund Warburg, CEO o f  SG Warburg, with whom he had good relations; 
this resulted in cross-shareholdings between the two banks. In 1974, they combined  
their N ew  York subsidiaries and acquired the American investment bank AG Becker. 
However, differences in management, insufficient co-operation and the death o f  Sir 
Siegmund, together with the nationalisation o f  Paribas, weakened the partnership in 
1982 (fiussidre, 1992: 211, 222). In 1984, Becker Paribas suffered from the American 
inflation and debt crisis and the French bank finally sold Becker to Merrill Lynch 
( The Banker, February 1985). But according to Fouchier, “It proved very instructive 
about the workings o f  American financial markets”. More precisely, the experience 
resulted in a transformation o f  Paribas asset management business.
There was one individual who took part in the A G  Becker adventure and was to have 
a particular role in the French asset management industry: Alain Leclair. A graduate 
o f  HEC, one o f  France's leading business schools, Leclair joined Paribas in 1966 and 
in London in the 1970s he held some short-term appointments relating to the alliance 
with Warburg.. In 1982 he was sent to N ew  York, and worked in brokerage activities 
with some American managers and took part in the creation o f  an asset management 
subsidiary. Together with other French em ployees o f  Paribas, he was therefore able to 
observe British and American patterns o f  organisation and behaviour. As managing 
director o f  AG Becker in 1983, he was in charge o f  selling the AG Becker Fund 
Evaluation Service, which dealt with performance measurement. This provided a / 
good learning experience covering all aspects o f  Anglo-Saxon methods of
By manipulating the environment, French managers had the chance to learn and draw 
inspiration from the practices o f  their British or American colleagues. Some com panies, like 
Paribas, CCF and Indosuez, decided at an early stage to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model, even 
though most o f  the industry still conformed to the French model. But the initiatives o f  French 
groups abroad were not the only way to get to know the Anglo-Saxon model. The opening o f  
borders also enabled foreign players to put a foot in the country.
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1.2. At home: Anglo-Saxon players and methods
The other encounter between the French and Anglo-Saxon models resulted from the arrival in 
France of foreign players. With the single European market and the liberalisation of capital 
movements, it became easier for foreign companies to come to France and offer their asset 
management services. It also became easier for foreign investors to come and invest in 
France. And interestingly, Anglo-Saxon companies also brought with them advisors and 
consultants, who were potentially in a position to exert coercive pressure on French patterns 
of behaviour.
1.2.1. The arrival of Anglo-Saxon competitors: a failure?
J.P. Morgan had a French asset management subsidiary as early as 1982, but most Anglo- 
Saxon competitors in the business arrived in France in the late 1980s or the early 1990s, 
thanks to the UCITS directive and the liberalisation of capital movements. It is questionable 
whether they ever managed to establish their leadership in the country. *
In 1988 Invesco, one of the leading US investors, arrived in France; Fleming, the Scottish 
asset manager arrived in 1989; Baring Asset Management, the British investment bank, in 
1990, and State Street Banque, the Boston asset managers, in 1991 (Mieux Vivre Votre 
Argent, January 29, 1996). However, even the leading world players had trouble penetrating 
the French market: the domination of the domestic banking and insurance groups, who had 
90% of the market in 1990, prevented them from gaining large market shares. Fidelity, the 
world/leader, had to retreat in the wake of the 1987 financial crisis and did not return until 
1994.Tql988/J.P. Morgan sold its portfolio of institutional investments to CCF inp998/an 
action which shocked many observers {Les Echos, June 24, 1998; L'Agefi, June 24l 1998)/fn 
consequence Anglo-Saxon competitors had barely 3.3% of the French market in September 
1997, according to Upper Analytical Services, and the foreign groups with the highest 
market share were actually German (Commerzbank with CCR Gestion) or Dutch (ABN- 
Ambro with Banque NSM). However, even though they failed to gain large market shares in 
France,37 the Anglo-Saxon asset managers did have an impact in as far as their presence 
publicised the Anglo-Saxon model.
37 However, Lipper Analytical Services noticed that the domination of large French players was eroding, together 
with the decrease in the money market sector: while the top ten domestic players represented 74% in 1994, they 
represented 66% in 1997.
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For instance, Mike Giles, president o f  Merrill Lynch International explains that success in the
bank comes from a Chinese Wall between investment and fund management activities and
from the rigour o f  the methods applied. Confirming the idea that American competitors in
France sell the practices o f  their country, he underlines:
We took the American model and introduced it abroad: our international offices  
are the exact copy o f  what we do in the United States. {L ’Agefi, February 26,
One can see from the press that Anglo-Saxon players tried to advertise their m odel, and 
especially the scientific rigour o f  the investment process as opposed to the French so-called  
amateurism, and the good ethics linked to independence as opposed to French so-called  
dubious practices. Their presence thus increased the knowledge and visibility o f  the Anglo- 
Saxon model, and stimulated pressure to adopt Anglo-Saxon routines (Option Finance, July 
17, 1995). But the role o f  foreign pension funds was also particularly important.
1.2.2. Anglo-Saxon clients become valuable to French asset m anagem ent 
companies
Anglo-Saxon investors, especially US pension funds, became potentially very valuable 
customers for the French asset management industry from the late 1980s, when they started 
to invest internationally.
A study from the Conference Board showed that foreign securities as a proportion o f  the 
investments held by the 25 largest US pension funds rose from 4.8% in 1991 to 11.2% in 
1996 (Les Echos, February 24, 1998). Data taken from the Bank o f  France’s TOFA (a study 
o f  the flows and stocks o f  France’s national accounting) show that after 1992 France became 
a net receiver o f  investment in equities and mutual funds. To capture the influence o f  foreign 
investment on the French asset management industry, w e used as an indicator the balance 
between France and the rest o f  the world in certain financial assets. By calculating the 
difference between the flow o f  assets and the flow o f  liabilities, we can indicate when French
flow s for a given operation were superior to those o f  foreign econom ic agents. In the
VULXQa,
follow ing graphs, a positive number shows when France was a ijet exporter o f  financial assets 
w hile a negative number shows when France was a net importeii^of^financial assets. A 
negative variation indicates the potential demand from foreigners for asset management
1996)
services.
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Figure 26: France’s balance with the world in terms o f  equities
■20000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
-40000
-60000
-80000
Figure 27: France’s balance with the world in terms o f  UCITS
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In chapter II we pointed out that foreign investors had increased their share o f  ownership in 
the French stock market, from 10% in 1985 to 35% in 1997 (Camus, 1998). More 
specifically, these investors were first and foremost Anglo-Saxon pension funds, who owned  
more than 20% o f  the shares in the CAC 40 (L ’Agefi, March 19, 1998; Investir, July 6, 1998).
The negative balance from 1992 for both mutual funds and equities indicates that foreign 
investors had become more valuable clients for asset managers, at least in terms o f  market 
potential. An examination o f  the financial press confirms this statistical evidence.
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The following table shows the size of the portfolios of French assets owned by ten Anglo- 
Saxon funds in 1997.
Table 13: 1996 Portfolios of French assets (FF billions')
Franklin 21 T. Rowe Price Associates 4.5
Fidelity 20.7 College Retirement 3.4
Capital Research 13.5 Grantham 3.4
Calpers 7.5 Harbor 3
Janus 5.5 Batterrymarch 3
Source: Dealer’s Book, (quoted in Le Nouvel Economiste, 1095,16/01/9* : 40)
Admittedly, these Anglo-Saxon investors had portfolios that represented only about 2% of 
the total asset management market in 1996, and it is not certain that all these portfolios were 
mandated to an external asset manager. However, when Paribas obtained a mandate from 
Calpers in 1997, it was to manage their assets not only in France but also in Europe. With 
French portfolios representing a mere 1% of the total assets of the Anglo-Saxon pension 
funds, the issues at stake are clear:38 they concern not just the French market but global 
opportunities.
1.2.3. Adaptation processes
We have shown that internationalisation resulted in a very direct confrontation between the 
practices of the French and the Anglo-Saxon players. Interestingly, the result was some 
adaptation processes: the learning of new routines, and for a small group of pioneers the early 
adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model.
When French firms ventured abroad and when Anglo-American players arrived in France, 
their patterns of organisation and behaviour were in competition with one another, and not 
only between individual firms, but also between the two models, the two different ways of 
organising the asset management business. To help them select good asset managers Anglo- 
Saxon pension funds brought to France their advisors, lawyers and consultants. As a result, 
French asset management companies and large French listed companies had from the early 
1990s to adapt to the Anglo-Saxon model of client relationships (selection procedures,
38 We should remember what we said in chapter II, that asset management companies’ revenues are 
directly related to the amount o f assets they manage. Also asset management fees are higher in the 
USA than in France.
191
standards and logic of contract), as Joseph Assemat-Tessandier, general director at Lazard 
Freres Gestion explains:
To conquer foreign investors, we had to show them asset management structures
that are as transparent in France as those of Anglo-Saxon firms. (Option Finance,
February 12, 1996: 17)
Although consultants did not play a really influential role until after 1996, when invitations to 
tender spread across the industry, they had already set foot in France at the beginning of the 
1990s. William Mercer and Watson Wyatt, for instance, had some resources in France 
together with their other consulting activities, while Frank Russell established an office at the 
end of 1994. These companies were able to make known Anglo-Saxon patterns of 
organisation and behaviour. Academics and professionals had been doing the same thing 
since the late 1980s.
In June 1991, Aftalion and Poncet, professors at the French business school ESSEC, wrote a 
paper about one element at the core of the Anglo-Saxon model, Performance measurement for 
UCITS, in the widely distributed Bank review {La Revue Banque, 517: 582-587). In 
December 1991, Veverka, a board member at Standard & Poor’s, wrote about the rating of 
UCITS in the same review {La Revue Banque, 522: 1121-1122). In 1991, Antoine Briand who 
was to become the influential chief executive of the French investment advisor Finance 
Arbitrage, had finished his doctorate and was starting to work in the training centre of ARCO, 
the structure grouping the largest French supplementary pension ftmds. Moreover, the use of 
new software and computer programmes designed in the US was progressively introducing 
new organisational routines {Analyse Financiere, 4th quarter 1989: 37-41). The confrontation 
with the Anglo-Saxon model therefore resulted in some adaptation processes among firms, 
and in particular the learning of new routines. But some firms went further than others.
A group of pioneers adopted the Anglo-Saxon model before the rest of the industry. We have 
already mentioned Paribas, which had an autonomous subsidiary implementing the Anglo- 
Saxon model as early as 1988. But CCF was soon to follow: in 1991-1992, after the 
acquisition of Framlington, it was de-merging its asset management activities and introducing 
investment processes. In 1992 both UAP, at the time the largest French insurer, and Indosuez, 
the French investment bank that had acquired Gartmore, created autonomous asset 
management subsidiaries. In 1992-1993, it was the turn of CDC, the largest French asset 
manager. And in 1994, shortly after the acquisition of Alliance Capital, AXA created AXA 
Asset managers, which became AXA Investment Managers in 1996. However until 1995- 
1996 these pioneers were the only examples to be found of companies introducing the Anglo-
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Saxon model.39 What is also interesting, however, is that in addition to encountering the 
Anglo-Saxon model, these pioneering firms realised that the French model of the mid-1980s 
was suffering from a problem of international legitimacy.
1.2.4. Conclusion: calling the French model into question?
We have shown that from 1984 the French asset management industry was increasingly aware 
of the Anglo-Saxon model and that learning processes had started to diffuse its practices and 
procedures. Moreover, faced with the international domination of the model, a group of 
pioneers, made up of the most international French players, had started to resemble Anglo- 
American companies. But this also made more French players conscious of the international 
leadership of the Anglo-Saxon model.
Anglo-Saxon firms are world leaders in the asset management business. In the light of this 
leadership, some asset management professionals realised that the French model was not 
internationally competitive.40 This does not mean that they recognised any intrinsic 
superiority o f the Anglo-Saxon model, but they did acknowledge its advantages, in a reflexive 
process (Giddens, 1984: xvi), as shown by A., vice-president of a French asset management 
firm:
For the Americans, we were barbarians, underdeveloped, people you should not . * 
give your capital to! We would mix our own pockets with the'Ofle’oF the clients; 
we did not live from asset management fees, but from stockbrokers’ retrocession 
commissions; there was no transparency, no reporting. (..) When you would 
come, like all good Frenchmen, and offer to manage an American pension fund, 
you would have to answer questions such as ‘but how are you organised? Where 
is your Chinese Wall? How come you give 50% of your brokerage to your house 
broker? In the US it is nil!’ (...) In short, being internationally organised means 
being like the Americans. All global consultants are American. Even to have the 
mandate of a Japanese firm or for the discreet wealth of the Belgian King, you go 
through an American consultant. To manage in Brunei', in Korea, it is always the 
same. There is domination. (...) If you don’t enter the norm, you are not 
recommended for selection.
We will see later that this realisation by some French asset managers led to collective action 
which eventually produced great changes. Until 1996, the move towards the Anglo-Saxon
39 We will show later how institutional interdependency can explain this result.
40 Another story gave supplementary weight to this argument that the French model was not up to the 
international requirements: the failure of the CDC in New York, which after an attempt to establish 
itself in 1992 had to retreat in front o f accusations that it was using the portfolios o f its clients to serve 
the political interests o f the French State, as it had done during the attempt by Indosuez to take over 
G6n6rale de Banque.
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model was deviant in the French market: even though the French model was under pressure, 
institutional interdependency prevented any dramatic transformation until 1996.
2. The French model under stress: problematisation and 
institutional interdependency
In the last chapter we uncovered a puzzle: that the French asset management industry adopted 
the Anglo-Saxon model only after 1996. In this paragraph, we will investigate this time-lag 
further: we will show that although the foundations of the French model of the mid-1980s 
came under strain, systemic interdependency prevented any radical change. Even in the 1980s 
and the early 1990s a number of factors were adversely affecting the asset management 
business, and the actors in the field clearly realised this (Weick, 1979, 1995). However, until 
1996 and despite some cracks in the system, the institutional interdependency of the French 
asset management industiy prevented any substantial transformation of the French model.
2.1. The French model under threat
In the previous chapter we insisted that the French model had an internal coherence. At the 
same time, we showed how the three layers of analysis in our theoretical framework 
responded to broader institutional and societal arrangements. However, a number of changes 
in the environment of French asset management companies can be noticed over the period 
1984-1996, and these undermined this internal consistency. We will now show how actors 
made sense of these changes (Weick, 1979, 1995) and which types of solution were generally 
problematised (Miller, 1991) and advocated.41 However, we will not at this stage link the 
solutions with any category of actors: it will be the purpose of the next chapter to explain how 
some debate took place between various coalitions. Our analysis will show that the 
problematisation of the challenges to French firms led to one clear solution: get rid of the 
French model and adopt the Anglo-Saxon patterns.
2.1.1. Entrepreneurial synthesis: vertical integration under threat
We have shown that in the French model the entrepreneurial synthesis was based on vertical 
integration: asset management departments were considered as mere technical support 
functions for the retail networks of universal banks or insurance companies. They mostly
41 Evidence was collected from interviewees, who were asked about the changes in their business 
environment, and from statistical data coming from the Bank o f  France.
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targeted private investors through mutual funds, while institutional or wealthy investors were 
tackled within corporate or personal networks. However, new elements relating both to 
distribution and to internal banking or insurance structures, made the entrepreneurial 
synthesis problematic.
The first problem identified by the persons interviewed was the development of new
distribution channels which undermined the quasi-monopoly of retail banking in the
distribution of asset management products. From the late 1980s, the development of life
insurance, and in particular of products based on multiple UCITS, made life insurers look for
mutual funds providers external to their group. Consequently, they started distributing mutual
funds from other firms. At the same time, new networks appeared, in particular independent
financial advisors, as well as direct selling by post, and later by telephone. This provided an
opportunity for foreigners, as M , CEO of a German asset management firm, explains:
Until 10 years ago [i.e. 1989], the market was totally controlled by the banks.
(...) The arrival of foreign competitors in the market created a new offer, and the 
offer created a distribution network. Progressively, 800 to 1000 independent 
financial advisors emerged. (..). The other distribution channel was created with 
multi-assets insurance contracts: foreign investors would sell their funds as one 
of the UCITS in the contract. The creation of investment advisers and multi­
assets insurance contracts started to shake the monopoly of asset managers that 
were captive of their networks.
The opening of new distribution channels represented a potential danger for banking 
networks: their clients, in the French model captive and therefore very profitable, might be 
tempted not to buy their mutual funds from their branch and might prefer other products 
offered through these new channels. Hence, retail networks became more sensitive to the 
performance of their in-house asset management, out of fear that they m ig h t^ fa il to please 
their customers or even lose them. Interviewees made sense of these dynamics by recognising 
potentially divergent interests between the retail network and the asset management 
department of the same company. The network, they told us, wanted to distribute whatever 
the client liked best, which might not be the in-house products. At the same time, the asset 
management department wanted to distribute its own products as much as possible, with or 
without the support of the retail network. Interviewees suggested an obvious solution to this 
potential conflict of interests: loosen the ties between the asset management department and 
the retail network, so that they did not depend exclusively on one another.
However, implementing this solution would have amounted to a dismantling of the integrated 
French model. It would have led to a new entrepreneurial synthesis, in which asset 
management targeted specific segments through different distribution channels, as in the
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Anglo-Saxon model. Therefore w e see here the first serious threat to the French model in the 
late 1980s and the early 1990s. A second problem was identified around the entrepreneurial 
synthesis, which relates to the focus on private investors.
The proportion o f  securities in France owned by private investors, who are referred to as 
households in the statistics, decreased consistently over the period 1984-1999, in favour o f  
institutional and foreign investors. Evidence o f  this trend can be found in the yearly surveys 
by the Bank o f  France. Analysis o f  this survey shows that households, i.e. private investors, 
have lost their dominant position in terms o f  security ownership in France. The shift is 
remarkable, because it is observed in all categories o f  securities. The decrease in the 
percentage o f  households was matched by the increase o f  institutional investors, and o f  non­
residents.42
The Bank of France yearly surveys
I custodians, such as exchange agents until 1988
I
based on the value o f  securities in portfolio, as 
f  the year in the stock exchange. The Bank of
rey  every year. Nevertheless, the survey 
market. In 1984, 60.5% o f  Paris stock
gainst 45% in 1993 and 80% in 1998. It
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Over the 1984-1999 period, except in 1995, 1996 and 1997, the Bank o f  France
■ •
conducted an annual survey o f  the custodians in the French market, in order to 
analyse the composition o f  the securities portfolios among investors. The data was
provided by members o f  the AFB (French Banking Association), mutual banks, the"■
42 Foreign investors buying securities in or from France.
Table 13: Financial portfolio ownership in France (1984-1998)
1984** 1985 1986 1992 1993 1994 1998
Equities
institutional investors and mutual funds*
non financiary com panies
households
associations
non residents
22.6%
24.7%
44.8%
2.2%
5.7%
29.9%
23.0%
36.7%
1.7%
8.7%
28.8%
23.7%
36.2%
1.6%
9.7%
28.1%
18.7%
27.0%
0.9%
25.4%
24.9%
18.7%
26.2%
0.8%
29.4%
30.7%
18.0%
22.9%
0.6%
27.8%
36.9%
17.5%
11.7%
0.4%
33.4%
B onds
institutional investors and mutual funds*
non financiary com panies
households
associations
non residents
47.0%
5.5%
41.8%
3.3%
2.4%
56.8%
3.9%
34.5%
1.4%
3.4%
60.5%
4.9%
28.9%
1.8%
3.9%
58.2%
5.7%
24.2%
1.3%
10.6%
59.9%
5.4%
24.0%
1.3%
9.4%
64.1%
6.6%
16.8%
1.0%
11.4%
75.4%
3.6%
8.4%
0.6%
11.9%
SICAV and FCP sh a res
institutional investors and mutual funds*
non financiary companies
households
associations
non residents
13.7%
22.4%
58.7%
4.5%
0.7%
16.9%
18.6%
60.2%
4.1%
0.2%
17.5%
18.5%
59.9%
4.0%
0.1%
13.2%
15.3%
66.9%
4.1%
0.6%
14.7%
17.2%
62.5%
4.7%
0.9%
29.6%
17.3%
48.3%
3.8%
1.0%
45.9%
16.8%
30.2%
5.5%
1.6%
Foreign securities***
institutional investors and mutual funds*
non financiary com panies
households
associations
non residents
30.2%
11.7%
50.7%
2.5%
4.9%
38.2%
9.5%
45.0%
1.3%
6.1%
41.2%
12.2%
40.0%
2.6%
3.9%
45.6%
14.4%
23.8%
0.7%
15.5%
46.4%
15.1%
20.4%
0.6%
17.4%
60.3%
12.3%
14.3%
0.4%
12.6%
67.5%
11.7%
5.2%
0.3%
15.3%
* insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and credit institutions
** in 1934, the figures corresponding to institutional investors and mutual funds do not include credit institutions 
*** comprise foreign equities, foreign bonds and shares of foreign mutual funds
Figure 28: Ownership o f  French equities by category
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Figure 29: Ownership o f  French bonds by category
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Figure 30: Ownership o f  French mutual funds bv category
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In addition to the question o f  distribution, the second threat to the entrepreneurial synthesis 
o f  the French model came therefore from a shift in the demand for asset management 
services. The model focused on private investors and not on institutional and international 
investors, which had become the dominant segments. Even more, the project o f  introducing
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true pension funds in France to supplement and progressively replace the French contributory 
pension system would reinforce the importance o f  institutional investors. The creation o f  
pension funds has been a constant subject o f  controversy in France in recent years (Deroy, 
1994: 12). Eventually, the right-wing government o f  Juppe voted a law creating pension 
funds in February 1997, but its implementation was first stopped and then cancelled by the 
newly elected socialist government o f  Jospin in 1997. One interviewee commented that in 
general, and by pursuing various projects, asset managers had been preparing them selves 
since 1990 for the introduction o f  pension funds, in the hope o f  finally developing an industry 
capable o f  rivalling the Anglo-Saxons. To serve best the growing segments (institutional and 
foreign investors) actors in the field suggested creating new marketing and sales capacities to 
supplement integrated distribution channels. T his would mean, however, abandoning the core 
o f  the French model, vertical integration, and adopting the Anglo-Saxon entrepreneurial 
synthesis o f  aligning different customer segments with different products and distribution. 
The third threat to the French model arose out o f  the differing dynamics inside banking and 
insurance structures.
French financial institutions have faced a crisis over the last 20 years (Plihon, 1998). Over the 
period considered, the profit margins o f  French banks show a steady fall:
Figure 31: Net results o f  French banks (1988-1996)
Source: OECD
Since the mid-1980s, the number o f  credit institutions has decreased by 60%, mainly as a 
result o f  concentrations, and the number o f  employees in the sector has fallen by 26,000. 
Financial firms have faced problems o f  cost reduction and restructuring. However, for asset 
management the situation was very different: while the rest o f  the company had to tighten its 
belt, asset management activities were experiencing high growth, high margins and 
expansionary perspectives. The following table shows the growth rates o f  several types o f  
financial services, and illustrates that asset management had more favourable dynamics:
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Figure 32: Growth rates among financial services*
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In these circumstances, the structures o f  the French model are problematic: they 
prevent any special treatment o f  the asset management business, because it is integrated 
with the rest o f  the company. Again, interviewees said that given this problem a good  
solution would have been to set up a separate company devoted to asset management. 
However, this would have meant de-merging this business from the rest o f  the 
company, in other words a direct challenge to the French model o f  vertical integration 
and universal banking.
At the level o f  the entrepreneurial synthesis, we have seen that the French model had been 
under stress since the late 1980s, as regards distribution, customer focus and internal 
dynamics. We have shown that the actors in the field problematised these changes and that 
de-merger and the establishment o f  a new entrepreneurial synthesis focusing also on 
institutional investors were perceived solutions to these strains. However, nothing really 
changed until 1996. We now show that at the level o f  both the conception o f  control and 
organisational routines, the French model was also faced with serious threats.
2.1.2. Conception of control and organisation routines: complexity and 
com petition
Several other elements put pressure on the French model and were recognised by the actors in 
the field as requiring new organisation structures and new organisational routines: foreign 
competition, the increased difficulty o f  the asset management business and the increased level 
o f  clients' expectations.
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In the French model, the role of gifted fund managers is critical to the success of asset 
management firms, because they supervise the totality of the value chain and are not 
controlled very specifically. This makes them the key resource for companies, and one that 
companies are highly dependent upon. In the French model this did not create problems, 
because of the national collective agreement, the career structure and vertical integration. 
There was little incentive for fund managers to change company, since they would make no 
more money elsewhere and would risk losing the rewards of seniority and experience. 
However the situation changed in the late 1980s, with the arrival of foreign competitors, 
especially Anglo-Saxons in the habit of using head-hunters and bonuses to hijack successful 
people. There was a risk that French firms would lose their most precious resources, the fiind 
managers at the basis of their conception o f control. A director in an asset management firm 
told us:
Portfolio management companies want to recapture the value-added, which to a 
dangerous extent originated from employees. Pebereau [BNP chief] says that 
investment banking is bad business for shareholders: it is good business for 
clients and for employees who earn a lot of money, but not for shareholders.
Asset Management was becoming a very good business for employees and quite a 
good business for shareholders. Hence the idea not to be at risk with employees, 
by losing them.
Actors problematised the risk with the French conception o f  control; they recognised that a 
good way to change the dependence would be by giving the company pre-eminence over the 
individual fund manager. But this would have amounted to abandoning the focus on fund 
managers which is at the core of the French model. Moreover, interviewees recognised that 
the changes in the financial markets had brought new complexity and new demands from their 
clients, which also put stress on French asset management.
First of all, the job of the fund managers became more complex. As one asset manager
recognised when reflecting on the changes surrounding financial markets:
A phenomenon of sophistication and of geographical globalisation made it 
increasingly difficult to manage security portfolios just by being a prudent man.
With new technologies and the use of computers the technicality of the business increased. 
This was coupled with financial evolutions. By the end of the 1980s there had appeared on the 
French market new financial instruments which were more complex and sophisticated; they 
included futures, options and swaps. Such new financial techniques as hedging and asset- 
backed securities substantially increased the technical complexity of the business. But not 
only did it become more complex, it also became more difficult, because of the fall in interest 
rates: to beat the market and even to reach decent performance levels, one had to be more than
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just adequate. In the m id-1980s, interest rates were consistently high and investments focused
on Treasury bonds or monetary products, which produced good returns precisely because o f
high interest rates, and the technicality and risks o f  which remained fairly limited. As a result,
there were few issues at stake: it was not necessary to put a lot o f  effort into asset
management in order to obtain decent returns. But once markets became deeper, more fluid
and more com plex, and once interest rates settled at relatively low levels, it was suddenly
much more difficult to secure high returns. As the CEO o f  an asset management firm,
subsidiary o f  an insurance group, explains:
The fall in interest rates was a very important factor o f  change for the demand, 
be it institutional or private investors. They got more interested in the return g0 V \  
their assets, in liabilities constraints. This was also the case for private 
individuals: they became sensitive to the necessary development o f  their 
savings.
Figure 33: Evolution o f  French short term interest rates 0 9 8 0 -1 9 9 8 )
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Source: Banque de France
Once again actors in the field saw the problem: for instance, Alain Bokobza, from Societe  
Generale, set out a vision o f  risk and returns more similar to Anglo-Saxon practices (Option  
Finance, September 11, 1995: 16). The solution advocated by the people we interviewed was 
a need to be “professional”, to appear convincing from a technical as well as a personal point 
o f  view , in order to secure clients’ trust. Chief executives told us it was important to avoid the 
image o f  “romantic” fund managers who relied more on instinct than on rational 
methodologies. Hence the requirement to build on abstract knowledge, which is, according to 
Abbott (1988) the basis for any professional legitimacy.
A whole range o f  clients became more demanding at the beginning o f  the 1990s. At this time, 
French pension funds faced particular difficulties because o f  increased unemployment, which  
reduced their in-flows. A member o f  AGIRC (Association Generale des Institutions de 
Retraite des Cadres), which regroups pension funds for line managers, explained to us:
18 i
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202
From 1992-1993, the amount o f  collected funds decreased, because o f  
unemployment, and w e had to pay more attention to the risks o f  default against 
our pensioners (and therefore carefully monitor and manage our liabilities) and 
to the returns o f  the portfolio.
From this point on French pension funds became more careful with their asset managers, and 
started to pay more attention to the possibilities o f  controlling their investment activities. But 
again, this meant attacking personal trust as the foundation o f  customer relationships. Some 
firms, recognising the increasing demands o f  institutional investors, decided to develop the 
capabilities to respond to their requirements. This was explained by P., director in an asset 
management firm:
In the medium term, I am convinced that the demands from institutional investors 
will require methods and techniques that will pay out. Those who do not choose 
this way w ill suffer.
In this quote, w e see how the perceived problem with the conception o f  control and 
organisational routines is apprehended and problematised, and new arrangements are 
suggested, corresponding to the Anglo-Saxon logic o f  contract.
A s regards the conception o f  control and organisational routines, the French model was often 
under threat in the period 1984-1999. Its foundations, and especially the focus on fund 
managers and the pre-eminence o f  personal relationships, came under attack. As in the case o f  
the entrepreneurial synthesis , the actors in the field were not insensitive to such 
developments, and in a process o f  sense making (W eick, 1979, 1995) they recognised the 
threat and formulated or problematised (Miller, 1991) some solutions. Interestingly, the* 
resulting suggestions- amounted to a move away from the French model and towards the 
Anglo-Saxon patterns o f  organisation and behaviour: autonomy o f  the asset management 
business, professionalism, norms, rational methods and contract-based customer relationships. 
To a large extent, the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model was the generic solution advocated 
by the actors to the changes in the environment o f  the French asset management industry. 
However, it took a long time for this solution to come about: while changes could be 
perceived from the late 1980s, it was only after 1996 that adaptive upgrading could take 
place. Before that, institutional interdependency prevented any radical move.
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2.2. Institutional interdependency
We have seen that the foundations of the French model often came under stress in the period 
1984-1996. We have also shown that sense making (Weick, 1979, 1995) and problematisation 
(Miller, 1991) among market players indicate that the challenges to the French model were 
identified, and that a move towards the Anglo-Saxon model had been suggested. However, 
despite pressures driven by the external environment, the French model continued to prevail 
until 1996, when asset management was constituted as a new (autonomous) organisational 
field. This evidence supports the various theories which insist that system interdependency 
and institutional incentives and constraints limit the possibilities for change (Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1998; Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, 1994; Kristensen and Whitley, 1995, 
1997; North, 1990; Soskice, 1991; Whitley, 1999). After re-confirming the time lag in the 
transformation of the French asset management, we will identify some elements that held 
back the move towards the Anglo-Saxon model.
2.2.1. Some further evidence
Despite the various pressures for change, until the end of 1995 companies in the French asset 
management industry continued to operate in line with the dominant patterns of the French 
|y | model. The people we interviewed all emphasised that the year 1996 was a turning point; and 
some evidence confirms that before that date most French asset management companies were 
using the French model.
In terms of structures, very few banks or insurance companies had de-merged their asset 
management business to create autonomous subsidiaries. As Option Finance pointed out in its 
review of the asset management business in February 1996: “the retail banks have their asset 
management still entirely organised internally” (17). With the exception of a few players, 
those banks or insurers that had ventured abroad, the major retail banks, Societe Generale, 
BNP and Credit Lyonnais, and the totality of the medium-sized banks operated vertically 
integrated asset management departments. For instance, Bernard Simon-Barboux, vice- 
president at Indosuez bank, explained that his firm was an autonomous subsidiary but 
declared:
Question: Did other banks de-merge their asset management business too?
B S-B: It is the case o f Credit Agricole, through Segespar or Paribas, through 
PAM, but we are not numerous. (Banque et Strategic, January 1996: 3)
Moreover, a study by the American consultant Frank Russell at the end of 1995 showed that 
asset management was heavily concentrated and that institutional clients were largely captive.
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Both of these are typical features of the French model (L'Agefi, July 11, 1996). In terms of 
entrepreneurial synthesis, therefore, the French model was still alive and kicking at the end of
1995. In terms of conception o f  control and organisational routines, the same situation is 
revealed by tracing the dates at which investment processes were designed and implemented 
in major French players. Paribas introduced one at the end o f the 1980s and CCF in the early 
1990s, but AXA, despite having an autonomous subsidiary in 1994, only formalised its 
investment process in 1997, when it merged with UAP. Indosuez AM and Segespar, 
subsidiaries of Credit Agricole, set up their investment process in mid-1995. Societe Generale 
developed one just before creating its asset management subsidiary in December 1996. BNP 
worked on its investment process in 1995-1996, in collaboration with Frank Russell, and then 
implemented it in 1997, along with the de-merger of its asset management activities. CDC 
finalised its investment process in 1997 with the arrival of a new CEO, Daniel Roy from 
Paribas. In 1998, Credit Lyonnais had still not made its investment process explicit. The same 
trends could be observed in smaller players, which in general developed investment processes 
only after 1996.
In 1995, Fimagest, a small bank managing FF 47 billions, stated that its fund managers were 
still independent decision-makers regarding investments (L'Agefi, August 2, 1995), one 
typical feature of the French model. The case of Compagnie Financiere Edmond de 
Rothschild offers another illustration: in June 1996, Samuel Pinto, its chief investment officer, 
explained that asset management was organised as a department within the bank (L ’Agefi, 
June 6, 1996). In February 1997, he explained that it operated as an autonomous subsidiary, 
Rothschild Asset Management (Le Figaro Patrimoine, February 28, 1997). More examples 
could be found illustrating that until 1996 the French model was still dominant. The various 
pressures identified earlier, which should have pushed firms towards the Anglo-Saxon model, 
seem to have had no impact. Institutionalist theories provide some explanation of this 
situation.
2.2.2. Interdependency and resistance to change
A series of institutional factors explain why the French model remained in operation in the 
asset management industry until 1996. If we look at the three institutional dimensions 
suggested by Scott (1995: 34), we find indeed regulatory, cognitive and normative constraints 
sustaining the French model or impeding the introduction of Anglo-Saxon practices.
Until 1996, the institutional regulatory framework prevented the recognition of asset 
management as an autonomous business. Here we find an illustration of Douglass North’s 
argument that rule systems and enforcement mechanisms, as inscribed in institutional
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arrangements, affect actors’ calculations o f  benefits and costs (1990: 81). First, the legal 
framework did not recognise the asset management business as distinct from other services. 
There was no such thing as a single regulator: even though the COB (Stock Exchange 
Com m ission) supervised UCITS, banking authorities shared the supervisory role because they 
controlled credit institutions involved in portfolio management activities. Consequently, 
regulatory arrangements supported an entrepreneurial synthesis in which banks distributed 
mutual funds; in short, the French model. Asset management had neither a unified
professional body nor its own national collective agreement in labour law. Any attempt to 
develop autonomous resources dedicated to asset management would have been extremely 
costly: it would have implied developing new institutions and fighting against existing ones. It 
is not then surprising that market players did not feel strong incentives to change. Moreover, 
as w e demonstrated in our analysis o f  the French model, the lack o f  pension funds supported a 
situation in which large credit institutions were able to distribute asset management services 
to captive private clients and enjoy large market shares and high margins. It was in their 
interest to maintain such a favourable situation. As shown from this brief cost-benefit
analysis, there were good reasons for market actors not to change their ways. Regulatory
institutions in line with the French model o f  the m id-1980s reinforced its systemic
interdependency and prevented the Anglo-Saxon model gaining ground.
In terms o f  cognitive institutions, one should remember that in France in early 1990s 
universal banking was seen as the best way to organise financial services. At the time, as can 
be seen for instance from reports from the Commissariat General du Plan (1992: 158), the 
German banking model was considered the way forward. Credit Lyonnais was involved in a 
period o f  frenetic expansion, and together with all major French banks applied the concept o f  
the ‘banque-industrie’: banks would take direct participation in a variety o f  companies, in 
order to sustain strategic partnerships and secure high long-term returns. It was taken for 
granted that financial institutions in France should follow the universal banking model, even 
i f  was not necessarily the most efficient given the new competitive conditions (Meyer and 
Zucker, 1989: 47). It did not matter if  they continually made losses, as did GAN or CIC. What 
mattered was that they applied the legitimate best way to organise. In other words, within this 
institutionalised rationality about the best way to organise there was little support for any 
model o f  asset management based on a strict separation o f  activities, such as the Anglo-Saxon  
model.
Finally, there were also some normative institutional elements which prevented the 
introduction o f  the Anglo-Saxon model before 1996. French financial institutions were indeed 
faced with som e problems o f  consistency in the way they treated their asset management
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departments. We have seen that market dynamics were very different in this business from 
those in other financial services. In the institutional framework we have described, asset 
management was conceived as an integral part of banking or insurance. But in the integrated 
French model there was a clear problem: how can you recruit people for one department of 
the firm when all the others are making people redundant? How can you invest in new 
computers for the asset management department when you are limiting the budgets of other 
entities? As T., CEO of an asset management subsidiary of a bank explains:
It is not possible to have one department with high growth, with possibilities of
recruitment and investment and to say no to other departments.
Normative pressures prevented a differentiated treatment of asset management activities: it
________ _ _________ —y
Would not have been appropriate to destroy egalitarian rules within French banks or insurance 
companies, especially in firms that had a close relationship with the state. Normative 
expectations were that all employees should receive the same treatment, because they were in 
the same company. Here we find the argument, developed by March and Olson (1989) and 
Parsons (1937), that roles, attitudes and behaviours are driven by implicit institutional rules: 
in this case, norms did not permit asset management to be treated differently. This too 
prevented the introduction of Anglo-Saxon practices, which would have required substantial 
investment and recruitment.
In summary, we have shown that until 1996 a series of institutional conditions prevented the 
introduction of the Anglo-Saxon model. Regulatory, cognitive and normative elements were 
strong obstacles to the adoption of the new practices, despite the perception among actors, 
even in the late 1980s, that change was needed. In the last chapter, we showed that the French 
business system could accommodate a sub-system, an island functioning in radically different 
ways from the dominant patterns of the system. Far from contradicting institutionalist 
theories, the French case seems to verify the perspective that institutions have an impact on 
economic action. Until 1996, national institutions constrained firms’ patterns of organisation 
and behaviour in a way that prevented them from introducing any radical change. But in the 
French asset management industry after 1996 these obstacles could be removed by setting up 
a new organisational field. We will explain how in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VII: THE CONSTITUTION OF A 
NEW ORGANISATIONAL FIELD: 1995-1997, 
AGENCY AND STRUCTURATION
At this stage of the analysis, we have drawn two important conclusions about adaptation 
processes. First, from the late 1980s onward the French model was under threat, through the 
confrontation with the Anglo-Saxon model, and because of changes in the business 
environment that undermined its internal consistency. We have identified how actors in the 
field made sense of these challenges and how their solutions pointed in one direction: the 
adoption of the Anglo-Saxon patterns. Secondly, we have shown different sorts of dynamics: 
while a few companies adopted the Anglo-Saxon model early on, the bulk of the French asset 
management industry continued to operate the French model. This tension within the field 
corresponds to different adaptation processes. While most companies experienced learning 
processes and adopted new routines from new software, from financial training and from 
competitors, only a few companies, mostly those who had made international acquisitions, 
changed their entrepreneurial synthesis and their conception o f control. And they changed by 
adopting the Anglo-Saxon model. In the following pages, we will reconcile our previous 
conclusions, and explain how the setting up of asset management as a new organisational 
field made it possible to adopt practices considered deviant in the French business system. 
Before, systemic interdependency had prevented any radical move; afterwards, it was possible 
to establish new rules and new practices. What is all the more interesting, however, is the path 
that enabled the constitution of asset management as a new organisational field; and we will 
outline how collective action and debate, at both cognitive and political levels, made it 
possible.
We will show how one coalition, made up of the French asset management business elite, 
organised collective action, and how their institutional entrepreneurship (Selznick, 1959) 
found support in the French State and could be catalysed through particular legitim isation 
vehicles (a professional report and a new law). We will show that once asset management was 
constituted as a new and autonomous business, certain institutional agents and calculation 
tools were successful in establishing the field and sustaining it, and how this resulted in
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institutional and competitive isomorphisms (DiM aggio and Powell, 1983). We w ill insist that 
political pressures were critical in both the structuration o f  the field and the resulting 
isomorphisms. In conclusion, we will account for the differentiation observed in the French 
asset management industry, by recognising how the French sub-system adopting Anglo- 
Saxon patterns o f  organisation and behaviour is actually integrated within trans-national 
networks.
1. Setting the scene: conflicting viewpoints and coalitions
The first step in our understanding o f  the processes that enabled asset management to emerge 
as a new business is to understand clearly who brought about the transformation. Adopting a 
reflexive and interpretative approach (Giddens, 1976: 163), we will outline how particular 
coalitions supported particular opinions about the organisation o f  asset management, and in 
particular the view  that the Anglo-Saxon model was better. This w ill allow us to refer back to 
our theoretical framework, and to the articulation between political and cognitive dimensions 
in the process o f  adaptation.
Our investigation enables us to identify a number o f  coalitions, representing groups o f  
individuals, organisation or institutions, which employed similar discourses and had similar 
positions in the field. In the following pages, we analyse their perspectives and opinions in 
respect o f  one key question: should French companies change their practices and adopt the 
Anglo-Saxon model? This single question summarises in many w ays the nature o f  the debate 
that occurred in France around 1996. It follow s from our earlier conclusion that sense-making 
and problematisation led to the proposition that the French model had to be altered to take on 
board the Anglo-Saxon patterns o f  organisation and behaviour. For that reason, to analyse the 
politics o f  consensus formation (Power, 1992), we focused on this single question and 
positioned the various coalitions in regard to their opinions along two axes:
a ‘cognitive ax is’ where a positive position means “the Anglo-Saxon model is better than 
the French one”. This axis represents the opinions o f  the actors in the field about the 
intrinsic advantages o f  the Anglo-Saxon model, in terms o f  financial performance, costs, 
quality o f  service to customers and ethics;
a ‘political axisj. where a positive position means “the Anglo-Saxon model is better for
me”. This axis represents our interpretation o f  the potential gains or losses for the actors
dation to their situation in the French model, in terms o f  power and
icial reward.
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In the theoretical framework, we identified these two dimensions as supporting adaptation 
processes; now our objective is to see how the processes were related to particular arguments. 
The combination o f  the cognitive and political axes is interesting, in the sense that it allows us 
to relate the “ interests” o f  the actors and their opinions in the debate about the Anglo-Saxon  
model. A possible mapping o f  the debate in 1994-1995 would be as follows:
Figure 34: Positioning o f  the main coalitions in the debate
The Anglo-Saxon 
model is better
Customei
academic
dournali*
dent
players
Retail
banks
The A nglo-Saxon 
model is worse
The Anglo-Saxon model 
is better for me
After presenting the coalitions, w e will try to explain their positions in the diagram, which 
will then be the basis for the analysis o f  their confrontation.
1.1. V arious coalitions
As w e have explained, the French asset management business had been subject to various 
pressures since 1984, but until 1996 the majority o f  firms continued to operate using the 
patterns o f  the French model. To understand the underlying dynamics o f  the field, it is 
important to identify clearly the coalitions that tried to influence the debate, and that favoured
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or opposed the new patterns o f  organisation and behaviour imported from the Anglo-Saxon  
model.43
7
o
First o f  all, it is necessary to recognise that the debate was structured along multiple levels 
and between different categories o f  actors. The first level was the organisational one: 
coalitions o f  individuals within organisations. Here we can identify three coalitions, which are 
depicted with the same colour in the diagram: fund managers, the chiefs o f  asset management 
units, and the trade unions, which represented the em ployees. The second level was the inter­
firm one. Here we find the firms competing in the asset management business: retail banks, 
insurance companies, independent players, and foreign players. Within foreign players we 
include the various consulting firms that are a component o f  the Anglo-Saxon model: 
investment advisors, management consultants and rating agencies. Again, these players are 
pictured with the same colour. The third level was the institutional one, witiythe state, the 
COB, and public opinion as represented by customers, academics and journattsts^-Hefe we 
have implicitly fused professional associations with firms, because w e assume they would 
represent the view s o f  their members. In our representation, three categories o f  players, i.e. 
the three levels, are in constant interaction and confrontation. Here again we find that 
organisational adaptation is a dynamic process which operates at multiple levels, because o f  
its embeddedness in social and institutional spheres. v * „ ✓
—
37; tM. 0
l /U  ■
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Altogether, we have identified ten coalitions, which took part in the debate in the French asset 
management industry about adaptation through the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model.44 We 
can now present the key opinions and positions o f  these coalitions on our two axes.
43 Here we follow the example o f  Power (1992) in his analysis o f brand accounting, and Bourdieu 
(1992: 192-233) in his analysis o f the literary field in 1880s France.
44 Some others could possibly have been added, but we argue that we have here the most relevant
players, those that actually had some influence on the debate. Moreover, these coalitions display some
clear opinions towards the Anglo-Saxon model, as can be explained subsequently. ^
1.2. Those in favour of the Anglo-Saxon model
We found two prominent coalitions, foreign players and chiefs of asset management 
departments, who supported an upgrading of the French management industry in order to put 
it at the level of the Anglo-American model. We also found a third coalition, independent 
players, who had an opportunistic attitude. The motivations of these three coalitions were 
very different.
The foreign players consistently advocated the Anglo-Saxon model. American and British 
asset managers represented the world leaders and it seems natural that they should believe in 
their own superiority. They argued that their model was simply better than the practices of 
French players, because it involved clarity, good ethics, quasi-scientific procedures etc. They 
had therefore a strong cognitive argument in favour of their model. Moreover, we can assume 
that they had a strong political interest in seeing the model expand into France. We have 
described how difficult it was to penetrate the French market, precisely because of its vertical 
integration within bank or insurance retail networks. Introducing the Anglo-Saxon patterns of 
organisation and behaviour in France would break up vertically integrated structures and 
distribution arrangements, and open new possibilities for the Anglo-Saxons to sell their 
services. At the same time, arguing for their model was also a strong marketing argument 
against French competitors. Criticising the French model was not only a way to promote their 
own virtues, but also a way to attack the institutional barriers to their growth.
For independent players the situation was slightly different. First of all, some interviewees in 
this category believed that the Anglo-Saxon model was not necessarily superior. In particular, 
they insisted that investment processes do not bring better results. For instance, B. claimed 
that the old-fashioned methods brought in the end “performances that are just as good as the 
firms using [investment] processes”, while M  insisted that “big firms are anonymous 
monsters”, and L. recognised that clients appreciated direct contact with their fund managers. 
Many of these arguments are actually in favour of the French model. However, some players 
used the Anglo-Saxon label to make their status as independent companies more valuable. For 
instance, Carmignac Gestion presented itself as “independent, a 1*Anglo-Saxon!”. We can 
therefore interpret support for the Anglo-Saxon model as a matter of professional recognition, 
on our political axis. If independence became the norm, French independent players would 
gain in terms of visibility, recognition and professional power. They would no longer be the 
odd players in a business to which no-one paid attention, in a sector dominated by retail banks 
and insurers; they would become the core actors of a new business, asset management
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conducted on the Anglo-Saxon model. This is why we positioned this coalition in favour o f  
the model, but for opportunistic reasons.
The third coalition in favour o f  the Anglo-Saxon model was made up o f  the heads o f  asset
management departments in the large banking and insurance structures. This category
probably understood best the market and its evolution, because they were at its core, with
large market shares, resources and professional exposure. They could listen to the
problematisation o f  the changes in their environment and to the solutions that were advocated.
The consensus emerging among them was that a new business model was required to enable
them to compete successfully (Kleiner, 1999: 57). To a large extent, their arguments echoed
those we analysed earlier about the sense-making and problematisation o f  the changes in the
business environment. Given the increased sophistication and complexity o f  the financial
markets, as w ell as increased competition and an expected growth and refinement o f  demand,
they became convinced that asset management needed specific resources and some strategic
autonomy to enable it to develop distribution and marketing areas. In other words, it needed a
new entrepreneurial synthesis, in which asset management would be an autonomous business.
This manager in an asset management firm summarises:
This could not go on. There was competition from the Anglo-Saxon world, from 
brokers. In terms o f  Human Resources, there was a problem o f  pay. By creating 
independent subsidiaries, it is possible to give bonuses, to have salary flexibility, 
to get out o f  collective agreements.
Increased competition and new market conditions required a new conception o f  control, in 
which firms recapture the value-added from the fund managers, and target institutional 
investors through investment processes and dedicated marketing. All these elements pointed 
in one direction: towards the Anglo-Saxon model. And they were all the more convinced that 
they had to upgrade their practices because future European integration would bring about a 
market similar to the Anglo-Saxon ones, as this representative o f  AFG-Asffi declares: “The U/O *  
European financial market will become like the American one”. The coalition o f  asset 
management chiefs therefore supported the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model, from a 
cognitive point o f  view . But they also supported it from a political point o f  view. Y o u 2
There are obvious reasons to account for why the heads o f  asset management departments 
favoured the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model. In the French model, they were in charge o f  
one not very large department within a large financial institution, either bank or insurance. 
They were considered as support functions, and their business had no professional 
recognition. As one o f  them told us, “To say that asset management required Chinese Wall< 
used to make people laugh!”, or as another underlined: “the starting point was a total lack o f
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recognition for the asset management business”. Within financial groups, their status and their 
prestige was limited, despite the fact that their business was second in the world in terms o f  
assets managed in mutual funds, and despite growth ratios much higher than those in other 
financial services. By establishing the Anglo-Saxon model, they would become CEOs o f  
dynamic companies in a growing business; they would have their own resources and their 
own strategic plans, and they would be recognised as a genuine profession. It is 
understandable, therefore, that they would favour the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Moreover, in the French model the conception o f  control made fund managers a dominant 
coalition. By introducing investment processes, in the Anglo-Saxon fashion, the heads o f  
asset management departments would be able to exercise better control o f  the fund managers, 
by utilising the advantages o f  division o f  labour, as explained by Braverman (1974), 
Abercrombrie and Urry (1983) and Touraine (1955). In summary, there was a strong case in 
favour o f  the Anglo-Saxon model within the coalition o f  asset management chiefs. But even 
here some other voices could be heard. ) ( s o  uJLa ^ O  <~ ?
1.3. The coalitions opposing the adoption o f the A nglo-Saxon  
model
In the field, we found three clearly identified coalitions that opposed the adoption o f  the 
Anglo-Saxon model: fund managers, trade unions and retail banks. Again, both cognitive and 
political motives can be noticed.
When talking to French fund managers, one detects some scepticism about the Anglo-Saxon
model. In particular, fund managers criticise the introduction o f  investment processes as
marketing gimmicks, as a way for the new heads o f  departments, many o f  whom were not
genuine financial analysts, to take control over investment decision-making. This is what this
director o f  a leading French investment consultant, h im self former fund manager and SFAF-
financial analyst, expresses:
When one looks at performances and processes, one notices that the “m odem ” 
process is in fact a loss o f  efficiency. Paradoxically, the financial houses that have 
the best performances are those with the most archaic processes, those that did 
not modernise, those that manage in a traditional fashion.
The same idea could be heard from other fund managers, that the Anglo-Saxon model was no 
better than the French one, in terms o f  performance. And also in terms o f  customer 
relationships: some insisted that in times o f  market decline, clients would very much prefer to 
be able to talk directly to the fund manager, not to a sales person. In other words, from a 
cognitive point o f  view, fund managers did not recognise any superiority o f  the Anglo-Saxon
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model. And from a political point of view, we would also expect them to oppose it strongly. 
After all, having an investment process, in the American or British fashion, means putting an 
end to fund managers’ autonomy. It means taking away from them the supervision of the 
value-chain, the power of decision-making, the glory of beating markets and colleagues. It 
means taking away from them the glamour of gambling on the financial market and it means 
transforming their work into a dull occupation of following bureaucratic rules.45 Moreover, 
adopting the Anglo-Saxon model would jeopardise the financial rewards of fund managers, 
because they would risk being replaced more easily. For all these reasons it is not surprising 
that they would oppose the departure from the French model. But they were not the only 
* coalition*opposed to the move.
Trade unions representing asset management employees were also opposed to the Anglo- 
Saxon model. First, having an autonomous business would mean that people working in this 
area would lose the privileges and protections of the national collective agreements in 
insurance and banking. We have already underlined that these agreements were advantageous 
for the workforce. The Anglo-Saxon model would put an end to the life-long banking career 
for those working in asset management. But it would also mean advocating another type of 
career-track, one which involved external mobility and, as some said, even greed. One human 
resource consultant told us he did not want to work with asset management professionals any 
more, because pay and money had become the only relevant variables, unlike in the old 
French model where job satisfaction was also important. Someone told us that in 2000, Force 
Ouvriere, a leading trade union, had distributed a leaflet saying “Investment professionals, we 
don’t have the same corporate values!” to express the view that the new (Anglo-Saxon) model 
emphasised individualistic and money-oriented attitudes and was undermining corporate 
loyalty and solidarity. From a cognitive point of view, therefore, trade unions were opposed to 
the introduction of a new model of human resource management that would destroy the 
commitment of employees to their company. But it is also easy to understand why they would 
oppose it from a political point of view. Creating autonomous subsidiaries that would remain 
outside the national collective agreement was a direct threat to the role of trade unions. It 
would eliminate their right to supervise redundancies, to protect employees against unfair 
practices and to have a stake in many personnel management areas. It would also make it 
possible for banks or insurers to create not just asset management subsidiaries, but any other 
kind of subsidiaries, and thus to destroy the actual relevance of collective agreements. And of
45 Several interviewees confirmed that nowadays being a fund manager is not as exciting as it used to 
be.
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course trade unions were not ready to accept that, as we will show later. The final coalition 
opposing departure from the French model was that of retail banks.
The cognitive motive for banks to oppose the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon model has 
already been mentioned. It relates to their conviction that universal banking was a superior 
way to organise the business; universal banking meant that asset management was integrated 
within banking structures, and not autonomous. But we would also expect them to oppose it 
strongly from a political point of view. Asset management was a very profitable activity in the 
French model: clients were captive and thus had to pay rather high fees, and because of a lack 
of transparency they had no effective control of how much the bank actually charged. With a 
quasi-lack of distinction between their own portfolios and those of their clients, banks had on 
hand colossal amounts of money that they could almost play with (Story and Walter, 1997: 
286). France’s sui generis version of the German universal banking model meant that the 
grand corps heading retail banks had become an oligarchy, holding the levers of economic 
policy and of corporate governance in the boardrooms o f major corporations (Story and 
Walter, 1997: 218). In the end the separation of asset management in the Anglo-Saxon 
fashion would demean the universal banking model: it would imply introducing new 
corporate governance structures and in particular external scrutiny. The relationships between 
the retail bank and its asset management subsidiary would now be controlled, and unethical 
practices would be identified; customers would start comparing the performances of asset 
managers and would no longer obediently buy the mutual funds of their retail bank. 
Accepting the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model meant acknowledging flaws in their 
ways of doing business, and shooting themselves in the foot by breaking up the stronghold of 
their economic power. We can therefore understand why retail banks opposed the departure 
from the French model. A third group of coalitions can however be identified, which had less 
fixed opinions on the issue.
1.4. Those fairly neutral but ready to be convinced
In the debate about changing the French asset management model, there were other coalitions 
which before 1995-1996 did not seem to have strong views about the issue: the COB, 
insurance companies and two broad categories we call the State and public opinion.
The COB, France’s Stock Exchange Commission, shared the supervision of the asset 
management business with the banking authorities until 1996. But, while it did not control 
asset management firms exclusively, its role was critical in terms of licensing of UCITS.
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Since 1988 and the Brae de la Perriere report, there had been some ethical rules about the 
management of UCITS, and in particular independence. The COB was therefore receptive to 
the Anglo-Saxon model, because this model made it easier to control the relationships 
between the promoters and managers of UCITS. But apart from that, the COB did not have 
strong views about the Anglo-Saxon model. In particular, the scandals involving Maxwell, 
BCCI, Barings, and Morgan Grenfell, which occurred in Britain in the early 1990s, were not 
strong incentives to implement the model in France. Moreover, with its responsibilities in the 
stock market already large, it is doubtful that the COB was willing to take up new workload. 
As a result, it is difficult to identify any clear COB position on the departure from the French 
model. The same is true of insurance companies.
Insurance companies collect large amounts of money through their life insurance and casualty 
activities. This gives them a natural stake in the asset management business. Admittedly, the 
Anglo-Saxon model may have offered them some advantages: with autonomous subsidiaries, 
they would be able to hire people with a stronger financial background. They would also be 
able to increase their market share at the expense of retail banks. However, the structure of 
their balance sheet meant that until 1994-1995 they had a relatively neutral attitude: after all, 
most of their portfolios contained their own assets and not those of external clients. Insurance 
companies mostly invest on their own account and do not to any great extent manage assets 
for third parties. The present leadership of asset management companies such as AXA IM or 
AGF AM arises mainly from their management of the assets of their parent insurers,46 not 
from the management of many external mandates. It is therefore understandable that the 
insurance companies had no strong opinion about the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model; to 
a large extent they regarded themselves as operating in another organisational field.
Finally, we must consider two broad coalitions in the debate: the State and public opinion, as 
represented by customers, academics, and journalists. We admit that these groups were rather 
amorphous and not very active in the debate. But they represent its institutional level, and 
however vague they may be they can be interpreted and analysed through the comments of 
the people involved in the field. Before 1995-1996, it appearsthat-ftrese-ft^o coalitions had 
rather vague opinions about the asset management business/The French Stateju^ported the 
universal banking model. However, from 1993 there was some-evotetion in its position, as 
the Credit Lyonnais fiasco was gradually revealed. In November 1993, Jean-Yves Haberer, 
the bank's CEO, was sacked. In July 1994, the debates about the transposition into French law
46 Around 80% o f  the assets managed by AXA IM came directly or indirectly from AXA Group in 
1998.
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of the European investment services directive started, with the publication of a law proposal 
in the Senate. The financial commission of the Senate, under the presidency of Philippe 
Marini, a former financier, had drafted a text that went in the direction of the Anglo-Saxon 
model, making a clear distinction between investment and credit activities. But in its first 
reading the French government did not take this vision on board and continued to support the 
universal banking model (Marini, 1996: 18). It appears that until 1996 the French parliament 
did not have strong views about the Anglo-Saxon model and was neutral about the necessity 
to depart from the French model. The same was true of public opinion.
There were some articles emphasising the positive aspects of Anglo-Saxon practices (for 
instance: Option Finance, 388, January 1996) and others claiming that the reputation o f the 
Anglo-Saxons was largely overrated (for instance: La Vie Frangaise, December 13, 1997). 
More generally, the professional magazine Banque did not carry many articles about asset 
management, which may indicate that public opinion was fairly neutral about the whole 
debate. French pension funds too expressed mixed views about the Anglo-Saxon model, some 
recognising that it offered more transparency (see for instance the example of ARCCO, in 
Option Finance, June 29, 1998), others being unconvinced of its merits (see for instance the 
SBF-Sofres survey in L'Agefi, July 9, 1996). In general the insurance companies, the COB, 
the State and public opinions appeared relatively neutral about any departure from the French 
model. Collective agency, however, would change this situation.
2. Historical opportunities: collective agency, MAF law, La 
Martiniere report
We showed in chapter V that by 1999 the French asset management industry had become 
very similar to the Anglo-Saxon model. We also showed that the transformation took place 
only after 1996 and that until then a majority of firms continued to employ the French model. 
The thesis we develop is that this was possible through the setting up of a new organisational 
field, in which new practices imported from the Anglo-Saxon model and largely deviant to 
the rest of the French business system could be implemented. In this section, we explain how 
this happened and how asset management emerged as a new business in 1996. Interestingly, 
the path followed a very French trajectory, in which elites and the state played a critical role. 
After showing how some individuals in the French asset management business started to
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organise some collective agency47 in 1994-1995, we will show how they seized the historical 
opportunity of the transposition of a European directive and of the creation of a professional 
working group to impose their views on the debate.
2.1. The ‘Club des Gerants’ (‘Asset Managers Club’)
We have seen that the heads of asset management departments were among those supporting
the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model in French asset management. However, the very
concrete role played by some members of this coalition is not well known. More precisely, in
1994-1995 the elite of this group, consisting of the heads of those companies that had
international exposure and had adopted or were about to adopt the Anglo-Saxon model, got
together and initiated collective agency. A few quotes from those who initiated the process
are particularly enlightening, and show how they realised that they had to take on the whole
industry. The main message of this elite of the French asset management business was that
France was in danger, that something had to be done in order to resist the competition from
foreign competitors. Times had changed and the French asset management industry, despite
its large size and apparent power, was in danger of losing out to the international competition.
The two following quotes, from two influential members of the Asset Managers Club, are
particularly revealing of the process of collective agency, as well as of the message
transmitted to the other coalitions of the field:
We did some brainstorming with other people. We understood that the market 
had to evolve. The British sell the credibility of London; the Americans the 
credibility of the US. People have a certain image of credibility: Americans are 
regarded as good, safe, as having good products. There is the notion of stock 
market potential. We realised that we could not live with our SICAV. There was 
the challenge of Europe: we were already the first in Europe for mutual funds; to 
stay in the highest rank would be difficult. We needed to establish the credibility 
of France and of French professionals. (...) Times had changed. There had been a 
series of factors... at a certain point, things were mature; there was a willingness.
I created the Asset Managers Club, with 5 or 6 people, in 94-95, with XX, XX,
XX and XX. We felt the time had come and that it was necessary to organise as a 
profession. It was necessary to get out of monetary and small mutual funds. We 
had built an enormous back-office largely on monetary funds; we knew that all 
this middle and back-office should be used for something else. Hence the 
attempts towards de-merger, hence the La Martiniere report, which we are some 
to have motivated, invented in some ways. We have continued our efforts.
47 In this paragraph we use the term collective agency to define the various lobbying, influence, opinion 
and voicing ffom a group o f  individuals, who engage in a collective project and aim at the same 
objectives. We can contrast it with the concept o f  institutional entrepreneurship, as defined by Selznick 
(1954) and with that o f  collective action as defined by Olson (1965).
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What happened in France is the realisation that the reference market was where 
pension funds existed, in short the American and the British markets, where asset 
management was operated in a thoroughly different way. This was an 
autonomous revelation of French authorities, French associations and of certain 
big French players, that was catalysed by foreign competitors and consultants.
But it was an autonomous revelation. (..) Some of us, who wanted to change the 
situation, created a small Club, which was the starting point for the La Martiniere 
report, in order to exchange our views and to make Members of Parliament, 
public administration, journalists and a series of people sensitive to the issue. This 
was driven by a number of people. We tried to sustain a collective action from 
rule-makers, public authorities, some clients, the press, the academic world and a 
number of personalities, so that people would realise the obligation we had to 
change. Yes, we were the second mutual funds industry in the world, but we had, 
from a conceptual point of view, an outdated profession. We had large amounts 
o f assets under management on one hand, and on the other, a lack of conceptual 
instruments that we could present to international competition.
Three individuals we identified who took part in the creation of this Asset Managers Club had 
certain things in common. They all had been in contact with the Anglo-Saxon model; they 
belonged to networks of Grandes Ecoles (HEC, ENA, X), and they had been part o f the 
administrative elite, by working in the Treasury, or the Finance Inspectorate or with 
professional associations (Asffi, in particular). In other words, they represented a typical 
group of French business elites (Barsoux and Lawrence, 1997: 42-45). And they developed 
the same type of arguments as other French elites before them.
The way the problem was conceptualised was through the idea of ‘credibility’, which could 
be interpreted as a claim for legitimacy. Again, we can notice that the argument is reflexive: it 
integrates an understanding of self and of the others, as well as an understanding of the notion 
of competition among the laws (Woolcock, 1991). Globalisation, or rather Europeanisation in 
this case, was perceived by these people as puttingdirect pressure on the F rencfT^tenTby 
exposing it to foreign competition. And in this reflexive process, the French elite of the asset 
management business expressed a major doubt about their system. We should remember a 
previous quote from one of the member of the Club: “For the Americans, we were 
barbarians!” Danger was identified in the present configuration of their industry, which was 
apparently large and powerful, but which was not in fact prepared to resist international 
competition, in their opinion.
To cope with the new environment, the whole asset management business needed to be 
organised differently, to become like the Anglo-Saxon model, which was the international 
standard, the standard that was most legitimate and that would conquer Europe. Their 
collective agency was targeted at various institutional levels, and not surprisingly, at the 
coalitions identified earlier: the state, collective opinion, bankers and insurers. The Asset
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Managers Club developed the argument that the French asset management business was in 
danger. “If banks did not modernise, they would risk to see their clients taken by the 
Americans, who would do their speech about integrity, security, control, performance e tc . . .”, 
one member o f  the Club told us. They insisted that distribution networks would open up in the 
future, and that French players had to be ready to face international competition. Finally, there 
was the argument that the sooner the better: “It would be more costly to invest later, when all 
competitors are ready”. All these arguments reflect some already identified in the 
problematisation o f  change in the French model. What is interesting in such a phenomenon is 
that it recalls traditional French activism as a way o f  achieving institutional change.
In fact, the message delivered by the elites o f  the French asset management business is almost 
exactly the same as the American Challenge o f Servan-Schreiber. In 1967, Servan-Schreiber 
declared that in fifteen years time the third industrial power could be American industry in 
Europe (18), and that the superior competitiveness o f  American organisation, management 
and technology (61-62) required a radical reaction from France and Europe (168). “Find back, 
in front o f  the American challenge, the mastery o f  our destiny, requires becoming aware o f  it, 
then requires patient efforts” (171). And then he called for political and econom ic elites to 
stimulate debates and reactions, and organise the counteroffensive (227-246). We can see here 
the similarities with the position o f  the Asset Managers Club, who played this role o f  
stimulation and reaction. Moreover, the way forward, suggested by Servan-Schreiber, was 
very similar to the propositions o f  the Club: not to close French borders, but to embrace the 
American challenge by strengthening competitiveness (173). In other words, in 1967 and in 
1995, the rhetoric o f  French elites was the same: in the face o f  international competition, in 
the face o f  the expected invasion o f  Anglo-Saxon competitors, it is necessary to change and to 
adopt the international dominant standard o f  organisation. And again we notice a clear 
reflexivity in the debate itself, a capacity to look back to the French model and to distance 
oneself from it, in order to make it evolve. I t  fix?  VC ' 0 / ^
We have shown that behind the scenes some individuals had organised them selves to 
stimulate a change in the French asset management industry. However, on its own this 
collective agency from managerial elites was not sufficient. It needed a catalyst, a historical 
opportunity; in certain respects, in France at least, it needed a more fundamental endorsement 
by the State.
221
2.2. The M A F law and the La M artiniere report
The catalyst for the transformation in French asset management, the foundation that would 
allow the creation o f  a new business which could eventually be organised in a way different 
from the French business system, is to be found in the combination o f  two events. The 
transposition o f  the European Investment Services Directive (the MAF law), and the 
publication o f  the report o f  a working group from Paris-Europlace (the La Martiniere report) 
occurred in the same period and combined to create a momentum that was to change French 
asset management radically.
The first determining event was the transposition o f  the European Financial Services 
Directive. Debate had started in 1994, with a report from the financial com m ission o f  the 
Senate. At the end o f  1995, and amid collective action from the Asset Managers Club, debate 
started again. By this time, it had become clear that European Monetary Integration would 5 «-
take place. After the Madrid Council o f  December 1995, the doubts and uncertainties about 
the project had been lifted, with a strong commitment from Paris and Bonn to give birth to a 
single European currency on January 1, 1999 (The Economist, October 17, 1998). In this new  
context the European Investment Services Directive had become extremely important, 
because an inadequate transposition would mean a risk o f  the Paris Stock Exchange losing 
ground in a competitive market (Marini, 1996: 13). At the same time, Paris-Europlace, the 
association representing the Paris Stock Exchange and trying to help its development, set up a 
working group to examine the competitive situation o f  the asset management industry. Behind 
this initiative was an influential character in the French financial market: Gerard de La 
Martiniere.
Gerard de La Martiniere, ENA, Finance Inspectorate, had worked at the French Treasury until 
1986, when he became the first president o f  the MATIF, France’s futures market. He had 
been very successful, making Paris one o f  the leading exchanges in the world, especially  
because o f  the high degree o f  technicality and innovation in its products. But in 1996 he was 
also General Director and number three o f  AXA Group, at the time when A X A  had just 
acquired UAP and become the world’s leading insurer. Moreover, since A X A ’s acquisition o f  
Equitable o f  the US in 1991 he had had a very good knowledge o f  the Anglo-Saxon model. In 
1995, he was also a board member o f  Paris Europlace. In discussions o f  the com petitiveness 
o f  Paris, Jean-Franfois Theodore and the top management o f  Paris Stock exchange had a 
strategy o f  developing market transactions, through state-of-the art information systems, 
procedures and regulation: they believed they would win against Frankfurt or Amsterdam  
because transactions would be easier, quicker and more secure in Paris. In various meetings
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and informal discussions Gerard de La Martiniere had expressed the view, arising out of his 
experience at MATIF and in America, that one of the key elements in the competitiveness of 
the Paris Stock Exchange was not only the operations systems, but also the capacity to 
develop a whole chain of financial actors: both issuers to increase the pool of securities in the 
market, and investors to increase the liquidity of the market. With large firms, start-ups and 
with privatisations to come, France was not short of issuers. However, it did maybe lack asset 
managers, a result o f the lack of French pension funds and of a preference among small 
investors for bonds rather than equities. Consequently, Gerard de La Martiniere was asked by 
his friends and colleagues from Europlace to investigate the French capital management 
industry in depth, in order to assess its competitiveness. He set up a working group, which 
started meeting in March 1996 and ended in October 1996. On July 11, 1996, the group gave 
the first conclusions of its meetings, at Paris Europlace International Day {Paris Europlace, 
1996: 10). One week before, on July 2, 1996, the Modernisation of Financial Activities Law 
(the MAF law) had been voted. The La Martiniere Group therefore accompanied and 
followed the parliamentary debates about the transposition of the Investment Services 
Directive. It is particularly interesting to look at the members of the working group, and at 
some biographic information, which shows how the members were closely linked to some of 
the coalitions identified earlier.
Table 14: The members of the “French asset management industry” group
Nam e Functions Some biographic inform ation in 1996
Gerard de LA  
MARTINIERE, president 
o f  the group
General Director AXA ENA, Finance Inspectorate, Treasury, 
First president o f  MATIF, which he made 
into a world leading derivatives exchange 
before joining AXA in 1990; brother o f  
Dominique de La Martiniere, finance 
inspectorate in the Economics Ministry
Pierre BOEGLIN, 
group secretary
ASFFI general delegate
Amaud de BRESSON, 
group secretary
Paris EUROPLACE, 
general delegate
IEP-Paris, Financial analyst-SFAF, 
worked at CDC until 1985, then CEO o f  
Ficom
Catherine THERY, 
group secretary
Vice-president asset 
management department, 
Soci£t£ G£n6rale
Jean TRICOU, 
on behalf o f  AFECEI 
(Association Fran?aise des 
Etablissements de Credit et 
des Entreprises 
d'Investissement)
Delegate AFECEI
Jacques d ’AUVIGNY, 
on behalf o f  AFEI 
(Investment Firms 
Association)
AFEI General delegate
Paul Henri de LA PORTE 
Du THEIL, 
on behalf o f  ASFFI
Vice president, asset 
management department, 
Credit Agricole
Aeronautics engineer and M A from 
Stanford University, various jobs at 
Credit Agricole and Eurocard, before
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becoming head o f  the controlling division 
o f  CA in 1986. Head o f  asset 
management since 1991.
Marcel NICOLAI, 
on behalf o f  FFSA
CEO, UAP gestion 
financiere
Financial analyst-SFAF, head o f  
securities investment at UAP since 1981, 
established UAP Gestion in 1992-1993
Gerard BARBOT Director o f  asset 
management, Caisse des 
Depots et Consigrations.
Treasury, appointed Finance Inspectorate 
in 1980, CDC from 1984, in charge o f  
asset management since 1994
Monique BOURVEN CEO, State Street Banque IEP-Paris, academic job before joining 
Crddit Agricole, head o f  capital markets 
from 1985, from 1991 at State Street
Philippe COLLAS Director o f  asset 
management, Soci6t6 
Generate
IEP-Paris, Socidtd Gdnerale Inspectorate 
1976-1983, then assistant head o f  capital 
markets, in 1988 managing director o f  SG 
Merchant Bank London, 1992-1995 head 
o f human resource o f  Soci6td Gdn£rale
Philippe DELIENNE CEO, CPR Gestion Financial analyst-SFAF, vice-president o f  
Credit Agricole in Chicago, then head o f  
the Treasury department; since 1988 at 
CPR
Alain DROMER President, CCF Asset 
Management Group
X-ENSAE, Finance Ministry 1978-1981, 
Treasury 1981-1987, Edmond de 
Rothschild until 1991, when he joined 
CCF; son o f  Jean Dromer, French 
capitalist and former president o f  the 
French Banking Association
Gilles DUPONT CEO Cholet-Dupont IEP-Paris, ‘agent de change’ 
(stockbroker) since 1975, member o f  the 
Stock Exchange Council
Jean-Baptiste de 
FRANSSU
CEO Invesco France Master in European Business 
Administration, actuaiy, journalist, joined  
TGF (asset management) in 1987 and 
Invesco in 1990
Daniel FRUCHART Director, GAN In charge o f  asset management since 
1988
Alain GERBALDI Vice president, Fimagest X-Pont, worked with politicians in Paris 
and Marseille until 1988 when he joined  
Fimagest
Gilles GLICENSTEIN Associate Director in 
charge o f  asset 
management, BNP
IEP-Paris, ENA, Finance Inspectorate, in 
charge o f  strategic development at BNP  
in 1994 before taking over institutional 
Asset Management in 1996
Christian de GOURNAY Vice president, AGF
Jean-Pierre
HELLEBUYCK
President AXA Asset 
Management
Master in European Business 
Administration
Alain HINDIE Director o f  asset 
management, Credit 
Lyonnais
HEC, Financial analyst-SFAF, head o f  
asset management since 1990, ASFF1 
committee member
Guillaume JALENQUES 
de LABEAU
President, Privde de 
Gestion et de Conseil
Alain Leclair Vice-President, Paribas 
Asset Management
HEC, IEP-Paris, managing director o f  AG 
Becker in 1983, head o f  Paribas AM 
since 1987, ASFFI committee member
Source: La Martiniere report, various newspapers and author
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It should also be mentioned that Francis Delooz, head of the savings and asset management
department at the COB (Stock Exchange Commission), was an observer of the group, which
meant that he took part in all the meetings (MTF-L ’Agefi, 86, December 1996). The working
group met regularly on Fridays at 9:00. “It was very methodical”, commented someone who
took part, especially because it was the first time that asset management had been considered
on its own, the first time that the exact number of people working in this business and the
exact size of the market had been calculated precisely. And according to some members, La
Martiniere, whose name and reputation were in the balance, did a very good job of covering
the important issues.48 All aspects of the subject were reviewed and a number of people were
invited to present their views and opinions on how the French asset management should be
organised. Altogether, twenty-one people were invited and it is worthy of note that many of
them belonged to the Anglo-Saxon world: one vice-president of TIAA-CREF, one o f the
largest US pension funds, two US investment consultants, two rating agencies, one auditor
from the Big Five, one US asset manager and two French expatriates in the US. In fact, this
means that the debate in the working group, because of its members and because of the people
interviewed, was related to many of the coalitions we identified earlier. Strikingly, retail
banks were not well represented in the proceedings: only one bank manager was interviewed
and no banking association or professional was in the group. To characterise the discussion, it
appears from the comments we gathered that the La Martiniere group perceived itself to be on
a mission: to show that asset management was a genuinely separate business, that it had an
existence of its own, different from retail banking, as expressed by one of its members:
A strong interest was shown in the opportunity to take part in the birth of a new 
business. I found people who were highly motivated to give their contribution to 
this exercise. (..) We gathered with the young ambitious people of the sector, who 
wanted to show that they existed and that they could have their share of paradise.
This was coupled with the re-birth of Asffi, which gave itself the mission to 
gather all asset management professions. They seized a political opportunity.
Given its members, the La Martiniere group was therefore a catalyst able to offer a forum to 
some coalitions, in particular the Asset Managers Club and the Anglo-Saxon players. It 
allowed their voices to be heard and legitimised them, especially against retail banks. And 
importantly, it influenced and reinforced what was happening in the Parliament, in the debates 
re-defining investment services.
-----------------------------------------  fG L
48 Anecdotally, the name o f  La Martiniere was mentioned several times in 2000 to h e a d ^  prospective 
financial markets authority, which could gather all supervisory bodies into one, following the British 
example.
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Figure 35: The La Martiniere Group as a catalyst for shifting the debate
the State, 
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Customer^
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The Anglo-Saxon 
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The Anglo-Saxon 
model is better
La Martiniere
The Anglo-Saxon model 
is better fo r me
The MAF law was voted in July 1996 and the greater part o f  its second hearings occurred at 
the same time as the La Martiniere group was working. Portfolio management is one o f  the 
investment services identified in the Directive. In France, UCITS were covered through the 
1989 law, which gave supervision to the COB. But asset management covers not only UCITS, 
but also mandates. The European Directive was not specific about who should supervise these 
mandates. In the MAF law, something relatively unexpected happened, however, which was 
to change the face o f  the organisational field.
First o f  all, we can confidently assume that collective agency, as well as the proceedings o f  
the La Martiniere working group, had some impact on the parliamentary debates. We know  
that the Asset Managers Club had done some active lobbying, and that the members o f  the 
group had connections with the political world. Members o f  the La Martiniere group were 
invited to hearings in the preparation o f  the preliminary report o f  April 1996 (Marini, 1996), 
and their work was apparently well known, since one parliamentarian even referred to it 
(Senate, session o f  May 2, 1996). Then certain events, e.g. the Pallas Stem Bank scandal, 
seemed to emphasise the wisdom o f  a separation between retail banking and asset 
management for third parties. The Pallas Stern Bank entered a bankruptcy procedure on June 
22, 1995, and was liquidated in 1997, together with its parent company Comipar. Pallas Stern
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was a well-known player in the asset management business and its bankruptcy was the largest 
since World War II (Les Echos, October 5, 1995). The case revealed the dangers o f  vertical 
integration. Eskenazi, president o f  Pallas Stern, was also president o f  Comipar, the principal 
shareholder in Pallas Stem. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, together with other top executives and 
with the complicity o f  the external auditors, he provided false information about the financial 
situation o f  the bank. These facts were recognised in March 2001, when the protagonists were 
sentenced to pay large fines and in some cases even to jail {Les Echos, March 2, 2001). Pallas 
Stem showed clearly that vertical integration could lead to a mismanagement o f  investors’ 
portfolios and to a dangerous lack o f transparency. In other words, it was a further blow, after 
Credit Lyonnais, to the French model. But what actually led to the organic differentiation o f  
asset management, and hence to its constitution as a new organisational field, was something 
that could easily have seemed a mere technical point in the law.
In the last reading o f  the MAF law, in the Senate, senator Marini observed that the shape o f  
the law lacked consistency. Although portfolio management was recognised as one financial 
service in the directive, there was no single vehicle for providing it: on the one side there were 
UCITS, and on the other many companies were entitled to manage portfolios. Here again we 
find one o f  the core arguments o f  the La Martiniere group. Marini proposed the creation o f  a 
new type o f  company: the Portfolio Management Company, which would be authorised to 
manage not only UCITS but also investment mandates. With this single legal entity, the 
structures would be more coherent. Moreover, the MAF law decided that the COB should be 
the only supervisor for this new Portfolio Management Company. Again, this was consistent 
with the fact that the COB already supervised UCITS. By this legal innovation the MAF law 
went further than the directive. It may not have been foreseen at the time that it had implicitly 
created a new organisational field: asset management as a single business, independent o f  
banking. The State had endorsed the position that the structures o f  the Anglo-Saxon model 
were more appropriate.
2.3. Conclusion: a new organisational field
We are now reaching the concluding part o f the adaptation: when asset management emerged 
as a new business, it could take on new rules o f  organisation and behaviour. In 1996, two 
specific events colluded to promote asset management as a new business. The La Martiniere 
report provided a forum o f  discussion, and a legitimisation vehicle for some coalitions in the 
field pleading in favour o f  the Anglo-Saxon model. At the same time, the transposition o f  the 
Financial Services Directive recognised that asset management was a business on its own and 
provided a new legal vehicle to operate it. A more detailed examination o f  the MAF law, o f
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the La Martiniere report, and of some further developments at the professional level, will 
show that the Anglo-Saxon model provided a template for the new rules of organisation and 
behaviour that were established with the creation of the new field.
The decision to create the Portfolio Management Company (SGP) and to put it under the 
single supervision of the COB meant that asset management was now considered a separate 
business from banking or insurance. However, the law did not require de-merger. But de­
merger, together with “the creation of a strong and powerful professional association” (13), 
was one strong recommendation of the La Martiniere report. In other words, the Anglo-Saxon 
model of asset management as a strong independent business was promoted. Even more, the 
suggestion to “adopt an appropriate marketing strategy by rationalising the product range, 
reaching alliances with distributors, communicate” (11) is none other than the Anglo-Saxon 
entrepreneurial synthesis. It is surprising how similar the new principles of organisation 
principles advocated in the La Martiniere report are to the patterns of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
For instance, in its executive summary, the La Martiniere report recommended improving the 
division of labour within asset management to recognise each specific function in the value 
chain (7), which was a rejection of the French model in which the fund manager supervised 
everything. Combined with a wish to differentiate the conditions of employment for asset 
management, this represents a clear move towards the Anglo-Saxon conception o f  control.
Furthermore, the La Martiniere report suggested supporting the setting up and development of 
investment consultants, of performance rankings and of rating agencies (6), as well as the 
development of codes of good practice and the increased formalisation of distribution 
contracts (5). This too was undoubtedly a departure from the French model and an imitation 
of the organisational routines of the Anglo-Saxon model. In conclusion, by constituting asset 
management as a new organisational field and by providing new rules to operate it, it was 
possible to implement the Anglo-Saxon model, in a sub-system deviant to the French business 
system. But to do that, some institutional agents and some calculation tools were necessary, in 
order to implement the new rules of the game.
3. After 1997: institutionalisation and differentiation
We saw in the last paragraph how asset management emerged, at the end of 1996, as a new 
organisational field, as a new business distinct from other financial services. We also 
underlined that the MAF law and the La Martiniere report had provided some new rules for it 
that looked similar to those o f the Anglo-Saxon model. We will now show how the patterns of
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the Anglo-Saxon model could be enforced and institutionalised in the newly constituted 
organisational field, and how this led to some differentiation between those companies that 
retained the French model and those that moved to the Anglo-Saxon and trans-national model. 
In particular, this will be the occasion to underline the role of institutional agents and of 
calculation instruments in this last stage of adaptation. We will also refer back to our 
theoretical framework, to notice how isomorphic pressures resulted in companies adapting as 
a result of their adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model.
3.1. Enforcing the law: the coercive role of regulatory bodies
The MAF law was voted in July 1996 and the La Martiniere report published in September
1996. From 1996 onwards, the number of de-mergers accelerated. However, it would be 
misleading to believe that just because asset management had been recognised as a new 
business, market players would depart from their current practices and behaviours, in short 
from the French model. Before any isomorphism could be observed at the level of the whole 
industry, there was a need for some political pressure, something we consider relatively 
underestimated in the analysis of Powell and DiMaggio (1983). We will observe a series of 
oppositions and struggles, from the actors in the field that we had identified as opposed to the 
move to the Anglo-Saxon model. We will also recognise the capacity of some institutional 
agents to enforce the law and the new rules. Moreover, we will observe how the three layers 
of analysis in our framework are linked together: once the entrepreneurial synthesis was in 
place, a new conception of control and organisational routines could be implemented. These 
three layers then combined to constitute new patterns in line with the Anglo-Saxon model.
3.1.1. Oppositions, debate and struggle
We identified several coalitions that opposed the Anglo-Saxon model. When asset 
management was constituted as a new organisational field, they tried to resist the move. 
However, this attempt did not succeed, thanks to certain regulatory bodies.
First of all, fund managers tried to voice their opinion of the Anglo-Saxon model internally.
They tried to struggle against their chiefs, and to put forward arguments against the new
situation. However, they were not given much chance. A number of older fund managers
were made redundant, or had to change jobs at the time when investment processes were put
in place. J.-P., CEO of an asset management firm, explained the impact of the introduction of
an investment process:
We developed and expanded our fund management teams extensively. (..) There 
are not so many older fund managers. Some of those who were there before could
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not adapt and thus are not with us anymore. Others are integrated within teams 
and therefore not alone on their products. They more or less accept it. Those that 
cannot accept it, well, change jobs.
The fact that young people could be recruited and could successfully replace the older 
generation of fund managers made the latter's complaints unsuccessful. They could not claim 
any monopoly of the abstract knowledge of managing funds, in part because younger 
graduates had had a good training, and one that focused more on quantitative methods. To use 
Pfeffer’s argument, it meant that the old fund managers could not claim to be a key resource 
in the way they had been in the mid-1980s; hence they lost organisational power (Pfeffer, 
1982: 192; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 39). Consequently, they could not stop the creation of 
autonomous subsidiaries. Moreover, with the new flexibility provided by de-merger, the old 
fund managers could be made redundant more easily; and the new employment contracts 
established a new governance structure and increased the power of the employer (Williamson, 
1985: 248-252). Fund managers had to comply with the new work organisation. And they 
may have seen some financial opportunity in the new structure; they realised that an 
autonomous subsidiary might give them bonuses and higher pay. All these elements 
prevented fund managers from blocking either the de-merger process or the establishing of a 
new conception o f control. Two other coalitions tried to resist the move towards de-merger.
One was the trade unions. In 1996, Societe Generale faced some reactions from the trade 
unions when it expressed its intention of creating SGAM as an autonomous subsidiary 
devoted to asset management, and of not applying the banking collective agreement within 
this new subsidiary. More precisely, as one human resource manager explained to us: “the top 
management was confronted with a fierce opposition from trade unions, who did not want to 
lose the benefits of the banking collective agreement”. And the opposition was fierce indeed, 
leading in 1996 to a series of high profile law suits against Societe Generale, in the attempt to 
prevent the creation of an autonomous subsidiary Societe Generale Asset Management 
(SGAM). In this battle, all of the trade unions representing the banking sector combined: \ 0  
(Force Ouvriere), CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail), CFTC (Confederation Fran9aise 
des Travailleurs Chretiens), CFDT (Confederation Fran9aise des Travailleurs) and SNT 
(Syndicat National du Tresor). They attacked the decision of Societe Generale not to allow 
the so-called ‘core-workers’ of the asset management business, 110 employees in all, to 
remain within the national collective agreement. Societe Generale used article L. 112-12 to 
transfer employees and their contracts to the new entity SGAM, as happens in the case of the 
sell-off or acquisition of a new company. The trade unions claimed that this was an abusive 
use of the law, and that it introduced a discriminatory measure and meant the loss of an
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advantageous status. The issues at stake were broader than just SGAM, said the trade unions.
As explained in an article covering the trial:
It was regarded as a test about the departure from universal banking for the 
adoption of a structure -more Anglo-Saxon-, where the activities different from 
the actual job of banker, are de-merged. “Today, this experiment is a test, and in 
the short run, markets and stock-broking activities on foreign exchanges will be 
directly concerned” said a union representative. (L ’Agefi, January 14, 1997)
It is all the more interesting that Societe Generale explicitly referred to the MAF law and the 
La Martiniere report when arguing in favour of de-merger, saying that it was a necessary 
move to cope with increased competition and with the demands of foreign clients. We will see 
in the next paragraph that the unions were defeated in their attempts. Further opposition came 
however from other retail banks, which unlike such leaders as SGAM had not been convinced 
that de-merger was an appropriate solution.
Retail banks tried first to damage the collective agency lead by the Asset Managers Club and
by the La Martiniere group. Even though they were not represented in the group, retail banks
tried to influence the conclusions of the report and to oppose the de-merger of asset
management activities. One of the group members recognises the difficulties:
This [La Martiniere] report eased organic differentiation, which means that most 
of the financial houses had to de-merge later. Even those who were reluctant had 
to do it, because of the dynamics created. (..) This being said, we had some 
difficulty drawing a synthesis. In particular, regarding some corporatist aspects...
Interviewer: like what?
To free asset management from banking.
There was some background resistance to the La Martiniere report from the banking 
profession, which resented a de-merger process that took away from it a profitable and fast- 
growing business. The constitution of asset management as an autonomous organisational 
field was an implicitjhreat to the professional power of the banking sector. One interviewee 
even told us tha1v998 there had been some manoeuvring by the French Banking Association 
in the attempt to ensure that Alain Leclair, the champion of an autonomous asset management 
business, would not be re-elected as president of AFG-Asffi. They tried to push for a 
president who was more in agreement with the priorities of retail banking (unsuccessfully, 
however). The banking coalition's resistance to the constitution of asset management as a new 
organisational field continued for some time. This was confirmed by the COB, when it 
noticed that some retail banks had suggested that the MAF law be applied in a lenient way. 
The arguments that were used to persuade the COB not to be too difficult with retail banks 
ran as follows: “You know me, you have known me for a long time, why not adopt a relaxed
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position towards the law? It will be all right!” Retail banks tried therefore to resist the 
implementation of the new rules of the game at all levels: institutional, professional and 
regulatory.
In summary, we can say that there was some opposition from some coalitions to the creation 
of asset management as an autonomous organisational field. However, they soon had to 
realise that their efforts were bound to fail and that they would have to comply with a new 
model.
3.1.2. Coercion: enforcing the law
In many ways, the turning point in terms of organisational adaptation was the creation of 
autonomous subsidiaries. They were the response in terms of governance structure to the new 
entrepreneurial synthesis, and they removed obstacles to the implementation of the new 
conception o f control and new organisational routines. We now show how the opposition to 
autonomous subsidiaries was soon defeated. A first blow to this resistance came from the 
tribunals, who did not oppose Societe Generale’s de-merger. Then, the COB played a critical 
role, in the sense that it strongly advocated the creation of autonomous subsidiaries. In short, 
it not only legitimised the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon model, but also enforced the new 
MAF law in a way that would privilege the adoption of this model.
First of all, the opposition from the unions proved unsuccessful in the tribunals. In January 
1997, the Paris tribunal (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris) ruled that de-merger was legal 
and could not be opposed. The verdict was appealed by the unions, but they lost again. 
Consequently, SGAM was recognised as an autonomous establishment, and was thus allowed 
to have its own labour contracts. In other words, the tribunal had given a legal backing to the 
constitution of asset management as a new organisational field; it had made it possible for 
banks to create autonomous subsidiaries and to implement new human resource management 
rules, something that had previously been impossible because of the national collective 
agreement. It had made it possible for these subsidiaries to abandon the national collective 
agreement, and thus to implement practices inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model and different 
from those of other French companies. The tribunals therefore silenced one voice opposed to 
the development of a new sub-system with patterns deviant to the French model. Further 
strong backing came from the COB in its new supervising role for the totality of asset 
management activities.
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We should recall that the COB had attended the meetings of the La Martiniere working group. 
Although the COB was at first opposed to de-merger because this would increase its 
workload, it appears from our interviews that the COB became increasingly in favour of de­
merger, and in agreement with the conclusions of the La Martiniere report. As one delegate 
told us:
We wanted it. De-merger has some merits,, in terms of clarity, there cannot be any
interference, and there is more ethics. With de-merger, you can organise a
Chinese Wall that is more efficient.
In other words, while the COB was fairly neutral in 1994, by 1996 it, like the State, had been 
convinced of the benefits of the Anglo-Saxon model. And it acted upon companies so that 
they made a move, in terms of changing their entrepreneurial synthesis and departing from 
the French model. In practical terms, the move operated through the creation and licensing of 
a Societe de Gestion de Portefeuille (SGP, Portfolio Management Company), the new legal 
entity created by the MAF law. Over the period 1996-1998 the COB processed in total some 
280 files, since it was in charge of approving the applications and issuing the license to 
manage portfolios. The licensing procedure stipulated that the COB had to look in detail at the 
means and the resources at the disposal of the SGP, and at the ethical standards of the owners 
and chief executives. It would accept the application only if certain standards in these respects 
were met, and after hearing the opinion of a Consultation Committee made up of asset 
management professionals. Through these legal powers, the COB was able to influence 
substantially the structures of the new SGP. It is interesting to look more precisely at the ways 
it used to achieve this.
First of all, the COB had to face opposition from retail banks and from insurance companies, 
both of which resented the move towards de-merger as increasing costs, and as attacking their 
previous integrated model of organisation. “The resistance came mainly from medium and 
small banks,” one delegate told us: “the large banks did it very swiftly: they could tell their 
bosses that the COB was demanding de-merger”. But those working in the large banks were 
precisely the coalition of the heads of fund management department. Here we see how they 
used internally, to convince their own bosses, the external legitimacy of the COB, o f the 
State. This confirms the view that organisational power needs to be legitimised externally, as 
foreseen in our theoretical framework. For the rest of the industry, the move had to be 
vigorously negotiated: according to one COB delegate, it was sometimes necessary to address 
even the company board, in order to ensure that some banks or insurers agreed to de-merge 
their asset management activities. “It was a considerable work,” he told us. Each application 
was treated individually, in order to convince people of the advantages of the move and to
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make sure that they would comply with the requirements of independence and sufficient 
resources.
One argument was to say that de-merger would help seduce international investors, that it was 
looked on favourably by the clients. There was also the argument that everybody was doing it, 
and that the La Martiniere group, with all its prestige, had strongly advocated it. In other 
words, the COB did a great deal of work in order to persuade firms to change their 
entrepreneurial synthesis, and also in making sure that they were doing it properly. In 
constituting ahiew organisational field it was thus advocating the Anglo-Saxon model and 
enforcin^Another interesting negotiating trick resulted from an institutional coincidence. 
Half of the members of the Consultation Committee, the committee that advised on the 
licensing of SGP, were former members of the La Martiniere working group. The net could 
thus close around the banks and insurance companies, which had to abide by the rules 
promulgated by the COB, rules which had been drawn up by those coalitions in favour of the 
Anglo-Saxon model.
La Martiniere
COB
negotiations consultation
com m itteeretail banks, 
insurance
new
entrepreneurial
synthesis
3.13 Conclusion
With this specific role of the COB, the entrepreneurial synthesis was changed: in 1997, new 
subsidiaries were created and there were guarantees in place that this autonomy was not a
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simple formal makeover.49 Asset management was recognised as a new business and this
recognition could not be removed, because it had taken place in the very structures of
companies. What is particularly interesting in the process we described is that it had to be
fought vigorously. The establishment of the new isomorphic structure, based on a de-merger
of asset management activities, was not a natural and docile process; it was inherently
political and battled through. As such it supports the view that institutional accounts of
organisational change and adaptation should not underestimate power and conflict (Fligstein,
1991: 312; Scott, 1995: 113; Whitley, 1999: 14). We have shown how eminently political and
confrontational the establishing of asset management as a new autonomous field was in
France in 1996-1997. The State had legitimised the idea that the Anglo-Saxon model was
desirable for French asset management companies. This opened new possibilities for firms to
change their organisation, their human resource management and organisational routines,
which eventually resulted in isomorphic patterns of organisation and behaviour. Here we find
a compelling illustration of the mechanism of constitution and structuration of a new
organisational field (Giddens, 1979,1983). As pointed out by DiMaggio (1991):
The neglect by researchers of structuration processes provides a one-sided vision 
of institutional change that emphasizes taken-for-granted, nondirected, 
nonconflictual evolution at the expense of intentional (if boundedly rational), 
directive, and conflict-laden processes that define fields and set them upon 
trajectories that eventually appear as “natural” developments to participants and 
observers alike. (268)
The development of the isomorphism we observed in January 1999 required the previous 
structuration of the new organisational field. Moreover, the legitimisation of the new practices 
was also complemented by the role of other institutional agents and of calculation tools, 
which made it possible to structure and to institutionalise the new model as a sub-system 
integrated in trans-national networks, and deviant to the French business system.
3.2. Sustaining the new field: institutional actors and calculation 
tools
We have seen that it was possible to constitute asset management as a new field autonomous 
from other financial services, in particular because of the work of professionals around the La 
Martiniere group, and because of the State, working especially through the COB, and because 
of the tribunals, who stopped the opposition from trade unions. However, for the Anglo-
49 A good test for the reality o f  this autonomy was provided by the BNP-Societ6  Generale-Paribas saga: 
the COB investigated how the asset management subsidiaries o f  these three banks had behaved in 
relation to the take-over bid. N o improper behaviour was identified {Les Echos, August 11,1999).
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Saxon model to be adopted by the majority of companies in the newly established field, a 
series of institutional and competitive elements had to push adaptation processes further in the 
same direction, by structuring the field. In particular, institutional agents and calculation tools 
provided isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which in turn stimulated the 
adoption of the Anglo-Saxon patterns of organisation and behaviour.
3.2.1. Diffusing the new model: management consultants and adaptation 
processes
Given the developments previously described, it is clear that the La Martiniere report and the 
State played a key role in defining asset management as a new business and in providing 
some new rules for this business, in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. The COB pushed 
towards the creation of autonomous subsidiaries, thus legitimising further the move towards 
constituting a new business. AFG-Asffi, the unified professional association created in 
January 1997, contributed by defining professional rules and codes of conducts: 
in April 1996 a new code for mutual funds was established 
in April 1997, a new code for asset management under mandates 
in June 1998, propositions about corporate governance issues 
in September 1998, a code of ethics relating to performance measurement and rating 
Taken together these elements were strong factors establishing an institutionalised rationality, 
or rational institutional myth (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) that the French model was outdated, 
and needed upgrading. They also provided some new rules and standards, in line with the 
Anglo-Saxon model: as already underlined, the La Martiniere report, the MAF law and the 
AFG-Asffi codes of conduct were all very much inspired by Anglo-Saxon patterns. French 
firms had already changed their entrepreneurial synthesis when establishing autonomous 
subsidiaries. However, for them to adapt further, to depart from the French model and to 
adopt the Anglo-Saxon one, another step was required. And here we see the role of some 
institutional agents, more precisely, of management consultants, who together with other 
professionalisation processes, made it possible for the new rules to be diffused across the new 
organisational field.
Management consultants are companies that advise firms how to improve the organisation of 
their activities. In the asset management business too, there are some established management 
consultants. In France, companies like Frank Russell, Watson Wyatt, Mercer, Deloitte & 
Touche, and McKinsey all offer this kind of service. As one American investment consultant 
explained to us: they offer to audit investment companies and to tell them how good they are
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in comparison to the best practices in the industry. From their role in advising investors,
investment consultants have indeed the opportunity to scrutinise veiy precisely individual
companies. This makes them very knowledgeable about the actual organisation and practices
of these companies, and especially those of market leaders. It is interesting that most of these
consultants are actually of American or British origin. In other words, when they say best
practices in the industiy they mean Anglo-Saxon practices, which are the practices of the
world leaders. Over the period 1995-1997 a large number of French firms hired such advisers,
as this director of an asset management firm explains:
With the ambition to be as good as the Americans, to have processes, to build up 
structures, there were companies like Frank Russell, who went to almost all 
companies on the financial market and said they should have dedicated means, 
organise processes. (...) The role of the consultants was determining. Frank 
Russell had a quasi monopoly; they advised at least half of the players and 
almost all the banks. They told them: you need to have well identified 
benchmarks, dedicated specialists, analysts, fund managers, instruments for risk 
management, a targeted approach etc... (..) Frank Russell sold what some 
Americans were doing. I even find that French companies did not go and see 
what the Americans do. This was all viewed through the consulting prism.
In other words, Frank Russell and other management consultants played the role of spreading
across the newly created field the institutionalised rationality borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon
model. As institutional agents, they contributed to the structuring and rationalising of the field
by determining which practices were “good” or even "the best”, thereby enhancing the
production of what Whitley (1992) calls business recipes. It should be noticed that the
recommendations of these institutional agents were instrumental in re-defining the conception
o f control in quite a few firms, as illustrated by the following two examples:
We did a lot of work with a consultant. We said to ourselves that we were in an 
asset management business, in an Euro world. Thanks to the merger we could 
start a new organisation from scratch. (..) We had 3 objectives:
1. To be able to respond to the needs of big French and foreign institutional 
clients.
2. To be level with international standards. This was part of our objectives 
to follow Anglo-Saxon norms, because they are the norms of the profession.
3. To be straight away in a European panorama. (Director of an asset 
management company, subsidiary of a leading retail bank)
There was an audit of the asset management organisation by Frank Russell to 
evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. This has led to an evolution in the 
organisation. Frank Russell told us to develop a buy-side analysis. They 
recommended us to create an equity table, so that fund managers do not have to 
spend too much time at looking for the best brokerage costs. A department was 
created. They told us to define a process, which means an investment 
methodology that is not based on intuition, but where the process is formalised to 
ensure its actual implementation within a team, its persistence and possible 
presentation to institutional investors. We created a service to reply to invitations 
to tenders. (Director of an asset management firm, subsidiary of a leading retail 
bank)
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As we can see, the role of these management consultants was therefore very important in 
stimulating and better formulating the new patterns of the French asset management business. 
They supported various adaptation processes, and in particular the change of conception o f  
control, by explaining the best way to organise. And what they transmitted, assuming people 
listened to their recommendations, was none other than the practices of the Anglo-Saxon 
model. Because asset management was newly created and therefore uninfluenced by any pre­
existing institutionalised rationality, the new precepts could take over. Furthermore, the 
diffusion of the new patterns was extended through subsequent or simultaneous adaptation 
processes.
Some French asset management companies have indeed learned from their competitors, by
hiring some of their workers and/or copying those companies they perceived as leaders. For
instance, some companies might attempt to steal effective and successful people from their
competitors, in order to learn the best practices from these new recruits. Some examples
illustrate these learning processes. For instance, in 1988 Paribas was the first company to
create a subsidiary dedicated to asset management, and it was therefore considered by many
observers as more advanced, in terms of its alignment with Anglo-Saxon practices. And some
of its employees were indeed hired by competitors, which hoped that they could learn from
the new recruits. This was the case of Jerome de Dax, who in 1995 moved from Paribas Asset
Management (PAM) to SGAM, in order to create a new marketing division dedicated to
institutional investors. And he then brought in Jean-Fran5ois Hirschel from PAM, to take up
the reporting function (which is important in institutional marketing and sales). Another
employee of PAM, Patrick Roy, was hired by CDC AME to become the board director.
Another professional, Charles-Etienne de Cidrac, who was working with Jerome de Dax at
SGAM, then left for AXA Investment Managers, where he became the manager of relations
with consultants, another key aspect of institutional marketing and sales. There were a
number of such moves, and they show how firms learned from each other through the
exchange of human resources. Obviously, companies recruited externally too, as well as from
consultants. They thus were able to learn from new recruits coming directly from school or
from other countries, as these directors of portfolio management companies explain:
We took people from our competitors, and we trained others. (..) We recruited 
analysts, including Anglo-Saxons, and for that reason a part of our analysis is in 
London.(...) Deliberately, we chose someone who was not French to be in 
charge of the research team. We have international teams. There are many 
French, but the last ones we recruited were English. The chief analyst is 
Canadian, he speaks French and English perfectly and has worked in a non- 
French company before.
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In consequence the new institutionalised rationality and the new organisational routines 
expanded. Again, we see that leading firms played the role of institutional agents; this 
coincides with the view of Meyer and Rowan (1977), who recognised in leading firms an 
important vector for the rationalisation of fields. The asset management professional 
association, AFG-Asffi, had an important role in stimulating the adoption of new rules and 
codes of conduct. In 1996, 1997 and 1998, it issued a series of codes of conduct and codes of 
ethics which stimulated French firms into changing their behaviour and adopting new 
standards. Interestingly, the AFG-Asffi rules duplicated to a large extent the prescriptions of 
British and American professional associations. This was confirmed by our interviewees, and 
can be observed, for instance, in the prescriptions relating to performance measurement: there 
are many similarities with the code of conduct of AIMR (American Investment Management 
Research association).
As the use of rationalised institutionalised rules became more widespread in the asset 
management business, the adaptation process of change in the conception o f control expanded 
by acknowledging the new rationality as the best way to organise. A rapid review of the 
financial press shows that after 1996 many companies introduced investment processes or 
declared their intention to do so, which indicates how the new conception o f control was 
being institutionalised. For instance, in the field of insurance* in 1997 AGF de-merged its 
activities and introduced an investment process {Les Echos, November 14, 1997), and in 1998 
Groupama created Groupama Asset management and Azur GMF Boissy Gestion to run their 
asset management activities (L'Argus, June 26, 1998). The same could be said of retail 
banking: in August 1998, Credit Lyonnais created its CLAM subsidiary dedicated to asset 
management {La Vie Franqaise, August 7,1998); this was the last in a series of de-mergers, 
by Societe Generale in 1996, BNP in 1997, Banque Populaires in 1998, CIC in 1997, Credit 
Mutuel in 1997 and so on. And each time the de-merger process provided the occasion to re­
organise the company structures and practices, so that most companies adopted an investment 
process and new organisational routines around this period. In other words, there took place 
progressively, from 1996 onwards, the establishment of some kind of isomorphism in the 
totality of the population of firms in the French asset management industry.
In summary, we can say that several institutional agents contributed to the structuring and 
rationalising of the newly constituted asset management organisational field. And certain 
calculation tools, combined with other agents, contributed to the strengthening and 
implementing of these rules, which resulted in isomorphic developments.
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3.2.2. Calculation tools, rating agency, investment advisors
At the same time as institutional agents elaborated the new institutionalised rationality about 
how best to organise and diffused it to the organisational field, others factors contributed to 
inhabit and sustain the new entrepreneurial synthesis and new conception o f  control by 
providing new organisational routines. Tools and techniques prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon 
model could be transported and imposed in the newly constituted field, thanks to the role of 
such agents as investment advisors and rating agencies. The new calculation tools, like 
performance and risk measurement, implied new organisational routines that enabled the new 
field to structure itself further and to develop systemic ties. In other words they contributed to 
rationalise and institutionalise the business recipes developed at the level of the field, and to 
bind together the new entrepreneurial synthesis, the new conception o f control and the new 
organisational routines. From the evidence provided in the case study, and echoing Berger 
and Luckmann (1967), Giddens (1983), Meyer (1994), Miller and O’Leary (1991, 1993,
1994) and Powell (1991), we can therefore develop an understanding of how fields are 
constituted, established and institutionalised, and how this contributes to isomorphic 
processes.
The departure from the French model and the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon one was not an 
overnight process. It was not because asset management was recognised as a new business 
distinct from banking that French firms suddenly changed their patterns of organisation and 
behaviour. We have already shown that over the 1984-1996 period they had learned some 
new organisational routines, through a broad confrontation with Anglo-Saxon practices. The 
radical change of 1996-1997 resulted in firms creating Portfolio Management Companies. 
This meant recognising that they were no longer merely the back-office of a distribution 
network, but had now to attract new clients. The new entrepreneurial synthesis followed 
therefore the one of the Anglo-Saxon model. Moreover, through the role of the COB, the 
prescriptions of the La Martiniere report, and the input from management consultants, a new 
conception o f control was able to gain ground. Deontology, and not only performance but also 
risk, regularity and investment processes were some of the business recipes that became 
institutionalised in this period. But before any kind of isomorphism (Powell and Di Maggio, 
1983) could be observed, the institutionalised rationality had to be diffused in the concrete 
practices of French firms. The structuration process requires that the actors of the field 
produce and reproduce in interaction the structural properties of the social system (Giddens, 
1983: 25). It requires that they develop recursive practices, which both constrain and further 
enable their actions. In our case study, this means that they needed to depart from the patterns 
of the French model and adopt recursively the new patterns of the Anglo-Saxon one. If not, 
the French model might have been temporarily shattered, but it would not have been replaced
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by the new situation we identified in the previous chapter. We can show that the routinisation 
of the new patterns came from specific calculation tools that allowed external pressure and 
scrutiny.
The following quote is particularly revealing of the reflexive dilemma within the structuration
process: while agents were knowledgeable of the institutionalised rationality, they did not
immediately depart from the old routines of the French model. If this eventually happened, it
was because o f supplementary constraints:
At least at the beginning, investment processes, which were compulsory for 
invitation to tenders and for the presentation of a series of norms, were prepared 
by the marketing people. There was no intellectual value-added but rather an 
organisational one, together with some formalisation through objective 
elements. There was an underlying argumentation, a certain speech that sales 
people have to give, like for instance for invitation to tenders. The sales or 
marketing person knows that he or she has to say this or that to be selected: they 
would say ‘top-down’ ... ‘bottom-up’ while knowing that fund managers would 
fight for their views and do whatever they like in the end. But there again, the 
pressure from clients and frpm consultants resulted in jargon and political cant 
becoming a requirement, sM duty and a structuring element. (..) And this is why 
consultants were needed; they made sure that words would fit reality, that we 
would do what we said we do. (J.-M. former controller in an asset management 
firm)
Here we briefly can show how structuration (Giddens, 1983) and co-evolution (Coriat and
Dosi, 1998) took place. Within the new entrepreneurial synthesis after de-merger, asset
management companies had to target more precisely clients’ needs and were not prevented
from doing so by the integrated structures of the French model. But institutional clients in
particular had become keen on receiving explanations and on measuring risk. As Alain
Leclair declared in 1995: “While the objective for an institutional client used to be mostly the
performance [of the fund], our priority is today to find out which risk he is ready to take for a
given performance and a given time frame” (Option Finance, 371, September 1995). The
introduction of new calculation tools provided the support for the satisfaction of these new
demands, which were typical of the Anglo-Saxon business system. This is where investment
advisors and rating agencies played a key role. They arrived in France in the 1990s, with
experience of Anglo-Saxon markets and with a series o f  instruments dedicated to measuring,
auditing and controlling the behaviour of asset management firms. Because clients were now
recognised formally, client relationships could become more formalised, and in this process
the investment advisors were able to diffuse the Anglo-Saxon routines. Gael de Pontbriand,
partner at Coopers&Lybrand Corporate Finance explained in April 1998:
The demand for increased professionalism first came from institutional investors 
and is now generalising to private investors. The methods to select an asset
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manager are very rigorous in the United States and in Great Britain and start to 
impose themselves in continental Europe. (Banque, 91, p.20)
In France, with the development of asset management as a new organisational field, a new 
market was made visible; it was constructed socially as a reality (Berger and Luckmann, 
1967). Various elements came together to institutionalise the new patterns of organisation and 
behaviour. Clients started to express their demands more clearly and more specifically, not 
least because asset management companies had developed marketing and sales capacities. 
Autonomous subsidiaries would listen to their clients, because the new entrepreneurial 
synthesis was to best target clients’ needs. And at the same time, some institutional agents 
could structure client relationship, by diffusing the Anglo-Saxon practices. Investment 
advisors, such as the Anglo-Saxon firms Frank Russell, Mercer, Watson Wyatt, and the 
French firms Fixage and Finance Arbitrage, could support the development of invitations to 
tenders. According to Mercer, there were 65 real invitation to tenders from institutional 
investors in 1996 and 118 in 1997 (MTF-L ’Agefi, 94, March 1998).
Moreover, these advisors would teach institutional investors the selection methods and 
encourage asset management companies to produce specific information to enable them to be 
selected. They also contributed to the development of auditable standards. For instance, Frank 
Russell developed its own ranking (the Russell institutional asset management universe) to 
compare the performance of 24 firms. This complemented the growing number of palmares, 
rankings and performance studies, from companies like Europerformance or Micropal. And 
other institutional agents, the so-called rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's, Fitch or 
the French firm AMR created in 1999, developed specific capacities dedicated to auditing, 
evaluating and comparing the performance of French asset management firms. Together these 
institutional agents contributed to the production and diffusion of analytical tools and more 
specifically performance and risk measurement instruments. As several interviewees 
explained to us, they were required to develop the capacities to produce specific information 
about their investment process and their performances. The following quote, from J-F, in 
charge of reporting in a major French competitor, illustrates the coercion process operated by 
these agents: if firms did not produce the information required they would not gain new 
contracts.
X X  is AIMR certified since March 1999. It was important to do the certification 
in order to respond to the transparency requirement of institutional clients, 
especially international ones, and some French ones too. We received two or 
three invitation to tenders last year saying ‘if you are not AIMR certified, do not 
reply!’
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The development of these new types of performance measurement ratios in turn reinforced 
the establishment of the new (Anglo-Saxon) practices; interaction had produced new routines.
As the professional review Option Finance underlined in September 1995, “the introduction 
of benchmarks has opened the way to the evolution of asset management techniques”. The 
benchmark, associated with specific performance measurement ratios (like the Sharpe ratio or 
the information ratio) allowed external clients and their advisors judging more precisely how 
well the asset manager was doing in comparison with the stock market. These ratios and other 
types of information, such as the questionnaires used in invitation to tenders, or any other 
indicators required by rating agencies, can broadly be called calculation tools (Miller and 
O’Leary, 1991, 1993). They make it possible to compare asset managers on a single scale, to 
evaluate them and to compare their performance against a standard (e.g. stock market indices, 
the practices of leading competitors etc). They provide the apparatus for performance to be 
monitored, analysed and ultimately reported to external parties (Power, 1997: 114). 
Furthermore, in the French case, these calculation tools could be used by external auditors to 
establish whether French asset management companies were conforming to the legitimate 
patterns of behaviour, in short to the Anglo-Saxon model. Investment advisors and rating 
agencies could use such calculation tools to investigate the patterns of behaviour of the 
French firms and to make sure that they were in line with the institutionalised myths (Meyer, 
1994; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), which in this case had become after 1996 those of the Anglo- 
Saxon business system.
In summary, the combination of calculation tools and institutional agents supported the 
production and re-production of the new routines taken from the Anglo-Saxon business 
system. On the one hand institutional agents pressed for auditable performance and they used 
the resulting calculation tools to compare the French patterns with the dominant 
institutionalised best practices, thus imposing new practices. On the other hand, calculation 
tools stimulated the production and re-production of new routines, which were opposed to 
those of the French model. In this process, we find support for the theories of Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) that reality is socially constructed as an objective reality through 
habitualisation and institutionalisation (70-80), and of Miller and O’Leary (1994), for whom 
new ways of organising require ideas, individuals and (accounting) practices to combine in a 
manufacturing space. And we also find support for Powell and DiMaggio (1983) and Meyer 
(1994), who recognise in rationalised environments the origins of formal organisations. 
Ultimately, this recursive process of structuration of the field resulted in some isomorphism in 
the French asset management industry: most firms adopted the Anglo-Saxon patterns of 
organisation and behaviour. The original interdependency of institutions and practices in the
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Anglo-Saxon model was applied to the development o f  a French asset management sub­
system. However, we observed in the previous chapter that the French model had not 
disappeared in the French economy, and that it survived in a section o f  the asset management 
field. The sustainability o f  the French asset management sub-system seem s related to its 
integration within trans-national networks.
3.3. Conclusion: differentiation between trans-national actors and 
French niche players?
To conclude our analysis, we have to take account o f  the evidence presented in the last 
chapter, that a fraction o f  the French asset management industry continued to operate the 
patterns o f  the French model. We have explained that the adoption o f  practices deviant to the 
French business system was possible because o f  the constitution o f  a new organisational field, 
where new rules applied. We also showed that certain institutional actors and calculation tools 
had supported the constitution o f  the new field and that they had oriented adaptation processes 
towards the Anglo-Saxon model. By noticing that these actors, together with the French 
companies adopting the new practices, were actually engaged in a trans-national market, we 
can understand why it was possible to have some differentiation within the French asset 
management industry.
A series o f  actors played a determining role in the story we just told o f  the transformation o f  
the French asset management industry. But we did not insist upon the importance o f  the fact 
that some o f  them were not operating only in France. The French firms that pioneered the 
adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model (Paribas, Indosuez, CCF, CDC, and A X A ) are heavily 
involved in international markets. Even though they are French companies, their structures, 
th^ir-employees and their organisation are in many respect trans-national. For instance, in 
1998 AXA Investment Managers developed a global matrix to manage its activities. 
'Specifically, this meant that for each function in the value chain there is one global 
competency. The investment process is identical for all countries where the company has 
subsidiaries (France, UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan and Hong Kong), even 
though a subsidiary in one country may be in charge o f  a specific product. For instance, the 
Japanese subsidiary supervises all funds invested in Japan, whereas the French one supervises 
all funds invested in France and so on. Some other horizontal tasks, for example relations to 
consultants, are managed across borders. The same is true o f  Societe Generale, which has 
shared resources with its British and Japanese subsidiaries, or o f  CCF, which uses the bottom- 
up analyses produced by Framlington throughout the company. Even CDC, which is still
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state-owned, developed in 1998 an integrated organisation with its subsidiaries in Germany, 
Luxembourg and the US (L ’Agefi, March 17, 1998). In other words, these French companies 
which initiated the move towards the Anglo-Saxon model have developed some trans-national 
capacities. The same is true on the other side o f  the spectrum.
British and American pension funds began to operate in France in the early 1990s. As such, 
they were in effect trans-national actors, because their investment horizons looked beyond 
their national borders. But the same was true o f  investment advisors, rating agencies, 
management consultants, lawyers, the Big Five and so on. All the various law merchants that 
supported these trans-national investors were themselves trans-national players (Dezalay,
1995). And with the single European market and the introduction o f  the euro, even regulators 
have taken an increasingly international dimension. The European Central Bank is a true 
federal institution, and we should not forget that the MAF law, the turning point in the 
constitution o f  the new field, originated in the European Commission, with its Investment 
Services Directive. In other words, some o f  the key actors that played a role in the 
constitution o f  asset management as a sub-system within the French system were actually part 
o f  broader trans-national networks. This observation may w ell complement our analysis o f  the 
striking difference between the asset management industry and the rest o f  the French business 
system. We may even suggest the hypothesis, that the sustainability o f  the French asset 
management as a deviant sub-system could be achieved because trans-national networks or 
practices were supporting it. Beccali (2001) develops a similar hypothesis, with a different 
methodology, in a comparative study o f  investment firms in Italy and the UK. Seen in such a 
perspective, the French asset management industry would have been able to sustain deviant 
patterns o f  organisation and behaviour within the French business system because o f  its 
inscription in a trans-national system (Sklair, 1991).
In conclusion, we have shown that there were different stages in the constitution o f  French 
asset management as a sub-system in which the Anglo-Saxon model was implemented. Far 
from contradicting the institutional perspective, our analysis actually complements it, by 
showing the mechanisms through which new practices and new institutions can emerge and 
establish them selves. The important lesson is the role o f  organisational field as dynamic 
components o f  business systems: new fields can be constituted in which agents and practices 
develop new routines, new institutions and new realities that eventually lead to isomorphic 
situations. Adaptation occurs continuously over time, but it does not develop smoothly. 
Admittedly, learning processes constantly produce and re-produce organisational routines. 
But those processes, which manipulate the environment and bring about change in the 
entrepreneurial synthesis or in the conception o f  control, require substantial power, and may
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not be completed without a field-wide adaptive upgrading. In other words, adaptation 
processes have to be related to the constitution of the organisational field in which firms 
operate. This leads us to conclude our analysis.
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS
In reaching the end of our journey, we try to spell out briefly the possible contribution of our 
research. We started from a generic question: in an integrating Europe, how do firms adapt to 
changes in their surrounding business system? This led us to focus on one case study, which 
proceeded in four stages:
1. problematisation and methodology (chapter I)
2. design of the hypotheses (chapter II) and of the theoretical framework (chapter III)
3. empirical investigation (chapters IV and V)
4. analysis of the adaptation processes (chapter VI and VII)
It appears therefore that our analyses largely focused on the case study, French asset 
management over the 1984-1999 period. In this concluding chapter, we will attempt to go 
back to the original problem and to evaluate what we can learn from the case study. Also, we 
will try to broaden our angle and to look forward towards the research agenda that would stem 
from the research.
1. Summary of the findings
In the thesis, we mainly addressed one area of literature: the institutional analysis of European 
business systems, meaning by that the various authors who consider economic action to be 
embedded within a societal context and who are interested in understanding national 
specificities. This area of literature gives credit to the role of institutions in shaping how 
economic agents behave, relate and are organised. It includes various groups of researchers 
with slightly different research agendas. Closest to our research, because they tend to have 
some organisational focus and to use sociological theories, are probably the scholars working 
around Whitley in EGOS, or ESF like Kristensen, Djelic, Mueller, Lane, Quack and Morgan; 
as well as the heirs of the Aix school around Maurice, Sorge, O’Reilly, and Berthelot. But 
other studies looking at models of capitalism should be mentioned, even though they tend to 
have a more macro focus and to refer more to economic or political theories: Hall and 
Soskice, Casper, Berger, Dore, Hancke, Hollingsworth, Crouch and Boyer, Hage. Altogether, 
there is a large and growing body of literature positing that economic behaviour is best 
understood in reference to its context, and that regular and distinctive patterns can be
247
observed in individual countries. We addressed this literature in reference to the problem of
^  nn integration ^nnd using organisational adaptation as a focus. And possibly we made
business systems, and we suggested some shortcomings in the present understanding o f these 
dynamics.
1.1. Methodology and analytical tools
In our attempt to analyse organisational adaptation in a given business system, we contributed 
to comparative methodology for the analysis of embedded economic action. We showed that 
dynamic processes are worth investigating, and that they can lead to a better understanding of 
international differences by revealing the internal links between national institutions and 
firms’ behaviour. Moreover, our treatment of the case study led us to develop analytical tools, 
which proved helpful in portraying the typical patterns of firms and their transformation.
1.1.1. Institutions matter
The first conclusion we draw is that our initial approach was appropriate: we verified that 
institutions matter and that they constrain actors’ behaviour. Simultaneously, we showed that 
the business system framework is both applicable and useful for any investigation of situated 
economic action.
Through the analysis of the French asset management industry, we confirmed the view 
sustained by the institutionalist approach that interdependencies exist between national 
institutions and firms’ economic organisation (Whitley, 1999: 47). Using the variables 
identified in the business system framework, we were able to identify typical patterns of 
organisation and behaviour in France in the mid-1980s, and in Britain and the USA. We were 
then able to relate them to the broader institutional context, and to show their striking mutual 
differences as well as their respective internal consistency. In each of our three layers of 
analysis {entrepreneurial synthesis, conception o f control and organisational routines) we 
found a coherent relation between asset management firms and their institutional setting. We 
were also able to establish that the resulting patterns were in line with previous studies 
conducted within the business system approach or societal school, regarding particularly the 
mode of financing, industrial relations and the labour market. In other words, our case study 
illustrated that distinctive forms of economic organisation are established in national 
institutional contexts, and in so doing it supported the business system concept and 
framework.
change, more precisely in reference to the persisting of national specificities in a context of
two contributions to it: we provided some analytical tools to analyse the internal dynamics of
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Admittedly, it is not so surprising that we were able to confirm the validity o f  an approach, 
which was our starting point: to some extent, this may be the natural result o f  our research 
design. But the importance o f  institutions was shown not only in the consistency o f  the 
models we formalised, but also in the concrete pressure felt by French firms as they faced a 
changing environment. We noticed in the thesis a time lag between the beginning o f  the 
changes and the adaptation by firms. More precisely, we saw that while solutions were 
advocated in the m id-1980s and that transformation was expected from then on, nothing 
happened until 1996. We showed that certain institutional conditions effectively prevented 
any radical change in the French model. Subsequently, we showed that before isomorphic 
behaviour could be established in the newly created asset management field other institutional 
mechanisms were needed, and in particular the political protection and policing o f  regulators, 
institutional agents and institutional tools. In other words, we not only showed the importance 
o f  institutions in terms o f  interdependency, but also as constraining and enabling factors. 
Consequently, we can say that by and large our findings confirmed the validity o f  the 
institutional approach, and the usefulness o f  the business system concept as an analytical tool 
for categorising econom ic action. We also complemented this framework, by insisting that 
dynamic processes are important and that they deserve further investigation.
1.1.2. Looking a t dynam ic processes is a valid methodological option
Our approach deliberately tried to avoid focusing on convergence or divergence between 
national economies. We wanted to escape from a methodological trap in which differences or 
similarities are exaggerated because o f  the format o f  the investigation. The solution we 
proposed in the thesis was to concentrate not on a static comparative picture, but to examine 
organisational adaptation as one key process within the dynamics o f  national business 
systems. And this m ethodology appeared a valid option.
The business system approach provided us with a useful framework by which to categorise 
national econom ies in a comparative perspective. But because we paid attention to 
transformation as well, we were able to notice the inherent tensions within business systems. 
Our analysis showed that w e should understand capitalist econom ies not as static and 
monolithic blocks but rather as constantly moving and dynamic entities, in which a number o f  
processes, including organisational adaptation, occur. Our focus on adaptation illustrated that 
even when the patterns o f  the business system do not vary, it is because they are reproduced 
over time by the actors o f  the field, and not because they do not change. In other words, the 
fact that national econom ies exhibit persisting differences could be apprehended not as a 
static and unproblematic stage but rather as a dynamic and problematic state o f  self-
reproduction. This methodological stance proved helpful in understanding how French firms 
changed their behaviour and organisation. In a longitudinal study, we found confirmation of 
what the societal school had argued in its comparative studies, that national specificities are 
revealed from the “construction” of “actors” and “spaces” (Maurice, 2000: 16). We then 
showed that this principle also illustrated how these same actors could lose their national 
specificities and construct new spaces, different from the dominant patterns of their business 
system. In other words, our methodological focus on dynamic processes has proved 
successful in the sense that it shone some interesting light on the mechanisms that can lead to 
stability and change among capitalist economies. But in the course of our investigation, we 
also developed some analytical tools.
1.1.3. Analytical tools
In this thesis, we spent some time developing analytical tools to understand organisational 
adaptation within the business system framework. These tools proved very useful in 
categorising the French model of asset management and its Anglo-Saxon counterpart, and in 
the subsequent analysis of the transformation of the French patterns in this industry.
One of our reservations concerning those approaches that focus on issues of convergence and 
divergence was that the methodologies used, by their very construction, drive analysis in the 
direction of supporting convergence or divergence. For that reason, we wanted to establish in
V
\  our investigation some kind of  grammar between clearly identified variables, in order to 
construct our objective reflexively. The methodological principle was one of a theory in 
practice, one where theoretical tools are specifically designed to help solve empirical 
problems. More precisely, our objective was to be able to monitor dynamic processes of 
adaptation and, at the same time, to fit this analysis within the general framework supplied by 
the business system perspective. This led us to build a framework, based on three analytical 
layers, that both comprehends all the activities of the firm and links its organisation to the 
surrounding environment.
The resulting definition states that the firm can be defined along three layers (entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception of control and organisational routines). The entrepreneurial synthesis is 
the reason for the firm to exist: it gives it its purpose and its value proposition as a response to 
the existing economic and societal environment; the entrepreneur forms a world-view about 
market inefficiencies and comes up with a synthesis in response. Once the entrepreneurial 
synthesis is formulated, a social space is open for individuals and practices to be organised in 
order to fulfil the goals set up by it. The conception o f control is the institutionalised 
rationality about how best to organise work in the firm in response to the entrepreneurial
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synthesis; it is also the source of the dominant coalition's authority and the foundation on 
which it grounds its legitimacy in the firm. Organisational routines, finally, are the 
programmes and practices that have to be remembered by the members of the firm to enable 
them to perform their assigned tasks in the conception of control and in relation to the 
entrepreneurial synthesis; they also participate in the external environment.
We showed that such a framework is a useful tool with which to analyse the patterns of 
economic behaviour of firms in a given business system. Not only do the entrepreneurial 
synthesis, conception of control and organisational routines provide a way to categorise 
situated economic action, but they also relate internal elements to their institutional 
environment. This enabled us to characterise organisational adaptation along four processes: 
change in the entrepreneurial synthesis, change in the conception of control, learning of new 
routines and manipulation of the environment. The first three processes were the natural 
consequence of our layered definition of the firm; they relate to changes inside the firm in 
order to better fit its economic and societal environment. The last one corresponds to all 
attempts by the firm to alter its environment according to its own priorities. In the analysis of 
the French asset management industry, we illustrated how these processes operated, which 
lead us to relate adaptation and the constitution of the organisational field. However, we also 
contributed to the literature by showing some of its shortcomings.
1.2. Refining the analysis of embedded economic action
The thesis not only offered a methodological contribution; it also provided some insights into 
the analysis of embedded economic action, and in particular into the processes that reproduce 
and alter the patterns of business systems. Our case study did not focus on convergence or 
divergence; instead it showed that a more fruitful understanding of economic action can be 
obtained by taking into account the constitution and structuration of new organisational fields. 
Only by looking at this intermediate level is it possible to grasp the complex mechanisms that 
sustain the perpetuation of business systems.
1.2.1. Neither convergence nor divergence
The main result from our thesis is that it argues against convergence and divergence research 
agendas. The complexity o f adaptation processes and the importance of the sectoral level 
make these focuses of analysis inappropriate. Even more, at the end of our journey, the 
concept of national business system has become problematic because it is not clear whether
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national spaces are consistent and stable or whether they become a mosaic of distinct 
organisational fields.
Our core empirical finding was that the French asset management industry at the launch of the 
euro looks very much like the Anglo-Saxon model. Admittedly there were some slight 
differences, but we argued that the similarities were very important indeed, and even 
sufficient for us to claim that French asset management firms had adopted the Anglo-Saxon 
model. This conclusion contradicted therefore the claim that business systems remain 
consistently distinctive in a context of economic change. More precisely, we did not establish 
any sort of convergence between national economies -we saw that France seems to retain 
most of its key features- but we argued that at the level of the organisational field, at the 
sectoral level, it was possible to find striking similarities across borders, between French and 
Anglo-Saxon firms. We therefore showed that within a national business system there could 
be some areas where firms behaved in a way notably different from the dominant patterns of 
the system. In other words, we discovered that in today’s integrating Europe there is a lot 
more complexity and contrast in terms of economic action than might have been 
acknowledged by the national business system approach, the models of capitalism approach 
and the societal approach. Nothing prevents the emergence and development of new practices 
within a national economy. Provided these practices can find a new social space to occupy, as 
well as promoters and institutional support, especially from trans-national players, they can 
establish themselves firmly and eventually be routinised and institutionalised as a new sub­
system. This claim was made by Mueller (1994), for instance. And it is something we can 
observe every day in our societies: China Town, the underground world, the Mafia and the 
jails are many examples of social spaces which not only function differently from the 
dominant culture but also function effectively.
Moreover, we showed that there is no mechanical interdependency between institutions and 
firms’ practices, no straightforward relationship. We showed how deeply political were both 
the reproduction of the French model and the subsequent departure from the dominant 
patterns. If institutions are to have an impact on economic action, they have to be fought over 
and legitimated by powerful actors; they need to be part of the same social space and to be 
constitutive of its structure, rules and routines. In other words, we showed that the business 
system concept, even though it is a valid analytical tool, is not satisfactory as a theory. The 
concept of system has become problematic in our study, because at the end of our 
investigation it is not clear where the appropriate boundaries of the French business system 
are. We showed that it was not enough to consider any business system as a given and stable 
entity, and that it was necessary to explain why and how institutions influence economic
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behaviour. The matrices provided by Whitley (1990, 1995, 1999) may be valid analytical 
tools, but they show only correlations. They do not demonstrate how these correlations work 
and how they might be put to the test. Our case study showed is that it is necessary to look 
carefully at how organisational fields structure themselves and become rationalised.
In summary, our thesis has provided some problematic insights about the coherence of 
national business systemSJalking about convergence or divergence does not seem appropriate 
any more, because it implies the risk of misrepresenting national economies, and of 
categorising them in abstract models that miss the internal tension within national spaces. 
Instead, a more fruitful insight should be about how business system remain national or not.
1.2.2 Theorising change in the business system perspective
What makes the case study also interesting is that it resulted in some change, in some 
departure from the French model. Our investigation discovered a business that operated 
differently from the rest of the economy and one that had to break free from institutional 
interdependency. If we look back at the transformation of the French asset management 
industry, we can furthermore identify some of the elements that made change possible, and 
theorise change in the business system perspective. We adopted the perspective of Glaser and 
Strauss that empirical studies aimed at producing theories; it seemed natural to now attempt 
generalising from our case.
We showed that the transformation of the French asset management industry was not easy to 
obtain, and that it was not so much a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon model as the 
internally generated constitution of a new organisational field. Even though challenges to the 
French model were mounting already in the 1980s, it was only after some special effort that 
the processes of adaptation could eventually apply to the whole industry in the direction of 
adopting new ways of organising. Until 1996, institutional interdependencies preventedvfrorrr-  
any departure from the French typical patterns of organisation and behaviour. We showed that 
firms could deviate from these institutional constraints when they found some shelter against 
French dominant institutions. The key element in our story was the constitution of asset 
management as a new organisational field. In 1996, it was recognised to be different from 
banking and insurance. Consequently, it was established in a virgin space and fitted with new 
rules and routines that could differ from the French patterns. Admittedly, the space was 
actually conquered against other sectors/professions. But we can formulate some theoretical 
intuitions about it: new practices can be implemented in new horizons and new frontiers
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because institutional constraints are lower there; change can be obtained by opening up new 
spaces. Such a proposition would very well apply to what used to be called the N ew  
Economy, where new business models have been invented outside existing frameworks.
At the same time, w e showed that French asset management could have returned to the old 
model, without strong support o f  the COB and subsequent implementation by other 
institutional agents and calculation tools. A second theoretical intuition is therefore that new  
practices need being sheltered further and routinised in order not to be reversed by the pre­
existing institutions. Shelter may com e from trans-national networks, we identified in the 
French case. Such a proposition would well apply to Eastern European countries, and explain 
why free market principles and the rule o f  law are so unevenly spread.
A second elem ent that could lead to further theorising is the path followed towards change. 
We showed that it was no straightforward generalisation o f  a one-best-way. On the contrary, 
it was through a reflexive process emanating from French actors themselves. More precisely, 
it was stimulated by a group o f  individuals and subsequently endorsed by the State and by 
professionals. The result was a radical alteration o f  the patterns o f  organisation and behaviour. 
At the same time, w e noticed that all firms had incrementally learned new routines. This leads 
to another theoretical proposition: radical change requires some mobilisation among groups o f  
individuals, learning is possible without it. Finally, if  we look at the path followed by French 
asset management firms towards change and the adoption o f  the Anglo-Saxon model, w e have 
to recognise that it follow ed a very French trajectory: collusion between elites and the State. 
This leaves us with a final theoretical proposition: to be successful, change needs to follow  a 
path that is in line with the existing structures o f  the business system.
To summarise, our case study suggests some theoretical propositions about change within the 
business system perspective. This corresponds to a list o f  conditions for change to be 
successfully implemented:
1. while incremental learning is relatively unproblematic, radical change is p ossib le  o n ly  as 
far as it is  em b ed d ed  in  the constitu tion  o f  a n ew  organisational fie ld
2. to be sustainable, radical change -a s  deviant behaviour- requires shelter from powerful 
institutions
3. radical change requires mobilisation from groups o f  individuals
4. to be successful, the path towards change needs adopting a trajectory that fits with the 
existing structures o f  the business system
(a-Vu ^ /u
Admittedly, these theoretical propositions are simple and even almost tautological; but they 
seem intuitively valid, and are testable, which could lead to further research. They may 
therefore be used as the basis for subsequent investigations.
1.2.3. Organisational adaptation
Finally, our case study also demonstrated how organisational adaptation operates. Three 
elements are worth noticing: first the various degrees of adaptation, secondly the combination 
of cognitive and political elements, thirdly, the mechanics o f elite replacement.
First of all, our study of the French asset management industry showed that adaptation goes at 
various speeds. Firms constantly learn new organisational routines'.; but under specific 
circumstances there may be more radical change, involving their entrepreneurial synthesis or 
conception o f control. The degree of adaptation is not constant; it varies with the intensity of 
pressure towards change. More precisely, radical change is difficult to achieve, as we 
underlined in the 1984-1996 period, when identifying a series o f mechanisms that effectively 
prevented firms from departing from the French model. Individual firms may develop their 
own deviant practices, but for these to be observed across a population of firms, there is a 
need for a structured and rationalised organisational field. We showed that adaptation was 
related to some co-evolution between firms and their surroundings. Their adaptation processes 
were not alien to the institutionalisation and structuration of new practices; on the contrary, 
they appeared to be driven by such developments. Adaptation goes therefore at various speeds 
and to grasp the degrees of adaptation, it is important to take into account not only individual 
firms but also the whole field in which they operate. Some processes are more radical than 
others. For instance, learning is a continuous process, while a change in the conception o f  
control and even more a change in the entrepreneurial synthesis will be rare and will relate to 
some kind of crisis within the firm. But even in the case of learning, several degrees exist 
between single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978).
Secondly, our analyses revealed that organisational adaptation operates along two dimensions 
that are not mutually independent: a cognitive and a political one. This was particularly 
apparent in our careful monitoring of the various processes that lead to the constitution of 
asset management as a new organisational field. We showed that actors problematised the 
changes in their environment and came up with solutions to adapt asset management firms; 
we also showed that these solutions were not immediately implemented but had to be battled 
through. Such findings are echoed in the organisational literature. The cognitive dimension is
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present in all adaptation processes, because it relates to the perception that actors make of 
their environment (Argyris, 1985; Weick, 1979). Learning, in particular, is almost purely a 
cognitive process. But even then, one should notice that political dimensions interfere. This is 
illustrated by the resistance to change that may be found in any attempt to foster 
organisational learning (Senge, 1995; Argyris, 1999). The political dimension is clear in the 
change of the conception o f control, since it corresponds to the confrontation between rival 
propositions about how to best organise the firm. But it also exists for the entrepreneurial 
synthesis: business partners, such as shareholders, banks, suppliers or clients exert pressure 
that contributes to changing the entrepreneurial synthesis by influencing the goals it should 
aim at (Mintzberg, 1983). Cognitive and political dimensions interlock and display different 
degrees of strength; this is all part of the complexity of organisational adaptation. Adaptation 
does not proceed smoothly, nor in a linear way; it fluctuates considerably, between small 
incremental evolutions and large crises that reshape the firm radically. Changes in the 
environment have first to be perceived and understood by the members of the organisational 
field (Miller, 1991; Weick, 1979, 1995). This leads to the production of new business recipes 
(Whitley, 1992) and to the development of new routines (Argyris, 1999; Nelson and Winter, 
1982). But it is not certain that these will be integrated immediately by the firm, without 
political struggle and without resistance. The complexity of the process requires therefore a 
particular treatment, and the use of a multi-layered definition of the firm is here again 
particularly useful, since it allows us to make distinctions between various families of 
influences.
The third element that we identified in the adaptation process relates to the links between the 
dominant coalition in the organisation and the conception o f  control in place. We showed that 
when a new conception of control was established in French asset management firms, 
hierarchy and control was substantially altered; the dominant position of the fund managers 
was replaced by the one of top managers seconded by controllers and sales people. 
Interestingly, this mechanism can be related to the model of elite replacement developed by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), which is dissimilar only in so far as it gives dependency as the 
only mechanism of institutionalisation. Pfeffer and Salancik explain that the removal and 
selection of top administrators is affected by the organisation’s context (1978: 228). New 
environmental conditions, in their view, impact on the distribution of power and control 
within the organisation, because those possessing key resources will have more power. New 
situations of dependence will lead to a new distribution of power that will lead in return to a 
selection of new executives. The perspective presented here follows and encompasses the 
resource-dependence model, by recognising that dependency is only one way to understand
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organisational legitimacy.50 In fact, the conception o f control, because it is a script about how 
to organise optimally, contains a specification of which resources are more necessary than 
others. Without a conception o f control specifying which resources are more important, it is 
impossible to establish dependency. Dependency is only an expression of the conception o f 
control. And the model of elite succession is applicable within the perspective adopted here: a 
new conception o f control (which integrates a new hierarchy of resource-dependency) will 
lead to a new ruling coalition. Again, such a conclusion is relatively simple and almost 
tautological -given the definition of the conception o f control- but it provides a theoretical 
proposition for the analysis of elite replacement.
2. Return to the general problem
We have now clarified the potential contribution of the thesis: a methodological contribution 
to the analysis of situated economic action and a contribution to the analysis of adaptation and 
change within the business system perspective. All these conclusions result from our case 
study, French asset management, over the period 1984-1999, which we hoped would enable us 
to make some analytical generalisations. It is now time to try and go back to the generic 
problem that made us choose and design the case: how European business systems confront 
societal change. What lessons can we then draw from the case study? Is national 
distinctiveness disappearing? Is negative integration sufficient to lead towards an integrated 
European business system? What can we say about France and potentially about other 
European states?
2.1. Politics of globalisation
The case study was selected because it represented a sector that had been submitted to 
accelerated change and where national specificities were remarkable. We found that asset 
management firms, by and large, had adopted the Anglo-Saxon model and departed from the 
French model, apart from a minority of small companies. These findings, together with the 
path of adaptation processes leave us with two problematic insights about our general 
question, about how European business systems confront societal change. First, we have
50 The problem with the resource-dependence model is lhat it takes the detection of dependencies for granted, as if 
it was easy to know what the firm needs most. This evacuates the cognitive problem of identifying which resources 
are most necessary to the success of the firm.
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found increased complexity and increased uncertainty towards the transformation of national 
capitalisms, in rebuttal to the convergence/divergence agenda. Secondly, we have identified a 
tension in the globalisation process that makes it eminently political and echoes recent events 
of unrest and disorder.
The story we just told did not follow a smooth path; French asset management did not change 
without fighting and resistance, without individuals mobilising and powerful institutions 
threatening. At one point, it seemed that national interdependency would prevent change. 
Soon after, the sector was escaping from the French model and integrating within trans­
national spaces and practices. In front of societal change, and especially one that comes from 
outside, national business systems appear relatively unpredictable. It seems difficult to 
reconcile the story we told without mentioning historical contingencies, without recognising 
 ^ French peculiarities and specificities. Change in France was possible because of the particular 
fabric of French elite: once the State convinced, there were no remaining strong opponents, 
capable of resisting the move. We found individuals, coalitions, cognitive sense making and . 
power games; we did not find a grand principle leading to convergence or divergence. We 
found rich contextual factors, triggering events and casual combinations, and not the easy 
adoption of universal best practices. This can be generalised when we think about 
globalisation. What the thesis tells us is that we should not take globalisation for granted, nor 
that it will proceed in a predictable way. Societal change and globalisation stimulate national 
business systems; they put pressure on firms and institutions and require adaptation to occur. 
But the outcome is not self-evident; it will result from the internally generated practices that 
actors develop in their local and situated environment. In rebuttal to all-encompassing 
theories, the thesis advocates caution about the potential outcome from globalisation and 
societal change: stimulation and change there may be, but whatever happens will be related to 
some peculiar context and contingencies.
The second element relates to the political nature of the transformation observed. We showed 
that change was not spontaneous and that it required the support of powerful institutions, 
which could shelter deviant behaviour and diminish resistance to the adoption o f new 
patterns. In other words, the thesis is an indication that we should recognise the ideological 
nature of the globalisation agenda. Globalisation is not irresistible; national institutions will 
 ^ not change unless actors make them change. Governments should not pretend that it is beyond 
their control and that changes linked to the opening of national systems will self-impose on 
their constituencies. Recent events of protests and demonstration at various international 
meetings are one illustration that globalisation is a political question, not a process that will 
naturally take over national specificities. For globalisation to take place, it needs specific
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institutions to be installed in the national fabric, it needs structuration of the organisational 
field. All this requires important political entrepreneurship and contest as examples from 
developing countries or from Eastern Europe illustrate. Whether national distinctiveness 
disappears or not is therefore a political question: from our research we can say that sectors 
can display similar patterns across borders, provided the actors of the field want it. 
Globalisation is not a spontaneous and irresistible process: it is stimulated by trans-national 
actors but embraced by national and local agents. When politicians blame globalisation, we 
ought to acknowledge that they are actually blaming their own acceptance o f it.
2.2. Trans-national spaces and European integration
In the introduction to the thesis, we explained that our research question was interesting also 
because it explored whether negative integration -  measures increasing market integration by 
eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of competition- was sufficient to foster 
some unified European business system. However, looking back at our case study, we can say 
that the key development that led to change in the French asset management industry was 
/  rather the production of new laws and new institutions, hence positive integration. For that 
reason, the thesis indicates that building a unified European business system requires more 
than negative integration, it requires building cross-border spaces of common practices, as can 
also be illustrated from European multinationals.
Our story about French asset management industry clearly showed a two-stage transformation 
process: before 1996 and despite de-regulation, increased competition and
internationalisation, firms continued to reproduce the French model. After the constitution of 
asset management as a separate organisational field, distinct from banking and insurance, it 
was possible for new practices to be implemented and for adaptation processes to take place. 
The thesis showed that these new patterns were inscribed in common European regulation 
(European investment services directive) as well as in the production of new rules and 
professional codes of conduct (La Martiniere report). It also showed that some regulatory 
bodies (the COB in particular, but also Paris commercial court) had to enforce the new rules 
of the game. In other words, even though stimulation towards change was generated from 
outside agents, like foreign competitors and clients, as a consequence of ‘negative 
integration’, the actual move towards new (trans-national) practices was the product of some 
‘positive integration’ mechanisms, and notably law making and political enforcement. This 
seems to indicate that negative integration will on its own not be sufficient to promote a
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European business system. For this to happen, it would be necessary to build and sustain new  
institutional arrangements. And it is not obvious that multinational companies on their own 
would have the means to develop and sustain some integrated European business system.
Here we may briefly refer to a survey conducted in January 1999 among 45 corporate partners 
o f  the Community o f  European Management Schools. This survey, which looked at human 
resource management issues and obtained a 69% return rate, was later complemented by a 
workshop involving 42 people from business and academia, held in Copenhagen in December
1999. Two major conclusions emerged from the study. First it showed that Europe was not 
isolated from the rest o f  the world in terms o f  management practices; there was no such thing 
as a European business system that stopped at the borders o f  the EU and contained distinctive
patterns (Kleiner, 1999b). Then it showed some convincingly similar practices between the 
companies in terms o f  international human resource management (Kleiner and Durand, 2000). 
This confirmed other findings that British and German manufacturing industries had started to 
display the same best practices (Kirchmaier and Owen, 2000). Even though more evidence is 
needed, there are therefore increasing signs that multinationals are using the same practices 
across borders (Morgan, 2001), and that these are not confined either to the national or the 
European Union level. We may therefore anticipate that not only in asset management but 
also in other industries, multinational companies will adopt the same (trans-national) kind o f  
practices, those which best suit their sectoral requirements. However, from what we saw in 
the French case, we may also expect that the path towards adopting this trans-national 
practices will be neither smooth nor unproblematic. On the contrary, it is likely to be very 
contingent upon national and sectoral conditions.
2.3. N ational business system s: differentiation and contagion
Lastly, we may try to use our case study to draw more general conclusions about national 
business systems. We focused on just one sector o f  the French economy. What can we learn 
about France as a whole? What does it tell us about other countries? Two elements are worth 
mentioning: first the issue o f  differentiation within nation-states, and secondly, the potential 
contagion o f  larger parts o f  the business system.
In the French case, we saw that it was possible for one sector to operate in ways radically 
different from the dominant national patterns. The French asset management industry actually 
became differentiated, between on the one hand smaller players reproducing the French 
model and on the other those that had embraced the Anglo-Saxon model. We were not able to
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explore in full how these two segments related to each other, but we had som e insights, to the 
effect that each had its internal consistency and that they did not target the same types o f  
clients. This differentiation within one national economy, between firms, which still adhere to 
national patterns and others, who have adopted foreign and/or trans-national patterns, leads to 
another hypothesis about persisting national distinctiveness. We could foresee a differentiated 
world, in which boundaries are not in the first place national, but rather horizontal. Different 
layers would be observed across countriesTandT^chTSyer would relate to a series o f  identified 
social stratifications. One layer would be made up o f  trans-national practices, institutions and 
actors such as the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and global 
professional firms and companies; these would largely ignore the national dimension because 
their field would be constituted across national borders. Another layer would be made up o f  
the various local levels, regions, sectors, towns and communities, which would have built 
their own logic, their own rules and behaviours, sheltered from national influence. The 
remaining layer would be made up o f  the remaining parts o f  the national business system, 
linked to the last elements o f  national sovereignty. Here we would expect the core institutions 
to nurture the few  sectors, industries and practices that best fit national specificities (Best, 
1990: 145; Mueller, 1994). National distinctiveness would therefore survive, but in a limited 
arena, one in which national interdependency was strongest and was reflexively regarded as 
the best alternative, in the face o f  trans-national and local competition. In other words, the 
national level would not be the natural level o f  analysis, but only one among others, and in 
opposition to others. O f course such levels would not operate independently from one 
another; they would however display distinct logics, rules and structures. The recent projects 
about a possible constitution o f  the European Union, on the basis o f  delimitation o f  powers 
between the European, national and regional levels, would represent the platform o f  such a 
model. However, differentiation within nation-states, as observed in the French case, entails 
the risk o f  losing sufficient basis for legitimacy, as is already the case at the level o f  the 
European Union. This leads to a subsequent problem: how to govern a national space that has 
become differentiated? How to build political legitimacy over citizens you do not in effect 
rule? We had underlined that European integration was not an automatic process resulting 
from deregulation; w e now see that it also includes problems o f  governance and constituency.
The second conclusion we may reach from our study regarding national business systen£> 
regards the impact o f  the transformation o f  one sector on the whole business system. N ow  in 
France, there is a full-functioning asset management industry, similar to what happens in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. It means that investment is managed according to specific rules, using 
calculation tools and reporting, applying codes o f  conduct and performance measurement 
standards. Admittedly, these rules are specific to the asset management business; but these
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firms also have relations with many customers, clients and with listed companies. This leads 
us to suggesjj^  that just like asset management was structured as a new organisational field, 
after confrontation with practices from England and America, this business could itself then 
trigger up subsequent contagion in the French business system. An area where the contagion 
of the French business system to the Anglo-Saxon model is already recognised regards 
corporate governance. It seems that in the very recent period, France has converted to an 
outsider model of corporate governance, similar to the Anglo-Saxon one, but that French 
firms’ innovation strategy is still affected by previous specialisations in the ‘dirigisf years of 
the late 1970s, early 1980s (Goyer, forthcoming). In other words, the contagion from asset 
management to other areas of the business system appears possible but once again is not a 
straightforward process. As we described for asset management, the same cognitive and 
political processes are to be expected in the adaptation of firms and the outcome can not be 
taken for granted. France will certainly not become a copycat of America of Britain; it is 
however taking up some key features of their business system, and contagion from the 
financial sector is already having an impact. Large French firms, such as Vivendi-Universal, 
have already embraced the Anglo-Saxon model. But the French state is also proving capable 
of re-defining and perpetuating its role with less direct intervention and more structural 
regulation, as illustrated in recent development in labour law (35-hour-week, employee 
consultation), corporate governance (transparency and control regarding stock options) or 
anti-trust (state aid to Credit Lyonnais, international expansion of EDF, prevention of Coca- 
Cola/Orangina merger). By comparison, such developments are unlikely to happen in 
Germany. Given the importance of intermediary levels, such as the trade unions, works 
councils, Lander, trade associations etc., it is not surprising that Germany seems so far to be 
blocked in its attempted reforms. Our analyses showed that any change required substantial 
efforts and political opposition to establish new rules of the game. With multiple level 
negotiation, it is necessarily more difficult to impose some radical move. There are 
indications that capital market pressures are having some impact (Vitols, 2000). But our thesis 
would expect it to be more difficult for Germany to change radically, because of its 
decentralised institutions.
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3. A research agenda
At the end o f  this thesis, we can see two areas where subsequent research would be needed to 
continue and complement the small initial step conducted in this project.
First, it appears necessary to use a similar method to gather more evidence about 
organisational adaptation and to test the conclusions o f  this thesis. A first step would be to 
look at the asset management industry in other European countries, in particular Germany, 
Luxembourg and Italy, which are also large markets. It would be interesting to establish 
whether the Anglo-Saxon model has also been adopted there, and if  so then how this 
happened. The hypothesis to be tested would be whether a new organisational field has been 
constituted and how. After looking at the asset management industry in other countries, the 
research agenda should include similar investigations, but in other sectors, the objective every 
time being to pay attention to the various elements that contribute to the structuration o f  social 
spaces. Interesting topics could be the Eastern European countries, where it would be 
important to find out how the principles governing the market econom y were implemented, 
and the resulting impact on patterns o f  organisation and behaviour. Another interesting area 
might be the analysis o f  new public management programmes, and the attempts at reform 
within the public sector. lATtoTrx^ ? jj
In parallel with this investigative agenda, the thesis suggests a broad theoretical agenda. It 
would concern the various elements and processes that constitute organisational fields. We 
identified institutional agents and calculation tools as important elements. But more generally, 
what makes a social space? What are the conditions under which actors and practices can 
constitute institutional arrangements? A research agenda could use the material above to test 
whether the constitution and structuration o f  social spaces is the foundation o f  the 
development and stability o f  society. This could fuel a theory o f  what might be called 
institutional ecology, which would examine how new institutional arrangements are produced 
and re-produced by agents over time and how they fade away.
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Fund manager
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duration lh35
4 place Vendome 
Paris
David Marsh 
Head o f  Research
Flemings 11 December 1998, 
10:00; duration: lh
25 Cofthall Avenue, 
London
St6phane Girardot 
Marketing manager
Fleming Asset
Management
France
8 June 1999, 9:00; 
duration 50 min.
39:41 rue Cambon 
Paris
Philippe Delaby 
Head o f  the asset 
management division
GAN 30 June 1999,11:00; 
duration: 25 min.
on the phone
Christophe Beauvilain 
Vice-President Asset 
Management
Goldman Sachs 17 November 1999, 
12:30; duration lh30
Bank restaurant
Aldwych
London
Paul Guidone 
Chief Executive
HSBC Asset 
Management
4 February 1999, 
10:00; duration 45 
min.
6 Bevis marks, 
London
Pierre-Henri de la Porte du
Theil
Director
Indocam 28 May 1999,11:00; 
duration: lh05
90 Boulevard Pasteur 
Paris
Thierry Coste 
C hief Executive
Indocam 2 June 1999,17:30; 
duration lhlO
90 Boulevard Pasteur 
Paris
Joseph Ass6mat-
Tessandier
Partner
Lazard Fr£res 
Gestion
14 September 1999, 
15:00; duration 45 
min
10 avenue Percier 
Paris
Yves Bazin De Jessey 
Fund manager
Lazard Freres 
Gestion
2 September 1999, 
16:00; lh
10 avenue Percier 
Paris
Mitchel Shivers 
Managing Director o f  
EMU Project
Merril Lynch 12 January 1999,
11:00; duration 40  
min.
25 Ropemaker Place 
London
Richard Bronk Merril Lynch 11 December 1998, 
18:00; duration 55 
min
CafS Amici
Aldwych
London
Jean-Philippe Tasl£ 
d’Heliand 
Chief Executive
ODDO Asset 
Management
1st December 2000, 
14:45; duration 45 
min.
14 Bid de la
Madeleine
Paris
Alain Leclair 
Vice-President 
(also president o f  AFG- 
Asffi)
Paribas Asset 
Management
2 July 1999 ; 161130- 
duration 50 min
31 rue de Miromesnil 
Paris
Jean-Luc Bordeyne 
Human Resource Manager
Paribas Asset 
Management
3 June, 15 :00 ; 
duration lh
3 rue d’Antin 
Paris
Alain Emewein
Head o f  relationships with
professional associations
SGAM 26 May 1999, 10:00; 
duration lh
Tour E lf  
La Defense
Jean-Fran^ois Piofret 
Head o f  Human Resources
SGAM 26 May 1999,17:00; 
duration lh l5
Tour E lf  
La Defense
Jean-Fran^ois. Hirschel, 
SGAM
SGAM 25 June 1999,9:00; 
duration lh
Tour E lf  
La Defense
Bernard Camblain 
C hief Executive
Sogip Banque 31 March 1999,
11:00; duration lh20; 
11 June 1999,10:00; 
duration lh
5 avenue Percier 
Paris
Didier Bouvignies, 
Chief investment officer
Victoire AM 29 June 1999, 15:30; 
duration lh l5
28 rue P6pini6re 
Paris
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Professional associations and public authorities
N a m e an d  t itle O rg a n isa tio n D a te , t im e  an d  
d u ration
P la c e
Eric Pagniez 
International matters
AFG-Asffi 12 May, 11:00; 
duration lh
31 rue de Miromesnil 
Paris
Pierre Bollon 
General Secretary
AFG-Asffi 30 May 1999,10 :00 
duration lh05
31 rue de Miromesnil 
Paris
M. Chesneau 
General Secretary
AGIRC 22 September 1999, 
16:00; duration lh05
4 rue Leroux 
Paris
Pierre de Massy 
Head o f  Social Matters
Association 
Fran?aise des 
Banques
26 April 1999,
15 :00 ; duration 
1 hi 5
18 rue Lafayette 
Paris
Alison Michell 
Advisor
Association o f  
Unit trusts and 
Investment 
Funds
11 February 1999,
10h30; duration 1 h 15
65 Kingsway 
London
Pierre-Henri Cassou 
General Secretary
Banque de 
France
4 May 1999, 18:00; 
duration: lh20
2 rue de Radzivill 
Paris
Amaud Jean
Unionist, delegate for the 
banking sector
CFDT 27 May 1999, 14:30; 
duration 30 min.
on the phone
Francois Delooz 
Director, Savings and 
Investment
Commission des 
Operations de 
Bourse
1st December 2000, 
16h30; duration lh35
17 place de la Bourse 
Paris
Herv6 Carr6 
Director, DG Economic 
and Monetary Affairs
European
Commission
6 January 1999, 1 lh; 
duration 45 min.
Avenue de Beaulieu 
Bruxelles
Gianluigi Campogrande, 
head o f  unit C -l, DG 
Internal Market
European
Commission
6 January 1999, 
17:00, duration: 35 
min.
A v de Cortenberg 
n°107.
Bruxelles
Jos6 Fombellida-Prieto 
Head o f  unit investment 
products, DG Internal 
Market
European
Commission
6 January 1999, 
16:00, duration : lh  
35
A v de Cortenberg 
n°107.
Bruxelles
Consultants, finance professionals
N a m e an d  t itle O rg a n isa tio n D a te , t im e  and  
d u ration
P la c e
Thierry Saintot 
Consultant
AMR 3 September 1999; 
16:00; duration l h l 5
17 rue Banque 
Paris
Jerome Thoenig 
Consultant
Artech 21 April 1999, 17:00; 
duration lh  30; 31 
May 1999, 15:00; 
duration lh
21 avenue Victor
Hugo
Paris
Gdrard de La Martintere 
Global General Director
AXA Group 3 June 1999, 16:00; 
duration 50 min.
23 avenue Matignon 
Paris
Jean-Jacques Bonnaud 
Advisor to the CEO 
(former chief executive o f  
GAN)
Caisse des 
Depots et 
Consignations
1 June 1999, 9h30; 
duration 2 h
282 Boulevard Saint
Germain
Paris
Jean de Flassieu 
former CEO
Credit Lyonnais 13 April 1999, 17:00; 
duration lh20
27 rue de Choiseul 
Paris
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Jean-Claude Betb^ze 
Head o f  strategy
Credit Lyonnais 12 May 1999,7:30; 
duration lh
81 rue de Richelieu 
Paris
Jean-Yves Rossignol 
Strategy analyst
Credit Lyonnais 18 May 1999, 17:30; 
duration lh
81 rue de Richelieu 
Paris
Martin Cooper 
Manager, division 
financial services
Deloitte & 
Touche 
Management 
Consulting
23 February 1999, 
10:00; duration 40  
min.
1 Stonecutter Court, 
London
Daniel Toumier Egon Zehnder 27 April 1999, 
15:00 ; duration 50 
min
12 av Georges V 
Paris
Gonzague Poirier- 
Coutansais 
Chief Executive
Eurosearch
Consultants
21 April 1999, 9:30; 
duration lh40
103 rue La Boetie 
Paris
Laurent Roussel 
Financial analyst
Exane 4 May 1999; 15:00; 
duration 55 min
16 avenue Matignon 
Paris
Antoine Briant 
Chief Executive
Finance
Arbitrage
23 June 1999, 18:30 ; 
duration lh l5
19 rue Vivienne 
Paris
Michel Piermay 
Chief Executive
Fixage 10 June 1999, 10:00; 
duration lh
10 av Myron-T-
Herrick
Paris
Dominique Dorlipo 
Consultant
Frank Russell 
Company
24 August 1999, 
10:30; duration lh
6 rue Christophe
Colomb
Paris
Michel Louvet 
Analyst, mutual funds
IBCA Fitch 30 August 1999; 
16:00; duration 25 
min
(on the phone)
Mr. Schultze, Consultant KPMG
Luxembourg
5 January 1999, 
10 :00 ; duration 
lh05
31 A116e Scheffer 
Luxembourg
Isabelle Gourmelon et 
Laure Pautel
Editors, asset management 
supplements
L’Agefi 10 May 1999, 12:00; 
duration lh40
Gallopin, rue Notre 
Dame des Victoires 
Paris
David Newton, 
Partner, in charge o f  
financial services
PriceWaterhouse
Coopers
29 January 1999, 
15:00; duration lh20
Southwark Tower
n°32
London
Jacques Felousa 
Head-hunter, financial 
services
Progress 30 June 1999,14:45; 
duration 30 min.
(on the phone)
Olivier Godechot 
Human Resource
Soci&d G6n6rale 23 August 2000, 
14:30; lh20
Jardins de l ’Ecole des 
Mines, Bid St 
Germain 
Paris
Dominique Potiron 
Head-hunter, financial 
services
Spencer Stuart 29 May 1999, 10:30; 
duration 25 min.
(on the phone)
Robert Devil le 
Chief Executive
Watson Wyatt 
Paris
9 June 1999,17:30; 
duration 50 min
26 rue pepiniere 
Paris
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